As Communist régimes collapse in Eastern Europe, and the rhetoric of the Cold War is at last abandoned, it seems an appropriate time to examine an aspect of Bertrand Russell's political life and thought which has not been as well documented as, for example, his activities in the First World War or the 1960s. In the decade following the end of the Second World War Russell could, with some justification, be accused of contributing to Cold War mistrust, and even of playing the role of a "Cold War Warrior". Between 1945 and 1953 not only was Russell, as he himself later admitted, well entrenched as part of the "Establishment", but he was also actively involved in denouncing Communism, Stalin, the Soviet Union, and at times even the Russian people. Russell's Cold War invective intruded into his private letters, newspaper and magazine articles, public lectures and some of his books during this period. For example, What is Freedom? and What is Democracy?, whilst not the best remembered of Russell's books, are illustrative of his vehement hatred of Stalin's régime, and are of especial interest because they underwent small but significant revisions after Stalin's death. This brief survey of Russell's anti-Stalinism is, by necessity, highly selective, and has intentionally focussed on some of Russell's more extreme statements. A much more comprehensive study would be necessary to analyze the overall significance of Russell's anti-Stalinism.

Russell's political thought in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War is dominated by what has been called his "preventative war phase". His proposal that the Soviet Union should be
pressed into signing the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons, was made on at least twelve separate occasions between 1945 and 1949 and was, he later confessed, "the worst thing" he ever said. This episode, characterized by controversy, proposals, denials and counter-denials, and reasonably well discussed by both critics and commentators, has direct relevance to Russell's anti-communist rhetoric. His prescient awareness of the staggering implications of nuclear weapons led him to demand, within two weeks of the destruction of Hiroshima, the urgent implementation of some procedure of international control.

Since the First World War Russell had always maintained a vigorous belief in the long-term necessity of world government. Although this internationalism had been a central component of Russell's political thought, it had remained at least until 1945, at the level of a political ideal rather than a concrete proposal. In his more pessimistic moods, Russell had maintained that it would only arise through American hegemony, and at all times he had argued that a world government would only be effective if it possessed a monopoly of weapons.

Suddenly with the development of the atomic bomb, conditions had changed. Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly of this new monstrous weapon. Despite his very mixed views about both American political ideology and practice, Russell now clearly looked to the United States for international leadership. From the outset he accepted that international control of the bomb may not arise voluntarily. In October 1945 he wrote, "I think a world government supremely important, and I do not expect to see it established without an element of compulsion." Nevertheless, a month following the United Nations debate on the Lilienthal–Acheson Plan (later incorporated into the Baruch Plan) Russell seemed optimistic that the development of the bomb could have beneficial effects: "If the atomic bomb shocks the nations into acquiescence in a system of making great wars impossible, it will have been one of the greatest boons ever conferred by science."

At the same time Stalin's assertiveness, which first became apparent at Yalta and Potsdam, was beginning to cast a dark shadow over prospects for a stable peace. Within two months of the surrender of Japan Russell publicly called for a defensive policy against Stalinism. His fear of the extension of the Soviet sphere of influence was not groundless: Communist régimes became established in Bulgaria and Albania in 1946, Poland in 1947, Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1948, and Hungary and East Germany in 1949. Also in 1949 the Communist army finally defeated Nationalist forces in China.

In one sense Russell's position appeared contradictory. Whilst condemning the spread of Communism in tones as forceful as Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, he still clung to the ideas of the Baruch Plan as a means to world government and lasting peace. There is evidence that Russell genuinely believed that Stalin would, at some point, acquiesce to an International Atomic Development Authority—especially if some pressure was exerted. When it became clear that the Soviet Union had no interest in the proposals, Russell became increasingly despondent and vitriolic in his attitude towards Stalin's Russia. Writing to Einstein in November 1947, he claimed: "I have no hope of reasonableness in the Soviet Government; I think the only hope of peace (and that a slender one) lies in frightening Russia.... Generally I think it useless to make any attempt whatever to conciliate Russia." Earlier that year he had written to Colette in Sweden complaining of the unpopularity of his anti-Stalinist views amongst many of his friends on the Left and declaring that ever since the end of the war he

