“The gulf between men and women is terrific”, Bertrand Russell told Lady Ottoline Morrell in 1913. “I suppose they never understand each other—and I think where sex attraction is absent there is a natural antipathy. Most people have a sort of sex-patriotism, which makes them instinctively stand by their own sex.”

There are many parallels between class- and sex-consciousness. To name only three: similar preconditions (largely urban and industrial) exist for the emergence of both; each aspires to all-inclusiveness, and therefore aims ultimately to cut across the other; and the sharpness of each alignment is blurred by a minority which neglects short-term self-interest by refusing to identify politically with its own kind. This third parallel is the focus of attention here, for in the conflict of interest between the sexes Russell displayed a “false consciousness” analogous to the response of the bourgeois Marxist or proletarian conservative in the class war; that is to say, he aimed—in his political, intellectual and personal life—to moderate and even eliminate a potential polarization of society. Such apparently altruistic minorities are of special interest, not simply because their altruism demands explanation, but because their minority situation enriches their opportunities for perceiving significant social tendencies. It is surprising that a recent study of male feminists fails to analyze the complexities of their situation, or even to mention Russell’s presence in their midst.

In its theoretical Marxist application, the term “false consciousness” is essentially descriptive; it aims simply to specify a social and political location, and the same can be said of its application to the sphere of gender. Yet in practice, the excitements of class and gender conflict force emotion rapidly to the surface, and cause the bourgeois Marxist, the proletarian conservative, the male feminist and the female anti-feminist to incur strong...
praise or condemnation, depending on the commentator’s viewpoint. The male feminist, like the bourgeois Marxist, incurs all the hostility that social groups can reserve for the alleged traitor—all the admiration that the underdog can bestow on the altruist who helps them with his power, wealth, energies or intellect. Like other male feminists, Russell throughout his career denied that gender conflict need ever be inevitable, and sought to reorganize society accordingly.

Yet at least three contrasts circumscribe the analogy between class- and sex-consciousness. Firstly, there is no solvent of class conflict with anything like the power of the sexual attraction which fragments the male and female armies, detaches individuals from each side, and unites them to the alleged enemy. “A class is in its very idea a separate thing with common interests”, Lord Hugh Cecil informed Parliament in 1910, but “sex is just opposite. Sex is a body whose members are essentially interested in the members of the other sex.”

There is a second contrast; the feminist male and the anti-feminist female, unlike the bourgeois Marxist and the proletarian conservative, can never merge completely with their new-found allies; in the sphere of gender conflict, occasions for potential disagreement will frequently recur. It follows that whereas a Marxist allegiance need not unduly disrupt the personal life of the dissident bourgeois, a feminist allegiance makes such stringent demands on the male who wants his conduct to match his conviction that many male feminists will fall by the wayside; their false consciousness will then extend beyond the alleged betrayal of their sex into a concomitant betrayal of their feminist beliefs.

It is arguable that Russell himself displayed, in the sphere of gender conflict, this second and deeper variant of “false consciousness”; he will therefore attract still fiercer condemnation from some quarters. But in discussing Russell’s feminism it is important to avoid a mood of censoriousness, and to make full allowance for the difficulties of his personal situation and for contrasts between attitudes to gender today and during Russell’s formative years. A tripartite discussion of his roles as suffragist, feminist and husband will illuminate not only Russell’s personality and intellectual achievement, but also the complexities in situation and outlook that are to be found among the Edwardian male feminist pioneers whom Russell aspired to join.

Collaboration between the sexes was integral to the mood of nineteenth-century British feminism. Suffragist women knew how much they owed to John Stuart Mill, and co-operation with sympathetic men pervades the feminist careers of Florence Nightingale, Josephine Butler, Elizabeth Elmy and Millicent Garrett Fawcett. Collaboration with men was so integral to the mood of the non-militant National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) that it entitled its periodical Common Cause; “humanists we are, not feminists”, its editor believed. “I never believe in the possibility of a Sex War”; Mrs. Fawcett, the non-militants’ leader declared in 1910: “Nature has seen after that: as long as mothers have sons and fathers daughters there can never be a sex war.” The Union therefore admitted men to membership on the same terms as women. The same mood governed the United Suffragists, profoundly influenced as they were by Olive Schreiner’s sex-collaborationism; the militant Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) owed so much to Richard Pankhurst’s inspiration that it began to repudiate men’s aid only in its declining years.

Men contributed to suffragism in at least four ways: through ideas, voting power, money and personal advocacy. Mill’s writings and example inspired at least three of the leading pioneer British suffragist politicians—Leonard Courtney, Henry Fawcett and Sir Charles Dilke. “We call him dead, but he is a living figure to us”, Mrs. Despard declared in 1910, after a feminist procession had culminated in laying wreaths to celebrate the anniversary of Mill’s birth; the Women’s Freedom League was still paying tribute to his memory by placing flowers on his statue in 1927.

Mill’s influence on the first organization of feminist men—the Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage, founded in 1907—was direct: the chairman of its executive committee, Herbert Jacobs, recalled reading The Subjection of Women as a young man and “that settled my convictions once and for ever”. Mill’s influence was later reinforced by George Meredith, whose novels reached a rather different readership, and who envisaged enlightened men and women advancing together in the Liberal cause; the editor of Common Cause drew on her own experience when she memorably described the impact his novels could make on a young woman.

Edwardian feminist men could never fully mobilize their voting power because party programmes never gave first priority to women’s suffrage, but this did not deter organizations of feminist men from mobilizing the electors. The Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage had two classes of member in 1910: those who were, and those who were not, prepared to pledge their votes against candidates whose parties were uncommitted to a women’s suffrage measure. The Men’s Political Union for Women’s Enfranchisement was formed to organize deliberate anti-government voting at the general election of January 1910. Although the independent suffragist candidates at the general election of December 1910 attracted minimal support (Mirrlees only 0.4% of the votes cast at Glasgow Camlachie, Jacobs only 0.3% of the votes cast at St. Pancras East), more support could be drummed up at a by-election. Bertrand Russell won 24.4% of the votes cast at Wimbledon in May 1907 and George Lansbury 44.9% at Bow and Bromley in November 1912, though in both candidates women’s suffrage
was only one aspect of a wider reforming appeal. Male voting power could also operate in Parliament, where suffragist M.P.s triumphed in all six divisions on women's suffrage motions from 1897 to 1911; the heroes of that story came from all parties, led by Philip Snowden, Keir Hardie, Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Lord Robert Cecil.

Male feminists also contributed money. The militant suffragists, for instance, owed much to the sums donated and mobilized by Fred Pethick-Lawrence, though the proportion of men among the donors whose sex is specified in WSPU subscription-lists declines as Pankhurstian hostility to men escalates: from 11.5% of the total in 1907-08 to 9.1% in 1908-09 to 6.4% in 1910-11 to 5.4% in 1912-13. Most important of all was the personal advocacy that feminist men could contribute, often in ways not open to women. The Men's League had ten branches by 1910, issued a monthly periodical, distributed literature, held open-air meetings, and sought to mobilize electors. Its membership included sympathizers with many branches of the women's movement, and it therefore saw itself as performing a valuable integrating role. By 1912 its vice-presidents included Earl Russell, Rev. John Clifford, Philip Snowden, and Professor J. B. Bury, its speakers included R. C. K. Ensor, and its Oxford branch was supported by Gilbert Murray. In 1910 the Men's Political Union split off to promote the militant policy and had twelve branches by 1912; in 1911 the Men's Society for Women's Rights was launched to promote women's suffrage and to attack the white slave traffic. The escalation of militant tactics furnished the male feminist with new roles: speaking at meetings closed to women, defending feminists when physically attacked, and even going to prison on their behalf.

An effort of the imagination is now needed to appreciate the moral courage this frequently involved. "Looking back on it now", wrote Laurence Housman decades later, "I think the hardest thing one had to face was the sense of feeling foolish", breaching what was seen as good form. In the anti-suffragist mind, sex-roles were clearly distinct and male feminism was seen as a sign of effeminacy. Yet suffragism required from Edwardian men qualities then seen, especially by anti-feminists, as decidedly male: physical courage and a chivalrous protectiveness towards an allegedly oppressed female sex. Paradoxically, there is more than a trace of chivalry in the suffragism of Lord Robert Cecil and Keir Hardie, to name only two. In its first two years, eight members of the Men's Political Union were imprisoned for the cause, and by 1913 men were organizing themselves to defend women's right to free speech in Hyde Park.

Russell was not a leading British feminist, nor did he contribute importantly to it in the area where he was best qualified; he did not respond to Margaret Llewelyn Davies's suggestion of 1906 that he should "write us a new and modern classic on the suffrage—to replace Mill—or rather, continue him". Such a classic was much needed if British Edwardian feminist argument was to capitalize fully on recent economic and demographic change; Edwardian feminists produced surprisingly little substantial literature. Russell wanted to oblige, and made some attempts at writing, but said that "they have been so lamentable that I came to the conclusion I was incapable of that sort of writing"; in the end he produced only ephemeral pamphlets and short articles. Nor was Russell prominent in any of the other three areas of Edwardian male feminist achievement. Whatever he might do in the 1960s, in the Edwardian period his crusading zeal did not cause him to operate outside the party system or to break the law.

Yet his feminism was fervent, and he was predestined to it for at least three reasons. Given his feminist family connections on both sides, an anti-feminist Russell would have been a rebel indeed. His maternal grandmother Lady Stanley was a founder of Girton College, which she consistently aided until her death in 1895. His father Lord Amberley was a radical whose political career was aided by J. S. Mill; to Amberley's wife Kate it was "of course more pleasure to hear him ... commended by Mill than all the praise or blame of the world". She found Mill's company inspiring, and asked Mill to act as Bertrand's non-religious godfather, "for there is no one in whose steps I would rather see a boy of mine following ... than in Mr. Mill's". At her request, Mill introduced her to the pioneer woman doctor Elizabeth Garrett Anderson at his house in Blackheath; with Dr. Anderson's aid, her son Bertrand was later brought to birth. By 1869 Lady Amberley was vigorously combating all aspects of the anti-feminist case, and was "very much pleased" later in the year with her presentation-copy of The Subjection of Women. She overcame her distaste for publicity and lectured on women's suffrage in 1870, for with her (as she put it) it had become "a matter of faith or religion".

Russell's feminism also owes much to his temperament, for like his father he detested conventionality. "We live in a world of novelties", Mill enthusiastically informed Parliament in the women's suffrage debate of 1867; "the despotism of custom is on the wane; we are not now satisfied with knowing what a thing is, we ask whether it ought to be." The young Russell was inevitably influenced by Mill, whose autobiography supplied arguments to buttress Russell's loss of faith. He became a passionate feminist after reading Mill on the subject during adolescence, some years before becoming aware of his mother's feminist commitment. Through his educational writings and personal example, Russell spent a lifetime in propagating Mill's irreverence towards authority. Meredith was not an important influence; Russell was not attracted by the personality revealed in his books, and detected "coarseness" in his novels and letters. Russell's Anti-Suffragist Anxieties (1910) shows a facetious and even mild contempt for A. V. Dicey's anti-suffragist arguments; its mood is remote indeed from
the conservative’s anxious preference for well-trodden ways.

Russell’s irreverence was combined with a continuous awareness of human suffering which was related in complex ways to his depressive tendency. His discomfort amid cultivated and often opulent personal surroundings reflects a youthful ardour for the late-Victorian Liberal programme which would enable progress to chase away cruelty, tyranny and injustice. He told Lady Constance Malleson in 1916 that “the centre of me is always and eternally a terrible pain—a curious wild pain—a searching for something beyond what the world contains ... it is the source of gentleness and cruelty and work, it fills every passion that I have ... it sets one oddly apart and gives a sense of great isolation.” Nor could all the twentieth-century’s setbacks to Russell’s Liberal optimism prevent him at the end of his life from sharing Mill’s impatience “with those who accept fatalistically the view that man is born to trouble”.

The third reason why Russell’s feminism is predictable concerns his intellect. Anti-feminists had been forced back on anti-intellectualism from the start, whereas feminism marshalled the forces of progress against “the stupid party”; until the 1920s only a minority of Conservatives supported women’s suffrage. Within four months of its formation in 1907, the Men’s League was boasting that so many of its members came from the legal, medical and teaching professions as well as from the church, art, literature and journalism; its list of distinguished male supporters in 1909 included Russell. Among the self-declared Edwardian suffragist authors were Wells, Shaw, Galsworthy, E. M. Forster, Meredith, Gilbert Murray, Hardy, J. M. Barrie, Belloc, Chesterton, Bennett, Bernard Bosanquet, H. A. L. Fisher, F. C. S. Schiller, F. M. Cornford and A. R. Wallace.

