Reviews

The acts of the apostles

by Nicholas Griffin


It is one of the ironies of the historiography of philosophy that Moore and Russell so frequently rub shoulders in the same chapter. The reasons for this rather alarming juxtaposition of names have always seemed slight enough. For a period of four years (1899–1903) Russell and Moore held roughly similar metaphysical theories; for a further period of eight years Russell held a Moorean position in ethics (not, by any means, the most important of Russell's philosophical concerns); and throughout the rest of their lives they shared a common antipathy to Idealism. This last was cause enough to link them together at a time when most professional philosophers were Idealists; but by the 1920s, when Idealists were becoming an endangered species, the class of non-Idealists ceased to be a useful philosophical classification. With the exceptions noted above, Moore and Russell differed on practically everything philosophical: from the positions they held to the methods they used to justify them. It now turns out, if Paul Levy is correct, that they weren't even friends.

Levy's book is the result of ten years' exclusive access to Moore's Nachlass. As such it is full of information which has hitherto been withheld from public discussion. Since much of this information is important for understanding the intellectual concerns of Moore, Russell, the Bloomsbury group and the Cambridge Apostles, it is impossible to ignore the book. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to take it quite seriously. For Levy's book is a sad travesty of what the product of ten years' work on the papers of an important philosopher ought to be. Philosophically, beyond the information revealed in scattered quotations from Moore's unpublished writings, its contribution is negligible. This is true, not only in connection with the analysis of Moore's philosophy, but
in more mundane matters of philosophical scholarship, such as the more precise dating of Moore’s changes of position. On this last matter, Levy, with all Moore’s extant diaries and correspondence to go on, must have had better information than has been granted to the rest of us. Yet Levy gives us no better idea of when Moore first reacted against Idealism, nor of what his precise allegiance to Idealism was, than we had before. Biographically, the book is full of new information. But Moore’s is a difficult life to write, lacking, as it did, the public drama of Russell’s tempestuous career, the elaborately constructed persona of Strachey and the pivotal internal anguish of Virginia Woolf. What Moore left for his biographer, in his letters and diaries, was a series of detailed descriptions (as honestly presented as introspection would allow) of his various states of mind. To fashion these documents into a coherent and convincing study of the man requires more psychological acuity and narrative skill than Levy demonstrates. Thus Moore’s compulsive behaviour, which manifested itself not only in his manner of doing philosophy but in his compiling lists of people he knew and when he cleaned his pipe, is glossed by Levy (pp. 13–14) as a mere amiable eccentricity, which, indeed, at one level it was. But a biographer might reasonably be expected to pursue the matter somewhat further. We wish to know, if possible, why Moore was like that, and how it affected his personal relations. And Levy doesn’t tell us. The difficulties in writing a good biography of Moore are akin to those in writing a good one of Forster. The relative successes of the biographers of these two men can be judged by comparing Furbank’s excellent *E. M. Forster* with the present patchy and flawed account of Moore.

There is some confusion as to what exactly Levy’s book is. After a summary of Noel Annan’s paper on the English intellectual aristocracy into which Moore’s family background can conveniently be fitted, Levy follows with two purely biographical chapters taking Moore up to his first two years at Cambridge. This material is well presented and promises us a decent conventional biography. Thereafter, however, the book falls to pieces. The first three chapters comprise Book I. Book II consists of a single chapter on the Cambridge Apostles. Here, again, Levy has been fortunate in his sources of information: he has discovered a lot more about the Apostles up to the early twentieth century than was hitherto known. In particular, he has a detailed (perhaps not comprehensive?) knowledge of topics discussed, access to some of the papers read (by Moore and others), a full list of members up to 1914 (which he printed as an appendix) and, from the correspondence he has studied, a great deal of information about the goings-on behind the scenes including a surely comprehensive listing of homosexual relations between members. In his fourth chapter, however, he takes us back to 1820 and the formation of the Society, and follows it up with a list of the Apostolates of notable members from J. F. D. Maurice (elected 1823) to Nathaniel Wedd (elected 1888). Of this sizeable body of luminaries very few had any direct connection with Moore, and the story of their noumenal activities belongs to another book. It may be, of course, that Levy gained access to this information on the understanding that it was to be used (if at all) in a book on Moore. In this case, while Levy’s reluctance to exclude it is understandable, it would have been better situated as an appendix, for in its present position it interrupts the narrative and breaks the back of the book.

