

**HUMAN KNOWLEDGE FROM PEN TO  
PRINT: A COLLATION OF TEXTS**

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Russell's last major philosophical work, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, went to press in England without incident in 1948. But in the United States, Simon and Schuster gave Russell fits. They altered his typescript and refused to honour his requests to restore the text to its original wording. Our collation of texts illuminates Russell's dispute with his American publishers, the character of their alterations, and some of the changes Russell made between manuscript and printed text.

**I. THE DISPUTE WITH SIMON AND SCHUSTER**

The publication of *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* in 1948 took place *almost* simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic—the book was published by George Allen and Unwin in England, and by Simon and Schuster in the United States. Allen and Unwin, Russell's steadfast British publishers, asked for and received a three-month head start on Simon and Schuster.

Ironically, Russell first mentioned the manuscript for *Human Knowledge* in a letter he wrote at Trinity College to Max Lincoln Schuster, dated 22 October 1945, after inquiring about a personal copy

of *A History of Western Philosophy* which Schuster had just published. Russell wrote:

All goes well with me. I am giving a year-long course of lectures called "Introduction to Philosophy", & I hope that parts of it will in time grow into a systematic exposition of the whole of my philosophy. But that will take another year or two.<sup>1</sup>

Schuster took the hint and circulated this letter throughout the office with "new book" pencilled in the upper right-hand corner.<sup>2</sup>

Schuster was not to have the first glimpse of the new book. In 1947 Russell was corresponding with Allen and Unwin about his manuscript, and on 8 July Sir Stanley Unwin received Russell's synopsis of the new book, accompanied by a letter in which Russell offered to rewrite the synopsis making the book sound more exciting if Unwin thought it too "dry". He warned Unwin that it would not have the popular success of his previous book: "It is not the sort of book that can have the wide success of the 'History', since it is, in part, considerably more difficult."<sup>3</sup>

Russell's misgivings apparently increased, for he sent another letter on 11 July suggesting more strongly that he rewrite the synopsis:

With regard to the synopsis of "Human Knowledge" that I sent you, I am wondering whether it would be wise to try to make it sound more attractive, which I could do by means of actual quotations from it. I think the level of

<sup>1</sup> Letters from Bertrand Russell to Max Lincoln Schuster are in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Columbia University, gifts of Mrs. M. L. Schuster, her children, and James L. Heineman. Xerox copies are available at the Bertrand Russell Archives in REC. ACQ. 232a: Correspondence with M. Lincoln Schuster.

<sup>2</sup> In the upper right hand corner of the letter is a pencilled note from M. L. Schuster that shows how this letter was routed through the office. It appears roughly as follows:

MS F  
EJB Russell MLS ✓  
Copy for ✓ WB  
new book See my answer  
R is ✓ [4 unintelligible checked initials]

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Sir Stanley Unwin from Bertrand Russell dated 7 July 1947. Russell was then living at 27 Dorset House, Gloucester Place, N.W.1. The letter is marked "[Rec.] -8 JUL. 1947".

difficulty in it is about the same as in "Our Knowledge of the External World"; it is definitely easier than "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth". Perhaps it would be as well if I were to make another shot at a more attractive synopsis.<sup>4</sup>

On 31 August 1947, Russell wrote to Unwin that he had finished the manuscript for *Human Knowledge* and would give it to him at latest in October. All indications are that publication with Allen and Unwin went smoothly. Not so with Simon and Schuster. The editors at Simon and Schuster modified Russell's typescript in ways offensive enough to warrant gentle, written disapproval:

I am sending you today corrected proofs up to & including Galley 70. I will send the rest in a day or two. With three trivial exceptions ["corrections" *lined out*], all the corrections I have made are where the proof differs from the typescript.<sup>5</sup>

The editors did not accept Russell's corrections to restore the proofs to the condition of the typescript, and Russell's next letter of disapproval was openly sarcastic:

The corrections are again, with a very few trivial exceptions, to restore the proofs to agree with the copy. I find that you have made a number of deliberate alterations without asking my consent, I hope you will not insist upon retaining these. As I shall be regarded as the author, I have, I think, a right to say what shall be printed as purporting to be by me.<sup>6</sup>

While it is true that Russell had a right to say what shall be printed in his name, it is also true that Simon and Schuster could and did ignore what he said. Not wishing a delay in publication, Russell backed down

<sup>4</sup> The letter is marked "Rec. 12 Jul. 1947" (RA REC. ACQ. 70).

