Two facts about Russell's Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* have gone largely unnoticed. One is that there exist two versions of that Introduction. The other, more important, concerns the variants between the two versions. It is well known that Wittgenstein felt that Russell's original Introduction revealed he had misunderstood his views. There are important additions and revisions in the second version about the notion of a logically perfect language which Russell may have included as a result of Wittgenstein's charges. Do these changes correct Russell's original views in some way? In what follows I wish to draw attention to the evidence that can illumine these issues.

Neither a manuscript nor a typescript of Russell's Introduction to the *Tractatus* is known to be extant. In 1952 G.H. von Wright saw in Gmunden a typescript of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* having attached to it a typescript of Russell's Introduction. These typescripts are missing.

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My thanks are due to the Russell Archives for providing a Xerox copy of the German Introduction. I also want to thank K. Blackwell, B.F. McGuinness and Dr. G.P. Baker for their kind help and for the valuable suggestions they have made to improve the paper. H. Rikhof and Mrs. H. Duncombe patiently helped with the German.
now.

The Engelmann typescript of the Tractatus, now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, is the typescript that Wittgenstein must have sent Russell from the prison camp in 1919, and is the same typescript that Russell had while writing the Introduction in 1920. The Engelmann typescript contains various modifications in Russell's handwriting. One of them (on p. 57: "Notes on [p, q, n, n]"—about 8 lines) occurs in the printed Introduction in almost the same form. From the Engelmann typescript the first publication of the "Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung" took place. It appeared in the final issue of Wilhem Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie in Autumn 1921. This edition contains a translation in German of Russell's Introduction, which had been originally written in English. In November 1922 the "Abhandlung" was published in London under the title Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, edited by C.K. Ogden and published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. In this edition Wittgenstein's text, both in German and English, was preceded by an Introduction in English by Bertrand Russell.

A detailed comparison between the two versions of Russell's Introductions—the German as it appears in the Annalen, and the English of 1922—discloses certain variants of importance. I propose to lay them bare. Before collating the two versions of the Introduction some notes of historical interest will be given.

Historical Notes

The history of Russell's Introduction to the Tractatus begins in mid-December 1919 at the Hague where Russell and Wittgenstein met. This meeting was first proposed by Wittgenstein to Russell in a letter from the Italian prison camp dated 13 August 1919. The meeting had a twofold purpose in view: that Russell should be enabled to understand the content of Wittgenstein's book by having it explained to him, since in his first reading he had not got hold of the main contention (cf. Letters to Russell, p. 71), and that some way of getting the treatise published should be found. Wittgenstein had contacted various publishers, but they did not want to take the risk of publishing a book without a sure market. He sought help from Russell: "If only you were able to come to the Hague! ... The difficulties with my book have started up again. No body wants to publish it. Do you remember how you were always pressing me to publish something? And now when I should like to, it can't be managed. The devil take it!"

Since the "Abhandlung" as published in the Annalen has not been widely available, there are authors and commentators who do not seem to have been aware of this early version of Russell's Introduction. Cf., e.g., M. Black, Companion to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1964), p. 24; R.C. Marsh, ed. of B. Russell, Logica and Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 175. (ibid., p. 81). The meeting at the Hague was a successful one and enjoyed by both parties. Wittgenstein reported with optimism after the meeting: "at present the matter stands as follows: Russell wants to write an introduction to my treatise and I have declared myself in agreement with this. The introduction is intended to be half the length of the treatise itself and to elucidate the most difficult points in the work. Now, with this introduction, the book is much a smaller risk for a publisher or possibly no longer a risk at all, because Russell's name is very well known and will guarantee a quite definite public for the book. Of course, I don't mean that this will bring it into the right hands, but at any rate it will render a happy accident less out of the question" (letter to von Ficker, 28 Dec. 1919, Prototra­tatus, p. 21).