British feminism owes much to Bertrand Russell’s university; thirty-two fellows of Cambridge colleges signed a women’s suffrage petition as early as 1876. In the Edwardian period Russell moved freely among their successors; his first wife Alys chaired a public meeting on women’s suffrage there in February 1907, and Bertrand later expressed admiration for the local feminist pioneer Miss Mary Bateson. In July 1907 Alfred North Whitehead and his wife, Evelyn, entertained Cambridge suffrage delegates in their garden, and both remained prominent in the local branch thereafter. By 1909 Cambridge’s branch of the Men’s League boasted about eighty members, and there was also a branch at Oxford.

But Russell’s intellect drew him towards feminist activism for another and more subtle reason. It would be impossible to summarize in a brief capsule-statement that remarkable combination of rationalism and mysticism, puritanism and physical passion, cold selfishness towards individuals and warm benevolence towards humanity that moulded Russell’s intellect at what was philosophically his most creative moment. But two lifelong and contradictory impulses can be distinguished as henceforth governing his conduct: a desire for the loneliness and self-conscious specialization that is associated with major intellectual achievement; and a humanitarian conscience that periodically drove him to repudiate quietism and throw himself into the world and its problems. A syncopation between quietism and political activism pervades the whole of his early career. “[I]t is hard not to long, in weak moments, for a simple life, a life with books and things, away from human sorrow”, he wrote in 1903; yet he saw the free-trade crusade of 1903–04 as supplying “relief to my philanthropic impulses”; it provided intellectual refreshment and relaxation until the call to the intellect once more asserted itself. There was wisdom in the warning offered by his brother Frank in 1916 that “what the world wants of first class intellects like yours is not action—for which the ordinary politician or demagogue is good enough—but thought, a much more rare quality”; for Russell’s practical political writings cannot compare in importance with his philosophical achievement.

Yet Frank was wrong, because practical activity was integral even to Russell’s philosophical creativity. He might at the time regard political demands as a tiresome intrusion, but in practice they gave him at least four kinds of help: they periodically assuaged that inherited family urge towards assuming responsibility for public affairs; they temporarily satisfied the intellectual’s occasional yearning to move in less sophisticated circles; they brought relaxation from an intellectual effort so formidable as repeatedly to induce a sense of failure; and they helped him to cultivate human relationships at a time of marital breakdown and family disapproval. This is the context in which to view Russell’s Edwardian suffragist activism. Margaret Llewelyn Davies often refers apologetically in her suffragist correspondence with Russell between 1906 and 1909 to “THE BOOK” from which she is distracting him. Conversely the book could refresh a political career which in the Edwardian period he showed signs of taking very seriously; as he told a friend in 1906, “mathematics is a haven of peace without which I don’t know how I should get on”.

This complexity in Russell’s motivation is compounded, however, by his relationships with women. His affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell after 1911 provided a human relationship of a very different order, drew him away from suffragist activism, and at first provided both the encouragement and the internal harmony that made for a new burst of intellectual creativity. By June 1913, however, he was growing restive at the tyranny and loneliness of such complete intellectual absorption, and explained to Lady Ottoline that in such situations his rebellion eventually “grows stronger and comes to the surface and I am human again”. There is a strange alternation at work in Russell’s career between a passionate commitment to one woman and a generalized benevolence towards humanity at large. Describing to Lady Ottoline in 1911 his mystical experience of 1901 with
Mrs. Whitehead, Russell pointed out how universal love "came as an escape from private misfortune", and caused him suddenly to repudiate the Boer War with such energy that Alys reacted jealously to his new-found commitment.  

A similar alternation between private affection and public crusading took place during the First World War. At such a time there was of course ample objective reason for Russell's political involvement; yet here too there was a personal dimension, for Wittgenstein had undermined his philosophical self-confidence and his affair with Lady Ottoline was not going well. A note of genuine exhaliration enters into his work, often of the humblest kind, for the No-Conscription Fellowship; furthermore, insofar as Russell was able to engage in purely intellectual work for his political causes, he could pursue from a new direction, with temporary success, that harmony between emotion and intellect which proved so elusive in his personal relationships. Yet exposure to human imperfection rapidly drove him back to mathematics (and to Lady Constance Malleson). "Instinct tells me that mathematics is what I need", he told Lady Ottoline in 1917; "I have lived too long with temporary things and things full of emotion. I always used to use mathematics as an escape from them, and I must do so again. I need the wide horizons, the cool atmosphere, the feeling of eternity."  

In 1920, family responsibilities brought him back once again to practical preoccupations, but in a way that could be less easily shaken off in the future.

Russell's feminism was nourished by two non-feminist influences: his repudiation of aristocracy and his inherited respect for the English libertarian tradition. He took up a middle position not only in the sex war but also in the class war, though the class war that is relevant here is not the Marxist struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, but the Victorian conflict between the "masses" and the "classes". His brief spell as a diplomat in 1894 reinforced his distaste for aristocrats "rigid and stiff and conventional, and horrified at the minutest divergence from family tradition", and he feared their corrupting impact on his personality.  

For him as for so many nineteenth-century radicals, aristocracy brought connotations of violence and war. His essay "The Free Man's Worship" (1903) describes "the worship of Force, to which Carlyle and Nietzsche and the creed of Militarism have accustomed us" as "a prostrate submission to evil, a sacrifice of our best to Moloch".  

Opposed to the worship of force were, as Mill told suffragists in 1869, "all the tendencies that characterized modern improvement ... the growing ascendancy of moral over physical force[,] of social influences over brute strength, of the idea of right over the law of might; the philanthropic spirit ... the democratic spirit ... the free-trade spirit ... the habit of estimating human beings by their intrinsic worth."  

For most nineteenth-century radicals, hostility to aristocracy also entailed repudiating the "physical force argument" that lay at the roots of the anti-suffragist case; military and imperial preoccupations were uppermost in the anti-suffragist mind, whereas for Russell the vote should be a protection for the weak, not an attribute of the strong. Russell's feminism, like Mill's, was but one aspect of the humanitarian's generalized repudiation of aristocratic values; "the argument in favour of equality between men and women", he wrote, "is merely an application of the general argument in favour of liberty". He told Lucy Donnelly that "it is not women as women that I want enfranchised, but women as human beings". All this had important implications for suffragist tactics; Christabel Pankhurst might feel in 1913 that "the great need of this time is for women to learn to stand and to act alone", but Russell's humanitarianism required the sexes to work together. His Edwardian feminist tactics foreshadow his famous appeal of 1954 "as a human being to human beings" to "remember your humanity, and forget the rest". Faced in 1969 with the argument that women have special reasons for repudiating nuclear warfare, Russell said he had "never been able to understand why the sexes should not combat it together".

One class and family trait that he did not repudiate was the English libertarian tradition, the second major non-feminist influence on his feminism. "Thanks to La Hogue, the Boyne and Blenheim we are a free nation", his grandfather Lord John Russell told Lord Amberley in 1872; he urged Amberley to give the name William to the newly-born Bertrand "in memory of our great ancestor, who gave his life for the liberty of his country". Like his Whig predecessors, Bertrand Russell throughout his life defends the individual citizen against a potentially oppressive state, and seeks to harmonize the two through promoting franchise reform. Reinforcing these Whig traditions is the strongly libertarian and individualist outlook of his paternal grandmother; as he later recalled, "her fearlessness, her public spirit, her contempt for convention, and her indifference to the opinion of the majority have always seemed good to me and have impressed themselves upon me as worthy of imitation."  

It was her influence that protected him against the scepticism and political inertia that descended upon so many nineteenth-century Whigs. Russell's loss of religious faith did not preclude the pursuit of a lifelong and passionate campaign for a better world, often carried on at the price of great personal discomfort and inconvenience. Into a new age and in new directions, he carried forward the traditional Whig pursuit of abstract justice with a truly evangelical indifference to what the world might think of him.

Russell's resolute independence is shared by several other British male feminists; H. W. Nevinson, for instance, was seen by many as decidedly English in his fearless resistance to oppression, and Edwardian suffragists often invoked the memory of seventeenth-century resistance to the Stuarts. "It is not only I who am in the dock", Russell declared in 1916, when
defending the conscientious objector, "it is the whole tradition of liberty which our ancestors built up through centuries of struggle and sacrifice." The later Russell might espouse socialism, but only within a decentralized political structure that would uphold individual liberty against new threats from tyranny. In 1931 he regretted Britain's decline in the face of American and Russian advance, if only because "the history of England for the last four hundred years is in my blood, and I should have wished to hand on to my son the tradition of public spirit which has in the past been valuable".

Such determined individualism carried over into Russell's practical reforming activity, and provides one further reason why his feminism took independent directions. His grandmother's emphasis on the Biblical text "thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil" made him an individualist even among individualists, an unbeliever among unbelievers, a dissenter among crusaders whose substitute-community nurtured reforming orthodoxies. Russell was a campaigner for many causes, and just as (in C. D. Broad's view) he produced a different system of philosophy every few years, so in politics he tended to move on from a crusade at its point of success. "So many people are puzzled and upset by the way I change and get away from things that I seem to see beyond ... ", he told Lady Ottoline in 1911; "there is no limit to what I can see and understand and love in the way of good."

There was ample scope in the Edwardian women's suffrage movement for moving on. For decades suffragists had resolutely adhered to the strategy evolved by Mill for use in a quite different political situation. Given the weakness of the early feminist movement, the prestige of the household franchise, the inarticulateness of the unenfranchised male after 1867, the undeveloped nature of mid-Victorian parties as manipulators of policy and mass opinion, and the consequent prominence in the reforming world of the private member's Bill and the popular pressure group, it was reasonable for Mill in the 1860s to recommend the equal franchise strategy—that is, the policy of removing the sex discrimination from the existing propertied franchise; the objection that this would reinforce the class bias of the existing electorate was then a less serious objection to his strategy than it became later. What now seems the obvious course, enfranchising all adults (that is, the adult suffrage strategy, which simultaneously involved enfranchising more men) would introduce dangerous political complications and detract from the simplicity of the feminist message.

Yet as early as 1870 Dilke had questioned the wisdom of Mill's strategy, and progressive Edwardian Liberals became increasingly convinced (if only by precedents from Australia and New Zealand) that their Party had nothing to gain from enfranchising women in such a way as to duplicate the anomalies of the existing propertied franchise. The "equality" involved in the equal franchise was bogus, they argued, because by strengthening Conservatism it would obstruct the social reforms that genuine equality required; the equal franchise offered no remedy for the problems peculiar to working women, and indulged in the absurdity of making the women's vote depend on marital status. An Edwardian Liberal zealot like Russell was inevitably attracted by the idea of resting the franchise on the voter's status as human being rather than as property-owner. Not only was there little chance in Parliament then for the private member's Bill and for non-party measures—adult suffrage was more firmly in tune with Liberal traditions, not to mention Labour Party sympathies.

Although Keir Hardie and several Labour M.P.s saw the equal franchise as the most practicable short-term route to women's suffrage, their Party—like the TUC—was even keener on adult suffrage, as amendments at the Party conferences of 1905 and 1907 made clear; the problem was that adult suffrage did not seem, for the moment, to be politically practicable. Geoffrey Howard's adult suffrage Bill of 1909, however, brought the matter to a head, demonstrated its potential for uniting Liberals with Labour, and advertised a way of getting votes for women without cutting across party loyalties. It was publicly championed by most of the women then prominent in the labour movement and by the Women's Liberal Federation; whereas 29 Unionists were prepared to support Stanger's equal franchise Bill of 1908, none backed Howard's measure of 1909, whose opponents included 74 Conservatives but only 46 Liberals. The adult suffrage strategy could not of course produce immediate results, but in the Edwardian party situation it had better long-term prospects than Mill's equal franchise strategy.

British feminists adapted only slowly to this new situation, and treated Dilke's adult suffrage strategy as a dangerous diversionary move. They thought support for adult suffrage was weaker than support for the equal franchise: "there is, I believe, some [adult suffrage] league or other, which meets once a year to preserve the copyright of its title", said H. N. Brailsford in September 1909, but even an adult suffragist like himself thought that the most practicable strategy was still to work for an occupational women's franchise in some form. There was also a good case for feminists concerning themselves only with removing the sex disqualification, and for their preoccupation with precedents from 1884, for in that year the Liberals had enfranchised more men but had done nothing for the women. In 1908 Mrs. Fawcett discussed with Russell Asquith's promise to accept any feminist amendment to a government franchise Bill which obtained a parliamentary majority; she told Russell that "we must remember that he has always been and remains an enemy of the movement and it looks to me now very much as if he were heading us off (or trying to do so) into the Adult Suffrage trap". As a suffragist, she said, "I have ... suffered too much from the political tricks of official liberalism for the last thirty years, not to be on my guard..."
against them now.”

