

# RUSSELL'S SEVENTEEN PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

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Most philosophers associate private-language arguments with Wittgenstein. A few associate them with Frege or Quine.<sup>1</sup> Peter Hacker has at least seen that Frege had a private-language argument.<sup>2</sup> But how many associate private-language arguments with Russell? Russell is the second of this great quartet of analytic philosophers. And he offered at least seventeen private-language arguments over the course of fifty-seven years. Speak of neglect! In this essay I shall discuss all seventeen arguments. Where "PLA" designates you-know-what, Russell gives these six varieties of private-language arguments in historical order:

PLA #	PLA VARIETY	YEAR(S)	METAPHYSIC
1-5	Act-Object	1900-12	Extreme Realism
6-7	Black Box	1918-21	Logical Atomism/Neutral Monism
8-9	Inner Comparison	1921	Neutral Monism
10	Subtle Black Box	1927	Representational Realism
11-15	Social Language	1927-48	Representational Realism
16-17	Probability	1948-56	Representational Realism

<sup>1</sup> Frege has private-language arguments in *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, the Introduction to *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, and "The Thought". See also my "Frege: Existence Defined as Identifiability", *International Studies in Philosophy*, 14 (Fall 1982): 6-7. Quine's classic arguments are in *Word and Object*, Chaps. 1 and 11, and "Ontological Relativity". Hector-Nêri Castañeda, in "The Private Language Problem", *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 6: 463, includes under "Bibliography: the Problem before Wittgenstein" Carnap and Weinberg, but not Frege or Russell. This is typical.

<sup>2</sup> "Frege and the Private-Language Argument", *Idealistic Studies*, 2 (1972): 274-87.

The last variety becomes virtually a traditional analogical argument for other minds, as Russell's fifth postulate of non-deductive inference is involved. It also seems unique to Russell. All invite comparisons, though verificationist criteria or rules, and Kripkean "sceptical paradoxes", seem totally absent. A PLA is supposed to be an argument against the possibility, in some sense, of private languages, in some sense. PLAS normally aim to show that what can count as meaning or reference is communicable and in the world external to minds. But here I have separated PLAS into basic kinds of argument which are often mixed together. And as it happens, the Black Box PLAS Russell gives allow behaviour to be appearance in such a way that a solipsist could happily accept them. Indeed, the 1918 Russell implies that language is largely private, since names name appearances. And as Russell Wahl very kindly noted,<sup>3</sup> my Act-Object PLAS do not address the privacy of language, but the externality of objects. My reply to him is that this is a good point, but that the PLAS do concern language directly, if not explicitly. For they address the privacy of objects which are not only the denotations, but also the meanings, of Russell's names.

Panayot Butchvarov has well described the private-language argument as "an argument that even after thirty-five years of discussion remains ... obscure and controversial."<sup>4</sup> Studying Russell's private-language arguments will relieve at least much historical obscurity. Russell offered these arguments through four main metaphysical periods: extreme realism, logical constructionism, neutral monism, and representational realism. Obviously he must have interpreted their implications for metaphysics—for realism in particular—differently in these different periods. The extreme-realist PLAS make communicable items non-mental entities; the constructionist/neutral monist PLAS make them fictions; and the representational-realist PLAS make them probable existents. (By "item" I mean very noncommittally "entity which is not nothing" or even only "ostensible being".) Largely on the basis of my historical analysis of Russell, I suggest that private-

<sup>3</sup> Wahl made his comment during the discussion that followed my reading of sections of this essay at the Bertrand Russell Society meeting held at the December 1990 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Boston.

<sup>4</sup> *Skepticism in Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 1989), p. 10.

language arguments such as those analyzed here are, by themselves, not able to support more than a minimal realism. For they are all interpretable as consistent with Russell's logical constructionism, where only logical atoms are non-mental real things. Indeed, this is Russell's view. For Russell's particulars (sense-data, appearances) are mind-independent and physically real. But I also suggest that any metaphysic, from the most realistic to the least, requires the acceptance of some private-language argument to be minimally adequate in the realism it advocates. For any realism must show its entities to be minimally language-independent and mind-independent. For instance there is a kind of minimalism in Frege, in so far as Frege's PLAS establish only the "objectivity" of communicable items, not their reality (for Frege, causal effectiveness). It seems that Frege-Russell private-language arguments establish only that objects of public discourse are, minimally, objective (Frege) constructions (Russell) of something real (Russell).

I shall not address the question whether there is any cash value to the distinction between objective and trans-subjective. The latter is a rejection of the privacy assumption made by private-language arguments, and is a conclusion drawable from them only in the sense of a *reductio ad absurdum* against them. Also, the burden is on trans-subjectivists to show how, ontologically and epistemologically speaking, trans-subjective ideas are any more comparable across minds than essentially private ideas are.

#### I. RUSSELL'S TWO 1900 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

In *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, Russell criticizes Leibnizean idealism on several grounds. Russell's private-language arguments give powerful support to what would otherwise be only a commonsense-based realistic critique.<sup>5</sup>

PLA-I may be analyzed as follows. (1) If 2 is a mere idea in my mind, then there is not "one definite number 2". (2) Then "there are as many numbers 2 as there are minds". (3) If one tries to account for a single public number 2 in terms of what all the idea-objects 2 have

<sup>5</sup> *PL*, pp. 117, 179–80. Russell also makes specific realist criticisms concerning relations, pp. 14–15; space, pp. 122–6; and time, p. 130.

in common, then this can only be another idea-object. (4) Thus there will be a vicious regress of ideas of what other ideas have in common. (5) Therefore (since there *is* “one definite 2”, so that two people *can* think of the same 2), 2 is not essentially a constituent of any mind.

Russell goes on to caution against supposing that merely because an object of thought, say, a centaur, is non-mental, somehow centaurs must exist somewhere (*PL*, p. 166). This is probably an anticipation of his 1903 distinction between being and existence, as we shall see shortly. In any case, non-mentality seems to be the 1900 Russell’s minimal standard of realism, and PLA-I fixes it.

PLA-I is very close to Frege’s 1884 private-language argument.<sup>6</sup> Even the example of the idea 2 is the same. Frege probably makes the content of the word “centaur” objective in 1884, just as he later makes its sense objective.

