

# Russell's Introduction to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"

Two facts about Russell's Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* have gone largely unnoticed. One is that there exist two versions of that Introduction. The other, more important, concerns the variants between the two versions. It is well known that Wittgenstein felt that Russell's original Introduction revealed he had misunderstood his views. There are important additions and revisions in the second version about the notion of a logically perfect language which Russell may have included as a result of Wittgenstein's charges. Do these changes correct Russell's original views in some way? In what follows I wish to draw attention to the evidence that can illumine these issues.<sup>1</sup>

Neither a manuscript nor a typescript of Russell's Introduction to the *Tractatus* is known to be extant. In 1952 G.H. von Wright saw in Gmunden a typescript of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* having attached to it a typescript of Russell's Introduction. These typescripts are missing

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<sup>1</sup>For the information gathered in these pages I have relied, apart from the Englemann typescript, on published sources: "Vorwort von Bertrand Russell" to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung" in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, XIV (1921), pp. 186-198; "Introduction by Bertrand Russell" to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Kegan Paul, 1922); *Prototractatus*, ed. B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg and G.H. von Wright (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971); Paul Englemann's *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir*, ed. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); Wittgenstein, *Letters to C.K. Ogden*, ed. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973); Wittgenstein, *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore*, ed. von Wright, assisted by McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

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now.

The Engelmann typescript of the *Tractatus*, now in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, is the typescript that Wittgenstein must have sent Russell from the prison camp in 1919, and is the same typescript that Russell had while writing the Introduction in 1920. The Engelmann typescript contains various annotations in Russell's handwriting. One of them (on p. 57<sup>v</sup>: "Notes on [ $\bar{p}$ ,  $\xi$ ,  $N(\xi)$ ]"--about 7 lines) occurs in the printed Introduction in almost the same form. From the Engelmann typescript the first publication of the "Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung" took place. It appeared in the final issue of Wilhelm Ostwald's *Annalen der Naturphilosophie* in Autumn 1921. This edition contains a translation in German of Russell's Introduction, which had been originally written in English.<sup>2</sup> In November 1922 the "Abhandlung" was published in England under the title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, edited by C.K. Ogden and published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. In this edition Wittgenstein's text, both in German and English, was preceded by an Introduction in English by Bertrand Russell.

A detailed comparison between the two versions of Russell's Introduction--the German as it appears in the *Annalen*, and the English of 1922--discloses certain variants of importance. I propose to lay them bare. Before collating the two versions of the Introduction some notes of historical interest will be given.

#### Historical Notes

The history of Russell's Introduction to the *Tractatus* begins in mid-December 1919 at the Hague where Russell and Wittgenstein met. This meeting was first proposed by Wittgenstein to Russell in a letter from the Italian prison camp dated 19 August 1919. The meeting had a twofold purpose in view: that Russell should be enabled to understand the content of Wittgenstein's book by having it explained to him, since in his first reading he had not got hold of the main contention (cf. *Letters to Russell*, p. 71), and that some way of getting the treatise published should be found. Wittgenstein had contacted various publishers, but they did not want to take the risk of publishing a book without a sure market. He sought help from Russell: "If only you were able to come to the Hague! ... The difficulties with my book have started up again. No body wants to publish it. Do you remember how you were always pressing me to publish something? And now when I should like to, it can't be managed. The devil take it!"

<sup>2</sup>Since the "Abhandlung" as published in the *Annalen* has not been widely available, there are authors and commentators who do not seem to have been aware of this early version of Russell's Introduction. Cf., e.g., M. Black, *Companion to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus"* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1964), p. 24; R.C. Marsh, ed. of B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 175.

(*ibid.*, p. 81). The meeting at the Hague was a successful one and enjoyed by both parties. Wittgenstein reported with optimism after the meeting: "at present the matter stands as follows: Russell wants to write an introduction to my treatise and I have declared myself in agreement with this. The introduction is intended to be half the length of the treatise itself and to elucidate the most difficult points in the work. Now, with this introduction, the book is much a smaller risk for a publisher or possibly no longer a risk at all, because Russell's name is very well known and will guarantee a quite definite public for the book. Of course, I don't mean that this will bring it into the right hands, but at any rate it will render a happy accident less out of the question" (letter to von Ficker, 28 Dec. 1919, *Prototractatus*, p. 21).

Wittgenstein's optimism was disappointed. First, when he received Russell's Introduction on 9 March 1920, he realized he had been misunderstood again: "There's so much of it that I'm not quite in agreement with--both where you're critical of me and also where you're simply trying to elucidate my point of view. But that doesn't matter. The future will pass judgement on us ..." (*Letters to Russell*, p. 86). Second, the translation of the Introduction into German turned out to be so bad that only "superficiality and misunderstanding" appeared to have remained. "I could not bring myself to have it (the book) published with Russell's introduction, which looks even more impossible in translation than it does in the original", wrote Wittgenstein to his friend Engelmann (*Letters to Engelmann*, p. 31). As all the attempts for a German publication of the book eventually fell through, Wittgenstein left everything in Russell's hands: "for the moment I won't take any further steps to have it published. But if you feel like getting it printed, it is entirely at your disposal and you can do what you like with it. (Only, if you change anything in the text, indicate that the change was made by you)" (*Letters to Russell*, p. 89).