Russell was irritated by this response: “I think long advocacy of a reform almost always destroys judgment”, he wrote privately, and later grumbled to Llewelyn Davies about “the idiotic action” of suffragists in failing to respond to Asquith’s move. Publicizing his support for adult suffrage in December 1909, he argued that suffragists should give no official preference to one mode of enfranchisement over another, and should recognize that for many voters the distinction between rich and poor was politically more important than the distinction between men and women. So while Russell’s Edwardian suffragist arguments aim to promote the objectives of J. S. Mill, they are marshalled after 1909 in favour of a strategy that Mill had explicitly repudiated. Russell’s standpoint is vindicated not only by the fact that women’s suffrage was eventually won through an adult suffragist (though age-restricted) route in 1918, but also by the comments of well-informed historians. In retrospect Sylvia Pankhurst saw Howard’s Bill of 1909 as the feminists’ great lost opportunity; the equal franchise demand had become “too narrow, too tactical, for popular appeal; it might convince, but it did not enthuse; it had constantly to be re-stated and re-argued”. R. C. K. Ensor thought that the equal franchise strategy had the major drawback of conflicting with the interests of the party in government.

It was this that eventually disenchanted Russell with the equal franchise strategy; but, appropriately enough for a male feminist, it was prolonged discussion with a woman that eventually consolidated his adult suffragist allegiance. For three years Margaret Llewelyn Davies applied adult suffragist arguments to Russell’s mind with intelligence and vigour. Born in 1862, she was the daughter of a Christian Socialist clergyman of Marylebone. Educated at Girton, she became the first secretary of the Women’s Co-operative Guild in 1889. When Russell first met her in the 1890s he found her very beautiful, and for many years her dedication, intelligence and fine presence won the affection and admiration of women co-operators. Even in December 1912, when going through one of his quietest periods, Russell found her company exhilarating: “Margaret was splendid”; he told Lady Ottoline, “so full of all sorts of work ... her enthusiasm is catching”; he later recalled that throughout her life she remained “vital, enthusiastic, and idealistic”. Even Virginia Woolf in 1918 brought herself to praise this “fine specimen of the public woman”, immensely hard-working, with a superb vigour and directness of character. Margaret’s bond with Russell lay through his close friendship with her brothers Crompton and Theodore, reinforced by Theodore’s death in 1905. For Margaret in 1907 it was “a comfort just to know you are there, dear Bertie, understanding, caring for the same things—wanting the deepest and best—trying for them”.

Her breathlessly informal letters to Russell were often written in haste, on trains and between commitments, and they contrast markedly in tone with Russell’s neat, concise and polished replies. Yet they reflect a strong sense of political realities, a shrewd political intelligence, and a political standpoint somewhat further left than Russell’s. She felt that women’s suffrage must be circumscribed neither by marital status nor by social class, and began formulating her objections to the feminist “equal franchise” strategy as early as 1904. Arguing that the wife would not be enfranchised if a mere propertyfranchise were extended to women, she was already foreseeing the eventual divergence between the democratic advocates of adult suffrage and the feminist advocates of the equal franchise. Nor did she share the feminists’ distrust of a general franchise reform which would include men; in Tribune for 6 December 1906 she urged the labour movement to commit itself to the adult suffrage in which in its heart it really believed. Her early commitment to adult suffrage reflects her conviction by 1906 that the workers and the lower middle classes would eventually gravitate to the ILP as a workers’ party, and as the only effective vehicle for challenging the property-owning classes.

The Women’s Co-operative Guild’s increasing Edwardian enthusiasm for adult suffrage encouraged her forward. As an organization whose members included many married working women, the Guild naturally backed the Liberal M.P. W. H. Dickinson in 1907 when he tried to get suffragists to put married women into their equal franchise Bill. He and Llewelyn Davies were in direct contact during this phase, but the feminists eventually persuaded him on tactical grounds reluctantly to delete the married women from his Bill. Behind this issue, too, there lay an internal dispute which had distracted the feminists since 1866; since that year they had been divided between those (backed by Emily Davies) who thought suffragism had the best parliamentary chances if it temporarily ignored the claims of the wife, and those (backed by Mill and Helen Taylor) who wanted wives included. In 1910 the Guild’s Oxford congress unanimously resolved that womanhood suffrage alone would enfranchise women “in a way that is just to all, married and single, rich and poor, and because the right to vote should be based on humanity and not on property”. Committed by its annual congress to women’s suffrage in any form in 1897, 1904, 1905 and 1906, the Guild opted in 1907 for womanhood suffrage. Its congress of 1908 wanted married women included in the government’s proposed franchise measure, and defeated a rider preferring adult suffrage. At the congresses of 1909–14, however, an adult suffrage resolution was passed annually, though in practice the Guild would probably have gone along with more limited variants of women’s suffrage if these had been the only way forward. In 1909 adult suffragists organized themselves into the People’s Suffrage Federation (PSF), to which the Guild’s central committee affiliated. The branches were left to decide for them-
Bertrand Russell: The False Consciousness of a Feminist

Brian Harrison

Meanwhile Llewelyn Davies was working hard to get the Labour Party committed to enfranchising the married women; the Women's Co-op Guild was her instrument, and in January 1908 she expressed delight that there seemed some chance of using "the ablest co-operator"—Tweddell of Hartlepool, vice-president of the CWS—to marshal the whole co-op movement behind Dickinson's strategy for getting married women incorporated into an equal franchise Bill; yet even the Dickinson strategy was, for her, a mere "pis aller" by comparison with residential adult suffrage. In May 1908 Russell told her that the NUWSS remained implacably opposed even to enfranchising wives; he now felt that the best way of getting them the vote was to choose a mode of enfranchisement which automatically included wives, instead of creating a special wives' franchise. Adult suffrage was the obvious way of doing this because it attached the vote to the person and not to the property, but Russell took some time to embrace it as a practical strategy.

For the moment he was still struggling to marshal the NUWSS behind the Liberal government; in May 1908 Asquith committed his government to incorporating in a prospective government male franchise Bill any woman's suffrage amendment accepted by the House of Commons. Should the NUWSS now abandon the traditional suffragist wariness of adult suffragism? Mrs. Fawcett firmly said no, but within the NUWSS she now faced rebels. Russell wanted a suffrage measure which would arouse Liberal enthusiasm and enable public opinion to neutralize potential opposition from the House of Lords. Unlike many feminists at the time, he and Llewelyn Davies saw the need to avoid antagonizing Liberals and to buttress suffragist M.P.S by mobilizing extra-parliamentary opinion. Propaganda in the country might be slow-acting, said Russell in 1908, "but it is not so slow, in the long run, as a succession of private members' Bills, each as barren as its predecessors ... let us realize that it is not primarily the Government or the House of Commons that we have to convert, but the nation".

The suffragists, by contrast, were still preoccupied with pleading and even coercing the politicians towards an equal franchise measure; "all the women who want the vote", wrote Russell in May 1908, "seem to me to be taking it in the way least likely to lead to success". So suicidal did suffragist tactics seem that he lay awake at nights worrying about it; for expressing his views within the NUWSS, "I am in disgrace all round", he told Llewelyn Davies in June. She now wanted him to leave the NUWSS and go publicly for adult suffrage; it was, after all, important in the longer term to challenge the idea that only the unmarried woman deserved the vote, and to repudiate the concept of a propertied franchise. By August 1908 Russell admitted that "it would be infinitely pleasanter to be working in the same camp with
you”. He confessed that he would prefer adult suffrage and might secede from the NUWSS, which became deeply divided over Howard’s adult suffrage Bill in 1909. Mrs. Fawcett told Russell in March that Howard’s Bill was “a disruptive force” and “a boon to no one but the anti-suffragists”; his commitment to a mode of enfranchisement more popular with Liberals than the equal franchise brought him close to resignation. He eventually agreed to remain in the Union on Mrs. Fawcett’s assurance that it opposed Howard’s Bill only for tactical reasons, but he did not stay for long.

Llewelyn Davies now thought that it was time to institutionalize the suffragist split she had foreseen in 1904; since a Liberal government was likely to support only an adult suffrage measure, public opinion must be mobilized behind it. Not surprisingly, she enthusiastically backed the PSF in 1909. “Miss Llewelyn Davies is a wonder”, Margaret Bondfield told Mrs. Ramsay MacDonald in October, praising the Women’s Co-op Guild’s enthusiasm for the Federation; its prominent supporters included Mary Macarthur, Dilke, Dickinson, Geoffrey Howard, Bondfield, Lansbury, Beatrice Webb, J. M. Barrie and John Galsworthy. In September, Llewelyn Davies thought there was no necessary incompatibility between supporting both the Federation and the NUWSS, but Russell’s conduct later denied it. At the NUWSS quarterly council in Cardiff, he joined rebels who accused Mrs. Fawcett of acting against her committee’s decision; “the major part of the plain-speaking fell to my lot”, he wrote. Bad feeling resulted, and in November Russell told Marion Phillips, secretary of the NUWSS that he must resign from the executive; he could not put women’s suffrage above all other considerations during the coming general election, at which “those suffragists who (like myself) desire women’s suffrage because it is implied in democracy, and not from any special bias in favour of women as a class, cannot but feel that everything they care for is at stake”. He thought that the drink trade would never allow the Conservatives to enfranchise women, and that the vote would anyway be of little value if the House of Lords were allowed to gain control over finance. In vain did she reply that in his absence it would be “more difficult than ever to get the Committee straight on the ‘democratic’ question”. His resignation was, as Mrs. Swanwick told him, “one of the worst blows we shall ever have”.

In the following month’s Common Cause, Russell explained his rejection of the suffragists’ long-standing “ostrich policy of hiding our heads in the sand whenever Adult Suffrage is mentioned”: “Suffrage can only be obtained through a party, and it is a pity to antagonize the two parties in which we have the most support [Liberals and Labour], merely because they desire to combine the removal of the sex disability with a change in the qualifications for a vote, which is a matter upon which, as Suffragists, we are not called upon to have an opinion.” By pressing for adult suffrage, acceptable to Liberals, suffragists would simultaneously increase Conservative enthusiasm for the more limited measure; either way, women’s suffrage would gain. He therefore urged suffragists not to oppose the PSF; it could be a way of attracting new allies. In his powerfully argued Anti-Suffragist Anxieties (1910) he therefore felt the need to refute objections to both the adult and the equal franchises.

At this point, Russell moves away from the centre of the suffragist stage. He had left the executive of the leading women’s suffrage organization, and ceased subscribing to it after 1909. At the general election of January 1910 he worked energetically for Philip Morrell’s Liberal candidature, spending most of his days canvassing and his nights addressing meetings. He appears in Asquith’s list of the Liberal peers who might be created to coerce the Lords in 1910, for his suffragism was but one dimension of an overriding commitment to the Liberal Party, and he now tried to get himself adopted as Liberal candidate for Bedford. Although the Men’s League ran independent suffrage candidates at the general election of December 1910, there was to be no second Wimbledon for him. Adult suffrage was the best route to women’s suffrage, he told the Bedford Liberal Association, “because it is direct and simple, and embodies what should be the ideal of every democrat”.

His political future, like his father’s at South Devon in 1868, founded upon a refusal to give the expected assurances about Christian belief. Philosophy eventually resumed its claims upon him, but between 1910 and the First World War Russell had not lost his enthusiasm for women’s suffrage; on the contrary, he told Lady Ottoline late in 1911 that there is “no doubt in my mind that it is one of those great events, like religious toleration or emancipation of slaves, that date a period and become landmarks for the whole future”. In January 1913 he hoped that Philip Morrell would vote in the impending divisions on women’s suffrage, because this was far more important than any other task of that Parliament; and when the Speaker’s ruling later rendered it impossible for those divisions to occur, he wished he could be “harged drawn and quartered”.