Wittgenstein's optimism was disappointed. First, when he received Russell's Introduction on 9 March 1920, he realized he had been misunderstood again: "There's so much of it that I'm not quite in agreement with—both where you're critical of me and also where you're simply trying to elucidate my point of view. But that doesn't matter. The future will pass judgement on us ..." (Letters to Russell, p. 86). Second, the translation of the Introduction into German turned out to be so bad that only "superficiality and misunderstanding" appeared to have remained. "I could not bring myself to have it (the book) published with Russell's introduction, which looks even more impossible in translation than it does in the original", wrote Wittgenstein to his friend Engelmann (Letters to Russell, p. 31). As all the attempts for a German publication of the book eventually fell through, Wittgenstein left everything in Russell's hands: "for the moment I won't take any further steps to have it published. But if you feel like getting it printed, it is entirely at your disposal and you can do what you like with it. (Only, if you change anything in the text, indicate that the change was made by you)" (Letters to Russell, p. 89).

Before Russell went to China in the autumn of 1920 he left Wittgenstein's work with Dorothy Wrinch so that she could find some means of having it published. Cambridge University Press was the first to decline the offer, possibly because Wittgenstein's work had been sent without Russell's introduction. Then three German periodicals were contacted. The editor of Annalen was the first to accept the publication, relying on the value of Russell's Introduction rather than on Wittgenstein's text (cf. Prototratatus, p. 26). Typescripts of the Introduction and of Wittgenstein's work were sent to Ostwald. The publishers translated the introduction into German and Ostwald seems to have read the proofs. There is no evidence as to who read the proofs of Wittgenstein's text. What is certain is that neither Wittgenstein nor Russell did. The
carelessness shown by the number of errors in this edition was so great as to make Wittgenstein call it a "pirated edition". When Russell came back from China in 1921 he agreed to the publication of Wittgenstein's work in England with C.K. Ogden. It was Ogden, apart from Russell himself, who appreciated Wittgenstein's work on its own merits. The printing of the Tractatus was carefully handled by Ogden as his correspondence with Wittgenstein shows. The original typescript of Russell's Introduction was requested from Ostwald by Ogden for the printing, but Ostwald replied that he had destroyed it when it was no longer needed. Meanwhile Russell found a spare copy which he sent to Ogden. This was in mid-November 1921. Wittgenstein agreed to have Russell's Introduction in English printed with his text, although, as F.P. Ramsey once remarked, he somehow considered it as "a strain" (cf. Letter to Ogden, p. 86).

G.H. von Wright discusses in the Introduction to Wittgenstein's Letters to C.K. Ogden (pp. 7-8) the events concerning the Introduction to the Tractatus in the period mid-November 1921 to 9 May 1922, in the following terms:

Later in the winter, however, Ogden seems to have returned the Introduction to Russell. For in a letter to Ogden of 9 May from Penzance Russell writes: "I return herewith the Introduction to Wittgenstein. I have added a page on p. 1, as you suggested."

Actually, the printed Introduction is dated "May 1922". A comparison with the original printing shows that the English and the German versions for the most part correspond sentence by sentence except for some significant changes and additions in the beginning. These changes then were evidently made at Ogden's suggestion and the whole thing finished in May.

In Russell's letter of 9th May there is a puzzling passage. Russell says: "When you have proofs, I should be glad to see them with the MS I sent you, from which you have made the typescript." This would suggest that on the basis of the copy of the stuff which he had received in November Ogden made a typescript. If the second copy had been a manuscript and perhaps not easily legible, we could easily understand this. Russell indeed says it was a manuscript in his letter of 9th May. But in the letter from November quoted above he calls it a spare typescript.