Russell generalizes PLA-I from ideas, which would be associated with subjects and predicates, to include truths, which would be propositional (*PL*, p. 166). Concerning truths, Russell gives his second private-language argument (PLA-2) when he says:

And generally if a truth be something existing in some mind, then that mind, and another mind which knows the truth, cannot be aware of the *same* truth. If we once admit that there is one and only one Law of Contradiction, then the law itself is something distinct from all knowledge, and cannot logically depend upon God’s mind. (*PL*, p. 181)

This adds to conclusion (5) of PLA-I that: 2 is distinct from all knowledge; and 2 cannot logically depend on any mind. Frege, of course, also addressed the objectivity of truths in 1884.<sup>7</sup>

One might hold that the *prima facie* implication of private-language arguments such as PLA-I is that extreme realism is correct. This realism includes particulars, universals, relations, truths, mere *possibilia*, abstract entities, in short, anything thinkable by two persons.

PLA-I has four major features. First, the whole mental realm vanishes from the domain of the communicable. Second, identity of

<sup>6</sup> *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern U. P., 1974), p. 37e.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34e, 36e.

objects of thought across persons is no sufficient condition of actuality—only of non-mentality. Third, PLA-I does not establish conversely that non-mentality is a sufficient condition of possibility of identity of objects of thought across persons. Thus in theory there may be non-mental items which have no public identity. Fourth, PLA-I entails a thought–non-mental distinction, now popularly called an act–object distinction. Russell also explicitly attributes such a distinction to Leibniz. This fourth major feature is questionable in light of the first. For according to the first, thoughts are either non-mental or incommunicable. How then can we communicate about our thoughts (mental acts)? And how then can this fourth major feature even be stated? Is this not a *reductio* of PLA-I? Russell will offer a resolution of this dilemma only in 1905.

## 2. RUSSELL’S 1903 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

In *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell gives his third private-language argument, again using Frege’s illustration of the idea of the number 2. Some brief preliminaries are needed for its interpretation. Russell here draws a distinction between being and existence. All existents are entities, but not all entities are existents. Russell draws a second implicit distinction between actual existence, which is always particular and always empirically known, and mathematical existence, which is indicated by the term *some a* in mathematical existence proofs.<sup>8</sup>

PLA-3 may be analyzed as follows. (1) If the number 2 is mental, then it is essentially an existent. (2) Existents are always particular. (3) If any particular exists in one mind at one time, then it cannot exist in another mind at any time, or even in the same mind at another (discontinuous) time. (4) Thus 2 must be minimally an entity that has being, regardless of whether 2 happens also to have existence. (5) Therefore, to generalize this, all knowledge must be recognition, and must be of entities which are not “purely mental”, but whose “being is a precondition, not a result, of ... being thought of”. (6) And even when somebody is thinking of 2, 2 does not exist as a literal constitu-

<sup>8</sup> See *PoM*, pp. 43, 57–9, 71, 73–5, 362, 449, 458, 466, 470, 476, 488, 497.

ent of the thought which that person has of 2. (7) Therefore 2 cannot be said to exist merely because somebody may (or even several persons do) think of 2 (*PoM*, p. 451).

PLA-3 makes showing the non-mentality of universals quick work indeed, if everything mental is particular. But by premiss (2), universals are shown to have only being, not existence. Being seems to be the minimal sort of non-mental ontological status an item may have. Thus PLA-3 fixes the minimal standard of realism for the 1903 Russell.

PLA-3 does not presuppose, but argues for, an act-object (or thought-entity) distinction. Thus PLA-3 faces the same dilemma as did PLA-I: it has a consequence which is either self-contradictory or unstateable. That is, acts are mental. Now either we can think of acts or we cannot. But if we can think of them (make acts objects of other acts), then they must be non-mental, which contradicts their mentality. And if we cannot think of acts, then we should not be able to distinguish them from objects, or even to speak about them at all.

PLA-3 implies the being of mathematical existents in its very example of the number 2. This distinguishes being from possible actual existence, in so far as 2 is not empirical. Evidently being is a general notion which applies alike to mathematical existents, actual existents, and possible actual existents, such as the Homeric gods. (There seem to be no merely possible mathematical existents.) Thus being is the minimal reality for Russell in 1903.

### 3. RUSSELL'S 1912 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Russell's fourth private-language argument is in *The Problems of Philosophy*. Here all particulars with which we are acquainted are private, and it is universals with which more than one person may be acquainted (*PP*<sub>3</sub>, p. 137). Also, the act-object distinction is completely explicit. It may seem presupposed, but in fact it is argued for as usual, by arguing that the object is non-mental.

PLA-4 may be analyzed in the following way. (1) If whiteness were an act of thought, then we would think of whiteness as mental. (2) But one person's act of thought is necessarily a different act from another person's. (3) Thus no two different persons could think of whiteness and no one person could think of whiteness twice. (4) But this is absurd. For this would rob whiteness of its universality. (5) And

whiteness is essentially a universal. (6) Thus universals are not thoughts (acts of thought of something), but objects of thoughts (when thought of) (*PP*<sub>3</sub>, p. 99; see pp. 12, 42).

Russell requires publicity for universality. (The notion of a simple universal essentially private to one mind is self-contradictory. Such a universal is no universal.) What is important here is that it is only knowledge by description that "enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience" (p. 59). Now knowledge by description *ipso facto* involves concepts.<sup>9</sup> And concepts are universals (p. 52). In the analyzed passage, Russell establishes that universals have being, that they are entities in their own right (p. 100). Thus they may serve as the sound metaphysical basis of public knowledge by description. Now if particulars were composed of universals, then particulars would be public and objective as well. Russell offers virtually such a theory of particulars in 1940, and the identity of indiscernibles, if not a private-language argument, is his explicit motive. Also, knowledge by description is Russell's resolution of the dilemma faced by PLA-I and PLA-3. For our mental acts may be known by description. In so far as knowledge by description requires successful description, Russell is now committed to a minimal realism indeed. Namely, to be an object of public discourse, an item need only instantiate a universal which may be the basis of public knowledge by (definite or even indefinite) description. Russell stated the resolution in terms of knowledge by description in 1905 in the second paragraph and also in the penultimate paragraph of "On Denoting" (*LK*, pp. 41, 55-6), but explicitly associated it with universals only in 1911 and 1912, perhaps because in 1905 he held that denoting phrases are without meaning, while in *Principia* they have meaning-in-use.