<sup>5</sup> Letter from Bertrand Russell to "Messrs Simon & Schuster" in Russell's hand. At the top of this letter the initials "MS", are crossed out and the initials "JH" are pencilled in to the right. The initials "MS" refer to Max Lincoln Schuster, and the initials "JH" refer to Dr. James Holsaert. Apparently, Schuster or his secretary routed Russell's correspondence to Holsaert. There is no date on the letter, but its contents indicate that it was written after 10 July 1948 and prior to 3 August 1948. Russell's address, at this time, was "Penralltgoch, Llan Ffestiniog, Merioneth".

<sup>6</sup> Letter to Simon and Schuster from Russell dated 3 August 1948.

and the editors at Simon and Schuster prevailed. In a letter to Dr. Holsaert, editor at Simon and Schuster, Russell wrote:

... I do not know which of my corrections you have refused to accept. E.g. I desire "Keynes's" not "Keynes"  
 ... "premiss" ... "premise"  
 But such points are not sufficiently important to delay publication on account of them. So I will definitely do without page proof.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, in the end, the editors at Simon and Schuster did not honour Russell's requests to restore the proofs to agree with the original copy, and Russell allowed the American edition of *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* to be released without benefit of page proof, still uncertain about its faithfulness to his typescript.

## 2. INTRODUCTION TO THE COLLATION OF TEXTS

Whether the alterations were all as innocuous as "Keynes'" and "premise" is unclear. While this could be determined directly only by a comparison between Russell's typescript and the first impression of the Simon and Schuster edition, only fragments of the typescript are available.<sup>8</sup> But there is, we think, a reliable, indirect way of assessing the alterations. Russell had no dispute with Allen and Unwin, and so it is highly probable that the British first edition is faithful to the typescript; thus, except for changes Russell made or approved in the proofs, we can determine what alterations were made by Simon and Schuster by comparing their edition and Allen and Unwin's first edition.<sup>9</sup> Further, we can determine what kinds of changes Russell thought were important between the time he wrote the manuscript

<sup>7</sup> Letter to James Holsaert from Russell dated 31 August 1948. In the British edition "Keynes's" and "premiss" are used and in the American edition "Keynes'" (except in running heads) and "premise" remain: Simon and Schuster refused to honour Russell's requests to correct the American edition.

<sup>8</sup> There were at least two copies of the typescript—one at Allen and Unwin and one at Simon and Schuster—and presumably three, for it is likely that Russell kept one himself. It is natural to assume that all three were the same, but the possibility exists that they were not. Since the typescripts have not been recovered, there is no way to know at present.

<sup>9</sup> Both publishers made only one edition of *Human Knowledge*.

and the time he deemed it ready for publication by comparing his handwritten (or holograph) manuscript with the first impression of the Allen and Unwin first edition.

Ideally, one would examine the entire work, but our resources were limited, and we had to settle for a small but representative sample of *Human Knowledge*. Our examination of the manuscript for *Human Knowledge* focused on Part Three, "Science and Perception". We examined, line by line, the "Introduction" and the first two chapters, "Knowledge of Facts and Knowledge of Laws" and "Solipsism". We compared the first impression of the Allen and Unwin first edition to five other texts:

- (1) The Allen and Unwin fifth impression (1966), the last in Russell's lifetime;
- (2) Russell's holograph manuscript (abbreviated "MS"), filed at RA 210.006747-F8-9, folios 315-56;
- (3) the galley proofs for the Simon and Schuster first edition ("G1"), filed at RA REC. ACQ. 838, the galleys being numbered 59-66 and dated 21 June [1948];
- (4) the first impression of the Simon and Schuster first edition ("SS1");
- (5) the Simon and Schuster second impression ("SS2").<sup>10</sup>

In the collation that follows, editorial comments appear in italics and all page and line numbers are keyed to the Allen and Unwin first edition, which was published just as Russell wished. This text functions, then, as our reference text. The first reading to the right of the page: line number is always from that text; therefore no special symbol is used to represent the Allen and Unwin first impression. We discovered that this edition corresponds exactly to the Allen and Unwin fifth impression—additional evidence that Russell was satisfied with the first edition—and so the fifth impression is unmentioned. Where all other editions mentioned above agree with the Allen and Unwin first impression, the abbreviations of those editions are omitted (e.g.,

<sup>10</sup> In general we follow the conventions of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. See "Textual Principles and Methods", pp. 445ff., and "Guide to the Textual Notes", pp. 455ff., in *Papers* 1.

178: 2 below). Finally, for those who have an American edition of *Human Knowledge* and wish to examine the emendations, we have included page:line references to the Simon and Schuster edition in parentheses following SS1.


### 3. COLLATION OF TEXTS

#### PART THREE SCIENCE AND PERCEPTION

175: 1-2 Part III Science and Perception MS] Science & Perception *above inserted* [Principles of Scientific Inference] *which is the title of Part VI*

#### INTRODUCTION

- 177: 1 INTRODUCTION] *Introduction. MS*  
 177: 4 attempting MS] *above deleted* concerned  
 177: 5-6 to come as near as our capacities permit to describing MS] *replaced* to describe  
 177: 35 nearly MS] *inserted*  
 177: 37 understand. MS] *above deleted* comprehend.  
 177: 38-178: 1 in the following Parts to discuss, first our data, and then the relation of science to the crude material of experience.] in this Part to discuss the data from <data from *above deleted* principles by means of> which science makes its inferences. MS] in this and following Parts to discuss first our data and then the relation of science to the crude material of experience. G1, SS1 (162: 8), SS2  
 178: 2 scientific] these MS  
 178: 5 It is evident that, MS] It is evident that G1, SS1 (162: 13), SS2  
 178: 9 events MS] *above deleted* things  
 178: 14-15 human knowledge MS] *replaced* the human intellect  
 178: 16 *Two headings are lined out in MS: Scientific <above deleted Probable> Inference. | Introduction.*  
 178: 17-20 The inferences ... demonstrative,] The inferences upon which we have to rely in science <in science *above deleted* this Part> differ from those of deductive logic & mathematics in being non-demonstrative, MS] *replaced* The subject to be discussed in what follows is inference which is not demonstrative,  
 178: 17 considered in Part VI, MS] considered in Part Five, G1, SS1 (162: 24), SS2  
 178: 20 do MS] *above deleted* does  
 178: 20 truth MS] *above deleted* certainty



MS., fol. 318, of *Human Knowledge* (see variants, 178: 16-20)

178: 21 they are MS] *above deleted* it is  
 178: 31 nearly certain, MS] nearly certain; G1, SS1 (162: 37), SS2  
 179: 1 I believe that, if MS] I believe that if G1, SS1 (163: 9), SS2  
 179: 3 if not in place of it. MS] *inserted before deleted* Of these, memory may serve as an example. <*marginal note*: Memory not a principle of inference but a source of data> Memory is fallible, & therefore cannot be regarded as giving conclusive evidence in favour of what is remembered; but it does give a probability, greater or less according to the vividness of the memory & the recentness of the occurrence. I think it will be found that our reliance on the probable truth of memory is not to be justified by the principle of induction alone, but must be, or be derived from, a principle independent of induction.

I propose first to set forth once again a somewhat familiar theme, namely the limitations of deductive logic, & then to proceed to the analysis of probable inference as it actually occurs in scientific practice.