Before Russell went to China in the autumn of 1920 he left Wittgenstein's work with Dorothy Wrinch so that she could find some means of having it published. Cambridge University Press was the first to decline the offer, possibly because Wittgenstein's work had been sent without Russell's Introduction. Then three German periodicals were contacted. The editor of *Annalen* was the first to accept the publication, relying on the value of Russell's Introduction rather than on Wittgenstein's text (cf. *Prototractatus*, p. 26). Typescripts of the Introduction and of Wittgenstein's work were sent to Ostwald. The publishers translated the Introduction into German and Ostwald seems to have read the proofs. There is no evidence as to who read the proofs of Wittgenstein's text. What is certain is that neither Wittgenstein nor Russell did. The

carelessness shown by the number of errors in this edition was so great as to make Wittgenstein call it a "pirated edition". When Russell came back from China in 1921 he agreed to the publication of Wittgenstein's work in England with C.K. Ogden. It was Ogden, apart from Russell himself, who appreciated Wittgenstein's work on its own merits. The printing of the *Tractatus* was carefully handled by Ogden as his correspondence with Wittgenstein shows. The original typescript of Russell's Introduction was requested from Ostwald by Ogden for the printing, but Ostwald replied that he had destroyed it when it was no longer needed. Meanwhile Russell found a spare copy which he sent to Ogden. This was in mid-November 1921. Wittgenstein agreed to have Russell's Introduction in English printed with his text, although, as F.P. Ramsey once remarked, he somehow considered it as "a strain" (cf. *Letter to Ogden*, p. 86).

G.H. von Wright discusses in the Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Letters to C.K. Ogden* (pp. 7-8) the events concerning the Introduction to the *Tractatus* in the period mid-November 1921 to 9 May 1922, in the following terms:

Later in the winter, however, Ogden seems to have returned the Introduction to Russell. For in a letter to Ogden of 9 May from Penzance Russell writes: "I return herewith the Introduction to Wittgenstein. I have added a page on p. 1, as you suggested." Actually, the printed Introduction is dated "May 1922". A comparison with the Ostwald printing shows that the English and the German versions for the most part correspond sentence by sentence except for some significant changes and additions in the beginning. These changes then were evidently made at Ogden's suggestion and the whole thing finished in May.

In Russell's letter of 9th May there is a puzzling passage. Russell says: "When you have proofs, I should be glad to see them with the MS I sent you, from which you have made the typescript." This would suggest that on the basis of the copy of the stuff which he had received in November Ogden made a typescript. If the second copy had been a manuscript and perhaps not easily legible, we could easily understand this. Russell indeed says it *was* a manuscript in his letter of 9th May. But in the letter from November quoted above he calls it a spare *typescript*.

The detailed study of the differences between the two versions of the Introduction shows that the two texts are essentially the same except for the page added at Ogden's suggestion.<sup>3</sup> Still the alterations, additions of full quotations, which in the German text were only referred to by number, and other additions, made the English text a *revised version*. All these changes, and in particular the additions of quotations, shed some light on the problem of Russell's reference to the Introduction both as a typescript and as a manuscript. We have to assume that the "spare typescript" was the same as the one used by Ostwald

and that, therefore, it had no full quotations in it, except for three short ones, namely, 2.1, 5.56 and 6.45b. It can be established with great probability that the translations of the quotations were Russell's<sup>4</sup> on the basis of the following evidence: Wittgenstein appears to have written to the English publishers asking them "to treat the translations to Russell's Introduction as having equal authority with the original" (*Prototractatus*, p. 29). Also, in the correspondence between Ogden and Wittgenstein there are some comments about certain propositions that occur in the Introduction, namely, 4.003 (paragraph 5), 2.1 (par. 8), 4.014 (par. 9), 4.112 (par. 9), 5.1361 (par. 18), 5.542 (par. 24), and 6.45b (par. 28). In cases like 2.1 and 4.112 it is explicitly said that Ogden followed Russell's renderings of those remarks (see *Letters to Ogden*, Questionnaire for 2.1 and editor's comment on 4.112, p. 52). Besides, Russell's versions of remarks 4.003, 3.1432, 5.54, and 6.54b differ, although slightly, from those of the *Tractatus*. This can be taken as an indication that Ogden respected in those cases Russell's own renderings: had Ogden inserted the quotations himself he would have rendered them exactly as in the text of the *Tractatus*. In the case of 5.1361 and 5.542 Russell's version *coincides* with that of the *Tractatus*. These two remarks were rendered after Wittgenstein's suggestions. Did Ogden revise those remarks in the Introduction according to Wittgenstein's comments, or is it a *mere* coincidence that these remarks were rendered in the same way? But if Ogden corrected these two why did he not do the same with 4.003, 3.1432, 5.54, 6.45b? Whatever the answer may be the problem seems to arise only in the case of those two remarks, and so it does not challenge in a fundamental way the evidence there is for claiming that the translations in the Introduction are Russell's.