Russell moves from the centre of the suffragist stage after 1909 for two reasons. Firstly by opting for adult suffrage, he was distancing himself from the precise mode in which the women’s organizations sought to gain the vote. Though in November 1911 he was pleased when for a moment it seemed possible that Christabel Pankhurst would opt for womanhood suffrage, in the following month he admitted that his membership of the PSF made compromise difficult for him, too; the Federation could hardly forsake its formal objective for the Dickinson compromise of including wives within a propertyd franchise, which at that time seemed likely to attract Lloyd George’s support. Russell’s suffragist energies were concentrated during 1911 on lecturing and fund-raising in the Cambridge area for the PSF. But the second reason for his retreat from suffragist promi-
nence was that in 1911 his priorities shifted, as he put it, “from the universal woman to the particular”—that is, to Lady Ottoline. Another phase in Russell’s syncopation between activism and quietism, politics and philosophy, had begun. In the autumn he was wearying of work for the PSF, and felt “very great relief” in October when C. K. Ogden took over the secretariaship of the Cambridge branch from him. In December he privately confessed to being “bored to extinction” by women’s suffrage; in February 1913, after attending his brother’s Cambridge Men’s League meeting, he told Lady Ottoline that he “felt rather a worm” for no longer doing anything for women’s suffrage, “but it is so mixed up with opposition to the Government”.75

What does Russell’s suffragism reveal about his overall political outlook? Beatrice Webb in 1902 found Russell’s nature “pathetic in its subtle absoluteness: faith in an absolute logic, absolute ethic, absolute beauty ... compromise, mitigation, mixed motive, phases of health of body and mind, qualified statements, uncertain feelings, all seem unknown to him. A proposition must be true or false; a character good or bad”.76 Jo Vellacott, whose study of Russell is among the first to give his public work the detailed and scholarly historical attention it deserves, emphasizes the First World War’s role in advancing his political education. She sees the No-Conscription Fellowship as “a forcing-house for learning about human nature, for the growth of toleration of personal vagaries and the recognition of differences of opinion even among those who shared the highest ideals and integrity”. She cites his remark that in working for it he had “got rid of the don and the Puritan”, and argues that henceforward he gave more balanced attention to the role of instinct, as distinct from reason, in human affairs: “He had gained a much more complex view of life, in which people could do good things with bad intentions and bad things with good intentions.”77

How far can Russell’s Edwardian suffragism be reconciled with this analysis? Five points can be made; firstly, Russell’s suffragism reminds us that he was no political novice in 1914. In both the free-trade and women’s suffrage movements he had been exhilarated by collaborating with others in a cause. When standing at Wimbledon in 1907, he had at first doubted his capacity for impromptu speaking, but J. S. Mill his mentor had successfully combined the active and the contemplative life, and suffragists and relatives respected Russell for moving out of his accustomed sphere; as his mother-in-law pointed out, “it is all contrary to his nature and to his line of things, but he feels it is a ‘testimony’ he ought to bear”. For two years thereafter, Russell assiduously attended NUWSS committee meetings and helped to make policy. He even carried a banner for the cause at a women’s suffrage procession in June 1908; “it was splendid of him”, wrote his mother-in-law, “for the crowds jeered at him all along.”78 Russell’s suffragism is far more than an amateurish or passing whim; his correspondence with Llewelyn Davies shows that he thought hard about the whole suffrage question—its tactics, party connections and long-term objectives. Commenting on his resignation, the NUWSS saw him as “for two years one of the hardest-working members of the Committee”.79

Russell’s suffragism also circumscribes the role we can assign to the First World War in scaling down the role of reason within his political analysis. In a suffrage letter of 1908 he shared Llewelyn Davies’s view that truth is found by ways other than reason, and admitted that reason “is a controlling force, not a driving one”. Urging non-militant suffragists to conciliate the adult suffragists in 1909, he regretted the widespread suffragist failure to remember “that the appeal to reason is the only ground upon which women can hope to receive any large measure of support from men”.80 But this overriding rationalism did not lead him to rule out non-rational ways of bringing reason into operation at particular junctures; on suffragette militancy in the 1900s he was as pragmatic and utilitarian as on direct action in the 1960s, recognizing the news-value of staged sensationalism.

Thirdly, the suffragist Russell possessed a sense of tactics and strategy; here as in the 1950s his political awareness “increases the nearer one gets to his activities”.81 Russell did not content himself merely with exposing the anti-suffragists’ more absurd misunderstandings of politics; he also pinpointed many defects in suffragist strategy. For example, he recognized the importance of backing up parliamentary allies by mobilizing sympathetic public opinion; suffragists could not blame the government “when the real blame falls on the apathy of the vast bulk of men and women”.82 He also recognized the importance of working with the grain of political party. The Liberal Party attracted him not simply as a potential vehicle for women’s suffrage, but as a generalized progressive crusade; when the tactics of the smaller (feminist) crusade threatened the larger (Liberal) cause, he searched for a new strategy by trying to persuade suffragists away from their long-standing and now damaging suspicion of political party. Only the First World War disrupted Russell’s Liberal allegiance: “You were right about the Liberals”, he told Llewelyn Davies in August 1914, “... I had never believed anything so frightful could happen”. Yet in some respects he remained a lifelong Liberal—wary of the centralized, bureaucratic state, responsive on libertarian and crusading issues, and remote from the Labour Party’s essential structures. His Labour allegiance by 1930 was reluctant, but (as he put it) “an Englishman has to have a Party just as he has to have trousers, and of the three Parties I find them the least painful”.83

Fourthly, Russell’s suffragism had introduced him, well before his No-Conscription Fellowship phase, to the political complexities resulting from disagreement between the well-intentioned. There was not only the divergence between those who favoured the equal and the adult franchise: there was what is, in the light of his later career, the more significant
divergence between suffragists of the militant and non-militant variety. He and Llewelyn Davies fluctuate in their attitude to the suffragettes, experiencing all the liberal’s dilemmas when confronted by political violence. In May 1906 she declared that “no-one approves of their silly bad manners in the House”, but by November Russell had lost his initial doubts: the suffragettes had publicized the cause and had lent more prudent suffragists “an air of moderation by repudiating the extremists”. Llewelyn Davies was almost converted to militancy at a WSPU meeting during Easter 1907, and regarded their tactics as “horribly odious and successful”. Russell liked the WSPU’s energy and enthusiasm, but they both disliked its equal franchise strategy because in 1907 this effectively meant a non-progressive commitment to the old suffragist “limited Bills”.

By December Russell was criticizing suffragettes for interrupting public meetings: “if they merely made a protest, I shouldn’t mind, but when they make free speech impossible they class themselves with the Russian police.” In May 1908 he thought they were “doing everything likely to defeat Women’s Suffrage” in Parliament; they would rather not get women’s suffrage at all than get it via a Liberal government male franchise Bill. Yet during the next month he echoed what had then become Llewelyn Davies’s view—that by arousing opinion the militants had done suffragism more good than harm. In October they were again united when they blamed the government for encouraging suffragette militancy by ignoring the non-militant suffragists; Russell said he had never judged lawbreaking “by any other test than whether it paid”. But he disliked the WSPU’s “atmosphere of artificially-promoted hysteria”, and attacked its anti-government by-election policy, which merely reproduced the non-militants’ old-fashioned non-party strategy.

Russell’s long-term political evolution therefore involved less a maturing of ordinary people to be subversive or anarchical or such as to cause serious inconvenience to average unpolitical people”. But it cannot be reconciled with the parallel he drew in old age between the suffragettes and CND: “I disliked the unconstitutional methods of the Suffragettes, but in the end one had to confess that it was they who had secured votes for women.”

By 1915 the divergence between Russell and the Pankhursts had widened, ironically because his and their relationship towards the political system had by then been transposed; in May, Christabel Pankhurst’s assault on the Union of Democratic Control, headlined “Go to Germany!”, described Russell as more German than the Germans. This transposition raises one final problem: the difficulty of defining political maturity objectively. Russell’s Edwardian suffragist commitment to the Liberal Party restrained his tendency (much stressed by his biographer when discussing his later career) to repudiate the “compromise and wheeler-dealing” which is so integral to the political process. Sympathizing with Llewelyn Davies’s suffragism in 1907, for instance, Russell nonetheless urged her not to refuse the half-loaf that might alone be practicable in the short term. By spurning compromise, he told her, “Temperance people ... have been howling in the wilderness for a generation.” Despite being briefly tempted in 1911 by Tolstoy’s renunciation of the world—“I feel so intimately every twist and turn in Tolstoy’s struggles after simplicity”, he wrote—the Tolstoyan ideal was for the Edwardian Russell “Satan in an angelic form”. The oriental quietist failed to reconcile the ideals of simplicity with the complexities of modern living; politics in general, and the Liberal Party in particular, must be the route to the better society. Russell’s transatlantic letters in 1914 therefore breathe an infectious enthusiasm for political gossip, an eagerness to know whether Asquith and the Liberals will prevail over the Unionist foe.

The First World War overturned Russell’s political strategy because it destroyed his party, and made new political structures seem both urgent and feasible. During 1916 he came to see himself as a teacher who would help working people to capture the political system and make something better of it; such a role offered him a new way of uniting theory with practice, philosophy with politics. Yet by September 1918 he was criticizing the Labour Party for fostering envy, and doubting whether politics could ever provide a vehicle for his ideals. The old dilemma still tormented him: if he preserved his ideals through a sectarian repudiation of politics, he would make no practical impact on human affairs. Russell’s visit to Russia in 1920 damaged his faith in politics still further, for as he courageously pointed out at the time the process of implementing Russian revolutionary idealism had warped social values and subverted the freedom of the individual.

Russell’s long-term political evolution therefore involved less a maturing
of the political judgment than a shift in political allegiance which entailed rejecting Edwardian Liberal political structures and procedures; he never really recovered his closeness to the British political process. This was partly because his political evolution also entailed the ultimate triumph of one side of his personality over the other. Seeking salvation in educational reform during the 1920s, he developed a conspiratorial outlook on the political process which his second wife described as tending "to exaggerate the cruelty and evil intentions of governments and individuals." His fears of a government victory in the General Strike, for example, are grotesque: "it will put all the leaders in prison", he wrote, "make trade unionism illegal, and perhaps disfranchise all who struck, on the ground that they are criminals, as that foul beast Simon explained." So after 1914 he remained politically "on the touch-lines rather than in the field", whereas the suffragist Russell had briefly dreamed of becoming a player. "Until 1914", he later recalled, "I fitted more or less comfortably into the world as I found it.... Without having the temperament of a rebel, the course of events has made me gradually less and less able to acquiesce patiently in what is happening." Whether this transition shows increased political maturity is a question that will be answered differently according to the political standpoint of the observer; it is therefore a question on which Russell's admirers are unlikely to agree.

II

Russell's humanitarian inspiration broadened his perspective not only on suffragism, but also on the range of feminist concern. The analyst of Russell's feminism, as distinct from his suffragism, works in a wider field on a more complex theme with much less evidence at his disposal. There are two further complicating factors: the chronologies of feminism in its different dimensions do not necessarily coincide, nor can it be assumed that feminists always correctly identify the social changes required for women's effective emancipation. Many suffragists (including Mr. and Mrs. Mill) were conventional in some of their attitudes to sexuality, nor did all suffragists challenge the notion of separated spheres for men and women; suffragism united many people whose views on women's sexual and occupational roles diverged. Furthermore, the impact of British feminism on women's emancipation was severely restricted by its individualism. Feminists differed on factory legislation, for instance, until the 1930s, and some feminists (including Mrs. Fawcett) opposed family allowances. Again, the moralism of British suffragism (closely linked to its individualism) caused it to conflict with the twentieth century's broader variant of feminism—especially on the double standard, birth control and family structure. British feminist attitudes to each of these three subjects must first be considered in turn before an analysis of Russell's outlook upon them can clarify the nature of his feminism.

Women's emancipation required feminists to repudiate the double standard of morality, but pioneer British feminists would be astonished at the manner of its decline. They usually attacked it by urging greater male chastity, whereas twentieth-century Britain subverts it through relaxing the demand for female chastity, thereby simultaneously contracting the number of the occupationally unchaste—that is, prostitutes. The suffragists' private and sometimes public support for Josephine Butler's attack on state-regulated prostitution and their support for the British Women's Temperance Association paradoxically reveals how far they shared the anti-suffragist belief in the elevating influence of woman; their cause seemed to harmonize with the widespread contemporary desire for moral progress. A survey in 1911 of the officials in women's organizations found suffragists contributing thirty of the thirty-three Ladies' National Association officials (campaigning against state-regulated prostitution) and four of the British Women's Temperance Association's eight. Suffragists were coy about acknowledging Mary Wollstonecraft as a predecessor, and wary of Sir Charles Dilke as advocate of their cause.