When the narrative of Moore’s life is resumed in Chapter 5, something has clearly gone wrong and remains wrong for the remainder of the book. The catalogue format of Chapter 4 persists, and we are given in Chapter 5 a catalogue of Moore’s early appearances at the Apostles, and in Chapter 6 a complementary catalogue of his other philosophical writings. Thereafter, in fact, the catalogue technique is never wholly abandoned. Material is presented in roughly chronological order, and gaps open up in Moore’s life: any time he spent away from Cambridge (which amounted to several years) is virtually ignored, as are his regular academic tasks at Cambridge. And yet both of these are of reasonable importance, biographically and intellectually: a man from a very sheltered environment, who spends his early manhood (to the age of thirty) at Cambridge, might be expected to undergo some changes as a result of moving to Edinburgh for three and a half years to live on unearned income with his lover. But of what these changes might have been, whether Moore felt disappointment or bitterness at not receiving a Cambridge Research Fellowship, of why he didn’t receive one, of how the domestic arrangements in Edinburgh worked out, we are told nothing beyond what Moore had already reported in his autobiography. An infatuation (to use Levy’s term for it), even if as Platonic as Levy would have us believe, and setting up house with the infatuee are not events likely to be without consequences in a person’s life. Yet in Levy’s account they stand isolated and detached, without echo or resonance. By sharp contrast the events of Moore’s Apostolate are recorded in meticulous detail: the election of new members (however peripherally they impinged on Moore), the succession of Apostolic dinners that Moore attended, are all recorded *seriatim*. It comes as no real surprise when on p. 222 we read: “In December 1900 a very extraordinary thing happened”—as if Moore had suddenly become Prime Minister—when the event in question was merely that the same

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paper was read on two consecutive Apostolic meetings. It’s almost as if Levy believes the Apostolic fiction that all outside the Society was mere appearance. And yet for all this concern with Apostolic minutiae, Levy’s coverage is far from thorough. Thus the meeting of 11 December 1897 when Russell read “Seems, Madam? Nay, It Is”, which marked his own break from the Apostles’ dominant Idealism, is not even mentioned in passing. A potentially good and interesting biography of Moore, the book loses its way in Chapter 4 and becomes a compilation on Moore’s connection with Apostles.

Levy continues this sketchy story up to the First World War. The last topic covered in any detail is Moore’s attitude to the war. Moore’s marriage in 1916 to Dorothy Ely is passed over with the discreet platitudes of a memorialist. Clearly, in view of both the selection of material and the fact that the book ends when Moore still has another forty years to live, Levy’s book is much less than a biography. Yet in other ways it attempts to be much more, for it aims to survey Moore’s influence. Here Levy’s claims far outstrip the evidence for them. There is, of course, a very weak sense of “influence” in which one might be said to be influenced by whomever one had read or even heard of. In this sense, Moore’s influence was very wide, but this is not the type of deep influence which is significant in cultural history. There is no doubt that Moore exerted considerable influence on the Apostles and on Bloomsbury. There is no doubt, also, that the Apostles, through their subsequent occupancy of key positions in the British cultural and administrative establishment, were themselves influential. Nor that Bloomsbury exerted considerable influence on aesthetic and intellectual style in the first half of this century, and beyond. But influence is not transitive. That Moore influenced Bloomsbury is undeniable, as is the fact that Bloomsbury influenced English attitudes to French cooking. But to claim that Moore influenced English attitudes to French cooking would be absurd. Levy comes close to drawing this conclusion (pp. 14–15). He certainly draws others equally absurd, e.g. that, in 1905, with the exception of symbolic logic, “Russell acknowledged his discipleship to Moore in most areas of philosophical concern” (p. 256). Elsewhere, Moore’s influence is insinuated, often pretty improbably, without being directly claimed—e.g. in the suggestion (p. 219) that Moore’s Apostolic paper on conversion may have influenced Whitehead’s later philosophical writings. In fact, it is hard to see any even tenuous connection between Moore’s paper, as cited by Levy, and process philosophy. 2 Another example of Levy’s method of insinuation concerns Strachey’s statement of the principles on which he based his conscientious objection to the Hampstead Appeals Tribunal. “G. E. Moore’s influence”, Levy writes (p. 278), “is present not only in the language, but in the sentiments of that statement.” There is likely some truth in that judgment, although Strachey at one point says that it is unreasonable to generalize about an abstraction—a view which Moore could hardly share. However, on p. 289 Levy is asserting that Moore actually helped Strachey with his statement. Levy cites no evidence for this claim, beyond the fact that Moore did help other people draft similar statements, and Michael Holroyd certainly provides no support for this contention. 3 And Levy is certainly excessive in claiming (p. 15) a major influence for Moore on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, a book which contains only three references to Moore: a commendation of the style of Principia Ethica, an attack on its use of probability, and favourable mention of Moore’s method in epistemology. 4 Levy’s attempt to show that Moore is one of the central influences of twentieth-century British culture is, I think, thoroughly misplaced.