---


8 Letter to Albert Einstein, 24 Nov. 1947 (RAI 710).
had been as anti-Russian as anyone can be without being regarded as insane. A month before the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, Russell thought the conquest of Western Europe by the Red Army to be a strong possibility. In an infamous letter to Walter Marseille, an American professor who shared Russell’s “preventative war” views, Russell expressed the fear that following a Soviet invasion “practically the whole educated population will be sent to Labour camps in N.E. Siberia.” He argued that “Communism must be wiped out, and world government must be established”: “... I do not think the Russians will yield without war. I think all (including Stalin) are fatuous and ignorant. But I hope I am wrong about this.” Today this reads as a parody on McCarthy-inspired American anti-Communist fanaticism. But it was not. The letter was later published by Marseille—provoking an angry response from Russell who claimed such views had been expressed in private and were not intended for publication. Nevertheless, both publicly and privately, Russell was, by now, unequivocally fighting as a propagandist on the side of the West in the Cold War. In 1948 he advised Colette not to stay long in Sweden, otherwise the Russians would get her. In the same year he was invited by the British Council to deliver a series of political lectures in Oslo and Trondheim. The latter is best remembered for the near-fatal flying-boat accident that Russell was involved in. In his autobiography Russell claims that he was sent to “Norway in the hope of inducing Norwegians to join an alliance against Russia”. He supported the establishment of NATO in 1949 and argued that the present Russian government was “in the fullest sense of the word, imperialistic”—in contrast to America, which “has never been imperialistic.” This contradicted Russell’s long-held distrust of American foreign policy, which, for example, he had expressed in strong terms in 1920, and which was to become his principal political concern in the 1960s.

The testing of an atomic device by the Soviet Union in 1949 upset the equation on which Russell’s earlier reasoning had been based, and with one or two exceptions he ceased to argue for preventative war in public. However, his dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union continued unabated. In his autobiography he relates how, after receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950, he discussed international politics with the King of Sweden and approved of the King’s idea of Nordic Pact against the Russians (Auto. 1: 31). Russophobia also intruded occasionally into some of his more general books written at this time.

In December 1951 Russell received a request from Colin Wintle, a literary agent writing on behalf of Stephen Watts, editor of the “Background” series of books published by the Batchworth Press. These small books, generally of about forty pages, and selling for 15.6d., were, according to the publishers, intended “to provide ordinary people, interested in what is going on in the world today, with some background information about events, institutions and ideas”. They were, in part, financed by special funds made available by the British Foreign Office to facilitate the publication of arguments against Communism on a wide scale. Russell had already contributed an essay to an earlier volume on Why Communism Must Fail. Wintle asked Russell to write on What Is Freedom? and enclosed a memorandum on the proposed contents of the pamphlet. He suggested that the conclusion would “accept the proposition that the prospects of human freedom are better outside Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and would develop arguments to show why this is so.” It was not unknown for Russell to write such pre-planned books: Roads to Freedom was an earlier example, but What Is Freedom? may well have been the first

10 Letter to Walter Marseille, 5 May 1948 (RAI 410).
instance of a publisher suggesting a specific ideological position to Russell. It was no doubt a considerable publishing scoop for Batchworth considering the long-standing cooperation between Russell and Unwin. What Is Freedom? was published in 1952, and the following year Russell was asked by Wintle to write a similar book on What Is Democracy? The tone of the book was suggested by Watts represented by Wintle: “the conclusion might be, in effect, that however faulty Western democracy is, it is in practice at least not the negation of everything we mean by the word, as is the Communist version.”