As in PLA-I and PLA-3, PLA-4 establishes not existence, but being. In *The Problems of Philosophy*, universals constitute the world of being. But for once, being is not the minimal ontological status. Entities and existents are mutually exclusive: no existents have being and no entities exist. Russell deems existence and being to be equally real. Thus both existence and being are in a sense both minimal and maximal in ontological status. They are also both non-mental, except for

<sup>9</sup> This is the whole import of *PP*<sub>3</sub>, pp. 51-9. See *IMP*, p. 168.

existents such as minds and acts. (Even sense-data are mind-independent and physically real, at least for the 1914 Russell.)

But it is not just universals that are public for the 1912 Russell.

PLA-5 is simple. (1) If there are to be public neutral objects, etc., then there must be something over and above the private and particular sense-data which appear to various people. (2) We want the same object for different people. (3) Therefore, we want physical objects over and above the sense-data which appear to people. (4) Therefore we want such physical objects to exist (*PP*<sub>3</sub>, pp. 20–1).

PLA-5 argues for a realism for physical objects which seems to rule out logical constructionism very flatly. Thus PLA-5 may be the reason why Russell delayed so long in extending his *Principia* abolition of classes to abolishing bodies and minds, not to mention space and time, construed as mere fictional classes of events, and ultimately as classes of sensed and unsensed sensibilia.

Like PLA-1 to PLA-4, PLA-5 argues for the act-object distinction. But PLA-5 shows that Russell's 1912 public mind-independent items need be neither timeless nor universal in nature.

#### 4. RUSSELL'S TWO 1918 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" Russell gives two arguments which foreshadow his 1921 and 1927 private-language arguments. The first of these is an embryonic private-language argument. Here we leave Act-Object PLAS behind in favour of Black Box PLAS, even though Russell will not abandon the act-object distinction itself until 1921.

PLA-6 may be analyzed as follows. (1) I can know that two appearances belong to the same person, Jones. (2) I can know the existence and identity of Jones only through my experience. (3) Therefore what I know as Jones cannot be some metaphysical entity or Self beyond my experience, even if there may be such an entity. (4) It also follows from premiss (2) that there must be something in my succession of experiences of Jones which enables me to say of them that they are all experiences of Jones. (5) This something must be an empirical relation which they all have to each other (perhaps under normal conditions). (6) Thus this relation must define what I mean by "Jones", and, more

generally, by "the same person".<sup>10</sup>

It is easy to extend PLA-6 to include all Jones's ideas which I may say rightly I know about. Jones is the mysterious black box. The resemblance to Wittgenstein's mysterious beetle in a box illustration is unmistakable.<sup>11</sup> But Russell goes much further. He offers a long parallel argument about bodies.<sup>12</sup> And in effect he even includes numbers, understood as entities, as possible occupants of a metaphysical black box beyond what may be called our experience of counting.<sup>13</sup> Russell does not give an argument like PLA-6 in the case of numbers, but it would be easy to construct. In all three cases—other minds, bodies, and numbers—Occam's razor is applied by Russell to entities which may lie beyond experience. Publicity and neutrality thus have nothing to do with PLA-6 and its extensions. A solipsist would find PLA-6 quite congenial.

The "empirical relation" is not a criterion in the verificationist sense. Though "it must define what I mean", Russell was no verificationist. For he admits there "may" be a metaphysical Self beyond experience in premiss (3).<sup>14</sup>

If Russell had noticed that PLA-6 applies even to one's own self viewed as a metaphysical subject, perhaps he would have abandoned act theory in 1918. Here the black box would be one's own introspective experience. The essence of an act, of course, is that it relates a conscious subject to an object.

<sup>10</sup> PLA in *LK*, pp. 276–7; in *Papers* 8: 239–40.

<sup>11</sup> *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968), §293.

<sup>12</sup> *LK*, pp. 272–3; in *Papers* 8: 236–7.

<sup>13</sup> *LK*, p. 277; in *Papers* 8: 240. On counting see *IMP*, p. 10, and *HK*<sub>2</sub>, p. 237; see the strict parallel to geometry, p. 237ff.

<sup>14</sup> On the occasions on which Wittgenstein uses a neo-Russellian Occam's Razor, *Investigations*, §§270, 271, 291, Wittgenstein is not a verificationist either. Verificationism and Occam's razor are incompatible. For what we could but need not assume is not nonsensical, and what is nonsensical is not something we can but need not assume. Note also Russell's rejection of verificationism in 1940.

Note the absence of any requirement of "intersubjective checkability" for Russell's "empirical relation" in PLA-6. I can know that two of my sense-data are appearances of Jones. Therefore there must be an empirical relation which defines what I mean by "Jones". PLA-6 is concerned with identity conditions that are put forward in 1918 as logically more fundamental than intersubjective identity conditions.

## 5. RUSSELL'S THREE 1921 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

In *The Analysis of Mind*, Russell abandons constructionism and logical fictions for neutral monism. To be sure, he reminds us that this is a leap over a narrow ditch.<sup>15</sup> But it does involve at least his official abandonment of the act-object distinction.<sup>16</sup> This is of some concern. First, how can Russell's Act-Object PLA-1 to PLA-5 survive his abandonment of the act-object distinction in 1921? Second, how can anything be objective, i.e., on the side of objects, when the very distinction between act and object is abandoned? The Black Box PLA is Russell's replacement for Act-Object PLAS. Simply conceding that nothing given as empirically known is wholly objective seems to be his answer to the second.

Now does the change of metaphysic, in particular the abandonment of the subject, bring the change in PLAS, or does the change of PLA does bring the change in metaphysics? On the one hand no fallacy, invalidity, or false premiss is ever found in any Act-Object PLA. On the other hand the change of metaphysic makes the conclusions of Act-Object PLAS categorially ill-formed. For even the 1918 PLA-6 implied the superfluity of all selves, including even one's own self as a "subject". The best conclusion is that the two changes go together.