The orthodox view of Moore’s influence, which Levy traces to Keynes’s “Two Memoirs” (written much later for the Bloomsbury Memoir Club), is that Bloomsbury adopted certain doctrines from Principia Ethica, especially from the last chapter, which then formed a sort of philosophical backdrop for their own intellectual endeavours. There is certainly some truth in Levy’s challenge to this view. Moore’s influence on Bloomsbury was at least partly personal. His almost palpable integrity, the seriousness with which he pursued the truth, his high-mindedness, his lack of reverence for metaphysical obscurity and his childlike innocence were all qualities which endeared him to the Bloomsberries. The extent to which they tried to emulate him, however, is open to doubt. Although Levy maintains that they owed their attempt to be candid about their personal relationships and feelings to Moore’s example, it seems quite impossible to be sure that in this Moore and Bloomsbury were not both reacting against Victorian hypocrisy. At the same time it is difficult to suppose that, as Levy reports (pp. 11–12), A. J.

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2 Moore’s paper in 1900 is, indeed, a very curious one, when compared with Moore’s other writings, both before and after. It is a regrettable consequence of Levy’s atomistic and fragmentary method that it is presented as yet another event in Moore’s Apostolic history, without any attempt to see why Moore, at that time, should be writing such an uncharacteristic paper. One obvious suggestion, from the material Levy provides, is that it was, at least partially, the result of Moore’s infatuation with Ainsworth, which was at its height in 1900.
Ayer could have been converted to Moore’s ethics by reading Clive Bell’s Art if Moore’s influence on Bell had not been, in some ways at least, doctrinal.

Levy’s claim that Moore’s influence was not doctrinal, if true, would at least serve to extenuate one of the more marked failures of the book: Levy’s refusal to come to grips with Moore’s philosophy. Principia Ethica is the only published work treated at any length. The more popular Ethics warrants only a single paragraph, and Some Main Problems of Philosophy (written in 1910–11, but published later) is barely mentioned. Even the treatment of Principia Ethica leaves a lot to be desired, not only as regards Levy’s analysis of the book, but also his account of the origins of its doctrine. Levy is assiduous in trying to find even tenuous connections between Moore’s Apostolic papers and the positions adopted in Principia Ethica. Yet he ignores completely the content of Moore’s lectures on ethics given in London in 1898–99, despite the fact that Moore states in his autobiography that it was in writing those lectures that he developed the outline of Principia Ethica. What discussion of Moore’s philosophy there is usually takes place second-hand through the quoted comments of other philosophers. When Levy himself takes over the debate disaster is often close at hand—as when he says that “The Refutation of Idealism” “put paid to the phenomenalistic basis of all idealist philosophies” (p. 248). It is indeed true that phenomenalism is attacked (in my view successfully) in “The Refutation of Idealism”, but it is simply false to maintain that all idealisms are phenomenalistic. And it is seriously misleading to maintain this in a book where the brands of idealism most frequently mentioned are neo-Hegelian ones, and to reinforce the error in the next sentence by remarking that nonetheless Moore continued to attend McTaggart’s lectures, despite his having put paid to phenomenalism. What is perhaps more important historically than Moore’s having put paid to phenomenalism in his famous paper, is his having put paid to Bradleian idealism in his unknown fellowship dissertation on Bradley’s ethics and a neglected paper “On the Nature of Judgment” (Mind, 1899) which he extracted from it. It was this paper which, Russell said, was “the first published account of the new [i.e. analytic] philosophy”. It is scandalous that Levy should have had exclusive access for ten years to Moore’s unpublished dissertation and yet, in the chapter he devotes to it, be unable to tell us anything more about it than was already known from published sources. It is to be hoped that eventually a serious study of this important document will be possible.6