Russell's speedy response in writing these books is indicative not only of his anti-Communist position, but also of a desire to contribute to a more balanced critique of Communism to offset American fanaticism. He had experienced the early days of McCarthyism in the United States in 1950 and 1951, and in an interview given in New York in 1951 he had argued that “you have got to leave room in the anti-Communist camp for people who want reform.”

On the whole, the two Background books do reflect a more balanced approach to anti-Communist propaganda than some of Russell’s earlier fulminations. When theorizing about the meaning of freedom, he accepts that there is a high degree of intolerance in the West as well as the East, although the limitation of freedom is by far at its worst in the USSR. He accepts that laissez-faire principles have failed to secure economic freedom, but on the other hand “socialism in the Russian form does far more to destroy it than was done by capitalism even in its most ruthless days.” He admits that both the FBI and the Russian secret police restrict personal and ideological liberty, although again the Soviet example is more extreme. Nationalism, he argues, is one of the greatest threats to freedom, and the Russians’ belief in Communism and the Americans’ belief in democracy are largely “cloaks for nationalism” (p. 30). Russell also warns that there is a danger of other nations becoming so obsessed by the “Russian Menace” that they neglect their own freedoms. In What Is Democracy? Russell claims that whilst the Russian use of the term “democracy” is “shameless”, the witch-hunts in America have also reduced the accountability of the government to the public. He also returns to an old idea of his, first expressed thirty years earlier, that democracy cannot work amongst “uncivilized people” or where there is a high proportion of mixed groups which hate each other. In a more equivocal mood Russell asserts that the West must make the world safe for democracy.

Interspersed with Russell’s more balanced reasoning are outbursts of indignant condemnation more typical of mainstream anti-Communist propaganda. Russell clearly saw himself as a key spokesman in an ideological conflict, arguing that “those who have kept alive a knowledge of what it is that makes us prefer Western systems to that of Russia are doing something absolutely necessary to the victory of what they value” (What Is Freedom?, p. 32). He stresses that the intellectual freedoms present in the West are absent in the East. Despite his teaching experiences in America, including the famous judgment by Justice McGeehan, he nevertheless feels able to state that in “the realm of science the correct intellectual attitude is taught in the West” (ibid.). Russell considers Stalin's foreign policy to be reminiscent of the Czar's and a constant source of danger to Western nations. It is motivated by the political passions which Russell had always claimed to be most dangerous: “a fanatical creed”, “a possibility of glory” and “the sheer lust for power”. Writing before the full extent of Stalin's tyranny became apparent, Russell argued that in the matter of liberty, “Soviet Russia is worse than even Nazi Germany” (What Is Freedom?, p. 22).

Russell claimed that if a Third World War comes about, it will be caused by Russian aggression, and in a slightly modified version of his earlier position he argued, “I would resist, at almost any cost, the extension of Soviet tyranny to the Western world; and so long as this menace hangs over us, liberty must have very definite limits” (p. 27). It is, he claimed, up to the Russians to force war upon the West, if they so decide, and if so, the West “must accept the challenge at whatever cost” (What Is Democracy?, p. 39). Russell argued that the only chance for the improvement in East–West relations lies in reform east of the Iron Curtain. Whilst Communism remains an aggressive ideology, the West must maintain a “defensive hostility to such a Power in

---


order to preserve national liberty” (What Is Freedom?, p. 30).

It could be argued that these writings demonstrate that not only had Russell abandoned his usual style of political analysis, but that he had also retreated from his socialist radicalism of the post-World War I period, in favour of the defence of Western values above all else. This is not to say that Russell was ever overtly pro-Communist; his views on Communism and Marxism are riddled with confusion, a certain amount of misunderstanding and a fair degree of contradiction. His visits to Germany in 1895 had left him critical of the ideological base of Marxism, and these trips were followed rapidly by his rejection of idealist philosophy. From then onwards, he was, almost throughout his life, an opponent of Marxist political and economic philosophy. But his reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution was hardly unequivocal. Later, during his 1947 correspondence with Einstein, he argued that he had come to his wholly negative view of the Soviet Union when in Russia in 1920, and that all that had happened since had made him feel more certain that he was right. This retrospective gloss was, however, a rather simplified version of his earlier position as developed in The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920), where he expressed quite mixed views about Russian Communism and accepted that Communism may be a more appropriate form of development for “backward nations”. This notion was reiterated in The Prospects for Industrial Civilization (1923). Nevertheless anti-Stalinism was not a central component of Russell's political writing. The excesses of the régime were not so widely known at this time, and after the outbreak of the Second World War, Russell's growing hatred of the régime was, for patriotic reasons, confined to personal letters.