Russell's *Analysis of Mind* includes a very early exploration of the theme of behaviourism in connection with identity conditions for mental items. The year it was published, the *Tractatus* was just being published in its first edition, and the *Blue Book* would not be dictated for another twelve years.<sup>17</sup> Russell's seventh private-language argument is thus much more likely to have influenced Wittgenstein than

<sup>15</sup> It is common knowledge that Russell's 1918 logical atomism and 1921 neutral monism are almost one. See PLA in *LK*, pp. 221-2, 277-80; in *Papers* 8: 195-6, 240-3. Russell says that behaviourism "belongs logically with neutral monism", p. 279. Perhaps this holds for logical atomism as well. See also *MPD*, pp. 101, 103.

<sup>16</sup> See *PP*, pp. 12, 99; *AMi*, pp. 141-2; *MPD*, p. 135. As in fn. 12, the shift from 1918 to 1921 may not be so great. Other minds were constructions as early as 1914. And attending to or "noticing" from 1921 on seems a ghostly survival of acts. See *AMi*, p. 174, and *MPD*, pp. 139-40. And then, again from 1921 on, sense-data are resurrected as sensations that are noticed!

<sup>17</sup> George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 5, 9.

to have been influenced by Wittgenstein.

PLA-7 may be analyzed as follows. (1) We can more or less discover what animals desire from their behaviour. (2) We can observe only actions of animals. (3) Therefore actions alone must be the test of desires of animals. (4) And an animal's desire is nothing but a characteristic of a series of its actions—an observable trait of its behaviour (*AMi*, pp. 61-2).

Plainly, PLA-7 vindicates calling PLA-6 an embryonic private-language argument. Equally plainly, animals, including humans, are the black boxes. Russell says animals "may have minds" (*AMi*, p. 62), but he finds the inference of minds from actions dubious.

The use of Occam's razor to sidestep minds shows that behaviourism is not strictly proven, but just the most parsimonious theory. Indeed, Russell takes pains to make clear in 1921 that he regards behaviourism as a limited viewpoint. Occam's razor, used often by Russell, is far more reasonable than the logical behaviourism so often associated with private-language arguments. The linch-pin of PLA-6, premiss (2) and PLA-7, premiss (2) is epistemological necessity, not logical necessity. Parsimony, in fact, would make little sense on logical behaviourism. For logical behaviourism alleges a *logical* necessity about Jones being a public entity. (Of course, I do not mean formal deductive necessity.) Thus there would be no risk of error to be minimized by using Occam's razor, except, perhaps, by constructing some public entities in terms of others. (This is also why the "test of desires of animals" is no verificationist criterion, even though Russell uses the word "verification" [*AMi*, p. 62].)

Again, Russell accepts behaviourism only up to a certain point. He says that behaviourism fails "in the last analysis because it is based upon an inadequate philosophy of physics."<sup>18</sup> In fact, "as I have urged, the physical world itself, as known, is infected through and

<sup>18</sup> *AMi*, p. 230. Here Russell anticipates by some 70 years the contemporary debate whether Wittgenstein should have had to admit private ideas if science requires a functionalistic mentalism to explain human perceptual and linguistic behaviour. Russell is in effect answering in the affirmative. Compare the physicalistic Warren Goldfarb, "Wittgenstein, Mind, and Scientism", *Journal of Philosophy*, 86 (1989): 635-42. On private ideas as explanatory hypotheses in science as well as in the argument from illusion, and the resulting need to argue in turn for the existence of the external world, see *MPD*, pp. 104-8, 137-8, 149.

through with subjectivity" (*ibid.*). Subjectivity of point of view is found even in a photographic plate. Worse, physics itself in the end demands private images (pp. 130–1). Does such privacy contradict PLA-6 to PLA-8? No. But Russell now goes much deeper than knowledge by description:

The whole distinction of privacy and publicity, ... so long as we confine ourselves to sensations, is one of degree, not of kind. No two people, there is good empirical reason to think, ever have exactly similar sensations related to the same physical object at the same moment; on the other hand, even the most private sensation has correlations which would theoretically enable another observer to infer it. (*AMi*, p. 119)

Russell holds that some senses—sight, hearing—are more public than others: smell, touch, taste (p. 118). Thus "Taste has a sort of semi-publicity...."<sup>19</sup> Bodily sensations are the most private. But even they belong to public science, "since it is by means of many such observations that correlations are established, e.g. between toothaches and cavities" (p. 119).

Russell argues not: Sensations are private; therefore public correlations of sensations are impossible, but: (1) Public correlations of sensations are a fact; (2) therefore no sensation is absolutely private. Not only is this subtle argument consistent with all the private-language arguments, but it is itself virtually just another such argument. Nor is there room for a purely private component of sensation in this talk of degree. Surely Russell means that each sensation as a whole has a degree of publicity at least in theory. *Russell uses this degree solution of the problem of privacy for the rest of his career.*<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *AMi*. See *HK*, p. 226, on "quasi-publicity". This term suggests not that sensations have a literal degree of publicity, but that they have some property analogous to that of publicity. Compare Frege, "On Sense and Reference", in Peter Geach and Max Black, trans. and eds., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), p. 60, on "taking" ideas "as" objects.

<sup>20</sup> See *An Outline of Philosophy* (1st ed., 1927; New York: Meridian, 1974), p. 141; *HK*, pp. 47, 92–3. Now Russell does admit a distinction between public and private data, and evidently even "private elements" in public data, pp. 44–7 (see pp. 4, 53). But he concludes on p. 47 by making the distinction "one of degree". It seems to me that the best way to reconcile the text is to hold that the privacy of a private element within a public datum is a matter of degree, but a greater degree than that of the

Russell supports his solution with similar views. The distinction between a mere image and a perception of the world is a matter of degree (*AMi*, pp. 135–6). Similarly for images and bodily sensations (p. 154). Similarly for sensations and immediate memory (p. 174). Privacy and publicity are thus matters of degree on all fronts, as it were. Russell's neutral monism itself tends to obliterate the distinction, as Russell is well aware (pp. 117, 120–1). Russell makes the very distinction between mind and matter a matter of degree (p. 308; cf. *Outline*, p. 209). Of course, Russell should then mitigate his view that there can be any totally objective facts in physics.<sup>21</sup> All these matters of degree show Russell's great freedom from the restrictive mentality Richard Taylor has called polarization.<sup>22</sup> They also fit neutral monism extremely well.