There was of course a tactical dimension to all this: it would have been unwise to challenge too many accepted notions at once—witness the fate of Russell's father: Lord Amberley and his wife Kate in the 1860s. But if tactics alone had been involved, one might have expected women's political emancipation rapidly to release a wave of suppressed feminist sexual unorthodoxy—yet this did not occur. During 1914 Christabel Pankhurst made headlines with her slogan "Votes for Women and Chastity for Men", and argued that women's freedom required "the uplifting of men, the ennobling of marriage, and the purification of the race"; in the 1920s she did not change her position, but lent enthusiastic support to William Joynson-Hicks's campaign against indecent books. British feminist moralism sought further conquests in the 1920s—with Mrs. Pankhurst touring Canada in defence of purity, with Lady Astor's files bulging from her absorption in women's police and morality questions, and with moral objectives lengthening the agenda of the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (successor-organization of the non-militant NUWSS). For Lady Astor in 1928, Josephine Butler was "the greatest woman and most inspiring personality the nineteenth century produced".
decidedly cautious. They feared (in retrospect, rightly) that it would subvert the conventional morality, whereas it has since promoted women's emancipation in many dimensions; as the Malthusian pointed out in 1909, "women are kept down by their twofold chains of economic dependence and enforced maternity". Here again there were tactical considerations; it was prudent, for instance, for Emily Davies to avoid including Lady Amberley on her committee for Girton College in 1869 because she was "a very dangerous name". Campaigning for birth control might also divert women from fighting for their political liberties—though in July 1914 at least one suffragist male thought that this argument should carry less weight at a time when the short-term chances of women's suffrage were minimal.

British feminists were also conservative about family structure; they concentrated on getting a fair deal for divorced women rather than on promoting new attitudes to sexuality. The Women's Emancipation Union articulated the overall British feminist aim: "to make marriage a just and honourable companionship of equal souls, free from lordship or mastery on either side." Feminists in the 1870s feared the political consequences of Mrs. Wolstenholme Elmy's unorthodox sexual outlook; pregnant before marriage, she was pressed into respectability; nor did Dr. Pankhurst later encourage Emmeline in her initial idea of marrying without legal formalities. Cicely Hamilton's only alternative to the marriage relationship, whose impact on women was memorably assaulted in her Marriage as a Trade (1909), seems to have been celibacy, not the one-parent family. Here again there were no doubt tactical considerations; the anti-suffragists' partial success during 1912 in capitalizing on the feminist Freewoman's free-love notions illustrates the political dangers involved in feminist sexual adventurousness, and Mrs. Fawcett told the Archbishop of Canterbury that on receiving her copy she tore it up. Bachelor motherhood, as it was called, attracted more feminists in the 1920s—most notably Sylvia Pankhurst. Announcing Richard's birth in 1928 to an interested News of the World, she wanted marriage to be "based upon perfect love, apart from all material and economic considerations", an intimate relationship rescued from the lawyers. Her predictions were not entirely mistaken, but this could not moderate her mother's humiliation at the news; indeed, Ethel Smyth thought it caused her death in the following year. When Lord Amethyst cited Dora Russell's Hypatia in 1925 as reflecting feminist attitudes to morality, Rose Macaulay rightly rejoined that "most of the prominent feminists have been very respectfully and monogamously married wives and mothers".

This feminist picture and Russell's views must now be juxtaposed. Both in his writings and in his personal example, he was a prominent advocate of new attitudes to sexuality. In Anti-Suffragist Anxieties he sees that even women's political emancipation will require more than the vote, for enfranchised women will enter a political system "which has been made by men, where the parties are divided according to the divisions of opinion among men, where all the candidates are men". His long-term hopes for women rest on both a libertarian variant of socialism and an emancipated view of sexuality. As early as September 1894 he saw that "any improvement in the condition of the great mass of women is only possible through Socialism"; he credited his insight primarily to Alys, whom he was shortly to marry, and it was the link between feminism and economic questions that first interested him in social problems. "Every extension of the franchise has been followed (at a respectful distance) by a modification of the orthodox economics", he points out in 1910, rejecting the anti-suffragist claim that legislation cannot raise women's wages; on the contrary, Parliament can influence wages by its policy on trade unions, taxation, government employees' working conditions, and so on. He expected women's votes to foster "a greater care for questions of women's work, of the rearing and education of children, and of all those increasingly important problems upon which the biological future of the race depends".

Because he saw motherhood as woman's primary role, Russell thought the state should help the mother during childbearing, and diverged, like Margaret Llewelyn Davies, from those individualist feminists who opposed protective legislation for women in industry. He donated a guinea to the Women's Trade Union League in 1915 and 1916, and argued in his Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916) that the state must compensate women who give up wage-earning for childbearing, if only to improve demographic trends. His Marriage and Morals (1929) advocates paying childbearing mothers, whether married or not. Russell thought that one possible outcome would be what we now call the one-parent family, in which the father's child-rearing role would diminish; alternatively, women wage-earners might prefer to remain in employment and have their children brought up by the state. Like Mill before him, Russell favoured state intervention in the selection of partners, but on eugenic rather than economic grounds. As with so many of his ideas on the family, his courtship correspondence with Alys during 1894 anticipates this inter-war commitment. "As knowledge increases", he writes in 1929, "it becomes more and more possible to control, by deliberate Governmental action, forces which hitherto have seemed like forces of nature. Increase of population is one of these."

Russell's broad variant of feminism led him to reject the moralism as well as the individualism of British feminists. He pioneered "the new morality", and the whole of his Marriage and Morals, which Fabian News saw as "the first perfectly frank discussion of the sex question that there has ever been", reflects that zeal for open and frank discussion about sexual matters which
stemmed from his painful memories of youthful sexual anxiety. His surreptitious and informal routes to sexual knowledge—through childhood companions and observing the loose attitudes to women prevalent at his Southgate crammer's—so distorted his sexual experience that he yearned to protect others against similar miseries. As he told Alys in 1894, "what dread and what despair I might have been saved ... by a few words from any pure-minded elder".  

Russell's challenge to Victorianism involved more than an intellectual fashion; as in the case of Marie Stopes, its vigour owed much to the intensity of the private suffering that had preceded it. His challenge embodied his repudiation of Southgate and Pembroke Lodge, and particularly of his Aunt Agatha's narrow morality. In a courtship letter of September 1894 Russell saw her distaste for sexual relations—formulated "in biting stinging dogmatic little sentences, with a Satanic delight in the wickedness of mankind, and her own exemption (forsooth) from human passions"—as more wicked even than the views of a Rabelaisian friend. The idea that sex is shocking was for Russell but the other face of the sexual impurity that he so detested, but his emancipation from Victorian sexuality did not fully permeate his sexual conduct until 1911. As he told Lady Ottoline twenty years later, "in 1911 I was still a dreadful prig, and you did me an immense amount of good in that way. I used to think I should be dreadfully wicked if I let myself go." The loud laughs that came from his prison-cell during the First World War while reading Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians* represented his defiance, not so much of the prison system, but of a painful past that in his forties he still felt the need to exorcise, a celebration of a rather personal and recent sexual emancipation.  

Russell's broad humanitarian outlook therefore led him to challenge British feminists between the wars at all three of the restrictive points which have so far been mentioned: the double standard, birth control and family structure. Prostitution, as the most flagrant instance of the male sexual exploitation of women, had disgusted Russell from his earliest days at Southgate; his fellow-students there were "all of an age to have just begun frequenting prostitutes", and this was "their main topic of conversation". He told Alys during his painful months in Paris immediately before their marriage that the prevalence of prostitutes there made him "despair of the world and the sex question". His remedy was the rationalistic one of removing the mystery from sex by openness about it during childhood. His hatred of obscurantism and his fearless challenge to what he saw as outdated practices combined here with his eagerness to expose hypocrisy and foster spontaneity. Co-education, free discussion, formal sex-education—these seemed to be the ways forward. As early as 1894 he was discussing with Alys the idea of starting one day "a co-education school for the purpose of applying my theories".  

In the new world of *Marriage and Morals*, women gain emancipation not simply through better comprehension of sexual matters and reduced prostitution—but because they acquire, more fully than even Marie Stopes envisaged, sexual fulfilment. "Romantic love is the source of the most intense delights that life has to offer ...", Russell wrote in 1929; "I think it important that a social system should be such as to permit this joy."

He therefore saw the attempt to clamp the official morality more firmly on men as but a temporary phase in feminist evolution; only as long as celibacy was required of many men for economic reasons, and of many women for demographic reasons, did women's emancipation seem to demand "the traditional standards of feminine virtue". In the longer term, "women will tend to prefer a system allowing freedom to both sexes", he wrote in 1929, "rather than one imposing upon men the restrictions which hitherto have been suffered only by women."  

Buttressing Russell's single moral standard were new, cheaper and safer methods of birth control. In recommending them, Russell was continuing a family tradition. In 1864 his father had found J. S. Laurie's *Physical, Sexual and Natural Religion* inspiring; Lord Amberley welcomed Laurie's new cure for poverty, his solving of "the great social difficulty by much easier means than I had ever thought of". Russell's very birth apparently occurred more wicked even than the views of a Rabelaisian friend. The idea that sex is shocking was for Russell but the other face of the sexual impurity that he so detested, but his emancipation from Victorian sexuality did not fully permeate his sexual conduct until 1911. As he told Lady Ottoline twenty years later, "in 1911 I was still a dreadful prig, and you did me an immense amount of good in that way. I used to think I should be dreadfully wicked if I let myself go." The loud laughs that came from his prison-cell during the First World War while reading Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians* represented his defiance, not so much of the prison system, but of a painful past that in his forties he still felt the need to exorcise, a celebration of a rather personal and recent sexual emancipation.  

Russell's broad humanitarian outlook therefore led him to challenge British feminists between the wars at all three of the restrictive points which have so far been mentioned: the double standard, birth control and family structure. Prostitution, as the most flagrant instance of the male sexual exploitation of women, had disgusted Russell from his earliest days at Southgate; his fellow-students there were "all of an age to have just begun frequenting prostitutes", and this was "their main topic of conversation". He told Alys during his painful months in Paris immediately before their marriage that the prevalence of prostitutes there made him "despair of the world and the sex question". His remedy was the rationalistic one of removing the mystery from sex by openness about it during childhood. His hatred of obscurantism and his fearless challenge to what he saw as outdated practices combined here with his eagerness to expose hypocrisy and foster spontaneity. Co-education, free discussion, formal sex-education—these seemed to be the ways forward. As early as 1894 he was discussing with Alys the idea of starting one day "a co-education school for the purpose of applying my theories".  

In the new world of *Marriage and Morals*, women gain emancipation not simply through better comprehension of sexual matters and reduced prostitution—but because they acquire, more fully than even Marie Stopes envisaged, sexual fulfilment. "Romantic love is the source of the most intense delights that life has to offer ...", Russell wrote in 1929; "I think it important that a social system should be such as to permit this joy." He therefore saw the attempt to clamp the official morality more firmly on men as but a temporary phase in feminist evolution; only as long as celibacy was required of many men for economic reasons, and of many women for demographic reasons, did women's emancipation seem to demand "the traditional standards of feminine virtue". In the longer term, "women will tend to prefer a system allowing freedom to both sexes", he wrote in 1929, "rather than one imposing upon men the restrictions which hitherto have been suffered only by women."  

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Influenced by the ideas of Judge Ben B. Lindsey of Denver, Russell came to see companionate marriage as the institution best adapted to accommodate sexual intercourse, and favoured a tighter bond only for procreation. It seemed absurd for a couple to commit themselves to a lifelong relationship without knowing whether they were sexually compatible. He told Lady Ottoline in 1926 that when his daughter Kate grew up, "we shall urge her to live with any man she likes before marrying him—that seems to me only common prudence. And generally it would prevent an unsuitable match." If women were to enjoy the same sexual freedom as men in such circumstances, all extra-marital sexual intercourse would need to be accompanied by birth control—though the role of fatherhood might decline to the
Russell therefore diverged from the feminist moralists on family structure. Inter-war progressive thought often accompanies its collectivism in industrial and welfare matters with virtual atomism in personal conduct; inter-war divorce reformers gradually substitute the individual for the family as the basic social unit. For Russell, divorce reform was needed not merely for justice to the divorced woman, but as a consequence of the new morality. Observing his brother's unhappy marriage in 1890, Russell already favoured easing the divorce law. By 1912 he would have liked publicly to support Margaret Llewelyn Davies's campaign for divorce law reform, and branded as "utterly and hopelessly wrong" both the religious view of marriage as a sacrament and the legal view of it as a contract; couples would normally be held together by children, but where this was not so, it seemed "simply monstrous that people should be tied". By 1916 he was publicly linking divorce law reform to wider social purposes; "marriage ought to be constituted by children," he told Lady Ottoline in January, "and relations not involving children ought to be ignored by the law and treated as indifferent by public opinion. It is only through children that relations cease to be a purely private matter."

