Russell's last major philosophical work, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, went to press in England without incident in 1948. But in the United States, Simon and Schuster gave Russell fits. They altered his typescript and refused to honour his requests to restore the text to its original wording. Our collation of texts illuminates Russell's dispute with his American publishers, the character of their alterations, and some of the changes Russell made between manuscript and printed text.

I. THE DISPUTE WITH SIMON AND SCHUSTER

The publication of Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits in 1948 took place almost simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic—the book was published by George Allen and Unwin in England, and by Simon and Schuster in the United States. Allen and Unwin, Russell's steadfast British publishers, asked for and received a three-month head start on Simon and Schuster.

Ironically, Russell first mentioned the manuscript for Human Knowledge in a letter he wrote at Trinity College to Max Lincoln Schuster, dated 22 October 1945, after inquiring about a personal copy...
of A History of Western Philosophy which Schuster had just published. Russell wrote:

All goes well with me. I am giving a year-long course of lectures called "Introduction to Philosophy", & I hope that parts of it will in time grow into a systematic exposition of the whole of my philosophy. But that will take another year or two.¹

Schuster took the hint and circulated this letter throughout the office with "new book" pencilled in the upper right-hand corner.²

Schuster was not to have the first glimpse of the new book. In 1947 Russell was corresponding with Allen and Unwin about his manuscript, and on 8 July Sir Stanley Unwin received Russell's synopsis of the new book, accompanied by a letter in which Russell offered to rewrite the synopsis making the book sound more exciting if Unwin thought it too "dry". He warned Unwin that it would not have the popular success of his previous book: "It is not the sort of book that can have the wide success of the 'History', since it is, in part, considerably more difficult."³

Russell's misgivings apparently increased, for he sent another letter on 11 July suggesting more strongly that he rewrite the synopsis:

With regard to the synopsis of "Human Knowledge" that I sent you, I am wondering whether it would be wise to try to make it sound more attractive, which I could do by means of actual quotations from it. I think the level of difficulty in it is about the same as in "Our Knowledge of the External World"; it is definitely easier than "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth". Perhaps it would be as well if I were to make another shot at a more attractive synopsis.⁴

On 31 August 1947, Russell wrote to Unwin that he had finished the manuscript for Human Knowledge and would give it to him at latest in October. All indications are that publication with Allen and Unwin went smoothly. Not so with Simon and Schuster. The editors at Simon and Schuster modified Russell's typescript in ways offensive enough to warrant gentle, written disapproval:

I am sending you today corrected proofs up to & including Galley 70. I will send the rest in a day or two. With three trivial exceptions ["corrections" lined out], all the corrections I have made are where the proof differs from the typescript.⁵

The editors did not accept Russell's corrections to restore the proofs to the condition of the typescript, and Russell's next letter of disapproval was openly sarcastic:

The corrections are again, with a very few trivial exceptions, to restore the proofs to agree with the copy. I find that you have made a number of deliberate alterations without asking my consent, I hope you will not insist upon retaining these. As I shall be regarded as the author, I have, I think, a right to say what shall be printed as purporting to be by me.⁶

While it is true that Russell had a right to say what shall be printed in his name, it is also true that Simon and Schuster could and did ignore what he said. Not wishing a delay in publication, Russell backed down

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¹ Letters from Bertrand Russell to Max Lincoln Schuster are in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Columbia University, gifts of Mrs. M. L. Schuster, her children, and James L. Heineman. Xerox copies are available at the Bertrand Russell Archives in REC. ACQ. 232a: Correspondence with M. Lincoln Schuster.
² In the upper right hand corner of the letter is a pencilled note from M. L. Schuster that shows how this letter was routed through the office. It appears roughly as follows:

MS F
JJB Russell MLS ✓
Copy for ✓ WB
new book See my answer
R is ✓ [4 unintelligible checked initials]
³ Letter to Sir Stanley Unwin from Bertrand Russell dated 7 July 1947. Russell was then living at 27 Dorset House, Gloucester Place, N.W.1. The letter is marked "[Rec.] 8 JUL. 1947".
⁴ The letter is marked "Rec. 12 Jul. 1947" (RA REC. ACQ. 70).
⁵ Letter from Bertrand Russell to "Messrs Simon & Schuster" in Russell's hand. At the top of this letter the initials "MS", are crossed out and the initials "JH" are pencilled in to the right. The initials "MS" refer to Max Lincoln Schuster, and the initials "JH" refer to Dr. James Holsaert. Apparently, Schuster or his secretary routed Russell's correspondence to Holsaert. There is no date on the letter, but its contents indicate that it was written after 10 July 1948 and prior to 3 August 1948. Russell's address, at this time, was "Penalltgoch, Llan Ffestiniog, Merioneth".
⁶ Letter to Simon and Schuster from Russell dated 3 August 1948.
... I do not know which of my corrections you have refused to accept. E.g. I desire "Keynes's" not "Keynes'"...
"premiss"...
"premise"
But such points are not sufficiently important to delay publication on account of them. So I will definitely do without page proof.

Thus, in the end, the editors at Simon and Schuster did not honour Russell's requests to restore the proofs to agree with the original copy, and Russell allowed the American edition of *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* to be released without benefit of page proof, still uncertain about its faithfulness to his typescript.

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COLLATION OF TEXTS

Whether the alterations were all as innocuous as "Keynes'" and "premise" is unclear. While this could be determined directly only by a comparison between Russell's typescript and the first impression of the Simon and Schuster edition, only fragments of the typescript are available. But there is, we think, a reliable, indirect way of assessing the alterations. Russell had no dispute with Allen and Unwin, and so it is highly probable that the British first edition is faithful to the typescript; thus, except for changes Russell made or approved in the proofs, we can determine what alterations were made by Simon and Schuster by comparing their edition and Allen and Unwin's first edition. Further, we can determine what kinds of changes Russell thought were important between the time he wrote the manuscript and the time he deemed it ready for publication by comparing his handwritten (or holograph) manuscript with the first impression of the Allen and Unwin first edition.

Ideally, one would examine the entire work, but our resources were limited, and we had to settle for a small but representative sample of *Human Knowledge*. Our examination of the manuscript for *Human Knowledge* focused on Part Three, "Science and Perception". We examined, line by line, the "Introduction" and the first two chapters, "Knowledge of Facts and Knowledge of Laws" and "Solipsism". We compared the first impression of the Allen and Unwin first edition to five other texts:

(i) The Allen and Unwin fifth impression (1966), the last in Russell's lifetime;
(ii) Russell's holograph manuscript (abbreviated "MS"), filed at RA T210.006747-98-9, folios 315–56;
(iii) the galley proofs for the Simon and Schuster first edition ("GI"), filed at RA REC. ACQ. 838, the galleys being numbered 59–66 and dated 21 June [1948];
(iv) the first impression of the Simon and Schuster first edition ("SSI");
(v) the Simon and Schuster second impression ("SS2").

In the collation that follows, editorial comments appear in italics and all page and line numbers are keyed to the Allen and Unwin first edition, which was published just as Russell wished. This text functions, then, as our reference text. The first reading to the right of the page: line number is always from that text; therefore no special symbol is used to represent the Allen and Unwin first impression. We discovered that this edition corresponds exactly to the Allen and Unwin fifth impression—additional evidence that Russell was satisfied with the first edition—and so the fifth impression is unmentioned. Where all other editions mentioned above agree with the Allen and Unwin first impression, the abbreviations of those editions are omitted (e.g.,

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7 Letter to James Holsaert from Russell dated 31 August 1948. In the British edition "Keynes's" and "premiss" are used and in the American edition "Keynes" (except in running heads) and "premise" remain: Simon and Schuster refused to honour Russell's requests to correct the American edition.

8 There were at least two copies of the typescripts—one at Allen and Unwin and one at Simon and Schuster—and presumably three, for it is likely that Russell kept one himself. It is natural to assume that all three were the same, but the possibility exists that they were not. Since the typescripts have not been recovered, there is no way to know at present.

9 Both publishers made only one edition of *Human Knowledge*.

Finally, for those who have an American edition of *Human Knowledge* and wish to examine the emendations, we have included page:line references to the Simon and Schuster edition in parentheses following SS.