Knowledge by description, in retrospect, mandates in a sense a degree of publicity for any item which is accurately described, since the universal the description employed would of course be a literal property of that item. Thus the degree solution is not completely new at the metaphysical level. For "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" was first published in the Aristotelian Society *Proceedings* of 1910–11.<sup>23</sup>

Russell also adduces the negative Inner Comparison PLA-8 about memories:

The difficulty of this question arises through the fact that the sensation which an image is supposed to copy is in the past when the image exists, and can therefore only be known by memory, while, on the other hand, memory of past sensations seems only possible by means of present images. How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the past image and the present sensation? ... it is the very possibility of comparison that is hard to understand.

remainder of the datum.

<sup>21</sup> *AMi*, pp. 231–2. See *HK*, pp. 5–7; 93, "in all empirical knowledge liberation from sense can only be partial"; 248–9. See pp. 84, 293–4, 308 on the very different issue of junking proper names and particulars.

<sup>22</sup> *Metaphysics*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), Chap. 11. But Taylor is not adequately self-reflective. His own thinking about polarization is polarized when he implies that polarization is always untruth, since "reality is far too loose ... to admit of such absolute distinctions", p. 107. (His sentence is confusingly worded on this matter.)

<sup>23</sup> I thank an unknown philosopher for kindly giving me this early date.

We think we can know that they are alike or different, but we cannot bring them together in one experience and compare them.<sup>24</sup>

Russell gives a parallel argument, PLA-9, about expectations for the future:

How do we know that the sensation resembles the previous image? Does the image persist in presence of the sensation, so that we can compare the two? And even if *some* image does persist, how do we know that it is the previous image unchanged?<sup>25</sup>

PLA-8 and PLA-9 demand theories of memory of past events and verification of future events respectively. In a sense they, too, are extensions of PLA-6. For they show that past and future are black boxes beyond present experience. However, they go against Black Box PLAS in that they suggest that there is more to remembered events and more to correctly expected future events than mere images in our minds in the present, and more than can be constructed from items which are known to exist only in the present. Thus there is tension between Russell's Inner Comparison PLAS and his Black Box PLA-7, all of which occur in the same book. Russell seems to be unaware of this tension.

I shall not analyze PLA-8 or PLA-9 here. Their resemblance to certain passages in Frege and Wittgenstein is plain.<sup>26</sup> This is so even though PLA-8 leads Russell to a non-behaviourist image theory of memory, memory also having a belief-component which includes expectations of correlation; and PLA-9 is immediately followed by a call for "a more external and causal view" of expectations of future events. The 1921 Russell's theories of memory of the past and of expectations of the future are very important to assessing such PLAS, and to assessing the tension between them and PLA-7, but too difficult to pursue here.

<sup>24</sup> *AMi*, pp. 158–9. Cf. *Investigations*, §§604–5.

<sup>25</sup> *AMi*, p. 270. Cf. *Investigations*, §§376–8.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, pp. 35e, 36e, and especially Frege, "The Thought", trans. A.M. Quinton, *Mind*, 65 (1956): 299–302. See *Investigations*, §§253–65, 376–82, 604.

## 6. RUSSELL'S THREE 1927 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

In *The Analysis of Matter*, Russell gives a tenth private-language argument, which inverts Wittgenstein's famous beetle in the box illustration of privacy. Russell draws wider implications by including theoretical entities and all events beyond our bodies' surfaces in his box, not just one "other mind".

PLA-10 may be analyzed as follows. (1) Suppose a boundary is set around my own body. Then all I can know is what crosses this boundary, not what lies beyond it. (2) Two theories which explain any crossing-events equally well are then empirically indistinguishable to me. (3) Therefore there is no need to assume the existence of other minds or bodies, all of which would be "private" in the sense of being beyond the boundary of my experience, providing I have a theory which explains any crossing-events just as well without them.<sup>27</sup>

I count PLA-10 as a private-language argument because its scope includes other minds and their contents, and the text explicitly addresses solipsism. Solipsism is widened to include my body as the only body as well as my mind as the only mind. I call PLA-10 a Subtle Black Box argument because Russell puts himself in the box as observer. The question is what is *outside* the box. This is a simple and elegant approach. Only Descartes was more elegant. Descartes put even his own body outside the box of his ideas. But then Descartes did not advance private-language arguments or behaviourism.

The following two arguments are private-language arguments which are at least implicit in the text of *An Outline of Philosophy*. They are Social Language PLAS.

PLA-11 is: (1) Nobody can see exactly what I see. (2) "The purpose of words is to give the same kind of social publicity to thought as is claimed for physical objects." (3) "No words exist for describing the actual occurrence in all its particularity...." (4) Hence "... all words, even proper names, are general, with the possible exception of "this", which is ambiguous."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *AMa*, p. 28; see p. 29. Cf. *IMT*, p. 304, and *HK*, p. 481, on empirically indistinguishable grades of realism, and *HK*, p. 312, on there being infinitely many sets of causal laws compatible with any given finite set of empirical events.

<sup>28</sup> *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 10–12. The ambiguity of "this" is a famous view



For Russell generality is a matter of degree. Even an ordinary proper name such as “Peter’ ... is in a sense general.”<sup>29</sup> Thus publicity is made a matter of generality (universality), and privacy is made a matter of particularity. To be sure, all particulars theoretically may be known by description in so far as they have properties, and correlation has not been abolished in 1927.

PLA-12 is quite similar:

- [1] ... words can never escape from certain grammatical and social requirements which make them say at once more and less than we really mean....  
 [2] In using a general word such as “think”, we are obviously going beyond the datum, from a logical point of view. [3] We are subsuming a particular occurrence under a heading, and the heading is derived from past experience.  
 [4] Now all words are applicable to many occurrences; therefore all words go beyond any possible datum. [5] In this sense, it is impossible ever to convey in words the particularity of a concrete experience; all words are more or less abstract. (*AMa*, p. 172)

Russell adds, “Such, at least, is a plausible line of argument, but I am by no means sure that it is valid.” But however dubious to Russell PLA-12 is, it is in line with his other 1927 views. For abstraction is closely related to generality and is likewise a matter of degree for Russell.