A few years after Russell's most outspoken anti-Soviet activity, the sociologist Irving Horowitz wrote an article on Russell's pacifism in which he argued that even in his most radical period during the First World War, Russell was critical of the socialist alternative to war. He claims that later Russell came “more and more to see the beauties of laissez faire liberalism and the horrors of collectivism” and that “his return to the orthodox fold which originally nurtured him was happily received.” To understand Russell, argues Horowitz, “one cannot overlook his station as a foremost spokesman for the imperial lion.”

Horowitz's first criticism is surely incorrect: much of Russell's early political thought was precisely an examination of socialist ideas in a pacifist context. Similarly, his argument that Russell abandoned radicalism and socialism needs to be examined critically—especially in the context of Russell's Cold War writings.

Russell's political thought often defies attempts at classification. Whilst a number of key political ideals remain central, his political writings are often characterized by their eclecticism and contextualism. This period is a case in point. At the same time that Russell was advocating preventative war he was calling for industrial democracy in Authority and the Individual and updating his earlier radical ideas with warnings about uncontrolled growth and destruction of the environment. Whilst his readership could be forgiven for thinking that he had conflated his criticism of socialism and Communism, this was not the case. In What Is Freedom? he praised the greater economic equality facilitated by the British Labour Party, and in What Is Democracy? he called for participatory democracy based on ideological and occupational rather than geographical constituencies. He also argued for a return to the principles of both Guild Socialism and French Syndicalism, which, since the advent of state socialism in the Soviet Union, had, regrettably, been neglected by socialist theorists: “It is time to revive the aims which progressive people set before themselves in the days before the Russian Revolution. It is only in so far as this is done that Western democracy can be sure of remaining democratic” (p. 28).

Horowitz's other contention, that Russell had become part of the establishment at this time, is one that Russell himself later admitted. “By the early part of 1949,” wrote Russell, “I had become so respect-
able in the eyes of the Establishment that it was felt that I, too, should be given the O.M." (Auto. 3: 26). Towards the end of the Second World War both he and Harold Laski lectured to British servicemen, and Russell was also guest lecturer at the Imperial Defence College between 1947 and 1952. In addition to his trip to Norway in 1948 he was invited to Australia in 1950, where he lectured at various universities on "subjects connected with the Cold War". 29

His renown and aristocratic ancestry combined with his new-found popularity as a broadcaster and the success of his History of Western Philosophy, all contributed to the image of Russell as a respected, if rather mischievous, elder statesman. Russell claimed, no doubt rather tongue-in-cheek, that this new role worried him, as he feared respectability could easily lead to blind orthodoxy (Auto. 3: 31). This respectability cannot be seen as a prime cause of his anti-Communism, but it certainly contributed to his appeal to some publishers and newspaper editors.

In all Russell's political writings of this period the personality of Stalin casts a permanent shadow on the prospects of world peace. One of Russell's arguments against the Marxist interpretation of history had always been that it devalued the importance of the individual political actor. History would have been very different, he often argued, had—for example—Bismarck never lived. The same applied to Stalin. Russell believed him to be the reincarnation of Ivan the Terrible: insane, and totally evil. 30 This contrasts with Russell's views on Lenin and Trotsky, which at this time appear less negative than those expressed in Practice and Theory of Bolshevism in 1920.31 The period around Stalin's death was one of dramatic changes which included the testing of a British atomic device in 1952, the end of the Korean War in 1953, and most significantly, in the same year, the successful testing of a thermonuclear weapon by the United States. The discovery of the hydrogen bomb had a huge impact on Russell's political thought, and thus it is hard to isolate Stalin's death as being the single most important factor in Russell's transition at this time. Nevertheless it is instructive to note the speed with which Russell changed his position on the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin.