3. COLLATION OF TEXTS

PART THREE SCIENCE AND PERCEPTION

175: 1–2 Part III Science and Perception MS] Science & Perception *above inserted* [Principles of Scientific Inference] *which is the title of Part VI*

INTRODUCTION

177: 1 INTRODUCTION] *Introduction. MS*
177: 4 attempting MS] *above deleted concerned*
177: 5–6 to come as near as our capacities permit to describing MS] *replaced to describe*
177: 35 nearly MS] *inserted*
177: 37 understand. MS] *above deleted comprehend.*
177: 38–178: 1 in the following Parts to discuss, first our data, and then the relation of science to the crude material of experience.] in this Part to discuss the data from <data from *above deleted* principles by means of> which science makes its inferences. MS] in this and following Parts to discuss first our data and then the relation of science to the crude material of experience. GT, SS1 (162: 8). SS2
178: 2 scientific] these MS
178: 5 It is evident that, MS] *It is evident that Gi, SS1 (162: 13), SS2*
178: 9 events MS] *above deleted things*
178: 14–15 human knowledge MS] *replaced the human intellect*
178: 16 Two headings are lined out in MS: Scientific <above deleted Probable> Inference. | Introduction.
178: 17–20 The inferences ... demonstrative,] The inferences upon which we have to rely in science <in science *above deleted* this Part> differ from those of deductive logic & mathematics in being non-demonstrative, MS] *replaced* The subject to be discussed in what follows is inference which is not demonstrative,
178: 20 do MS] *above deleted does*
178: 20 truth MS] *above deleted certainty*

MS., fol. 318, of *Human Knowledge* (see variants, 178: 16–20)
178: 21 they are MS] above deleted it is
178: 31 nearly certain, MS] nearly certain; G1, SS1 (162: 37), SS2
179: 1 I believe that, if MS] I believe that if G1, SS1 (163: 9), SS2
179: 3 if not in place of it. MS] inserted before deleted Of these, memory may
serve as an example. <m marginal note Memory not a principle of inference
but a source of data> Memory is fallible, & therefore cannot be regarded
as giving conclusive evidence in favour of what is remembered; but it does
give a probability, greater or less according to the vividness of the memory
& the recentness of the occurrence. I think it will be found that our reli­
ance on the probable truth of memory is not to be justified by the prin­
ciple of induction alone, but must be, or be derived from, a principle
independent of induction.

I propose first to set forth once again a somewhat familiar theme,
namely the limitations of deductive logic, & then to proceed to the anal­
ysis of probable inference as it actually occurs in scientific practice.

179: 12 simple. MS] before deleted Since we are concerned with probable
inference, the first step must be to consider what is to be meant by the word
"probable".

CHAPTER I
KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND KNOWLEDGE OF LAWS

180: 1 I MS] replaced II
181: 2 any one MS] anyone G1, SS1 (166: 9), SS2
181: 5 how MS] How G1, SS1 (166: 12), SS2
181: 6 "Napoleon?" MS] Napoleon?,” G1, SS1 (166: 12), SS2
181: 6 “because MS] "Because G1, SS1 (166: 13), SS2
181: 7 told you"?] told you?“ MS] told you?,” G1, SS1 (166: 14), SS2
181: 8 say "why, ... I heard her". MS] say, "Why, I heard her." G1, SS1
(166: 15), SS2
181: 8-9 say "how do ... heard her"?] say "how do ... heard her?" MS] "How
how do ... heard her?" G1, SS1 (166: 13-14), SS2
181: 9-10 say “because ... distinctively”. MS] say, “Because ... distinctively,” G1,
SS1 (166: 16), SS2
181: 10 say “how do ... remember it”? say “how do ... remember it?” MS] say,
"How do ... remember it?", G1, SS1 (166: 17), SS2
181: 11 say "well, I do remember it". MS] say, "Well, I do remember it." G1,
SS1 (166: 18), SS2
181: 12 states”. MS] states.” G1, SS1 (166: 26), SS2 Also at 191: 35.
181: 21 premises MS] premises G1, SS2 premises SS1 (166: 27)
181: 22-3 we must, wherever possible,] we must, if we can, <, if we can, 
inserted MS] we must, whenever possible, G1, SS1 (166: 29), SS2
181: 25 are MS] above deleted were
There is no reason to suppose that light waves are not a

Lead us to subsequent experiences which it turns out that we do not have above deleted deceive us.

Light waves are not or sound.

Milky Way above deleted deceive us.