Russell first stated in *PLA* in *LK*, pp. 201, 203; in *Papers* 8: 178–80. But few philosophers realize its significance for the debate about private languages and whether one can distinguish between recognizing a sensation and thinking that one recognizes a sensation. Wittgenstein’s sign “S” entered in a diary for a sensation would be an ambiguous “this” for Russell, *Investigations*, §274. I omit here Russell’s theory of memory: *AMi*, Chap. IX; *HK<sub>2</sub>*, p. 517. The theory explains how we would remember what sign “S” denotes in terms of physiologically based habitual response, analogies to cases of “immediate memory” and fading sensation, and confirmations by various sorts of expected correlations. It is a weakness of Wittgenstein not to discuss such theories. It is a weakness to think of the sensation itself as the crucial locus of publicity or privacy. It is no such locus on neutral monism. And even if it were, there is Russell’s theory of degrees of privacy, and his view that a sensation one notices is a real physical event in one’s brain.

<sup>29</sup> *Outline*, p. 56. See *AMi*, p. 209.

## 7. RUSSELL’S FIVE 1940–56 PRIVATE-LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS

Russell’s thirteenth argument is a Social Language PLA implied in both the *Inquiry* and *Human Knowledge*. PLA-13 is as follows: (1) Language cannot be learned without a presupposition of correctness in teaching and learning situations. (2) Therefore incorrect denoting cannot predominate in mainstream usage.<sup>30</sup> This pertains to the words “denote” and “pain” alike. I do not see any great tension between PLA-13 and the Act–Object PLA-1 to PLA-5, on which one may say with Frege that things are as they are no matter what most or even all people believe. That is, PLA-13 does not imply that the earth was flat and motionless in medieval times merely because the earth was used then as a social paradigm of approximate flatness and stability.

Russell’s fourteenth argument is a Social Language PLA implied in *Human Knowledge*. PLA-14 is: (1) On pain of vicious infinite regress of verbal definitions, some words must be learned ostensively. (2) Therefore, there must be some words whose meaning is external to language. (3) There is a correlation between behaviour and feeling. (4) Therefore, “some words denoting private kinds of experience are learned ostensively.”<sup>31</sup> PLA-14 resembles Act–Object PLAs in its sub-conclusion (2), but has a different logical structure. It is a Social PLA because ostensive learning is unintelligible apart from a teacher–learner plurality of persons. There is no point to ostending all by oneself.

Russell’s fifteenth argument is a Social Language PLA in *Human Knowledge*:

- [1] ... the chief purpose of language is communication, and to serve this purpose it must be public, not a private dialect invented by the speaker. [2] It follows that what is most personal in each individual experience tends to evaporate during the process of translation into language. (*HK*, p. 4)

<sup>30</sup> *IMT<sub>2</sub>*, p. 28; *HK<sub>2</sub>*, p. 191. The argument appears as Transcendental Argument #11 in Dejnožka, “The Ontological Foundation of Russell’s Theory of Modality”, *Erkenntnis*, 32 (1990): 404. Chap. 5 of Dejnožka, *Being Qua Identity: The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition* (Wakefield, N.H.: Longwood Academic, forthcoming 1991), is a revised version of that article.

<sup>31</sup> *IMT<sub>2</sub>*, pp. 25, 66, 126; *HK<sub>2</sub>*, pp. 4, 70, 501–2; see p. 499. Premises (1) and (2) appear as Transcendental Argument #12 in “The Ontological Foundation of Russell’s Theory of Modality”, p. 404.

Degrees of privacy are manifest in “most personal”. Probability is manifest in “tends to evaporate”. Thus PLA-15 is something of a Probability PLA.

Russell gives his sixteenth private-language argument using probable inference of existents based on correlated representational data.

PLA-16 may be analyzed as follows. (1) Learning language must begin with ostensive definition. (2) For person *A* to teach person *B* the meaning of a word by ostensive definition, *A* must be able to surmise what *B* is attending to with a high degree of probability. (3) Language is learned. (4) Therefore teachers must be able to surmise what learners are attending to with a high degree of probability. (5) People do learn languages. (6) Therefore teachers do surmise what learners are attending to with a high degree of probability. (7) Therefore the probability is high that some things which people attend to exist external to language.<sup>32</sup>

I omit Russell's 1956 private-language argument, PLA-17, owing to its virtual identity with PLA-16.<sup>33</sup> Russell asserts both PLA-16 and PLA-17 in close connection with what may be called a principle of public acquaintance, or better, a principle of ostensive definition.<sup>34</sup> This principle does not replace Russell's 1912 principle of acquaintance, but is roughly parallel to it. In any case it should be clear that Probability PLAs have a Social Language aspect.

Russell's 1940–48 assessment of the public-private distinction undergoes one major change. The argument from illusion indicates that data are mental, since there are so many discrepancies between them and physical objects. Thus data are private and individual. But the privacy of data is merely an empirical fact. There is no theoretical or *a priori* reason why two people could not have the same datum if we connected their nerves, or even if they looked at very similar trees. So that erstwhile private particulars are now theoretically possibly public in their full particularity.<sup>35</sup> (Recall that particulars are now bundles of qualities. And though Russell deems qualities particulars,

<sup>32</sup> *HK*<sub>2</sub>, p. 499. PLA-14 and PLA-16 form a sorites.

<sup>33</sup> *MPD*, p. 169, “Again omitting ... to facts.”

<sup>34</sup> *HK*<sub>2</sub>, p. 502; *MPD*, p. 125.

<sup>35</sup> See *HK*<sub>2</sub>, pp. 92–3, 493; contrast p. xii and *IMT*<sub>2</sub>, pp. 229–30. See fn. 20 on privacy as “degree” and fn. 37 on “essential” privacy.

they are universals in every sense except that they have no sub-stratal “instances”.)