In his autobiography Russell claimed: "I rejoiced mightily in that event, since I felt Stalin to be as wicked as one man could be and the root evil of most of the misery and terror in, and threatened by, Russia" (Auto. 3: 20). He was asked by the BBC to deliver a lecture on Stalin. In "Stalin's Legacy" he condemned Stalin's régime so vehemently that the talk was never broadcast. However, in "A New Russian Policy" broadcast by the BBC's Eastern Service in 1953, Russell was more positive, expressing the hope that a solution could be reached over the Berlin problem, that the pace of collectivization could be slackened, and that there could be more religious toleration. By 1954 Russell felt able to say in a published essay that "there are signs that in the course of time the Russian régime will become more liberal" in the Soviet Union, and that the best weapon against Communism was not war but the reduction of poverty and hatred east of the Iron Curtain. 32 At the end of 1954 Russell made his historic broadcast on "Man's Peril from the Hydrogen Bomb" and became increasingly involved in mobilizing opinion amongst scientists against nuclear weapons and Cold War fanaticism. Even before Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956, Russell claimed that there had been genuine liberalization in the Soviet Union. 33 In a private letter he argued for a more balanced view of the USSR, claiming that "I think that progressives throughout the Western World have been led down blind alleys by sycophantic adulation or fanatical hatred of the Soviet Government." 34

The efforts of Russell and Einstein to mobilize scientists of both

30 Auto. 3: 26. Clark suggests that Russell described his activities at this time as "globe-trotting for the Foreign Office" (p. 504).

31 See interview with Belfrage cited in fn. 1, and "Stalin's Nightmare" in Nightmares of Eminent Persons (1954). See also "Flygt-balance giver ingen sildethed", Politiken, Copenhagen, 6 Sept. 1959, pp. 29–30—in an interview with Elias Bretsdorff Russell claims "not for one moment am I in any doubt that Russia would have accepted the Baruch Plan at that time if Stalin had been in his right mind" (as reported by Bretsdorff: jeg er ikke et øjeblik i tvivl om, at Rusland dengang ville have akcepteret Baruch-planen, hvis Stalin havde været ved sine fulde fem").


34 Letter to Corliss Lamont, 8 June 1956 (copy in RA Rec. Acq. 17j).
East and West against nuclear weapons met a setback in 1956 when Soviet troops suppressed the Hungarian revolt. Russell's response was muted. He explained in his autobiography that whilst he was opposed to the invasion, he concentrated his efforts on criticizing British adventurism in Suez, and that there were already plenty of people "fulminating" over Hungary. This was no doubt true, but it is doubtful that Russell would have taken such a position had Stalin still been alive. Russell's famous correspondence with Khrushchev and Dulles via the pages of the *New Statesman* in 1957–58 did not provide much ground for optimism about an improvement of East-West relations, but showed the United States to be more intransigent than the Soviet Union. It is possible to trace a growing distrust of America in Russell's writings in the late 1950s. In his autobiography he admitted that:

later I was brought around to being more favourable to communism by the death of Stalin in 1953 and by the Bikini test in 1954; and I came gradually to attribute, more and more, the danger of nuclear war to the West, to the United States of America, and less to Russia. (Auto. 3: 20)

This is reflected in the alterations Russell made to *What Is Freedom?* and *What Is Democracy?* In 1960 Stanley Unwin wrote to Russell concerning the inclusion of the two pamphlets in a new collection of essays, and suggesting certain revisions. Alterations to Russell's books were usually confined to writing new introductions, but in this case Russell accepted Unwin's suggestions:

if they are to be reprinted, they will require considerable alteration. They were written when Stalin and McCarthy were both going strong. They say many things against Russia which, even when true, I no longer think it useful to say.35