Social anthropology and socialist views of the state enabled Russell in Marriage and Morals to adopt a highly relativist approach to marriage as an institution, and to think through problems that many of his contemporaries preferred to keep under wraps. In the companionate marriage of Marriage and Morals, divorce becomes possible through mutual consent and the wife loses her alimony. Happiness and compatibility become crucial to the decision on whether a marriage shall continue—for here, as with prostitution, Russell thinks that "sex intercourse divorced from love is incapable of bringing any profound satisfaction to instinct". By the 1930s, therefore, Russell was extending into the sexual sphere the liberal faith in experiment that J. S. Mill had practised in politics.

Here again Russell was following in family traditions; his parents' outlook on sexual morality was so avant-garde for its day that the Russell family took care to destroy much of the evidence for it after the Amberleys' deaths. Amberley apparently allowed his atheist bachelor employee D. A. Spalding, whose tubercular condition dictated celibacy, to live with his wife for reasons of principle; "I know of no evidence", Russell later wrote, "that she derived any pleasure from doing so". Russell felt that social institutions must reflect the unpredictability of affection; Marriage and Morals denies that husbands and wives should act as one another's moral policemen. After fifty years of frequently painful and stumbling transition from the old morality towards the new, Russell's Marriage and Morals still seems imaginative, common-sensical and brave; it confronts problems which, even after a generation of energetic discussion, continue to perplex us. For the old morality to be perpetuated, he explained in 1929—in a powerful and often very funny passage—censorship would be required on a grand scale.

Yet Russell's vision of the new morality was by no means starry-eyed; he knew that many aspects of it required further thought, and made no claim to know the precise direction of future change. Furthermore his emancipation from the old puritanism was only partial; one source of his enthusiasm for the new morality was always the conviction that it would lead to moral progress for both sexes. His admiration for Lytton Strachey's assault on the Victorians was by no means indiscriminate; the Victorians may have lacked sincerity, he wrote, but they "had immense energy, and they had genuinely (in spite of cant) a wish to improve the world, and they did improve it". He preferred them to Lytton, "who is sincere but indifferent to the rest of mankind". Russell said more than once that the new morality would often require greater self-control, not less; "but self-control will be applied more to abstaining from interference with the freedom of others than to restraining one's own freedom." Two very demanding principles lie beneath the sexual morality of Marriage and Morals: firstly that "there should be as much as possible of that deep, serious love between man and woman which embraces the whole personality of both and leads to a fusion by which each is enriched and enhanced", and secondly that "there should be adequate care of children, physical and psychological". He thought that morality in sexual relations should consist "essentially of respect for the other person, and unwillingness to use that person solely as a means of personal gratification without regard to his or her desires".

A late Victorian who has lost his religious faith felt the need to show that his agnosticism, far from degrading human nature, nourished an elevated morality.

III

In several respects, therefore, Russell's humanitarianism caused him to appeal, at least on some points, from the feminists he knew to the feminists of posterity. Little is said about feminism in Marriage and Morals; yet the book reflects the reformer's often rash assumption that all good causes are readily compatible. It feels no apprehension about the difficulties individuals will experience in making the transition from the old morality to the new. "It doesn't suit women to be promiscuous", says Elyot in Noel Coward's Private Lives. "It doesn't suit men for women to be promiscuous", Amanda replies; to which Elyot rejoins "very modern dear; really your advanced views quite startle me". For Russell, the defects of the old morality are so glaring that it is hardly worth troubling oneself to mention
But there is more to Russell’s outlook than this: he never really shook off the anti-feminist belief that the sexes should occupy complementary social roles. He found Meredith’s ideal of woman hard and coarse, whereas “the woman I imagine is to retain the sympathy and kindness which belong with the maternal instinct.” In his private correspondence he ridicules the type of suffragist woman who dominates her husband, and never abandons the anti-suffrage view of man as the adventurer, the combatant, the achiever—who needs female reassurance and solace when recuperating at home from his periodic forays into the world. After attending a women’s peace meeting in 1915 he even hints to Lady Ottoline that he carried the notion of separate spheres into his view of women’s likely political influence: “I almost began to think perhaps women had something of value to contribute to politics,” he wrote, “—some element of compassion in which men are deficient.” His ideal woman was expected in her domestic role to perform three functions: to bear children; to console, comfort and reassure her partner; and to manage the home. Feminists who denied that woman should be the childbearer displayed “sheer selfishness and desire to shirk their proper work—as if mathematicians were to start a revolt against mathematics”. His second wife Dora therefore sees him as an old-fashioned husband. His first need was for a mother of his child, his pride to support them both; he accepted as normal, and was very dependent upon, his wife’s management of his household and domestic affairs ... he sought a wife who would not assert her independence, but would be at one with him in everything that he thought and did.

Such a view of the family left Russell free to plan his time, whereas his wives were required to dissipate theirs. In retrospect Dora saw how “all my life I have tried to do too many different things”. He told Lady Ottoline more than once of the conflict he experienced between doing his philosophy and day-to-day practical concerns; “having to entertain worries me”, he told Lady Ottoline in 1914, “because if I think about work I forget essential things. I quite see how a woman who has to run a house can’t do much in the way of thinking.” In these circumstances it seems harsh indeed of Russell, in another letter to Lady Ottoline a year later, to ascribe women’s preoccupation with petty matters to “triviality of soul”. Servants at first enabled Russell to postpone the conflict between his feminism and his career, but in later life he seems never even to have considered the idea of shared parental responsibility for child-rearing. In his second marriage, Beacon Hill School constituted a second way of evading the issue; Dora’s household role could therein be combined with a career, and Russell soon retreated from the school’s day-to-day management. The problem of household management was peculiarly acute for the inter-war feminist generation of women,
whom the new psychology required closely to supervise their children's upbringing; increasingly deprived of servants, though with homes not yet fully mechanized, they rarely found husbands alert to the full claims of the feminist revolution. It is neither surprising that many inter-war wives accepted woman's traditional domestic and separate role, nor that they flocked into non-feminist women's organizations—the Women's Institutes, the Townswomen's Guilds—which aimed to help them perform their conventional function.

Russell's outlook on the home ensured that his wives' careers exemplify that incompatibility between marriage and achievement which Florence Nightingale had so memorably captured in Cassandra. His first two wives both wanted careers and therefore resisted marriage with him, but both eventually succumbed. Alys's resistance was at first energetic. In their correspondence of 1893–94, she emphasizes the social benefits of women's specialization in philanthropy, which was at that time one of women's few major opportunities for usefulness outside the family; but for Russell, women's full philanthropic influence can be attained only through marriage and childbearing.149 "I wonder if thee really will not mind when I go tearing all over the country", Alys wondered in February 1894, when suggesting that she might continue her temperance campaigning after marriage; she insisted in November that she could not abandon her philanthropic work "and still be myself". Russell was attracted to Alys "as the woman of the future", and replied by expressing his support for the woman's "complete independence, as far as ever such a thing is possible", as "absolutely essential to a marriage: at least if the wife is worth anything".

All at first seemed to go well. In 1896 Alys contributed an appendix to Russell's book on German social democracy, and happily affronted Sussex notables by using her bicycle to display her emancipation; from 1905 she supplemented her temperance career with suffrage campaigning. Yet before Russell's first marriage can be seen in a feminist light, at least three qualifications must be made. Alys's philanthropic career could never lend her financial independence within the family; Russell remained the breadwinner, though Alys's marriage-settlement, of course, brought money into the marriage. Secondly, servants made it possible to postpone the full conflict between the demands of the male and the female career. Thirdly, Alys's career was not subjected to the ultimate test; she had no children. At first eugenic reasons deterred the Russells from raising a family, and later their deteriorating relationship was both cause and consequence of children's failure to arrive.

Dora's repudiation of the conventional female role was more complete than Alys's, and her resistance to marriage was more vigorous; with an academic post and considerable ambition, she was (in her own words) "a young woman of deeply-cherished modern views, just arrived at independ-
Catherine Marshall in the No-Conscription Fellowship during the First World War shows him capable of taking orders from a woman.  

He did not need Marie Stopes to instruct him on the woman's need for sexual fulfilment, for in October 1894 he had branded as "utterly untrue" the notion that the woman lacks sexual desire; in Marriage and Morals he argued that with safe birth-control techniques widely available, "husbands might learn to be as tolerant of lovers as Orientals are of eunuchs", and in his second marriage he practised what he preached. Dora was delighted by the companionship her husband supplied: "he was lover, father-figure, teacher, a companion never at a loss for a witty rejoinder or a provoking bit of nonsense." Yet this companionship did not rest on a Mill-like respect for woman's intellect. Whereas Mill said he owed to Harriet Taylor both inspiration and guidance from her relatively practical mind, and alleged that during their years of confidential friendship all his published writings "were as much her work as mine", no such allegation comes from Russell. His Anti-Suffragist Anxieties dismisses the more extravagant anti-feminist criticisms of woman's intellect. Yet he told Lady Ottoline in 1911 that "no woman's intellect is really good enough to give me pleasure as intellect", and he told Dora that he usually found it necessary to talk down to women. Like the anti-suffragist Asquith he was well able to appreciate the intellect of an individual woman (Karin Costelloe, for example), but this did not lead him to emphasize the intellectual equality of the sexes. Considerable allowance needs to be made here for the non-feminist influence on Russell of Edwardian cultural attitudes, and also for the outstanding intellect which Russell himself possessed. Furthermore he often qualified his criticism of woman's intellect with explanations cast in cultural terms. In 1914 he did not share Lady Ottoline's view that it was woman's lack of intellect that explained her tendency to worry too much over small things: "I don't think it is intellect that is lacking", he wrote, "but proportion in desire." In 1929 he thought it undeniable "that women are on the average stupider than men", but attributed this contrast mainly to the relatively tight restraints on curiosity imposed on women during early life. He also collaborated successfully on literary projects with his first three wives, thereby (according to Freda Utley) puffing up their intellectual self-esteem. Nonetheless it is Dora's opinion that Russell "did not really believe in the equality of women with men".

In retrospect, Alys was entirely correct in 1893 to wonder whether Russell's affection would last; falling in love, he rather ominously told her in 1894, "is a matter of temperament, and can't be helped. It is objected to, conventionally, but I never could understand why constancy should be a virtue, because it is simply impossible to love people because one ought to." The intellectual dimension of their eventual incompatibility is fore-shadowed in their correspondence during 1894, which his daughter many years later found "appallingly condescending" on his part. In September he told Alys that he feared she might ruin his career by wishing him to be too practical, and she feared that he would tire of living with a companion less intelligent than himself. His role had already become didactic: "thee Must think for thyself instead of merely taking scraps from different people", he told her, "...people with different Popes for different things have an extraordinary hitch-potch of views." In October he admitted that "if thee were strongly to take up anything I thought illogical or foolish I might be very disagreeable". She was now already occupying the subordinate role, welcoming his ambition because she was so keen to help him in his work; "perhaps I'm only infatuated", she wrote, "but I cannot help believing that thee will do very good thinking and useful work." She was already allowing him to shape her personality in the submissive direction he then required, but which he was later to repudiate.