Milky Way GI, SSI (172: 32), SS2

Evidence for the MS above deleted evidence of the GI

Maintaining, namely MS above deleted doubt.

Is, of course, above deleted doubt.

Am”, MS above deleted doubt.

Thoughts”, MS above deleted doubt.

Field: but MS above deleted doubt.

Experience, MS above deleted doubt.

Partially reject M5

Experience, MS above deleted doubt.

2 experience, MS above deleted doubt.

6 synthetic, MS above deleted doubt.

II MS] after deleted III

That you] that you MS

Exist”, MS exist,” GI, SS1 (176: 3), SS2

Word. MS] word SS1 (176: 8), SS2

Word of saying MS] of saying, GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2

CHAPTER II SOLIPSISM

II MS] after deleted III

That you] that you MS

Exist”, MS exist,” GI, SS1 (176: 3), SS2

Word, MS] word SS1 (176: 8), SS2

Word of saying MS] of saying, GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2

7 universe”, MS] universe,” GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2

Say “data MS] say, “Data GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2

University”. MS] university.” GI, SS1 (176: 10), SS2

Say: “this MS] say, “This GI, SS1 (176: 11), SS2

More”. MS] more.” GI, SS1 (176: 11), SS2 Also at 191: 28.

Say: “there MS] say, “There GI, SS1 (176: 12), SS2

“there MS] “There GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2 Also at 191: 34.

Data”, MS] data,” GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2

Data] “Data MS] “Data GI, SS1 (176: 19), SS2

Nothing MS] “Nothing GI, SS1 (176: 24), SS2

Except data] “Exempt data”, MS] beyond data,” GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2

Some one MS] someone GI, SS1 (176: 25), SS2

Saying “nothing MS] saying, “Nothing GI, SS1 (176: 27), SS2

Data] “Data MS] “Data GI, SS1 (176: 27), SS2

Other MS] “Other GI, SS1 (176: 28), SS2

Negative, and MS] negative and GI, SS1 (177: 1), SS2

Psychology, i.e. not MS] psychology; i.e., not GI, SS1 (177: 11), SS2

Field: but MS] field: but MS GI, SS1 (177: 24), SS2

Find dinner engagements] find engagements MS

Consists, or perhaps consists,] consists (or perhaps consists) MS

Thoroughgoing] thorough-going MS Also at 194: 3.

Events remembered,] events remembered GI, SS1 (178: 32), SS2] memory, MS

Descartes’ MS] Descartes’s GI, SS1 (178: 35), SS2

The consistent solipsist] the solipsist MS

Consists occurs”, MS] occurs,” GI, SS1 (179: 3), SS2 Also at 194: 31.

Occurs”. MS] occurs.” GI, SS1 (179: 17), SS2.

Assuming induction or some equally questionable postulate] assuming induction. MS

Experience, MS] experience GI, SS1 (179: 22), SS2

Partially reject M5

Experience, MS] experience GI, SS1 (179: 23), SS2

We must admit MS] replace, &

We grant what I shall call “the empiricist hypothesis”, namely MS]

Above deleted it is granted

A MS] after deleted the

This we may,] this we can, MS

27 experienced] experienced by some one. <by some one inserted: MS

Moment”, MS] moment,” GI, SS1 (181: 18), SS2

Limited] above deleted confined

To this task we shall address ourselves in Part VI. But it will be well first to make a survey, on the one hand of data, and on the other hand of
scientific beliefs interpreted in their least questionable form. By analysing the results of this survey we may hope to discover the premisses which, consciously or unconsciously, are assumed in the reasonings of science. To this task we must now address ourselves. And since the inferences concerned are such as make their conclusions only probable, our first step must be to inquire into the meaning or meanings of the word "probability". MS

4. OBSERVATIONS ON ALTERATIONS

We discovered seven different kinds of alterations made by Simon and Schuster:

- addition of punctuation marks (e.g., Napoleon?" \(\rightarrow\) Napoleon?," at 181: 6).
- deletion of punctuation (e.g., I believe that, if \(\rightarrow\) I believe that if at 179: 1).
- alteration of punctuation mark order (e.g., her" \(\rightarrow\) her," at 181: 8).
- substitution of punctuation marks (e.g., : \(\rightarrow\) ; at 193: 4 and [before namely and i.e.] \(\rightarrow\) ; at 181: 26 and 190: 1, respectively).
- addition of capital letters (e.g., say "because \(\rightarrow\) say, "Because at 181: 9–10).
- alteration of spelling (e.g., premises \(\rightarrow\) premises at 181: 21; any one \(\rightarrow\) anyone at 181: 2).
- minor word substitutions (e.g., wherever \(\rightarrow\) whenever at 181: 22–23).