If the revised Introduction has quotations given in full and they are Russell's own translations, when did Russell add those quotations and make all the other alterations in the Introduction? A conjecture is that he did so in mid-November before sending Ogden the spare typescript. The alterations, and in particular the quotations, do take quite an amount of space to have them inserted in the margins of the typescript. Russell could have inserted them on separate sheets and probably in his own handwriting. This would have made the original spare typescript into partly a *manuscript* and partly a *typescript* out of which Ogden needed to make a new typescript. If this is the case then it is indeed easy to understand why Russell called it both a typescript and a manuscript. If there were indefeasible evidence that Ogden knew of the translations in the Introduction before 9 May 1922 this

<sup>4</sup>D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, in the preface to their translation of the *Tractatus*, say that the Introduction's translations "are those of Lord Russell himself or of the first English translator".

<sup>3</sup>Paragraph 3, lines 5-28, in the Pears and McGuinness translation.

conjecture could be established as true. Now, the only evidence we have as regards those quotations comes from the questionnaire Ogden sent to Wittgenstein concerning certain queries about the English translation. In this questionnaire there is a note by Ogden concerning 2.1 which says: "this is the way I see Russell's introduction goes instead of 'for'. It is a slightly old English turn and quite suitable." Wittgenstein returned the questionnaire to Ogden on 10 May. Thus Ogden very probably had the Introduction when making this questionnaire and, of course, this must have been before 9 May, the day Russell returned his Introduction. What copy of the Introduction did Ogden have? The problem is that 2.1 occurs in full in the early typescript, so that there is no way of establishing whether the copy of the Introduction Ogden had with him was the revised one or not.

A second conjecture as to when the Introduction was revised is the following. The spare typescript that Russell sent to Ogden in mid-November may not have been the revised one, i.e. quotations may not have been added to it and any alterations made. Two different possibilities emerge. One is that Ogden, in receiving the spare typescript without the quotations, returned it to Russell asking him to insert quotations in full. In the process of doing so Russell could have corrected other phrases. Of *this* revised version Ogden could have made a typescript which later on was returned to Russell with the suggestion of adding a page to page 1. Russell's comment to Ogden "When you have proofs, I should be glad to see them with the MS I sent you, from which you have made the typescript" is an indication that Russell added the page to Ogden's typescript: and not to his own MS. The second possibility is that Ogden returned to Russell the original spare typescript only once asking him to insert quotations with the suggestion to add a page. But, under this hypothesis the fact that Ogden needed to make a typescript of the original one and the fact that Russell referred to it as both "manuscript" and "typescript" remain puzzling.

What could have induced Ogden to ask for the insertion of quotations and, in particular, to ask for the addition of a page? There was something worrying Ogden at the end of April which could provide a hint as to the correct answer. Wittgenstein wrote to Ogden on 5 May: "As to the shortness of the book I am *awfully sorry for it; but what can I do?* If you were to squeeze me out like a lemon you would get nothing out of me". He goes on commenting on it and then adds, "Rather than print the Ergänzungen to make the book fatter leave a dozen white sheets for a reader to swear into when he has purchased the book and can't understand it" (*Letters to Ogden*, p. 46). In another letter, five days later, he says again: "By the way-- printing my preface in German would make the book slightly bigger ..." (ibid., p. 48).

Ogden must have sent Russell both his manuscript and

the proofs of Wittgenstein's text, for in a letter dated 29 June 1922 Russell says that he is returning the proofs and comments: "I have corrected the Introduction but not his stuff, as I supposed you didn't need my help over that" (ibid., p. 12). Wittgenstein himself read his proofs. When the *Tractatus* was published Ogden sent some copies to Wittgenstein. In all of Wittgenstein's published correspondence there are no comments by him on the page added to the Introduction, where Russell bluntly repeated three times that Wittgenstein is concerned (albeit "in the part of his theory which deals with Symbolism") with "the conditions for a logically perfect language" or "accurate symbolism", and the reason why this was so, namely, that "language is more or less vague". The added page did not correct Russell's views as he first put them, it only clarified them. This is perhaps why there was no need of comment.

It seems as if Russell never came to understand Wittgenstein's views on the "cardinal problem of philosophy", i.e. what can be expressed by language and what cannot be expressed but only shown. Nevertheless it was through Russell's efforts, patience, and sympathetic understanding of Wittgenstein's genius that the *Tractatus* saw the light. The content of the Introduction bears witness to the first claim, its history to the second.

#### Textual Variants

In the exposition paragraphs and lines are numbered following the English version of the Introduction as printed in the 1961 edition of the *Tractatus* translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. This edition is easily available and subsequent impressions contain the Introduction in the same format. The paragraph numbers apply also to the Introduction in the 1922 translation of the *Tractatus*. The English text of the Introduction has been taken as the standard in comparing the two texts. The variants between the English and German texts have been grouped under three headings for the sake of clarity: *additions*, *alterations* and *errors*. Although some of the variants are easily classifiable, at times it is hard to judge whether an addition is really an alteration, or whether (say) an addition in the English text is a printing error in the German text. A list of the variants regarded as of minor importance follows.