The detailed study of the differences between the two versions of the Introduction shows that the two texts are essentially the same except for the page added at Ogden's suggestion. Still the alterations, additions of full quotations, which in the German text were only referred to by number, and other additions, made the English text a revised version. All these changes, and in particular the additions of quotations, shed some light on the problem of Russell's reference to the Introduction both as a typescript and as a manuscript. We have to assume that the "spare typescript" was the same as the one used by Ostwald.

and that, therefore, it had no full quotations in it, except for three short ones, namely, 2.1, 5.56 and 6.45b. It can be established with great probability that the translations of the quotations were Russell's on the basis of the following evidence: Wittgenstein appears to have written to the English publishers asking them "to treat the translations to Russell's Introduction as having equal authority with the original" (Prototractatus, p. 29). Also, in the correspondence between Ogden and Wittgenstein there are some comments about certain propositions that occur in the Introduction, namely, 4.003 (paragraph 5), 2.1 (par. 8), 4.014 (par. 9), 4.112 (par. 9), 5.1361 (par. 18), 5.542 (par. 24), and 6.45b (par. 28). In cases like 2.1 and 4.112 it is explicitly said that Ogden followed Russell's renderings of those remarks (see Letters to Ogden, Questionnaire for 2.1 and editor's comment on 4.112, p. 47). Russell's versions of remarks 4.003, 3.1432, 5.54, and 6.54b differ, although slightly, from those of the Tractatus. This can be taken as an indication that Ogden respected in those cases Russell's own renderings: had Ogden inserted the quotations himself he would have rendered them exactly as in the text of the Tractatus.

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3Paragraph 3, lines 5-28, in the Pears and McGuinness translation.
conjecture could be established as true. Now, the only
evidence we have as regards those quotations comes from
the questionnaire Ogden sent to Wittgenstein concerning
certain queries about the English translation. In this
questionnaire there is a note by Ogden concerning 2.1
which says: "This is the way I see Russell's introduction
goes instead of 'for'. It is a slightly old English turn
and quite suitable." Wittgenstein returned the question-
naire to Ogden on 10 May. Thus Ogden very probably had
the Introduction when making this questionnaire and, of
course, this must have been before 9 May, the day Russell
returned his Introduction. What copy of the Introduction
did Ogden have? The problem is that 2.1 occurs in full
in the early typescript, so that there is no way of
establishing whether the copy of the Introduction Ogden
had with him was the revised one or not.
A second conjecture as to when the Introduction was
revised is the following. The spare typescript that
Russell sent to Ogden in mid-November may not have been
the revised one, i.e. quotations may not have been added
to it and any alterations made. Two different possibili-
ties emerge. One is that Ogden, in receiving the spare
typescript without the quotations, returned it to Russell
asking him to insert quotations in full. In the process
of doing so Russell could have corrected other phrases.
Of this revised version Ogden could have made a typescript
which later on was returned to Russell with the suggestion
of adding a page to page 1. Russell's comment to Ogden
"When you have proofs, I should be glad to see them with
the MS I sent you, from which you have made the typescript'
is an indication that Russell added the page to Ogden's
typescript; and not to his own MS. The second possibil-
ity is that Ogden returned to Russell the original spare
typescript only once asking him to insert quotations with
the suggestion to add a page. But, under this hypothesis
the fact that Ogden needed to make a typescript of the
original one and the fact that Russell referred to it as
both "manuscript" and "typescript" remain puzzling.
What could have induced Ogden to ask for the insertion
of quotations and, in particular, to ask for the addition
of a page? There was something worrying Ogden at the end
of April which could provide a hint as to the correct
answer. Wittgenstein wrote to Ogden on 5 May: "As to
the shortness of the book I am awfully sorry for it; but
what can I do? If you were to squeeze me out like a lemon
you would get nothing out of me". He goes on commenting
on it and then adds, "Rather than print the Ergänzungen
to make the book fatter leave a dozen white sheets for a
reader to swear into when he has purchased the book and
can't understand it" (Letters to Ogden, p. 46). In another
letter, five days later, he says again: "By the way-
printing my preface in German would make the book slightly
bigger ..." (ibid., p. 48).
Ogden must have sent Russell both his manuscript and
the proofs of Wittgenstein's text, for in a letter dated
29 June 1922 Russell says that he is returning the proofs
and comments: "I have corrected the Introduction but not
his stuff, as I supposed you didn't need my help over that"
(ibid., p. 12). Wittgenstein himself read his proofs.
When the *Tractatus* was published Ogden sent some copies to
Wittgenstein. In all of Wittgenstein's published corre-
spondence there are no comments by him on the page added
to the Introduction, where Russell bluntly repeated three
times that Wittgenstein is concerned (albeit "in the part
of his theory which deals with Symbolism") with "the con-
ditions for a logically perfect language" or "accurate
symbolism", and the reason why this was so, namely, that
"language is more or less vague". The added page did not
correct Russell's views as he first put them, it only
clarified them. This is perhaps why there was no need of
comment.
It seems as if Russell never came to understand Witt-
genstein's views on the "cardinal problem of philosophy",
i.e. what can be expressed by language and what cannot be
expressed but only shown. Nevertheless it was through
Russell's efforts, patience, and sympathetic understanding
of Wittgenstein's genius that the *Tractatus* saw the light.
The content of the Introduction bears witness to the first
claim, its history to the second.