Had Levy paid more attention to the fellowship dissertation and “On the Nature of Judgment”, he would have been able to point out doctrinal influences where they really exist. He cites (p. 248) Russell’s vastly over-generous acknowledgement to Moore in the Preface to The Principles of Mathematics without demure and without indicating either the extent of the true debt or to which works of Moore’s Russell was indebted. (Indeed, Levy gives the impression that it was to “The Refutation of Idealism”.) Since both men came subsequently to conclude that the views they shared in The Principles of Mathematics were mistaken, Moore was being perfectly honest when he refers to Russell’s acknowledgement and says “I do not know that Russell ever owed me anything [positive] except mistakes”.7 Levy cites this remark and puts it down to tact. In fact, from Levy’s account one would imagine that the only time Moore deviated from his legendary honesty was when he said nice things about Russell; and that the only time Russell deviated from his characteristic dishonesty was when he said nice things about Moore. Levy’s account of Russell is so bad that when Russell makes a claim in his Autobiography for which there is no firm evidence for or against, apart from Russell’s word, Levy generously admits “it is not impossible that this is the truth” (p. 281).

There is no doubt that, despite the public politeness, Russell’s and Moore’s relations became strained very early on, and they were not the firm friends they were usually supposed to be. Levy is to be credited with bringing this fact to light. In doing so, however, he adopts an extravagantly partisan position. It is curious to see how the personal animosities which added spice to Bloomsbury life have been carried on by Bloomsbury biographers—how, for example, Virginia Woolf’s biographers attack Lyttton Strachey’s. Levy has no intention of casting a dispassionate eye on Moore’s feuding with Russell. It is, of course, to be expected that, on the whole, a biographer will side with his subject on such matters, but one might also expect a biographer to attempt to see something of the other side. This Levy fails to do. It is not difficult to see why Moore and Russell should not have got on. They were very different personalities: there was something infuriatingly bland about Moore, just as there was something infuriatingly unbland about Russell. This difference affected their philosophical discussions, for (according to Desmond

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6 Added in proof: Moore’s dissertation is now in the possession of Cambridge University Library and can be consulted in the Wren Library of Trinity College.

MacCarthy, cited p. 206) Moore felt flustered by Russell’s rapid delivery of arguments and positions, which contrasted with Moore’s painstaking, pedestrian methods of analysis. With Moore prone to silence and Russell to loquacity, a debate between them would certainly have had its comic side. Whether Moore really felt that Russell’s style of argument was dishonest (as Levy claims on p. 129) is not apparent from the evidence given, but it is clear that Moore did think that Russell often missed the point he was labouring to convey (p. 250).

According to Levy the provocations offered to the saint-like Moore by Russell’s malice and dishonesty were fairly frequent. But three incidents stand out, in Levy’s mind, as being particularly indicative of Russell’s low moral character. The first occurred on a walking tour in Norfolk before they took their respective Triposes in May 1894. On the walk they met a man whom Russell encouraged to tell dirty stories, much to Moore’s discomfort, who afterwards declared him to be the most wicked man he’d ever heard of. Russell, in a letter soon after to his fiancée, who would have been almost as horrified at dirty stories as Moore was, maintained that he’d encouraged the man because Moore needed a lesson about what the world was like. In his Autobiography Russell tells it as an amusing story to illustrate Moore’s innocence. Levy, in an extended fulmination (pp. 135–7), finds Russell guilty on two charges: first on account of the discrepancy between the two versions of the story, second on account of amusing himself by toying with Moore’s innocence. (Curiously, Moore’s version of the story is not given, so we cannot judge whether Moore found it as traumatic an experience as Levy supposed, or even whether Moore, in his innocence, realized that Russell was egging the man on.) It seems, on the face of it, that Russell did dress up the story for his fiancée by providing an appropriately high-minded, if somewhat ridiculous, explanation. Even in his letter, however, he can’t conceal his amusement. Whether this was so grievous a crime is another matter. Indeed the question might be raised as to whether, just a few years before the British Government invented concentration camps, in a world of sweat shops and imperialism, a moral philosopher who thought a man who told dirty stories was the wickedest person he’d ever heard of, wasn’t being culpably innocent.