- ¶1.1 *Alteration:* Title. The Latin title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* of Wittgenstein's "Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung" was agreed upon for the English edition of the book. Before this agreement was reached "Philosophical Logic" was jointly suggested by Russell and Ogden as a possible alternative. Wittgenstein rejected this suggestion: "As to the title I think the latin one is better than the present title. For although 'Tractatus logico-philosophicus' isn't *ideal* still it has something like the

ring of meaning, whereas 'Philosophic logic' is wrong. In fact I don't know what it means! There is no such thing as philosophic logic. (Unless one says that as the whole book is nonsense the title might as well be nonsense too)" (*Letters to Ogden*, p. 20). For Russell logical form is the subject matter of philosophical logic,<sup>5</sup> and logical form could be said to be the central concern of the *Tractatus*, too. So in a way it was natural for Russell to see that "Philosophical Logic" could convey the right impression about the main contention of Wittgenstein's book. But Wittgenstein's retort that he did not even understand its meaning is one more indication of the divergence between his views and Russell's. The philosophical setting in which the problem of logical form was considered by Russell and Wittgenstein differed totally. For Russell the concern of philosophical logic (and by philosophical logic he meant philosophy as indistinguishable from logic) is "the analysis and enumeration of logical forms ... an inventory of possibilities".<sup>6</sup> For Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, logical form cannot be enumerated or described; it can only be shown. Thus, philosophy cannot be an inventory of forms, it is an activity.

- ¶2 *Alteration:* Paragraphing. In the English version of the Introduction paragraphs are arranged in a new way. The changes merely improve the presentation, and do not involve a new arrangement of ideas. The English version is divided into 29 paragraphs while the German version has 21.
- ¶2.4 *Addition:* To clarify Wittgenstein's technical term "the Mystical", "Das Mystische" is naturally added here. This rendering appears to accord with Wittgenstein's suggestion about the translation of the term (see below p. 35).
- ¶3 The complete German text is as follows: "Man wird die Grundlagen der Symbolik nach Wittgenstein vielleicht leichter verstehen, wenn wir das Bestehen einer logisch vollkommenen Sprache annehmen. Nicht dass irgend eine Sprache logisch vollkommen wäre, oder dass wir selbst uns für fähig halten, jetzt und hier eine logisch vollkommene Sprache herzustellen. Aber der ganze Zweck der Sprache ist, dass sie etwas bedeutet, und sie erfüllt diesen nur in dem Masse, als sie sich dem Ideal nähert, das wir annehmen." (English translation: "The Principles of Symbolism will be perhaps better understood, according to Wittgenstein, if we postulate the existence of a logically perfect language. Not that any language is logically perfect, but that the whole function of language is to mea

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: Open Court, 1914) p. 43.

<sup>6</sup>"On Scientific Method in Philosophy", in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Longmans, Green, 1918), pp. 111-12.

something, and it only fulfils this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal that we postulate.")

- ¶3.2-5 *Alteration:* These lines could be regarded as an alteration of lines 1-3 of the German text.
- ¶3.1-28 *Addition:* With the exception of lines 2-5, if they are considered as an alteration, all the other lines up to 28 comprise the most significant change made in the English text. (These lines are the page added by Russell in 1922 following Ogden's suggestion.) Lines 29-33 occur in the same form in both texts, although the variance of the place of their occurrence is significant, too. The added passage is an elaboration of Russell's views as expressed in the short paragraph of the German text. There he contends for the usefulness of postulating a logically perfect language in order to understand better the principles of symbolism. Under this light the contention does not seem to be a blunt misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's views, which are *clearly* expressed in the comment he makes to Ogden on 10 May 1922 concerning remark 5.5563: "'logically completely ordered'. By this I meant to say that the propositions of our ordinary language are not in any way logically *less correct* or less exact or *more confused* than propositions written down, say, in Russell's symbolism or any other 'Begriffsschrift'. (Only it is easier for us to gather their logical form when they are expressed in an appropriate symbolism)" (*Letters to Ogden*, p. 50). But Russell's explanatory theses which follow supporting the first claim were not held by Wittgenstein, namely, (1) that no language is logically perfect and (2) that the conditions for accurate meaning are not to be found in ordinary language. Thus, Wittgenstein had to disagree with the interpretation of his views as expressed by Russell in 1920 when the Introduction was originally written. What Russell added in 1922 is explanatory of his earlier version: the conditions for accurate meaning are not to be found in ordinary language, for it is vague. For Russell those conditions occur only in an accurate symbolism. So Wittgenstein, Russell now contends, in dealing with the conditions of meaning, must be "concerned with the conditions for *accurate* Symbolism" (¶3.18) or, what is the same, with "the conditions for a logically perfect language" (¶3.4-5, 28). Russell's claim about the vagueness of ordinary language appears to be brought in in 1922 to support and justify his views about Wittgenstein's central concern in the *Tractatus*, i.e. accurate symbolism. But Wittgenstein's views about vagueness were not those of Russell's. Wittgenstein's comment on 5.5563 quoted above conflicts with Russell's claim that "language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise."
- ¶5.9-16 *Addition:* Remark 4.003 is quoted in full *except* for the last sentence, which says: "And so it is not to be wondered at the deepest problems are really no problems."