The more abstract data are, the more shared they are likely to be across observers. Thus privacy of data is now a *likely* matter of degree. We approach pure data “asymptotically” by removing interpretation. But this does not mean that data are “ineffable”; Russell is optimistic that we can describe them.<sup>36</sup>

Russell states two limits to degrees of privacy. First, he does not see why non-empirical, purely formal logic and mathematics should not be totally objective across different people (pp. 5, 93). Second, “here” and “now”, more accurately, “here-now”, “is the sharp point, in language, of the essential privacy of each individual's experience” (p. 90). And most private of all is “this”. Yet this very “this”, as we just saw, is a datum two people theoretically can share.<sup>37</sup>

Saul Kripke and the Hintikka's attribute to Wittgenstein a private-language argument in which language-games are posited as the best solution of a problem of multiple interpretation of ostensions and of language rules. It is worth noting that Russell inverts such an argument. In two major works he advances a theory of language as, *on the face of it*, a set of habits like playing cricket or cycling. Thus for Russell, language consists of game-like *complex habits*. Russell notes, in the context of this view as *already given*, that problems of misinterpretation can be easily corrected. So that he does not *argue* for his game-theory of language as the best solution of such problems.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *IMT*<sub>2</sub>, pp. 124–5, 315; *HK*<sub>2</sub>, pp. 47, 93, 167–71. Cf. *AMi*, pp. 132, 144; *Outline*, pp. 12–13, 68–9, 190–1, 212–13.

<sup>37</sup> *HK*<sub>2</sub>, pp. 90–3. Data are ordinarily called private if other people do not know them in the absence of your testimony. They are essentially private in the uniqueness of one's “here-now”. But “essential privacy” is epistemic, not metaphysical. For two people could literally have the same datum, p. 92. Also, where testimony is possible, privacy admits of degree. And one can testify, so far as I can see, about one's “here-now” using descriptions. See pp. 45–8, 191–5, on public testimonial knowledge of private data.

<sup>38</sup> *AMi*, p. 199, mentions misinterpreting “motor[car]” as including trains and steamrollers. *HK*<sub>2</sub>, p. 65, mentions misinterpreting “bottle” as including glasses of milk and “milk” as including bottles of water; I extrapolate somewhat from *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 51–3, 55.

## 8. FOUR DIFFICULTIES RESOLVED

Russell's legacy of seventeen private-language arguments is a rich one. Comparative studies of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine on private-language arguments are called for. The private-language arguments which Russell offered over a fifty-seven-year period underwrite Russell's much criticized extension of analysis from logic and mathematics to natural science.<sup>39</sup> They underwrite the existence-identity connection which that extension upholds by making public identity a sufficient condition of minimal realism. I cannot evaluate all the PLAS in detail here. But I can briefly address four *prima facie* difficulties.

(1) Most notably in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", private sense-data are as real as anything can be, while objects of public discourse are mere logical fictions. Does not degree of reality run in the wrong direction so far as Russell's private-language arguments are concerned? The answer is simple. As I have shown elsewhere in some detail, Russell uses the word "real" (and its cognates "existent" and "actual") in three different but theoretically related senses in that work. In the first sense, sense-data (or, alternatively, simple entities) are, as what is given (or, alternatively, as logical atoms), alone real. In the second sense, correlated groups of sense-data are commonsensically said to be real. In the third sense, existence is a property of propositional functions. The difficulty conflates the first and second senses of "real".<sup>40</sup> Publicity concerns the second sense.

(2) If objectivity is a matter of degree, what sort of degree is involved? I distinguish eight types of degree-realism which Russell might be held to have attempted to establish explicitly or implicitly.

*Degree Realism* is the view that the public-private distinction is a matter of degree. *Contingent Degree Realism* is the view that nothing is essentially totally public or essentially totally private. *Logical Degree Realism* is the theory that nothing is even contingently totally public or totally private. *Abstract Degree Realism* is the view that the degree of objectivity of an item is its degree of abstraction. *Probability Degree*

<sup>39</sup> As noted in *MPD*, p. 206.

<sup>40</sup> See Dejnožka, "Russell's Robust Sense of Reality: a Reply to Butchvarov", *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 32 (1988): 155-64. Chap. 4 of *Being Qua Identity* is a revised version of this article.

*Realism* is the view that the degree of objectivity of an item is the degree of probability with which one person may surmise that another person is attending to that item. *Correlational Degree Realism* is the view that the degree of reality of an item is the degree to which it is correlated with items other people may attend to. *General Degree Realism* is the view that the degree of objectivity of an item is the scope of its universality. *Describability Degree Realism* is the view that the degree of objectivity of an item is the degree of its public knowability by description.

Abstract Degree Realism is fundamental. For General Degree Realism and Describability Degree Realism presuppose it, while Correlational Degree Realism as well as Probability Degree Realism use abstract similarities. If everything is either abstract or else abstractable to some degree, then both Contingent and Logical Degree Realism must follow from Abstract Degree Realism. Russell seems to have held Contingent Degree Realism as early as 1921, and explicitly affirms Contingent Degree Realism in 1948. Only one question remains: Should Russell have countenanced Logical Degree Realism? I shall give three arguments that he should have.

(a) A "minimal person" who exists only for a moment, attends to a single item in that moment, "names" that item, but has no lawful correlations with the rest of nature, and whose sole item of acquaintance has no such correlations either, might be a counterexample to Correlational Degree Realism. Even so, it may be questioned with what right such a person or item may be called a person or item at all. Though they may nominally satisfy act theory, they are too unlike real things. Even worse, they are completely unlike the persons and intentional objects we know, except for the alleged "pure" fact of their being persons or intentional objects. In so far as such persons and items are spurious, Logical Degree Realism is correct. And in so far as Russell would reject such persons and items, he is a Logical Degree Realist concerning persons and bodies. This argument is not only limited to minds and bodies, but it also presupposes the theory of Correlational Degree Realism.

(b) Surely if Logical Degree Realism is construed in terms of the logical possibility of correlation, Russell is a confirmed Logical Degree Realist. For all Russell's events are absolutely contingent, making all correlations between them absolutely contingent as well. In theory an

event is public if and only if it is logically possible that there exists a similar event with which it may be correlated. But then no event can be intrinsically private or public. This argument, too, presupposes the correctness of Correlational Degree Realism.