Russell’s second great provocation to Moore came at a Society meeting. On 4 February 1899 Moore read to the Society a paper called “Do We Love Ourselves Best?”, which was, from Levy’s account, a tirade against ethical egoism. The following week Russell read a paper called “Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?”, in which he poked gentle fun at Moore’s lecturing on ethics in London, and sought to refute a view he attributed to Moore that beauty was good as an end in itself. Levy (pp. 204–6) insists on treating Russell’s paper as a reply to Moore’s previous one. Since Moore’s paper was on ethical egoism and Russell’s was on whether beauty had value independently of human consciousness of it, it is scarcely surprising that Levy finds Russell guilty of gross misunderstandings. In fact, the very grossness of the misunderstandings should have alerted Levy to the fact that he’d got it wrong. Russell is not replying to Moore’s previous Apostolic paper, and only someone wedded to the view that the only papers worth discussing were those read at the Society would have believed that he was. Not only are Moore’s and Russell’s successive Apostolic papers on completely different topics, but Russell virtually announces that he’s going to criticize Moore’s lectures on ethics given late the previous year in London. The typescript of these lectures was read by Russell and, unlike many of Moore’s papers, is available for scholars. Had Levy taken the trouble to read it he would have found there precisely the position Russell criticizes in “Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?” Thus, for example, Moore writes: “that which in itself was more beautiful must in itself be considered better than that which was more ugly, whether anyone were ever to be conscious of its beauty or not” (“The Elements of Ethics”, Lecture v, p. 160). Nor is this a mere aside, for Moore elaborates the argument over another page, and concludes: “it follows that beauty must in itself be regarded as a part of the ultimate end, as a part of the summum bonum, and not as a mere means to its own effects on any conscious being” (ibid., pp. 161–2). Nor was it a position Moore came quickly to reject. An argument (and to my mind a completely cogent one) for the position Russell was criticizing occurs in Principia Ethica (art. 51) in criticism of Sidgwick, where it was lifted virtually intact from “The Elements of Ethics” ( Lecture iv, pp. 129–31). But Levy’s errors are still further augmented, for he says that Russell “then claims that our ethical judgement that the man who enjoys beauty is a better man than one who enjoys ugliness implies the validity of hedonism.... This, because the only difference in the states of mind of a man perceiving beauty rather than ugliness, is that the former carries greater pleasure” (p. 206). This is indeed a theory which Russell states but goes on immediately to reject as obviously false, crediting Moore with having pointed out its errors. People working on Russell have not had access to Moore’s papers, but Levy has had full access to Russell’s. That he has failed to read the ones he cites gives grave cause for concern, as does the fact that he seems not to have read Moore himself with sufficient attention, for his account of Moore’s philosophy is not accurate either. He maintains that Moore’s position was that “only love of others is good as an end in itself” (p. 204; my italics), or that “the only things that are good in themselves are states of mind” (p. 206; my
Italics). Neither is the thesis of *Principia Ethica*, which claims only that “certain states of consciousness” are “[b]y far the most valuable things we can know or imagine”. Indeed he admits the independent value of beauty (on the basis of the argument of art. 51) but claims that it is “so small as to be negligible in comparison with that which attaches to the consciousness of beauty” (p. 189). Nor is the position Levy attributes to Moore to be found in “The Elements of Ethics”, where Moore maintains “of things that are not mental, I think that those which are most beautiful are the best” (Lecture x, p. 353; see also Lecture iv, p. 133). Nor does Levy supply any textual evidence to show that the position(s) he attributes to Moore were maintained by him in “Do We Love Ourselves Best?” Finally, it should have been obvious to anyone with Levy’s familiarity with Apostolic papers in the 1890s that what Russell describes (p. 266) as Russell’s “not entirely good-natured” teasing of Moore, was virtually a Society tradition, and represents a recognition by Russell that Moore’s views predominated in the Society. Levy himself has quoted papers by Moore given at the time of McTaggart’s dominance in which Moore, presumably this time with full good humour, engages in the same kind of chaffing at McTaggart’s Absolute.