179: 12 simple. MS] *before deleted* Since we are concerned with *probable* inference, the first step must be to consider what is to be meant by the word "probable".

#### CHAPTER I

#### KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND KNOWLEDGE OF LAWS

180: 1 I MS] *replaced* II  
 181: 2 any one MS] anyone G1, SS1 (166: 9), SS2  
 181: 5 how MS] How G1, SS1 (166: 12), SS2  
 181: 6 Napoleon? MS] Napoleon?, G1, SS1 (166: 12), SS2  
 181: 6 "because MS] "Because G1, SS1 (166: 13), SS2  
 181: 7 told you"?] told you?" MS] told you?," G1, SS1 (166: 14), SS2  
 181: 8 say "why, ... I heard her". MS] say, "Why, I heard her." G1, SS1 (166: 15), SS2  
 181: 8-9 say "how do ... heard her"?] say "how do ... heard her?" MS] "How do ... heard her?" G1, SS1 (166: 13-14), SS2  
 181: 9-10 say "because ... distinctly". MS] say, "Because ... distinctly." G1, SS1 (166: 16), SS2  
 181: 10 say "how do ... remember it"?] say "how do ... remember it?" MS] say, "How do ... remember it?," G1, SS1 (166: 17), SS2  
 181: 11 say "well, I do remember it". MS] say, "Well, I do remember it." G1, SS1 (166: 18), SS2  
 181: 20 data". MS] data." G1, SS1 (166: 26), SS2 *Also at* 191: 35.  
 181: 21 premisses MS] premises G1, SS2] *premises* SS1 (166: 27)  
 181: 22-3 we must, wherever possible,] we must, if we can, <, if we can, *inserted* MS] we must, whenever possible, G1, SS1 (166: 29), SS2  
 181: 25 are MS] *above deleted* were

181: 26 reason, namely MS, SS1 (166: 32-3), SS2] reason; namely G1  
 181: 33 senses". MS] senses." G1, SS1 (167: 2), SS2  
 181: 34 "real". MS] "real." G1, SS1 (167: 3), SS2  
 182: 3 look coloured] *look* coloured MS] look colored G1, SS1 (167: 11), SS2  
 182: 4 my mind MS] *above deleted* myself  
 182: 11 When (say) MS] When, say, G1, SS1 (167: 19), SS2  
 182: 12 aeroplane MS] airplane G1, SS1 (167: 19-20), SS2 *Also at* 182: 17.  
 182: 12 have a visual sensation G1] have the visual sensation MS, SS1 (167: 20), SS2  
 182: 16 mistake, for MS] mistake—for G1, SS1 (167: 24), SS2  
 182: 22 up-hill SS1 (167: 29), SS2] uphill MS, G1  
 182: 33 We thus] We MS] *replaced* We thus  
 182: 38-9 "dogs bark". MS] "Dogs bark." SS1 (168: 8), SS2] "dogs bark." G1  
 183: 1 Every-day MS] Everyday G1, SS1 (168: 11), SS2  
 183: 1 "dogs bark", MS] "dogs bark," G1] "Dogs bark," SS1 (168: 11), SS2  
 183: 4 dogs MS G1] Dogs SS1 (168: 14), SS2  
 183: 5 expect that, MS] expect, that G1] expect that SS1 (168: 15), SS2  
 183: 7 text-books MS] textbooks G1, SS1 (168: 17), SS2  
 183: 19 "dogs bark". MS] "dogs bark." G1, SS1 (168: 28), SS2  
 183: 20 why MS] Why G1, SS1 (168: 29), SS2  
 183: 20 this"?] this?" MS, G1, SS1 (168: 29), SS2  
 183: 21 what MS] What G1, SS1 (168: 29), SS2  
 183: 21 true"?] true?" MS, SS1 (168: 30), SS2  
 183: 37 see;] see: MS  
 184: 9 perception", MS] perception," G1, SS1 (169: 19), SS2  
 184: 11 King", MS] King," G1, SS1 (169: 21), SS2  
 184: 12 VI". MS] VI." G1, SS1 (169: 22), SS2  
 184: 14 Mr. Mackenzie KingMS] *replaced* a Mr. King  
 184: 21 towards MS] toward G1, SS1 (169: 30), SS2  
 184: 22-3 of MS] *inserted*  
 184: 23 light-signals MS] light signals G1, SS1 (169: 32), SS2  
 184: 24 by MS] *written over* in  
 184: 26 colours MS] colors G1, SS1 (169: 35), SS2  
 185: 24 sensations and memories are] sensations are MS  
 185: 29 perceptions", MS] perceptions," G1, SS1 (170: 37), SS2  
 185: 30 psychology] *psychology* MS  
 185: 39-40 as to the outer world MS] *inserted*  
 185: 40 my experiences MS] *before deleted* as to the outer world  
 186: 3 matters of fact MS] *above deleted* things  
 186: 4 certain", MS] certain," G1, SS1 (171: 14), SS2  
 186: 30 dreamt MS] dreamed G1, SS1 (172: 1), SS2 *Also at* 186: 31.  
 186: 34 play,] play MS, G1, SS1 (172: 4), SS2  
 186: 35 am, however, ] am however MS