(c) If I am a competent English speaker and attend to any item at all, I can always describe it as the item to which I am now attending. This correlates it minimally with my past public uses of English, which are correlated with the public uses of English of many other persons in turn. But Correlational Degree Realism is not strictly presupposed by this argument. For it is trivial to correlate items merely in respect of their being items at all. However, this argument can rely on Describability Degree Realism, and just as easily on Abstract Degree Realism.

(d) Can Logical Degree Realism face *possible* counterexamples? There might be colours and sounds unlike any others, sensible qualities unlike any others, modes of cognition unlike any others. Consider also the logical possibility (and no more) of the sort of yogic “one-pointed” concentration on one object described in Patañjali’s compilation of yoga sutras. However, our unlike items are like in simply *being* colours or sounds, sensible qualities, or minimally modes of cognition. And they can be publicly described as such. An object of one-pointed concentration is surely describable. How else could we know of its logical possibility? How else could Patañjali have written his sutras? Indeed, I publicly described all these counterexamples myself simply in giving them. Thus no counterexamples can be *described*. “*x* is a possible counterexample” is *itself* a public description! If somebody objects that this merely pushes possible counterexamples outside the realm of language, my reply is that it also pushes them outside the realm of thinkability. To echo Neurath, you can be silent on this matter, as long as your silence is not *about* anything. This argument is not conclusive. There may be more things between heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. But it seems reasonable that there are no possible counterexamples to Logical Degree Realism. For as Butchvarov has powerfully argued, unthinkability is the only basis we have for attributing impossibility.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Butchvarov, *The Concept of Knowledge* (Evanston: Northwestern U. P., 1970).

(3) What sort of minimal realism is sufficient to ensure genuine public communication? Serious doubts affect Logical Atomism, and affect Neutral Monism even more, since the latter abandons all metaphysical selves, that is, all genuine communicators.

For the 1918 Russell, genuine communication seems impossible. Other minds are logical fictions, and so are the material things and logical objects which I might wish to discuss with other minds. All of these are constructions of my own sense-data. We might impose the 1914 Russell’s views on sense-data in *Our Knowledge of the External World* and certain essays in *Mysticism and Logic*. We might, that is, hold that sense-data are physically real, and that there are also physically real unsensed sensibilia which figure into all constructions. We might also require that the empirical relation *R* which defines what it is for two experiences to be experiences of the same other person (or material thing or counted number) in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” to be itself a fully communicable universal, on pain of making communication impossible due to a Quinian ontological relativity of identity conditions. Such moves would make *objects* of discourse communicable enough. But they fail to make *other discourses* more than mere logically constructed objects of discourse, more than constructions of physically real sense-data and unsensed sensibilia defined by some relation *R*.

The problem is classic. Julius R. Weinberg raised it in his 1936 book *An Examination of Logical Positivism* concerning Carnap’s *Aufbau* and Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. Thomas Reid raised it about Berkeley and Hume on theory of ideas. Russell’s best resolution of it is in terms of his theory of structure, which is a special case of his theory of external relations, which is ultimately part of his theory of universals. Knowledge by description of objects of discourse and other discourses is probabilistic knowledge of structures existing beyond my own experience. Structure, of course, is a matter of abstraction. So that Abstract Degree Realism underlies structure, which underlies the genuineness of communication. But the motive power here belongs to the Probability PLAS, which most directly support Probability Degree Realism.<sup>42</sup>

pp. 75–88. I do not mean to imply that Butchvarov’s argument is conclusive either.

<sup>42</sup> See Julius R. Weinberg, *An Examination of Logical Positivism* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1936), pp. 215, 224; Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual*

(4) Russell's structure–qualitative content distinction has a difficulty in turn. As A.J. Ayer tried to make clear, one side of the distinction, content, seems incommunicable and therefore senseless. But Ayer fails to see that for Russell this distinction, too, is not one of kind, but of degree.<sup>43</sup>

#### 9. PLAS AND THE SUBSTANCE TRADITION

An account of Russell on private-language arguments would be incomplete if it failed to mention his opinion, not stated in so many words, that the whole metaphysical tradition is based on a private-language argument first given by Parmenides. For Russell says in *A History of Western Philosophy*:

The essence of [Parmenides'] argument is: When you think, you think of something; when you use a name, it must be the name of something. Therefore both thought and language require objects outside themselves.... This is the first example in philosophy of an argument from thought and language to the world at large. It cannot of course be accepted as valid, but it is worth while to see what element of truth it contains.... [The element of truth is that] it is obvious that, in most cases, we are not speaking of words, but of what the words mean. And this brings us back to the argument of Parmenides, that if a word can be used significantly it must mean *something*, not nothing, and therefore what the word means must in some sense exist.... (HWP, p. 49)

Where a transcendental argument argues from the nature of language or thought to the nature of reality, this might be called a Transcendental PLA. Parmenides thus emerges as perhaps the first philosopher ever to give a private-language argument. Due to its resemblance to Russell's Act–Object PLAS, it might also be called a Name–Object or *Speech Act–Object* PLA. In light of that fact, it should be no surprise that Russell thinks, in effect, that the realism of the whole substance tradition is based on this sort of private-language argumentation:

*Powers of Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 1969), pp. 179, 198–9. On structure, see HK<sub>2</sub>, pp. 231, 250–66, 460–75, 491–2.

<sup>43</sup> Ed.'s Introduction, *Logical Positivism* (New York: Free P, 1959), p. 20; and Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 132.

“What subsequent philosophy, down to quite modern times, accepted from Parmenides, was not the impossibility of all change, which was too violent a paradox, but the indestructibility of *substance*” (HWP, p. 52). Russell himself can be quickly connected to this tradition. His Logical Atomism and Neutral Monism are forms of Parmenidean atomism. For ancient Greek philosophers are famous for advancing forms of atomism to account for change in the face of Parmenides' argumentation. Indeed, Russell's particulars (sense-data) in “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” are explicitly substance substitutes.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> I wish to thank the United States Naval Academy Research Council for grants for the summers of 1987 and 1988 to study Russell on existence and identity.