Textual Variants

In the exposition paragraphs and lines are numbered
following the English version of the Introduction as print-
ed in the 1961 edition of the *Tractatus* translated by D.F
Pears and B.F. McGuinness. This edition is easily avail-
able and subsequent impressions contain the Introduction
in the same format. The paragraph numbers apply also to
the Introduction in the 1922 translation of the *Tractatus*.
The English text of the Introduction has been taken as the
standard in comparing the two texts. The variants between
the English and German texts have been grouped under three
headings for the sake of clarity: additions, alterations
and errors. Although some of the variants are easily
classifiable, at times it is hard to judge whether an
addition is really an alteration, or whether (say) an
addition in the English text is a printing error in the
German text. A list of the variants regarded as of minor
importance follows.

§1.1 Additions: Title. The Latin title *Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein's *Logisch-philosophische
Abhandlung* was agreed upon for the English edition of
the book. Before this agreement was reached "Philosophical
Logic" was jointly suggested by Russell and Ogden as a
possible alternative. Wittgenstein rejected this sugges-
tion: "As to the title I think the latin one is better
than the present title. For although 'Tractatus logico-
philosophicus' isn't ideal still it has something like the
ring of meaning, whereas 'Philosophic logic' is wrong. In fact I don't know what it means! There is no such thing as philosophic logic. (Unless one says that the whole book is nonsense the title might as well be nonsense too)" (Letters to Ogden, p. 20). For Russell logical form is the subject matter of philosophical logic, and logical form could be said to be the central concern of the Tractatus, too. So in a way it was natural for Russell to see that "Philosophical Logic" could convey the right impression about the main content of Wittgenstein's book. But Wittgenstein's retort that he did not even understand its meaning is one more indication of the divergence between his views and Russell's. The philosophical setting in which the problem of logical form was considered by Russell and Wittgenstein differed totally. For Russell the concern of philosophical logic (and by philosophical logic he meant philosophy as indistinguishable from logic) is "the analysis and enumeration of logical forms ... an inventory of possibilities". For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, logical form cannot be enumerated or described; it can only be shown. Thus, philosophy cannot be an inventory of forms, it is an activity.

Addition: Paragraphing. In the English version of the Introduction paragraphs are arranged in a new way. The changes merely improve the presentation, and do not involve a new arrangement of ideas. The English version is divided into 29 paragraphs while the German version has 21.

Addition: To clarify Wittgenstein's technical term 'the Mystical', 'Das Mystische' is naturally added here. This rendering appears to accord with Wittgenstein's suggestion about the translation of the term (see below p. 35).

The complete German text is as follows: "Man wird die Grundlagen der Symbolik nach Wittgenstein vielleicht leichter verstehen, wenn wir das Bestehen einer logisch vollkommenen Sprache annehmen. Nicht dass irgend eine Sprache logisch vollkommen wäre, oder dass wir selbst uns in ihr fühlten, sondern es ist eine logisch vollkommene Sprache herzustellen. Aber der ganze Zweck der Sprache ist, dass sie etwas bedeutet, und sie erfüllt diesen nur in dem Masse, als sie sich dem Ideal nähert, das wir annehmen." (English translation: "The Principles of Symbolism will be perhaps better understood, according to Wittgenstein, if we postulate the existence of a logically perfect language. Not that any language is logically perfect, but that the whole function of language is to mean something, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal that we postulate.")