Why did Russell leave out this sentence when it appears to be relevant to the point he was making? In the Engelmann typescript this last sentence is given in Wittgenstein's handwriting on a separate page. This sentence was not printed in the *Annalen* edition. It is known that the printing of the *Tractatus* in England took place from an off-print of the *Annalen* corrected by Wittgenstein, and so did the translation into English of the German text (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, Introduction, p. 9). When Wittgenstein sent Ogden the corrected translation, he made the following comment in reference to 4.003: "The end of this proposition has been left out. It begins a new line and runs thus: 'Und es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass die tiefsten Probleme eigentlich *keine* Probleme sind.' English something like: 'And it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really *no* problems.' This comes after '... is more or less identical than the beautiful.'" (ibid., p. 33). When Wittgenstein corrected this remark he was in possession of the Engelmann typescript which had been sent to him either from Ostwald or from Ogden. This was in April 1922. In March the typescript was still with Ostwald, for when Ogden asked Wittgenstein to correct the off-print from which the English edition was going to take place Wittgenstein replied it was difficult for him to do so without the typescript. "There are some additions I wrote into that M.S. which I don't know and of which--I think--I have got no copy" (ibid., p. 17). These last sentences of 4.003 could have been one of those additions. Russell returned the corrected copy of the Introduction to Ogden on 9 May. What text did Russell use to translate all the quotations? If the quotations were added in mid-November, then, he clearly did not have the Englemann typescript, for it was with Ostwald. If, on the other hand, the quotations were translated later in April it is also unlikely that he had the typescript, for it was urgently returned to Wittgenstein so that he could correct the text in full. Thus a reasonable conjecture appears to be that Russell also used an off-print of the *Annalen* to translate the quotations which appear in the revised version of the Introduction. Thus, as the last sentence of 4.003 does not occur in the *Annalen*, Russell's Introduction also omits it.

- ¶5.21 *Addition:* "but not a 'Sachverhalt'" does not occur in the German text.
- ¶6.4-5 *Addition:* the phrase "whichever of these ways may be adopted" does not occur in the German text.
- ¶7.7-9 *Addition:* "If we say 'Plato loves Socrates', the word 'loves' which occurs between the word 'Plato' and the word 'Socrates' establishes a certain relation between these two words". This sentence does not occur in the German text. It better illustrates the content of the paragraph.

- ¶7.11-14 *Addition:* remark 3.1432 is quoted in full. There is a slight difference between Russell's version and that of the 1922 *Tractatus*. Russell's version:  
We must not say, the complex sign "aRb" says "a stands in a certain relation R to b"; but we must say, *that* "a" stands in a certain relation to "b" says *that* aRb.  
The 1922 *Tractatus* version:  
We must not say, "The complex sign 'aRb' says 'a stands in relation R to b'" ; but we must say, "That 'a' stands in a certain relation to 'b' says that aRb".  
The version of the *Tractatus* renders exactly the German version of the 1922 "Abhandlung". Russell follows the *Annalen* version. This could be taken as a further confirmation that he used an off-print of the *Annalen* for his translations.
- ¶8.2 *Alteration:* There is a slight difference between the German versions of remark 2.1. The Engelmann typescript has:  
"Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen"  
In the German Introduction:  
"Wir machen uns Bilder von den Tatsachen"  
This difference can be taken as an indication of the fact that the German publishers translated from Russell's English without checking Wittgenstein's original. Ogden's translation of this proposition for the *Tractatus* followed Russell's rendering, which was: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, Questionnaire, 2.1).
- ¶8.7-11 *Alteration:* The corresponding lines of the German text contain the sense of remarks 2.161 and 2.17 which are now given in full. Russell's version of them and that of the 1922 *Tractatus* coincide. The expression "die logische Form der Wirklichkeit" ("the logical form of reality") is not used in the English text once the full quotation is given.
- ¶9.7-12 *Addition:* The remark 4.014 with its introductory sentence is added. Russell's version of this remark and that of the 1922 *Tractatus* coincide.
- ¶9.20-22 *Addition:* "Mr Wittgenstein maintains that everything properly philosophical belongs to what can only be shown, to what is common between a fact and a logical picture". These lines do not occur in the German text. They make the train of thought more rigorous and coherent. Russell appears to be misunderstanding here what Wittgenstein considers philosophy to be, namely, an activity. What is common between a fact and a picture is *logical form*. Once we understand what logical form is it becomes clear that philosophy cannot be a body of doctrine but an activity.
- ¶9.25-26 *Alteration:* A comparison between these lines and the equivalent ones in German seem to confirm what Wittgen-

stein once wrote to Russell: "All the refinement of your English style was, obviously, lost in the translation and what remained was superficiality and misunderstanding" (*Letters to Russell*, p. 88).

¶19.26-35 *Addition:* Remarks 4.111 and 4.112 are quoted in full. Russell's version of these remarks coincide with those of the 1922 *Tractatus*. There seems to be evidence that Ogden, after having taken into account Wittgenstein's suggestions concerning the translation of 4.111, followed Russell's renderings in the Introduction. Von Wright notes: "As seen from a note in the margin of the proofs, Ogden here opted for the way in which Russell had rendered this passage in his Introduction to the book" (*Letters to Ogden*, p. 52).