The third major upset in Russell’s and Moore’s relations was perhaps the most serious one, and concerned Wittgenstein. It came in two stages: first there was the question of Wittgenstein’s election to the Society; secondly there was a dispute about notes dictated by Wittgenstein to Moore in Norway. In both cases, Russell is accused of wanting to keep Wittgenstein to himself, of resenting Moore’s influence with Wittgenstein and the Society, and on one occasion (p. 273) of motiveless provocation. Lytton Strachey, in a letter to Saxon Sydney Turner (Holroyd, II: 71–2), maintained that Russell was desperate to keep Wittgenstein out of the Society. Russell, in a letter to Holroyd (ibid.) claimed he had no “strong views as to whether he should be elected or not”. This, claims Levy (p. 269), apparently unsure of whether to put it down as lucid dishonesty or innocent senility, was a “nonagenarian fib”, because at the time Russell had written to Ottoline Morrell that he had attended a meeting of the Society “to warn them about Wittgenstein, but they elected him”. Well, Russell may have been fibbing or forgetting, but he may equally have been telling the truth: for the two accounts, as a few moments’ consideration will show, are by no means inconsistent. It is quite possible to have no strong views as to whether Wittgenstein should or should not be elected, and yet at the same time to consider it worthwhile to warn the members about the likely consequences of electing him. In the event, Russell’s fears proved well founded: after a single meeting the brothers were in a flap and Wittgenstein was anxious to resign. Only the last-minute intervention of Strachey prevented his resignation. It was quite obvious that someone who had once exploded to Russell about the immorality of spending an afternoon watching a boat race when they could be working on logic, was not going to spend his Saturday nights enjoying schoolboy jokes about the Higher Sodomy. Levy’s explanation that “Russell wished to keep Wittgenstein out of the rival orbit of Moore’s influence” (p. 269) is equally absurd since Wittgenstein’s work primarily concerned logic, on which Moore could give him no help. In any case, Russell could hardly have kept Wittgenstein from seeing Moore when they were both at the same college and Wittgenstein had been attending one of Moore’s courses on ethics.

In 1915 there was a new clash over Wittgenstein. Moore had returned from Norway in 1914 with a series of notes on logic that Wittgenstein had dictated to him. Russell, whose previous major work on logical theory (the unpublished book on “Theory of Knowledge”, 1913) had foundered as a result of criticisms by Wittgenstein, was not unnaturally interested in Wittgenstein’s notes. It is not known whether Moore showed them to Russell, or told him of them, or neither. But there is a letter in January 1915 from Wittgenstein to Russell saying: “I find it inconceivable that Moore wasn’t able to explain my ideas to you.” On 20 January Russell showed this letter to Moore who, as Levy points out (p. 273) was furious and wrote in his diary: “Russell must have told him I couldn’t [explain Wittgenstein’s ideas]: but he had no right to say this, because he never tried to get me to explain them.” It seems that Moore’s legendary caution was abandoned here, because it is not so clear, from Wittgenstein’s letter, that Russell had claimed that Moore had tried, but failed, to explain the notes. On 10 February Moore recorded in his diary: “Russell asks to see my notes of Wittgenstein”. Whether this means that Russell had never seen the notes is not quite clear, but it is clear that between 20 January and 10 February Russell had not seen them. Four days later Russell showed Moore another letter from Wittgenstein, this time to Keynes, in which Wittgenstein was wondering what Russell had made of the notes. According to Levy (p. 273), this “was Russell’s way of firing that next shot in his battle with Moore”. It appears that Russell did not get to see the notes until 29 April. While clearly regarding all this as Russell’s attempts to provoke Moore, Levy does not attempt to suggest a motive for Russell’s behaviour. It apparently never crossed Levy’s mind that Russell, who saw in Wittgenstein’s work the one chance of solving the philosophical problems which had beset his work on the foundations of logic, had really quite a natural desire to see what Wittgenstein had been...

*(Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 188.*
doing. Nor does it seem to have crossed Levy's mind to ask why Moore found himself unable to pass on to Russell Wittgenstein's research notes, which he knew to be of vital importance to Russell's work, when he had Wittgenstein's clear permission to do so. Could it be that Moore was concerned to keep Wittgenstein's results to himself?

It is clear that in many ways Moore was a uniquely lovable human being. The comparisons with Dostoevsky's Prince Myshkin are not entirely out of place. On the other hand, like Prince Myshkin, Moore was a bit more complex and not so straightforward as appearances might suggest. So keen is Levy to leave Moore's sanctity intact that he ignores the subtleties and dark corners of Moore's personality. It is unfortunate that, after reading Levy's overly fulsome book, one comes to dislike Moore as much for his virtues as his vices.⁹

⁹ Thanks are due to Rashida Khan for help in checking references in this review.