Alteration: These lines could be regarded as an alteration of lines 1-3 of the German text.

Addition: With the exception of lines 2-5, if they are considered as an alteration, all the other lines up to 28 comprise the most significant change made in the English text. (These lines are the page added by Russell in 1922 following Ogden's suggestion.) Lines 29-33 occur in the same form in both texts, although the variance of the place of their occurrence is significant, too. The added passage is an elaboration of Russell's views as expressed in the short paragraph of the German text. There he contends for the usefulness of postulating a logically perfect language in order to understand better the principles of symbolism. Under this light the contention does not seem to be a blunt misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's views, which are clearly expressed in the comment he makes to Ogden on 10 May 1922 concerning remark 5.5563: "logically completely ordered". By this I meant to say that the propositions of our ordinary language are not in any way less correct or less exact or more confused than propositions written down, say, in Russell's symbolism or any other 'Begriffsschrift'. (Only it is easier for us to gather their logical form when they are expressed in an appropriate symbolism)" (Letters to Ogden, p. 50).

But Russell's explanatory theses which follow supporting the first claim were not held by Wittgenstein, namely, (1) that no language is logically perfect and (2) that the conditions for accurate meaning are not to be found in ordinary language. Thus, Wittgenstein had to disagree with the interpretation of his views as expressed by Russell in 1920 when the Introduction was originally written. What Russell added in 1922 is explanatory of his earlier version: the conditions for accurate meaning are not to be found in ordinary language, for it is vague. For Russell those conditions occur only in an accurate symbolism. So Wittgenstein, Russell now contends, in dealing with the conditions of meaning, must be 'concerned with the conditions for acurate Symbolism' (§5.18) or, what is the same, with "the conditions for a logically perfect language" (§3.4-5, 28). Russell's claim about the vagueness of ordinary language appears to be brought in in 1922 to support and justify his views about Wittgenstein's central concern in the Tractatus, i.e. accurate symbolism. But Wittgenstein's views about vagueness were not those of Russell's. Wittgenstein's comment on 5.5563 quoted above conflicts with Russell's claim that "Language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise."

Addition: Remark 4.003 is quoted in full except for the last sentence, which says: "And so it is not to be wondered at the deepest problems are really no problems."
Why did Russell leave out this sentence when it appears to be relevant to the point he was making? In the Engelmann typescript this last sentence is given in Wittgenstein's handwriting on a separate page. This sentence was not printed in the *Annalen* edition. It is known that the printing of the *Tractatus* in England took place from an off-print of the *Annalen* corrected by Wittgenstein, and so did the translation into English of the German text (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, Introduction, p. 9). When Wittgenstein sent Ogden the corrected translation, he made the following comment in reference to 4.003: "The end of this proposition has been left out. It begins a new line and runs thus: 'Und es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass die tiefsten Probleme eigentlich keines Probleme sind.' English something like: 'And it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems.' This comes after '... is more or less identical than the beautiful.'" (ibid., p. 33). When Wittgenstein corrected this remark he was in possession of the Engelmann typescript which had been sent to him either from Ostwald or from Ogden. This was in April 1922. In March the typescript was still with Ostwald, for when Ogden asked Wittgenstein to correct the off-print from which the English edition was going to take place Wittgenstein replied it was difficult for him to do so without the typescript. "There are some additions I wrote into that M.S. which I don't know and of which--I think--I have got no copy" (ibid., p. 17). These last sentences of 4.003 could have been one of those additions. Russell returned the corrected copy of the Introduction to Ogden on 9 May. What text did Russell use to translate all the quotations? If the quotations were added in mid-November, then, he clearly did not have the Engelmann typescript, for it was with Ostwald. If, on the other hand, the quotations were translated later in April it is also unlikely that he had the typescript, for it was urgently returned to Wittgenstein so that he could correct the text in full. Thus a reasonable conjecture appears to be that Russell also used an off-print of the *Annalen* to translate the quotations which appear in the revised version of the Introduction. Thus, as the last sentence of 4.003 does not occur in the *Annalen*, Russell's Introduction also omits it.