¶10.7-8 *Alteration:* The sentence "This is the same thing that he calls an atomic fact" is rather puzzling. The equivalent sentence in the German text is "ich will sie eine Elementartatsache nennen." Why this change from "ich" ("I") to "he"? Nowhere in the *Tractatus* does Wittgenstein use "Sachverhalt" for "Elementartatsache". The expressions "atomic fact" and "atomic proposition" are clearly Russellian, although Wittgenstein had used them, too (cf. *Letters to Russell*, p. 16). Perhaps the notes on the general form of proposition which occur on the verso of p. 57 of the Engelmann typescript in Russell's handwriting could give us a clue. There the term "atomic propositions" is used for what is rendered in the German text "Elementaren Satze". These notes must have been written by Russell *before* the first typescript of 1920 was produced since the notes occur almost in the same form in both versions of the Introduction. The notes could have probably been made by Russell in front of Wittgenstein when they met in the Hague. They are explanatory of Wittgenstein's symbolism concerning "E", which apparently Russell had not clearly understood (cf. *Letters to Russell* p. 73). If this conjecture is correct, then the fact that Wittgenstein agreed with Russell's renderings of "atomic proposition" and "atomic fact" could have induced Russell to claim that Wittgenstein himself called a "Sachverhalt" an "atomic fact". Whether Russell's claim is totally justified is hard to say. Perhaps this rendering also avoided the trouble of having to find appropriate technical terms in English for the corresponding German ones. It is hard to think that the change from "ich will ..." to "he calls ..." is simply an error, knowing that Russell himself read the proofs of the Introduction.

¶10.18 *Alteration:* The phrase "und das jede Tatsache Teile hat" ("and that every fact has parts") does not occur in the English text. It appears to be a correct omission. It is misleading to say that a "Tatsache", which is "what corresponds to the logical product of elementary propositions when this product is true" (Wittgenstein's own description as given in *Letters to Russell*, note (1), p. 72),

has parts in order to establish the requirement of simples unless it is said that atomic facts (as parts of "Tatsache") consist of objects.

¶11.5 *Addition:* The word "true" is missing in the German text. It is clearly wrong to say that "every proposition can be inferred". By having the word "true" in the sentence an error about the nature of valid logical inference is avoided.

¶11.27 *Alteration:* Russell in the early version of the Introduction may have used "E" instead "g" to conform to Wittgenstein's symbolism as it occurs in the Engelmann typescript. The typewriter that Wittgenstein used when writing the typescript did not have the appropriate symbolism and Ostwald printed the signs in the same fashion. For the English edition of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein asked Ogden to change the symbolism of the text to conform to that of *Principia Mathematica* (cf. *Letters to Ogden*, p. 30, comment on 5.101). Naturally the symbolism in the Introduction was changed accordingly, probably by Ogden himself (cf. *ibid.*, p. 48 and Editor's comment on it, p. 52).

¶15 *Alteration:* The layout of this paragraph is greatly improved in the English text. These lines together with the first four of the next paragraph occur in the Engelmann typescript in Russell's handwriting.

¶17.10-11 *Addition:* "(together with the fact that it is the totality of them)" does not occur in the German text.

¶18.4-5 *Alteration:* In the English text Russell quotes literally remark 5.1361, not so in the German text. This remark occurs as follows in the different texts:  
Engelmann typescript:

"Die Ereignisse der Zukunft können wir nicht aus den gegenwärtigen erschiessen."

Der Glaube an den Kausalnexus ist der *Aberglaube*.  
German Introduction:

"Die Ereignisse der Zukunft können nach ihm nicht aus denen der Gegenwart abgeleitet werden. Der Glaube an die Kausalität ist ein Aberglaube."

1922 *Abhandlung:* Same as in Engelmann typescript.  
1922 *Tractatus:*

The events of the future *cannot* be inferred from those of the present.

Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.

1922 Introduction: Same as in 1922 *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein commented to Ogden in connexion with this remark: "'Belief in the causal nexus is superstition' isn't right. It ought to be: 'Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus'. I didn't mean to say that the belief in the causal nexus was one amongst superstitions but rather that superstition is nothing else than the belief in the causal nexus. In the German this is expressed by the definite article before 'Aberglaube'"

(*Letters to Ogden*, p. 31). Later on, when Wittgenstein read the proofs of his book, he made the following request: "Don't print 'Superstition' in italics! But leave the German 'Aberglaube' gesperrt" (ibid., p. 69).

In the German text "können" is not italicized. Presumably the German "Kausalität" was "causal nexus" in Russell original typescript, for that is the word used in the Engelmann typescript from which Russell would have quoted. The German text commits a further mistake, according to Wittgenstein, by using the indefinite article "ein" instead of "der" in front of "Aberglaube", depriving the sentence of its authentic meaning.