Many of the general criticisms of the Russian régime were revised to retrospective condemnations of Stalinism. Russell qualified his argument that Russian aggression would be the cause of the next world war, and omitted several more extreme statements, including the comparison of Stalin and Hitler. Russell also inserted several passages to reinforce the idea that freedom and democracy were vulnerable throughout the world, not just in the USSR. Some of the alterations have the appearance of having been made in a hurry. Some paragraphs no longer follow where previous ones have been omitted, and in one instance Russell wrote as if Stalin were still alive.36 In *What Is Freedom?* Russell made a curious alteration, replacing the phrase, "the percentage difference between rich and poor is greater in modern Russia than in any other civilized country" with "the percentage difference between generals and privates is greater in modern Russia than in any other civilized country" (*Fact and Fiction*, pp. 64–5). It is not clear from this that Russell believed Khrushchev's reforms had resulted in significant economic changes, but it is indicative of his desire to separate himself from the Cold War rhetoric he had indulged in earlier.37

Russell's anti-Stalinist rhetoric in the 1950s coincided with popular feeling both in America and, to a lesser extent, Britain. It also coincided with Russell's "period of respectability". For once, the British and American governments found Russell's skill as a writer and publicist useful. In the brief period after the end of the Second World War and up until the death of Stalin, Russell found himself playing an uncharacteristic role. Later, especially after his involvement in the drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he came to an increasingly favourable view of the Russian leadership. In 1962, with characteristic definitiveness, he claimed that the USSR had "come to desire peace above everything."38 Soon after, Russell became involved in the campaign against American involvement in Vietnam: his anti-American rhetoric exceeded his earlier anti-Stalinism in both its intensity and impact.

---


37 [He may have made the change as a result of a letter from M. Francis of 16 Sept. 1960 (RA 720), who wrote that Russell had made the statement in an unidentified broadcast. He replied: "I think it is probable that as applied to a very few very rich people in the West my statement may not have been correct. What I was thinking of was some statistics I saw as to such matters as the percentage difference between the salary of a general and pay of a private which, it appeared, was considerably greater in Russia than in Britain or America. I am sorry that I no longer have the document from which I extracted this fact and many others of a like nature, but I do think that I ought to have made a proviso excluding the very few super-rich" (26 Nov.). He did not send Unwin the "copy" for *Fact and Fiction* until 9 Jan. 1965.—Ed.]

APPENDIX:
SOME ALTERATIONS MADE BY RUSSELL TO

The first numbers refer to pages and lines in the Batchworth Press editions (see fn. 22-3). The second numbers refer to the pages and lines of the revised editions published in Fact and Fiction (fn. 36). Words or phrases that are italicized in the passages quoted from the first editions were either replaced or deleted in the second editions. Replacements are shown in brackets or at the end of the note, and deletions are marked by the term "OMITTED". Curly brackets are used for my interpolations.