**Addition:** "but not a 'Sachverhalt'" does not occur in the German text.

**Addition:** the phrase 'whichever of these ways may be adopted' does not occur in the German text.

**Addition:** "If we say 'Plato loves Socrates', the word 'loves' which occurs between the word 'Plato' and the word 'Socrates' establishes a certain relation between these two words". This sentence does not occur in the German text. It better illustrates the content of the paragraph.

**Addition:** remark 3.1432 is quoted in full. There is a slight difference between Russell's version and that of the 1922 *Tractatus*. Russell's version:

"We must not say, the complex sign 'aRb' says 'a stands in a certain relation R to b'; but we must say, that 'a' stands in a certain relation to 'b' says that aRb."

The 1922 *Tractatus* version:

"We must not say, 'The complex sign 'aRb' says 'a stands in relation R to b'''; but we must say, That 'a' stands in relation R to 'b' says that aRb."

The version of the *Tractatus* renders exactly the German version of the 1922 "Abhandlung". Russell follows the *Annalen* version. This could be taken as a further confirmation that he used an off-print of the *Annalen* for his translations.

**Alteration:** There is a slight difference between the German versions of remark 2.1. The Engelmann typescript has:

"Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen"

In the German Introduction:

"Wir machen uns Bilder von den Tatsachen"

This difference can be taken as an indication of the fact that the German publishers translated from Russell's English without checking Wittgenstein's original. Ogden's translation of this proposition for the *Tractatus* followed Russell's rendering, which was: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, Questionnaire, 2.1).

**Alteration:** The corresponding lines of the German text contain the sense of remarks 2.161 and 2.17 which are now given in full. Russell's version of them and that of the 1922 *Tractatus* coincide. The expression "die logische Form der Wirklichkeit" ("the logical form of reality") is not used in the English text once the full quotation is given.

**Addition:** The remark 4.014 with its introductory sentence is added. Russell's version of this remark and that of the 1922 *Tractatus* coincide.

**Addition:** "Mr Wittgenstein maintains that everything properly philosophical belongs to what can only be shown, to what is common between a fact and a logical picture". These lines do not occur in the German text. They make the train of thought more rigorous and coherent. Russell appears to be misunderstanding here what Wittgenstein considers philosophy to be, namely, an activity. What is common between a fact and a picture is logical form. Once we understand what logical form is it becomes clear that philosophy cannot be a body of doctrine but an activity.

**Alteration:** A comparison between these lines and the equivalent ones in German seem to confirm what Wittgen-
stein once wrote to Russell: "All the refinement of your English style was, obviously, lost in the translation and what remained was superficiality and misunderstanding" (Letters to Russell, p. 88).

**Addition:** Remarks 4.111 and 4.112 are quoted in full. Russell's version of these remarks coincide with those of the 1922 *Tractatus*. There seems to be evidence that Ogden, after having taken into account Wittgenstein's suggestions concerning the translation of 4.111, followed Russell's renderings in the Introduction. Von Wright notes: "As seen from a note in the margin of the proofs, Ogden here opted for the way in which Russell had rendered this passage in his Introduction to the book" (Letters to Ogden, p. 52).