Russell's version of this remark coincides with that of the 1922 *Tractatus*. This is puzzling for it is most likely that Russell did not see Wittgenstein's comments on the proofs of his text. Why, then, does Russell have "superstition" without italics? Is it a mere coincidence or was it corrected by Ogden? But if Ogden corrected this remark to conform to Wittgenstein's suggestion, why did he not do it in other cases?

- ¶19.23 *Addition:* "between two descriptions" does not occur in the German text. This expression appears to clarify the function that identity has according to the examples Russell provides.
- ¶20.3 *Addition:* The phrase "that may be suggested" does not occur in the German text.
- ¶24.3-4 *Alteration:* The remark 5.54 occurs as follows in the different texts:  
Engelmann typescript:  
"In der allgemeinen Satzform kommt der Satz im Satze nur als Basis der Wahrheitsoperationen vor."  
German Introduction:  
"In der allgemeinen Satzform kommt ein Satz nur als Basis einer Wahrheits-Operation."  
1922 *Abhandlung:* (same as Engelmann typescript)  
1922 *Tractatus:*  
In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a proposition only as bases of the truth operations.  
The German Introduction, by omitting "im Satze", commits an error. The 1922 Introduction has "of truth-operations" at the end.
- ¶24.8-11 *Alteration:* The content of remark 5.542 is given in the German text but it is quoted in full in the 1922 text. Russell's rendering of this remark coincides with that of the 1922 *Tractatus*. This is puzzling. Von Wright comment about 5.542: "It seems that Ogden himself changed 'it is however' to 'But it is' but that all the other changes in this passage are by Wittgenstein" (*Letters to Ogden*, p. 43). If Russell did not see Wittgenstein's comments concerning the English translation of his text, why do the two versions coincide? An alternative to von Wright's suggestions about the changes of this remark could be that

Ogden here followed Russell's rendering as he did in other dubious cases, e.g. 4.112 and 2.1.

¶28.11-12 *Alteration:* There are certain variations in the way remark 6.45b occurs in the different texts:

Engelmann typescript:

"Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische.

German Introduction:

"Die Empfindung der Welt als einer begrenzten Welt ist das Mystische."

1922 *Abhandlung:*

"Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische."

1922 *Tractatus:*

The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical.

1922 Introduction:

The feeling of the world as a bounded whole is the mystical.

Wittgenstein did not use "Empfindung" for "feeling", but "Gefühl". The difference in the German text of this remark together with 5.54 and 5.1361 seems to provide sufficient evidence for claiming that Russell translated them into English and then the German publisher into German without checking Wittgenstein's originals.

In the Engelmann typescript the last word of 6.45, "mystische", originally had a capital "M", which was corrected in ink to a small "m". It is not known when this correction was made. In the 1922 *Abhandlung* the word is rightly printed with a small "m". But in the 1961 edition of the *Tractatus* (and subsequent impressions) the German word appears with capital "M". The translators probably thought that the occurrence of the small "m" in the 1922 edition was a mistake. In the 1974 impression of the *Tractatus*, revised (but not reset) according to Wittgenstein's suggestions in his correspondence with Ogden, the word is printed as in the original text with a small "m".

Among the comments that Wittgenstein sent to Ogden on 23 April 1922 about the English translation is the following: "6.45 Here 'mystical element' is *wrong*. If anything, it must be 'mystical feeling' for in *this* proposition the German 'das mystische' is an adjective belonging to 'Gefühl'." This comment accords with the correction in the Engelmann typescript mentioned above. Wittgenstein's comment on 6.45 is preceded by another one about 6.44 which says: "I don't like 'mystical element'. I suppose one can't say in English 'the mystical' simply. If so I would like it better." And about 6.522 he says: "'the mystical element'. This is the same as 6.44 but *not* the same as in 6.45."

The distinction between what Wittgenstein intends to say in remarks 6.522 and 6.44 on the one hand, and in 6.45 on the other, is important. It has bearings into



what he considered to be mystical about the world (and so a *noun*: 6.522 and 6.44), and our apprehension of it (and so an *adjective*: 6.45). They cannot be identified. "The mystical" is an aspect of that same world we think and talk about in propositions and which is revealed ("shown" to belong to the world through the medium of language, but cannot be thought or talked about in language. "The mystical" is "felt" and that feeling is the mystical feeling. But in no way is "the mystical feeling", i.e. "das mystische" the same as "the mystical" as expressed by "das Mystische".

In the revised Pears and McGuinness English edition of the *Tractatus* (1974) the translation of the remarks on the mystical is as follows:

6.44 It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists.

6.45b Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They *make themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical.

These renderings do not make it sufficiently clear in this English version when "mystical" is to be taken as a noun or as an adjective. This was of importance to Wittgenstein. It would be more natural to render "das Mystische" in 6.44 and 6.522 as "the mystical", if Wittgenstein's suggestions are followed, so as to distinguish it from the adjectival form which occurs in 6.45b and which could perhaps be simply "mystical".