- 187: 7 There is no reason to suppose that light waves] Light waves are not MS  
 187: 8 or sound] & sound MS  
 187: 13–14 lead us to subsequent experiences which it turns out that we do not have MS] *above deleted* deceive us  
 187: 25 milky way MS] Milky Way GI, SS1 (172: 32), SS2  
 187: 32 evidence for the MS] *replaced* evidence of the] evidence the GI  
 188: 4 maintaining, namely MS] maintaining—namely, GI, SS1 (173: 13), SS2  
 188: 5 physics, MS] physics—GI, SS1 (173: 14), SS2  
 188: 9–10 call in question. MS] *after deleted* doubt.  
 188: 14 is, of course,] is of course MS  
 188: 16 says MS] says, GI, SS1 (173: 23), SS2  
 188: 16 am”, MS] am,” GI, SS1 (173: 24), SS2  
 188: 18 thoughts”, MS] thoughts,” GI, SS1 (173: 25), SS2  
 188: 23–4, it is maintained, be uncertain MS] *replaced* be in grave doubt  
 188: 24 lightning, MS] lightning GI, SS1 (173: 31), SS2  
 188: 27 lightning”, MS] lightning.” GI, SS1 (173: 24), SS2  
 188: 29 It is not suggested MS] *above deleted* I am not suggesting  
 188: 32 expounding MS] *above deleted* accepting  
 188: 35 my self MS] myself GI, SS1 (174: 4), SS2  
 188: 35 are abstract MS] *after deleted* of  
 188: 36 some are memories, MS] *inserted*  
 189: 8 (a) MS] (a) GI, SS1 (174: 16), SS2  
 189: 9 (b) MS] (b) GI, SS1 (174: 17), SS2  
 189: 10 well-selected MS] well selected GI, SS1 (174: 18), SS2  
 189: 16 premisses MS] premisses GI, SS1 (174: 24), SS2 *Also at 189: 18, 189: 23, 189: 27, 189: 28.*  
 189: 20 all MS] All GI, SS1 (174: 27), SS2  
 189: 21 mortal”. MS] mortal.” GI, SS1 (174: 28), SS2  
 189: 21 Now no MS] Now, no GI, SS1 (174: 28), SS2  
 189: 28 that, MS] that GI, SS1 (174: 35), SS2  
 189: 30 i.e. MS] i.e., GI, SS1 (174: 37), SS2 *Also at 190: 2.*  
 189: 33 giving MS] *after deleted* justifying  
 189: 39 fact, MS] fact GI, SS1 (175: 8), SS2  
 190: 1 synthetic, MS, SS1 (175: 10–11), SS2] synthetic; GI