What Is Freedom?
15: 2-4 I do not think that there has ever in past history been so little freedom anywhere as there is in present day Russia. 56: 33-57: 2 was in Stalin's Russia.
16: 18-22 But there is a real danger lest, terrified, hypnotised and fascinated by the Soviet menace, [58: 115 such a menace] other nations should so completely forget the value of mental freedom as to share in the stagnation which must inevitably befall the Soviet State if it persists in its present form. 98: 17-18 a State which has suppressed individual initiative.
22: 7-45 In the matter of liberty, Soviet Russia is positively worse than even Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany permitted a certain amount of travel abroad, and also allowed foreigners to travel in Germany if there was no special objection to them. The Russian government allows no Russian to escape, not even the wives of foreigners. Foreigners are admitted to Russia only if the Russians consider them harmless or gullible, and are allowed to see only what the Soviet government thinks good for them. OMITTED
22: 16-21 Control of all forms of publicity is so absolute that the most fantastic beliefs about Western countries are practically universal. If you tell an inhabitant of Moscow that there are underground railways in Western cities, he looks at you with indignation or pity according as he thinks that you are attempting to deceive him or are yourself deceived. OMITTED
24: 25 The percentage difference between rich and poor is greater in modern Russia than in any other civilised country. 65: 1 generals and privates
27: 22-5 I would resist, at almost any cost, the extension of the Soviet tyranny to the Western world; and so long as this menace hangs over us, liberty must have very definite limits. OMITTED
30: 13-16 All this [the difference of behaviour in private life and in international relations] is very relevant to the subject of liberty, because the most serious interferences with liberty in the modern world are justified by the fear of war, and the risk of war is mainly due to nationalism. OMITTED
30: 31-5 So long as there is a great Power imbued with aggressive imperialism, there has to be defensive hostility to such a Power in order to preserve national liberty. But in the preservation of national liberty in such circumstances individual liberty inevitably suffers. OMITTED
32: 28-32 What the West stands for fundamentally is the belief that governments exist for the sake of individuals, not individuals for the sake of governments. It is this principle that is at stake. I cannot imagine one of greater importance to the future of the human race. OMITTED

What is Democracy?
7: 20-1 It must be said that the present Russian use of the word democracy is quite exceptionally shameless. 74: 1-2 diverges widely from previous usage
12: 4-5 It [terror] is of course very dominant in modern Russia. 78: 9 it was, at first,
18: 18-22 In Czarist Russia the Old Believers suffered persecution of greater or less intensity until the revolution. Since the revolution [84: 2, until Stalin's death] every deviation from Communist orthodoxy, however minute, has exposed the deviators to death or life-long torture. 84: 3 exposed
18: 31-19: 3 Consider the motives which make the Russian Government: such a source of danger to Western countries [84: 14 and vice versa]. These are of various sorts. There is first [84: 15, on both sides], a fanatical creed which it is thought desirable to spread. There is next a possibility of glory. And perhaps more powerful than either of these there is the sheer lust for power.
19: 19-23 If a third world war should break out—which Heaven forbid—it is clear that the unfriendliness and aggressiveness of Russian policy ever since 1945 will have been the [85: 2 a] main cause, whatever may be the final spark that brings the explosion.
24: 5-10 But almost every state is more anxious for victory than for peace. This evil cannot be remedied while the present East-West tension continues, but we may perhaps hope—that at the moment the hope seems-Utopian—that at a future date the nations will agree to abstain from teaching the belief in each other's wickedness. OMITTED
32: 19-21 The Russian Government thinks it knows [35: 31 Stalin thought he knew] more about genetics than any geneticist, and those who venture to disagree suffer very extreme penalties. 95: 32 suffered
38: 20-1 Is this advance [of science] to be brought to an end by an obscurantist Eastern tyranny? 101: 3 tyranny
38: 27-34 For this reason, although no-one can deny that war might be forced upon the Western nations, a sane man will feel that war, even successful war, [101: fn. The H-bomb has made successful war impossible.]
would involve a great loss and a very serious set-back in all matters as to which the West is in advance of the rest of mankind. Perhaps if we have sufficient patience, the time will come when the countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain will decide to liberalize their régime. ] 101: fn. To a considerable extent, this has happened since Stalin's death.

39: 10–12. It is open to the Russians, if they so decide, to force war upon us, and, if so we must accept the challenge at whatever cost, but we shall not be wise if we, realizing what is evil in the Communist system, ourselves encourage a war. ] 101: 27 OMITTED

39: 13–17 The chance of gradual improvement east of the Iron Curtain may, for the moment, seem slight, but it exists, and so long as it exists it is our duty to remember the best of the possibilities offered by our distracted world. ] 101: 30 precarious