#### Variants of minor importance

- ¶1.6 *Error*: In the German text the pronoun "it" is rendered "er" ("he").
- ¶4.2-3 *Alteration*: The word "determinate" does not seem to be the original from which the German "gegeben" might have been rendered.
- ¶4.3 *Addition*: The word "component" is missing in the German text.
- ¶4.10 *Error*: "Shown" is italicized in the English text, but the corresponding German "aufgewiesen" is not so.
- ¶5.7-9 *Alteration*: The sentence between the full stops occurs in brackets in the German text.
- ¶5.18-21 *Error*: The grammatical agreement of "Sachverhalt" and "Tatsachen" is incorrect in the German text; they should both be either singular or plural and agree with the corresponding verb form. Naturally these words are always italicized in the English text since they occur in German. They are only italicized on two occasions in the German text.
- ¶6.4 *Alteration*: The corresponding word in German for "unchanged" is "unabhängig", presumably a bad translation. But it could also be considered as an alteration in the

English text since the nature of the projective properties is more adequately conveyed by "unchanged" than by "independent".

- ¶9.5 *Error*: In the German text "Fact" occurs in plural and it should not ("Tatsachen").
- ¶9.15-16 *Error*: The phrases "the so-called logical constants are not represented by signs" is missing in the German text, leaving the whole sentence with no sense at all.
- ¶9.6 *Error*: "it" is erroneously rendered in German "er" ("he").
- ¶10.20 *Error*: "atomic fact" is wrongly rendered "Elementen" in the German text.
- ¶10.21-22 *Error*: The phrase "there would still be objects and atomic facts" is missing in the German text, leaving the sentence without sense.
- ¶10.24 *Error*: "fact" is not italicized in the German text.
- ¶14.19-20 *Alteration*: The sentence in brackets in the English text is not in brackets in the German text.
- ¶14.27 *Error*: In the formula "( $\exists x$ ).fx", the German text has a comma instead of a dot.
- ¶14.30-31 *Alteration*: The phrase in square brackets does not occur in brackets in the German text.
- ¶15.3 *Alteration*: The symbol "N" in the German text lacks the bar over it here and in the lines which follow; indeed, only the 1922 Introduction has the bar.
- ¶16.5 *Alteration*: The words "Form der" do not occur in the English text and, presumably, they should since Russell is there referring to *Tractatus* 6, where the expression "the general form of truth-function" is used.
- ¶17.4 *Error*: The word "generation" was erroneously translated into German "Verallgemeinerung" ("generalization").
- ¶17.7-9 *Alteration*: The sentence in brackets here is not in brackets in the German text.
- ¶19.1 *Alteration*: "names" is in italics in the German text but not so in the English text.
- ¶19.11-12 *Error*: The phrase "by means of identity" is missing in the German text.
- ¶24.6 *Addition*: The word "superficially" does not occur in the German text.
- ¶25.12 *Alteration*: The sentence "A considers p" occurs in the German text and not in the English text. Presumably it was a slip of the pen since the verbs used in line 10 are precisely those of the examples.
- ¶27.8 *Alteration*: The word "of" in the phrase "the structure of words" is not in italics in the German text.

### Concluding Remark

Wittgenstein's charges against Russell's Introduction may have been a powerful reason for making it a "widely-despised"<sup>7</sup> document--if I may borrow the description. Despite this, the interest and importance of the Introduction are still evident. Russell's philosophy of logical atomism and that of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* are best understood together. The issues that Russell and Wittgenstein deal with are common concerns. But their assumptions, and, consequently, the direction taken in the elucidation and solution of their problems appear to differ. In singling out common concerns, and pin-pointing divergent views, the Introduction is an invaluable guide. At times, it provides us with clear theses, at times with suggestions whose ultimate implications are to be found elsewhere.

Let me single out just one issue here--whose importance emerges from this study--namely, that of vagueness. Russell states in the Introduction that "language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise". This thesis, here simply stated, is discussed by Russell in his article entitled "Vagueness". The article was written in the same period as the Introduction. It was originally a paper delivered to the Jowett Society at Oxford on 25 November 1922,<sup>8</sup> and published the following year in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*. There Russell expounds his reasons for thinking all language is vague, and why, even for an "accurate Symbolism", precision might be an ideal. Thus, he indirectly discloses his motives for suggesting that the *Tractatus* is concerned with an ideal language, since definiteness of sense cannot be found in ordinary language. That definiteness of sense is a characteristic of ordinary language would have surprised Russell, if put forward as a serious claim. But Wittgenstein did claim it. His work was about language, and all language would have the essential characteristics that the *Tractatus* assigned to it, including that of definiteness of sense. That is why I suggest that disagreement between Russell and Wittgenstein as regards the main concern of the *Tractatus* is based, among other things, upon their divergent views on the nature of vagueness and where definite meaning is to be found.<sup>9</sup>

Somerville College  
Oxford

M. Teresa Iglesias

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<sup>7</sup>C. Wright, "On the Coherence of Vague Predicates", *Synthese*, 30 (1975), p. 325.

<sup>8</sup>According to the Jowett Society Minute Book, MS. Top. Oxon. d. 359/1, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

<sup>9</sup>This thesis is further developed in my paper, "Russell on Vagueness and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*", forthcoming in *Proceedings of the Second Wittgenstein Symposium*, Kirchberg, Austria, September 1977.