**Alteration:** The sentence "This is the same thing that he calls an atomic fact" is rather puzzling. The equivalent sentence in the German text is "ich will sie eine Elementar-tatsache nennen." Why this change from "ich" ("I") to "he"? Nowhere in the *Tractatus* does Wittgenstein use "Sachverhalt" for "Elementartatsachen". The expressions "atomic fact" and "atomic proposition" are clearly Russellian, although Wittgenstein had used them, too (cf. *Letters to Russell*, p. 16). Perhaps the notes on the general form of proposition which occur on the verso of p. 57 of the Engelmann typescript in Russell's handwriting could give us a clue. There the term "atomic propositions" is used for what is rendered in the German text "Elementaren Satze". These notes must have been written by Russell before the first typescript of 1920 was produced since the notes occur almost in the same form in both versions of the Introduction. The notes could have probably been made by Russell in front of Wittgenstein when they met in the Hague. They are explanatory of Wittgenstein's symbolism concerning "E", which apparently Russell had not clearly understood (cf. *Letters to Russell*, p. 73). If this conjecture is correct, then the fact that Wittgenstein agreed with Russell's renderings of "atomic proposition" and "atomic fact" could have induced Russell to claim that Wittgenstein himself called a "Sachverhalt" an "atomic fact". Whether Russell's claim is totally justified is hard to say. Perhaps this rendering also avoided the trouble of having to find appropriate technical terms in English for the corresponding German ones. It is hard to think that the change from "ich will ..." to "he calls ..." is simply an error, knowing that Russell himself read the proofs of the Introduction.

**Alteration:** The phrase "und das jede Tatsache Teile hat" ("and that every fact has parts") does not occur in the English text. It appears to be a correct omission. It is misleading to say that a "Tatsache" is "what corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions when this product is true" (Wittgenstein's own description as given in *Letters to Russell*, note (1), p. 72), 

has parts in order to establish the requirement of simples unless it is said that atomic facts (as parts of "Tatsache") consist of objects.

**Alteration:** The word "true" is missing in the German text. It is clearly wrong to say that "every proposition can be inferred". By having the word "true" in the sentence an error about the nature of valid logical inference is avoided.

**Alteration:** Russell in the early version of the *Introduction* may have used "E" instead "G" to conform to Wittgenstein's symbolism as it occurs in the Engelmann typescript. The typewriter that Wittgenstein used when writing the typescript did not have the appropriate symbolism and Ostwald printed the signs in the same fashion. For the English edition of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein asked Ogden to change the symbolism of the text to conform to that of *Principia Mathematica* (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, p. 30, comment on 5.101). Naturally the symbolism in the Introduction was changed accordingly, probably by Ogden himself (cf. ibid., p. 48 and Editor's comment on it, p. 52).

**Alteration:** The layout of this paragraph is greatly improved in the English text. These lines together with the first four of the next paragraph occur in the Engelmann typescript in Russell's handwriting.

**Alteration:** In the English text Russell quotes literally remark 5.1361, not so in the German text. This remark occurs as follows in the different texts: Engelmann typescript: "Die Ereignisse der Zukunft können wir nicht aus den gegenwärtigen erschliessen." Der Glaube an den Kausal nexus ist der Aberglaube. German *Introduction*: "Die Ereignisse der Zukunft können von der Gegenwart abgeleitet werden. Der Glaube an die Kausalität ist ein Aberglaube." 1922 *Abhandlung*: Same as in Engelmann typecript. 1922 *Tractatus*: The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present. *Superstition* is the belief in the causal nexus. 1922 *Introduction*: Same as in 1922 *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein commented to Ogden in connexion with this remark: "'Belief in the causal nexus is superstition' isn't right. It ought to be: 'Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus'. I didn't mean to say that the belief in the causal nexus was one amongst superstitions but rather that superstition is nothing else than the belief in the causal nexus. In the German this is expressed by the definite article before 'Aberglaube'"
Ogden here followed Russell's rendering as he did in other dubious cases, e.g. 4.112 and 2.1.

Alteration: There are certain variations in the way remark 6.45b occurs in the different texts:

**Engelmann typescript:**
"Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganze ist das mystische.

German Introduction:
"Die Empfindung der Welt als einer begrenzten Welt ist das Mystische."

1922 Abhandlung:
"Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganze ist das mystische."

1922 Tractatus:
The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical.

1922 Introduction:
The feeling of the world as a bounded whole is the mystical.

Wittgenstein did not use "Empfindung" for "feeling", but "Gefühl". The difference in the German text of this remark together with 5.54 and 5.1561 seems to provide sufficient evidence for claiming that Russell translated them into English and then the German publisher into German without checking Wittgenstein's originals.