With Russell as with H. G. Wells, the fractured male perception of women so widespread at the time was reproduced in his own person: woman was for him simultaneously courtesan and domestic manager. At times, Russell imagined that he had found a woman who combined these qualities, but when disillusionment ensued he moved on. His idealization of the loved one has traces of the anti-suffragist's chivalrous outlook; Dora sees him as displaying "something of the courtly romance of the troubadours", as well as something of the "eighteenth-century pleasure in pursuing a desirable young woman". Russell's affairs after 1911 at first issued in remarkable love-letters to Lady Ottoline full of storm and passion, but there was soon a coarsening in his style; his letters to Lady Constance Malleson contain fine passages, but they do not consistently attain the same profundity. Already by December 1914 he was resolving "to avoid philandering in future", but it was not long before Lady Ottoline discovered him using in his letters to Helen Dudley phrases he had earlier employed in letters to her; "I feel somehow it is too indiscriminating", she wrote—"the same form, the special offering, to be used to two people as unlike as Helen and myself." But Russell's depreciation of women in his personal life went further than this; in at least two respects, his own intellectual distinction was purchased partly at women's expense. The first of these has already been discussed: Russell's inability to share the domestic role made careers impossible for his wives. Indeed, he would have been remarkable in his class and generation if he had behaved differently. His early career entailed a rigorous exclusion of the irrelevant and the distracting in a quest to advance the frontiers of philosophy and mathematics; he was a pioneer professional in the twentieth-century world of academic research, and to some extent it was women who paid the price. "Progress involves specialization rather than duplication"; the anti-suffragists had argued, and Russell's suffragism did
not prevent his academic career from resting on an anti-feminist separation of spheres between the sexes. He told Gilbert Murray in 1903 that "specializing is necessary to efficiency, ... and however narrow the specialist becomes, we ought to pardon him if he does good work." As soon as Russell had persuaded Alys into marriage, she discovered that his career came first. In 1906 he admitted the conflict: "I can't help having an aloof manner when my mind is full of work and I am worried by it." Alys's role was to provide the love and admiration, the protection from interruption, the care in practical matters and the pleasant background that his work required. When after 1914 the cushioning effect of servants was largely removed, the conflict between Russell's feminism and his academic professionalism became direct, and he told Lady Ottoline in 1931 that his children had "taken the place of ambition to do good work." 172

Russell's personal life can never be fully understood without appreciating the sheer scale of his ambition and the nature of the impulse behind it. If the driving-force behind his philosophical career reaches forward in some respects towards the mid-twentieth-century academic professional, in other respects it reaches decidedly backward into the nineteenth century. A formidable combination of atheistic self-dependence, intellectual exhilaration, puritan upbringing, aristocratic assertiveness and masculine single-mindedness fuels his early achievement. "Living without any religious beliefs is not easy", he told Lady Ottoline; man's fate is to grapple with an intractable nature if he is to impose beauty and order on a universe made ugly by pain. Philosophy is his weapon, and his phrasing, when describing what it is like to see clearly after serious philosophical puzzlement, is significant: it is "one of the god-like things in life ... like surveying from a hill-top a country strewn with battlefields where desperate victories have been won against what seemed irresistible odds". 173 There is no room here for the milder Christian virtues: Russell is the philosophical Beethoven antagonizing all those around him while fighting through to mastery, the lone explorer hacking his way out of the heart of darkness, the tunneler struggling up to reach the light and air. "I must have something to fight", he tells Lady Ottoline, "my inmost soul is wild and raging, full of storm and infinite conflict—God and Devil at a death-grapple always." 174 He later told Lady Ottoline that he believed himself to possess a violent nature, and said that at sixteen he had nearly strangled a friend after an argument. In 1916 he told Lucy Donnelly that he did not care for the sort of praise obtained by echoing the views of others: "I want actually to change people's thoughts. Power over people's minds is the main personal desire of my life; and this sort of power is not acquired by saying popular things." 175

But Russell has more than mere ambition. Pembroke Lodge has provided him with the drive and application necessary for reaching his goal: "a sort of inner voice keeps on, as persistently as the rumble of a train", he tells Lady Ottoline in 1913, "saying 'get on with your work—get on with your work', leaving me no peace when I am doing anything else." 176 And a combination of aristocratic self-confidence and masculine privilege gives him the self-confidence necessary for major achievement. Exhilarated by a Wagner evening in Paris in October 1894, Russell tells Alys that like all men he likes mastery, but that he prefers "the most subtle and absolute, the mastery over people's wishes and thoughts and hopes, not merely over their outward acts." 177 It is a pursuit of power that may begin in the study but which ultimately seeks the sort of hold over men's minds that Russell's ancestors had once wielded over their bodies; "the love of power is terribly strong in me", he told Lady Ottoline in 1912, when he dreamed of becoming a prophet, the Carlyle of his age. 178

For all this masculine achievement, women are expected to pay a very high price. They are required to see that the cold remoteness and impersonal concentration necessary for highly abstract intellectual triumphs do not indicate lack of affection; that, on the contrary, such conduct in the philosopher testifies to the role performed by a woman's understanding comfort and affection in firing a creative engine which then proceeds on its own ungovernable way until it has exhausted its victim. "The fanatic comes in conflict with the lover". Yet the woman patiently bides her time, helping him to conserve his resources for grappling with his self-appointed task, recognizing that when in creative mood he is virtually helpless in the grip of an impersonal force, taking pride in her collaboration, busying herself with providing creature-comforts and conserving her powers of consolation for ready use whenever the male's perennial sense of failure brings him back to her. "If I could inspire you with the joy of having your share in work I feel as if you would not feel incidental sacrifices so much", Russell tells Lady Ottoline in 1912: "does all this sound very selfish? It really isn't." 179

Russell's personal exploitation of women goes still further. He told Lady Ottoline in 1916 that he was in permanent need of stimulus, "the sort of thing that keeps my brain active and exuberant. I suppose that is what makes me a vampire. I get a stimulus most from the instinctive feeling of success." The stimulus he received from women was not directly intellectual, but took the form of an emotional rejuvenation which simultaneously enabled him to escape from what he called "my Dostoiewsky-under-world" and released latent energy for further intellectual work. In 1918 he saw Lady Constance Malleson as protecting him from his terror at the sight of his ghost. 180 It was Russell that she seems to have had in mind when describing "a man exhausting other men by his intellect; exhausting women by his intensity; wearing out his friends; sucking them dry, passing from person to person, never giving any real happiness—or finding any." 181 Russell's daughter scarcely exaggerates when accusing him of using women "in a disgraceful way, as physical, emotional or spiritual hot water bottles,
to be turned to for comfort when the world looked grey” and then to be “thrown away like old shoes” once they had provided the stimulus and self-confidence he needed at crucial moments in his career.  

In August 1893 Russell noted that Alys “dwell[s] in my thoughts from morning till night and in my dreams from night till morning”; by July 1894 he found it “terrifying to be so utterly absorbed in one person”. He attributed the revival of his boyhood ambitions to “the exhilaration of love and the stimulating effect of it on all my faculties”, and told Alys that whereas Keats had drawn an antithesis between the pursuit of love and fame, for him the two were mutually reinforcing: “where Love is already, Fame does seem to grow to be almost as great—it reinforces love and makes it greater and finer.” Unfortunately Alys’s capacity to stimulate could not survive the immense strain involved in his producing *Principia Mathematica*; their sexual relations ceased, but the marriage-tie persisted for years. No wonder he found separation from her and friendship with Lady Ottoline immensely emancipating after 1911; as he himself recalled, “the nine years of tense self-denial had come to an end, and for the time being I was done with self-denial.” Furthermore Lady Ottoline’s milieu “fed something in me that had been starved throughout the years of my first marriage”, and he threatened suicide if Alys brought Lady Ottoline’s name into divorce proceedings. Again with his marriage to Dora and the birth of his first child, Russell “felt an immense release of pent-up emotion”.  

Yet Russell’s first two wives were not merely abandoned: they were subsequently tormented. Even when Russell’s affection was at its height, it involved dragging his partners tempestuously through the tangles of his strange inner life as part of his quest for harmony; to those he loved, Russell brought fierceness simultaneously with gentleness. The passionate affection of the courtship rendered the anger of the parting all the more terrifying. Discussing their separation, Dora recalls a “blank wall of indifference so complete as to seem hardly conceivable”. The emotional coldness of Pembroke Lodge re-emerged, reinforced by the philosopher’s austere intellectualism. The almost nightmarish story of the emotional tangles affecting the breakup of his second and third marriages cannot yet be told, but in 1949 Russell’s third wife Patricia told Freda Utley how quickly he could change from love to hate: “his face changes in an instant, and others have seen it like that when it turned away from me when a second before it showed me love and kindness.” She went on to discuss how “by talking against each to each he has always put everyone against everyone else among his intimates, and with women it is dreadful, he collects several at a time who each believe that he loves her and hates the others.” As early as 1932 Russell confessed to Lady Ottoline that “there must be something wrong about me, as I seem to be always hurting the people I am fondest of, and quite inadvertently”.  

Alys’s personal story is tragic; her relations with Russell had become so bad by 1907 that she privately hoped the lump in her breast would turn out to be cancer. For a brief moment during Russell’s by-election candidacy at Wimbledon in 1907 the clouds seemed to lift: “Wimbledon was a great and unexpected joy”, her diary recalls; “… I had great personal pleasure … as we were together all day long with plenty of things and people to talk about, and he seemed almost dependent on my help.” But two years later she was writing again about the lump in her breast: “every day I felt it growing with the pang of joy a woman feels over a baby. … I endured the pain as long as possible and finally only spoke of it thinking an operation would give temporary relief without ultimate cure.” In 1911 Alys was grateful to her family for convincing her that she was still lovable: “he is too critical to be with always”, she told her sister Mary, “and the last few years I have been completely discouraged about myself.” Five years later Alys told Mary that Russell “so rubbed it into me that I was the last of God’s creatures, that I not only believe it but feel it, and I am most agr[e]eably surprised that anyone ever likes me.”  

Russell knew what misery could result from the breakup of affection: “it is ghastly to watch, in most marriages, the competition as to which is to be tortured, which tortured”, he told Lucy Donnelly in 1903; “a few years, at most, settle it, and after it is settled, one has happiness and the other has virtue. … Marriage, and all such close relations, have quite infinite possibilities of pain.” Russell also knew what he was doing to Alys. There is, for instance, the pathetic journal entry of 1903, where he describes Alys’s “loud heart-rending sobs while I worked at my desk next door”, or his account of the breakup of their marriage in 1911, when her suffering was “like the suffering of an animal—like a dog run over by a motor—with the same unbearable appeal.” He writes about these aspects of his life with a strange economy of language. His *Autobiography* does not even mention the transition from his third wife Patricia to his fourth wife Edith, and changes of partner are portrayed as irresistible and inevitable. His cold austerity as autobiographer reflects something more than the philosopher’s economy in language, for his prose can often be lyrical and (to modern eyes) sometimes even embarrassingly overflowing. His austerity originates in Pembroke Lodge, and in the *Autobiography* it accompanies intense emotion of any kind—his youthful postponements of suicide, for example—and is not reserved for his relationships with women.  

Alys loved Russell to the end, as we can see from a moving sequence of letters and diary entries. “Everyone else can see him”, she lamented in 1911, “but only I who love him better than all the world can never see him.” In the 1920s she occasionally lingered outside the windows of the Chelsea house where he lived with Dora, watched him with his children, and then came home “to unutterable misery and desolation.” In 1950, the year before
she died, she still hoped that his recent visits to her denoted something more than a desire for the pleasures of shared recollection; in telling him of her enjoyment, she declared herself “utterly devoted” to him, while adding that her devotion “makes no claim and involves no burden on thy part, nor any obligation, not even an answer to this letter”. 196 And despite all the bitterness of her tangled legal quarrels with Russell, Dora’s autobiography reveals a comparable affection for him—yet during the breakup of their marriage, in Katharine Tait’s words, “all involved, including the children, emerged hurt, angry, bitter and desperately defensive”. 197 Constance Malleson continued to send Russell roses on his birthday up to 1968. This capacity for inspiring devotion says much about Russell, but also much about the qualities of the women who loved him.

The inhumane personal conduct of a man who was so publicly humane leaves us with a startling paradox. In any overall judgment of Russell’s feminism, a smug or ironic complacency among the mediocres at the personal failings of the great would be both trite and unhelpful; it is more important to avoid censoriousness, to make full allowance for the personal difficulties resulting from Russell’s unusual upbringing and for subsequent changes in attitudes to women, and to view human nature in the round. For although the philosopher’s pursuit of the abstract might lead Russell towards intolerance of human imperfection, the historian’s empirical cast of mind will readily adjust to human nature as he finds it; like Beatrice Webb in 1902, he will professionally have “no sense of sin”, and no desire to see it punished”. 198

For many human beings there would be no problem here, because many people can live with an extraordinary degree of incompatibility between the separate constituents of their own thought, let alone between their thought and their conduct. Yet with a man of Russell’s intellect, seriousness, conscience and capacity for introspection, this cannot be sufficient. Besides, Russell in later life took pride in his connection with the feminist movement: “few things are more surprising”, he wrote, “than the rapid and complete victory of this cause throughout the civilized world. I am glad to have had a part in anything so successful.” 199 How, then, is the paradox to be resolved? Such a resolution would probably have been beyond Russell himself, and can hardly be feasible for an outsider without philosophical or psychological expertise. Yet it is possible, briefly in conclusion, to rule out some types of explanation and to emphasize the potential in others.