None are substantial and most appear to be attempts on the part of Simon and Schuster to "Americanize" the text. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why an eminent logician and author known for his style would take offence at even "small" changes.

Russell's alterations, both in the manuscript and on the missing typescripts or proofs, are more interesting. At 179: 3 Russell deletes two paragraphs in which he stresses the fallibility of memory and claims that the probability it confers on beliefs is derived from or justified by some non-demonstrative principle of inference other than what we usually think of as induction—what Russell refers to as "simple enumeratation". One of the important features of Russell's epistemic work at this time is his stress on the different kinds of non-demonstrative inferences, some reliable and some not, that need analysis and systematization. The non-demonstrative principle from which memory is justified is Russell's third postulate, that of spatio-temporal continuity. His account of memory in Human Knowledge—a causal, reliabilist account—is remarkably contemporary and naturalistic.

In his manuscript Russell claimed that only sensations are truly data for our knowledge of the external world. But at 185: 24 he adds memory to the list. Without memory, knowledge is limited to what one now notices, and solipsism of the moment ensues.

At 185: 40, 186: 3, and 187: 13 Russell deletes claims that imply the existence of an external world and replaces them with claims that are more ontologically neutral; e.g., references to "the outer world" and "things" become references to "my experiences" and "matters of fact". This caution is important, since our "knowledge" of the external world is conditional, i.e., it requires postulates of non-demonstrative inference whose epistemic status is unclear. That their status is unclear can be seen in the revision at 194: 40. Russell claimed in his manuscript that induction cannot be inferred from events except by "assuming induction", but before it went to press he wrote "assuming induction or some equally questionable postulate". That Russell introduced the principles of scientific inference as postulates, thereby calling attention to their dubious status, is a striking example of his intellectual honesty.

At 195: 16–17 Russell refers to the consequence of accepting the second horn of an epistemic dilemma: either we accept sceptical solipsism or we reject it and admit that we know—indeed independently of experience—some non-demonstrative principle or principles of inference. If we reject solipsism and claim to know some non-demonstrative principle of inference, then, Russell says in the printed text, we must partially reject empiricism. But in his manuscript there are no qualifications: Russell writes that we must reject empiricism. This suggests that after he wrote the manuscript he began to see the issue not as one of accepting or rejecting empiricism but as one of properly restricting its domain to a subclass of human knowledge, one that excludes principles of non-demonstrative inference.
5. CONCLUSION

From this small sample of *Human Knowledge* we cannot say that all of Simon and Schuster's alternations were innocuous, only that those in the chapters we examined were. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why Russell the philosopher, who set such high standards of clarity, precision, rigour, and intellectual honesty, was disturbed by unauthorized changes in his typescript. Or why Russell the author, who was used to the respect for his writing idiosyncrasies that Allen and Unwin displayed by publishing his typescript unchanged, was irked by Simon and Schuster, who felt obliged to "correct" or standardize his punctuation. Finally, in his own revisions, we get a glimpse of those high standards at work, of Russell revising his epistemic views at seventy-five years of age ever mindful of what argument and evidence will allow him to say, and what it will not.12

POSTSCRIPT

On 8 June 1992, Kenneth Blackwell and I were examining Russell's personal copies of *Human Knowledge*, given to him by his British and American publishers. In a Simon and Schuster first edition we discovered their business reply card, tucked between pages 400 and 401. It read:

INFORMATION PLEASE The publishers would like to know whether this book has lived up to your expectations. If so, why? And if not, why not?

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: Its Scope and Limits

I wonder if Russell was as amused as we were. [Ned S. Garvin]

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13 I would like to thank the Faculty Development Committee at Albion College for the small grant that allowed me to bring my Russell Seminar to the Archives. Special thanks are due to Dr. Blackwell and Sheila Turcon for their generous assistance, patience, and encouragement. [Ned S. Garvin]