In the Engelmann typescript the last word of 6.45, "mystische", originally had a capital "M", which was corrected in ink to a small "m". It is not known when this correction was made. In the 1922 edition of the Tractatus, the German word appears with capital "M". The translators probably thought that the occurrence of the small "m" in the 1922 edition was a mistake. In the 1974 impression of the Tractatus, revised (but not reset) according to Wittgenstein's suggestions in his correspondence with Ogden, the word is printed as in the original text with a small "m".

Among the comments that Wittgenstein sent to Ogden on 23 April 1922 about the English translation is the following: "6.45 Here 'mystical element' is wrong. If anything, it must be 'mystical feeling' for in this proposition the German 'das mystische' is an adjective belonging to 'Gefühl'." This comment accords with the correction in the Engelmann typescript mentioned above. Wittgenstein's comment on 6.45 is preceded by another one about 6.44 which says: "I don't like 'mystical element'. I suppose one can't say in English 'the mystical' simply. If so I would like it better." And about 6.522 he says: "'the mystical element'. This is the same as 6.44 but not the same as in 6.45."

The distinction between what Wittgenstein intends to say in remarks 6.522 and 6.44 on the one hand, and in 6.45 on the other, is important. It has bearings into
what he considered to be mystical about the world (and so a noun: 6.522 and 6.44), and our apprehension of it (and so an adjective: 6.45). They cannot be identified. "Th mystical" is an aspect of that same world we think and talk about in propositions and which is revealed ("shown" to belong to the world through the medium of language, but cannot be thought or talked about in language. "The myst

ical" is "felt" and that feeling is the mystical feeling. But in no way is "the mystical feeling", i.e. "das mystische"

In the revised Pears and McGuinness English edition of the Tractatus (1974) the translation of the remarks on the mystical is as follows:

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

6.45b Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

These renderings do not make it sufficiently clear in this English version when "mystical" is to be taken as a noun or an adjective. This was of importance to Wittgenstein. It would be more natural to render "das Mystische" in 6.44 and 6.522 as "the mystical", if Wittgenstein's suggestions are followed, so as to distinguish it from the adjectival form which occurs in 6.45b and which could perhaps be simply "mystical".
Concluding Remark

Wittgenstein's charges against Russell's Introduction may have been a powerful reason for making it a "widely-despised" document—if I may borrow the description. Despite this, the interest and importance of the Introduction are still evident. Russell's philosophy of logical atomism and that of Wittgenstein's Tractatus are best understood together. The issues that Russell and Wittgenstein deal with are common concerns. But their assumptions and, consequently, the direction taken in the elucidation and solution of their problems appear to differ. In singling out common concerns, and pin-pointing divergent views, the Introduction is an invaluable guide. At times, it provides us with clear theses, at times with suggestions whose ultimate implications are to be found elsewhere.

Let me single out just one issue here—whose importance emerges from this study—namely, that of vagueness. Russell states in the Introduction that "language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise". This thesis, here simply stated, is discussed by Russell in his article entitled "Vagueness". The article was written in the same period as the Introduction and was originally a paper delivered to the Jowett Society at Oxford on 25 November 1922, and published the following year in the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. There Russell expounds his reasons for thinking all language is vague, and why, even for an "accurate Symbolism", precision might be an ideal. Thus, he indirectly discloses his motives for suggesting that the Tractatus is concerned with an ideal language, since definiteness of sense cannot be found in ordinary language. That definiteness of sense is a characteristic of ordinary language would have surprised Russell, if put forward as a serious claim. But Wittgenstein did claim it. His work was about language, and all language would have the essential characteristics that the Tractatus assigned to it, including that of definiteness of sense. That is why I suggest that disagreement between Russell and Wittgenstein as regards the main concern of the Tractatus is based, among other things, upon their divergent views on the nature of vagueness and where definite meaning is to be found.

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