It is important first not to exaggerate the scale of the paradox. What appears as Russell’s callousness towards the women who loved him may stem partly from a modest incredulity that he could really inspire such devotion; 200 some of the trouble no doubt originated, as so often in such cases, with insensitivity in the other partner. Furthermore in his efforts to preserve his third marriage Russell apparently tried to learn from his earlier mistakes, if only to avoid harming his third child Conrad; 201 his fourth marriage seems to have been very happy. Many of his difficulties were those of a whole generation that was awkwardly adapting to the changed institutions he himself had helped to create.

Inssofar as explanation is required, the first and most obvious route to resolution is simply the charge of hypocrisy. “It is better sometimes not to follow great reformers of abuses beyond the threshold of their homes”, George Eliot once wrote. 202 Russell’s critics might wryly comment on the incapacity of the supremely intelligent for managing personal relationships, and adorn a moralistic tale by citing him as the hypocrite who fails to practise the humanitarian gospel he so energetically preaches. Their indictment need not be crude, because human ingenuity in self-deception can be very great. Russell’s advanced ideas about sexuality might be interpreted as an elaborate intellectual superstructure designed to conceal, or even to justify, serious defects in character. Yet this type of explanation must surely be dismissed; Russell may frequently have deceived himself, and his Autobiography does not always fully expose the cruelty of his actions, 203 but it is remarkable for its frankness on sexual matters and for the scale of its self-criticism. Evidence of Russell’s callousness to women is often supplied by Russell himself.

A second approach is more promising: the notion that there is some causal relationship between his public feminism and his private callousness towards women. His peak of suffragist effort certainly coincides with a low point in his relations with Alys, and it would be neat if one could argue that Russell’s public support for feminism and pacifism originates in his awareness of the need to suppress undesirable traits powerful in his own temperament. He was certainly worried by the contradictions within his personal conduct towards individual women—instinctively seeking out the liberated woman only to dominate and therefore to despise her. 204 Yet if there is a link between Russell’s public feminism and private harshness towards women, it does not take a simple, direct or merely atoning form.

We have already seen that there are links of a more complex kind between his sexual, intellectual and political lives. Furthermore the pursuit of perfection, which was so prominent in his inspiration as a philosopher, was readily transferred not only to the world of politics but also to his expectations of the individuals around him. As Freda Utley puts it, “since he was seeking for an impossible combination of Cleopatra and Aspasia, Hypatia and St. Theresa, Boadicea and Joan of Arc, and was also drawn to Quakers and other Puritan types ... his quest for enduring love was abortive.” 205 Furthermore, the public humanitarian may perhaps in his private life need to preserve a certain economy of emotion; as Dora charitably wrote, “it may well be that it is not possible, if you spread your love over the human race, to have much left over to dispense within your home”. In some respects
Russell seems to have been the converse of Swift, who hated and detested “that animal called man” while heartily loving “John, Peter, Thomas, and so forth”. What Dora describes as the “capacity to up anchor and away, to go off at a tangent”, may have caused Russell to produce misery in the personal lives of others, but it was also integral to his courageous public defense of unpopular causes.

A third approach towards resolving the paradox, taken by Russell’s daughter, is to probe more deeply the quality of his feminism and reach an unfavourable verdict. It is certainly important to grasp the limited nature of his feminist commitment. We have already seen that although Russell was a keen and resourceful suffragist, his motivation was humanitarian rather than feminist, and that his hopes of women’s political influence were small. His feminism gained from the fact that his Liberalism naturally opposed him to any restrictions on the free flow of talent and opportunity, and he was more alert than many Edwardians to the scale of the social, economic and intellectual change required before women could really be said to have won their emancipation. Yet he was by no means alone among suffragists in continuing to accept the anti-suffragist notion that the sexes should occupy separate spheres. Some might even deny that it is possible for any man fully to comprehend the woman’s point of view. In 1916 Mrs. Swanwick told him his lectures showed how he “saw the whole world through a man’s eyes only”, and was “cold to women’s disabilities. You recognize them, but they do not deeply move you.” She refused to implement his aim of merging the male and female campaigns against the war because she felt that each sex had something distinctive to contribute.

This analysis may moderate, but it cannot remove the conflict between Russell’s public humanitarianism and his private inhumanity towards some of the women he knew. Briefly in a letter of 1914 to Lady Ottoline, he raises the possibility that there were times when the paradox did not concern him. Discussing the exhilaration of philosophical discovery, he goes so far as to say that “it is worth being mad and hateful and filling oneself and others with pain if that is the price one must pay”. The observer of Russell’s remarkable career will certainly admire his capacity for bringing forth immense intellectual and humanitarian achievement out of personal emotional crisis; but the historian, before vacating the field to the philosopher and the moralist, will feel bound to emphasize that some women who knew Russell well were in no position to experience the pleasures of the philosophical achievements that their sufferings had helped to make possible.

More than once Russell emphasized his enjoyment at reading history; yet the reason for his enjoyment is perhaps surprising in a philosopher who so admired the scientific method. He admitted that the historian might imitate the scientist by building up generalizations from accumulated facts, but history’s major attraction for Russell lay elsewhere; in his view, the facts themselves had “intrinsic value, a profound interest on their own account, which makes them worthy of study, quite apart from any possibility of linking them together by means of causal laws”. Perhaps history was Russell’s characteristically intellectual route towards a knowledge of human strangeness and unpredictability that many possess instinctively: towards a knowledge, as he put it, “of human beings in circumstances very different from our own—not mainly analytic scientific knowledge, but the sort of knowledge that a dog-lover has of his dog”.

Notes

1 I gratefully acknowledge here the generous help I have received in compiling this paper from Mrs. Barbara Halpern, who not only allowed me to consult the Smith Archives which are in her possession at Oxford, but also commented very helpfully on an earlier draft of this paper. Sheila Turcon of McMaster University gave most generous help at every stage, including comments on an earlier draft of the paper. I also enjoyed the privilege of receiving incisive and tolerant criticism of an earlier draft from Bertrand Russell’s daughter, Katherine Tait. Kenneth Blackwell and Jo Vellacott were also very generous in making their comments available to me. But nobody should be blamed for mistakes in the article except myself. (Quotations are footnoted in the order of appearance in the text.)

2 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 26 Feb. 1913 #7. 10.
3 Sylvia Strauss, “Traitors to the Masculine Cause”; The Men’s Campaigns for Women’s Rights (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1982).
4 H[ouse of] C[ommons] Debates, 11 July 1910, col. 103. 5
5 Common Cause (16 May 1912): 82; Mrs. Fawcett to Lady F. Balfour, 5 March 1910: Fawcett Library Autograph Collection, 1, Hi/6895, City of London Polytechnic.
6 Despard, The Vote (28 May 1910): 50; see also Woman’s Leader (27 May 1927): 128, (9 March 1928): 35.
7 The Vote (6 Aug. 1910): 173.
8 Common Cause (27 May 1909): 91.
9 Calculated from information in WSPU annual reports.
12 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, 4 May 1906; Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 9 May 1906.
14 H. C. Deb., 20 May 1867, col. 819.
16 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 31 Oct. 1912 #617 and mid-Nov. 1912 #638.
200 Brian Harrison


19 Women's Franchise (27 June 1907): 9; (23 July 1908): 46; (30 July 1908): 59; Men's League for Women's Suffrage, *A Declaration of Representative Men in Favour of Women's Suffrage* (n.d.).


24 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 7 June 1913 #799 and 18 May 1911 #72.

25 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, [1917] #1457.


32 The *Amberley Papers*, 2: 492, 490.


35 Quoted in Clark, *op. cit.*. p. 285.


37 Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 603.

38 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 1 Nov. 1911 #240.


41 Millicent Garrett Fawcett to Russell, 25 May 1908.

42 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 27 May and 8 Aug. 1908.


46 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, 12 April 1907.

47 See her undated, unsigned manuscript (pasted with pamphlets dated 1904), Green Scrapbook on Women's Co-operative Guild and Women's Suffrage: Women's Co-operative Guild, 342 Hoe Street, Walthamstow.


52 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, Easter Sunday, 1907.

53 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 1 April 1907.

54 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, "Sunday" [endorsed "1907"]; see also Llewelyn Davies to Russell, 26 May 1907 and "Sunday", n.d.

55 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 20 Sept. and 16 Nov. 1907.


57 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, "Friday", which must be a reply to Russell's letter to her dated 27 May 1908.

58 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 16 Nov. 1907 and 8 Aug. 1908.

59 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, 12 Jan. 1908; and her letter cited in note 57 above.

60 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 27 May and 5 June 1908.


63 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 27 May and 5 June 1908.

64 Llewelyn Davies to Russell, "Sunday" [endorsed Aug. 1908].

65 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 8 Aug. 1908.

66 Mrs. Fawcett to Russell, 12 March 1909; Russell to Mrs. Fawcett, 15 March 1909: M50/21295, Manchester City Library.

67 Margaret Bondfield to Mrs. MacDonald, 2 Oct. 1909: MacDonald Papers, Col. J, Vol. 5, f. 76, London School of Economics; Llewelyn Davies to Russell, Nov. 1909 (Friday).

68 Llewelyn Davies to C. P. Scott, 4 Sept. 1909: Scott Ms 128/93, Manchester University Library.

69 Russell to Donnelly, 18 Oct. 1909.


74 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 12 Nov. 1911 #253 and 13 Dec. 1911 #285.

75 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 12 Nov. 1911 #253, 18 Oct. 1911 #225, Dec. 1911 #280 and postmarked 21 Feb. 1913 #704.


Morning Post (8 July 1912).


Rover to Alys, 12 Sept. and 2 Oct. 1894.


Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 29 Nov. 1907 and 22 July 1906.


Ibid., pp. 13, 143, 146–6.


Marriage and Morals, p. 198.

Fabian News (Dec. 1929): 51; Russell to Alys, 12 Sept. 1894.


Russell to Alys, 12 Sept. 1894.

Marriage and Morals, p. 62.

Ibid., pp. 72, 13; cf. p. 69.

Quotation from The Amberley Papers, 1: 288; see also The Amberley Papers, 2: 316; 322.

For Russell’s birth, see Clark, op. cit., pp. 22–3.

Marriage and Morals, pp. 132–3; see also Strachey, op. cit., p. 151.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 15 June 1926 #1659; see also Marriage and Morals, pp. 73, 135; cf. pp. 16, 148–9.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 23 Dec. 1912 #656; see also “A Locked Diary” in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, 1: 51, entry for 12 June 1890; Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 185.


Marriage and Morals, p. 103; see also p. 130.


Marriage and Morals, p. 74.

Ibid., pp. 249, 246, 122.


Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 23 Dec. 1912 #656.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 24 June 1914 #1044; Russell to Lady Constance Malleson, 16 April 1918.


100 Russell to Lady Constance Malleson, 24 July 1920.


104 Typescript of Lady Astor’s talk on Josephine Butler, 24 April 1928, p. 10; Astor Papers, Ms 1416/1/160, University of Reading.


110 E.g. Anti-Suffrage Review (Sept. 1912): 206–7; Mrs. Fawcett to Randall Davidson, 20 June 1912: Randall Davidson Papers, 1912 File W16 (Women’s Suffrage), Lambeth Place Library, London.

111 See also, for example, Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 14 Nov. 1911 #256.

112 Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 13 April 1915 #1247.

113 Russell to Llewelyn Davies, 8 Aug. 1908; Dora Russell, *The Tamarisk Tree*, p. 294.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 18 Feb. 1913 #702; cf. Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, autumn 1911 #217.


"Die Elhe" in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, 1: 69–71; to which Alyx to Russell, 16 Aug. 1893, is a reply.

Alys to Russell, 1 Feb. and 14 Nov. 1894; Strachey, op. cit., p. 140; Russell to Alyx, 4 Feb. 1894.

Dora Russell, The Tamarisk Tree, pp. 73, 79; Russell to Lady Constance Malleson, postmarked 29 March 1918.


Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 25 March 1911 #6; Dora Russell, The Tamarisk Tree, p. 110.


Russell to Alyx, 1 Nov. 1894; Tait, "Russell and Feminism", p. 6; see also "A Locked Diary", p. 64, entry for 16 Sept. 1893.

Russell to Alyx, 3 and 29 Sept. 1894.

Russell to Alyx, 22 Oct. and 1–2 Oct. (midnight) 1894.

Alys to Russell, 9 Oct. 1894.


Russell to Alyx, 28 Sept. 1906; Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, 7 Aug. 1931 #1694; see also Strachey, op. cit., p. 152.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, [c. 15 July 1911] #149 and postmarked 4 Jan. 1914 #916.

Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, [March 1912] #386.


Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, postmarked 1 June 1913 #793.