## CHAPTER II SOLIPSISM

- 191: 1 II MS] *after deleted* III  
 191: 7 that you] that *you* MS  
 191: 19 exist”, MS] exist,” GI, SS1 (176: 2), SS2  
 191: 26 word. MS] word SS1 (176: 8), SS2  
 191: 26 of saying MS] of saying, GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2

- 191: 27 universe”, MS] universe,” GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2  
 191: 27 say “data MS] say, “Data GI, SS1 (176: 9), SS2  
 191: 28 universe”. MS] universe.” GI, SS1 (176: 10), SS2  
 191: 29 say: “this MS] say, “This GI, SS1 (176: 11), SS2  
 191: 29 more”. MS] more.” GI, SS1 (176: 11), SS2 *Also at 191: 28.*  
 191: 30 say: “there MS] say, “There GI, SS1 (176: 12), SS2  
 191: 35 “there MS] “There GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2 *Also at 191: 34.*  
 191: 35 data”, MS] data,” GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2  
 191: 37 data”. MS] data.” GI, SS1 (176: 19), SS2  
 192: 6 “nothing MS] “Nothing GI, SS1 (176: 24), SS2  
 192: 7 except data”, MS] beyond data,” GI, SS1 (176: 17), SS2  
 192: 7 some one MS] someone GI, SS1 (176: 25), SS2  
 192: 9 saying “nothing MS] saying, “Nothing GI, SS1 (176: 27), SS2  
 192: 10 data”, MS] data,” GI, SS1 (176: 27), SS2  
 192: 16 other MS] *inserted*  
 192: 18 some MS] *inserted*  
 192: 21 negative, and MS] negative and GI, SS1 (177: 1), SS2  
 192: 33 psychology, i.e. not MS] psychology; i.e., not GI, SS1 (177: 13), SS2  
 193: 4 field: but] field; but MS, GI, SS1 (177: 24), SS2  
 193: 8 find dinner engagements] find engagements MS  
 193: 27 consists, or perhaps consists,] consists (or perhaps consists) MS  
 193: 35 thoroughgoing] thorough-going MS *Also at 194: 3.*  
 194: 13 events remembered,] events remembered GI, SS1 (178: 32), SS2] memory, MS  
 194: 17 Descartes’ MS] Descartes’s GI, SS1 (178: 35), SS2  
 194: 21 the consistent solipsist] the solipsist MS  
 194: 22 occurs”, MS] occurs,” GI, SS1 (179: 3), SS2 *Also at 194: 31.*  
 194: 37 occurs”. MS] occurs.” GI, SS1 (179: 17), SS2.  
 194: 40 assuming induction or some equally questionable postulate.] assuming induction. MS  
 195: 2 experience, MS] experience GI, SS1 (179: 22), SS2  
 195: 16 partially reject] reject MS  
 195: 16–17 ; we must admit MS] *replaced*, &  
 195: 28–9 we grant what I shall call “the empiricist hypothesis”, namely MS] *above deleted* it is granted  
 195: 33 a MS] *after deleted* the  
 196: 21 this we may,] this we can, MS  
 196: 27 experienced.] experienced by some one. <by some one *inserted*> MS  
 196: 38 moment”, MS] moment,” GI, SS1 (181: 18), SS2  
 196: 39 limited] *above deleted* confined  
 197: 7–13 To this task we shall address ourselves in Part VI. But it will be well first to make a survey, on the one hand of data, and on the other hand of

scientific beliefs interpreted in their least questionable form. By analysing the results of this survey we may hope to discover the premisses which, consciously or unconsciously, are assumed in the reasonings of science.] To this task we must now address ourselves. And since the inferences concerned are such as make their conclusions only probable, our first step must be to inquire into the meaning or meanings of the word "probability". MS

#### 4. OBSERVATIONS ON ALTERATIONS

We discovered seven different kinds of alterations made by Simon and Schuster:

- addition of punctuation marks (e.g., "Napoleon?" changed to "Napoleon?," at 181: 6).
- deletion of punctuation (e.g., "I believe that, if" changed to "I believe that if" at 179: 1).
- alteration of punctuation mark order (e.g., "her". changed to "her." at 181: 8).
- substitution of punctuation marks (e.g., ":" changed to ";" at 193: 4 and [before namely and i.e.], changed to ; at 181: 26 and 190: 1, respectively).
- addition of capital letters (e.g., "say" changed to "say," "Because" at 181: 9-10).
- alteration of spelling (e.g., "premisses" changed to "premises" at 181: 21; "any one" changed to "anyone" at 181: 2).
- minor word substitutions (e.g., "wherever" changed to "whenever" at 181: 22-23).

None are substantial and most appear to be attempts on the part of Simon and Schuster to "Americanize" the text. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why an eminent logician and author known for his style would take offence at even "small" changes.

Russell's alterations, both in the manuscript and on the missing typescripts or proofs, are more interesting. At 179: 3 Russell deletes two paragraphs in which he stresses the fallibility of memory and claims that the probability it confers on beliefs is derived from or justified by some non-demonstrative principle of inference *other* than what we usually think of as induction—what Russell refers to as "simple enu-

meration". One of the important features of Russell's epistemic work at this time is his stress on the different kinds of non-demonstrative inferences, some reliable and some not, that need analysis and systematization. The non-demonstrative principle from which memory is justified is Russell's third postulate, that of spatio-temporal continuity. His account of memory in *Human Knowledge*—a causal, reliabilist account—is remarkably contemporary and naturalistic.

In his manuscript Russell claimed that only sensations are truly data for our knowledge of the external world. But at 185: 24 he adds memory to the list. Without memory, knowledge is limited to what one now notices, and *solipsism of the moment* ensues.

At 185: 40, 186: 3, and 187: 13 Russell deletes claims that imply the existence of an external world and replaces them with claims that are more ontologically neutral; e.g., references to "the outer world" and "things" become references to "my experiences" and "matters of fact". This caution is important, since our "knowledge" of the external world is conditional, i.e., it requires postulates of non-demonstrative inference whose epistemic status is unclear. That their status is unclear can be seen in the revision at 194: 40. Russell claimed in his manuscript that induction cannot be inferred from events except by "assuming induction", but before it went to press he wrote "assuming induction or some equally questionable postulate". That Russell introduced the principles of scientific inference as *postulates*, thereby calling attention to their dubious status, is a striking example of his intellectual honesty.

At 195: 16-17 Russell refers to the consequence of accepting the second horn of an epistemic dilemma: either we accept sceptical solipsism or we reject it and admit that we know—independently of experience—some non-demonstrative principle or principles of inference. If we reject solipsism and claim to know some non-demonstrative principle of inference, then, Russell says in the printed text, *we must partially reject empiricism*. But in his manuscript there are no qualifications: Russell writes that we must *reject* empiricism. This suggests that after he wrote the manuscript he began to see the issue not as one of accepting or rejecting empiricism but as one of properly restricting its domain to a subclass of human knowledge, one that excludes principles of non-demonstrative inference.

### 5. CONCLUSION

From this small sample of *Human Knowledge* we cannot say that all of Simon and Schuster's alternations were innocuous, only that those in the chapters we examined were. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why Russell the philosopher, who set such high standards of clarity, precision, rigour, and intellectual honesty, was disturbed by unauthorized changes in his typescript. Or why Russell the author, who was used to the respect for his writing idiosyncrasies that Allen and Unwin displayed by publishing his typescript unchanged, was irked by Simon and Schuster, who felt obliged to "correct" or standardize his punctuation.<sup>11</sup> Finally, in his own revisions, we get a glimpse of those high standards at work, of Russell revising his epistemic views at seventy-five years of age ever mindful of what argument and evidence will allow him to say, and what it will *not*.<sup>12</sup>

### POSTSCRIPT

On 8 June 1992, Kenneth Blackwell and I were examining Russell's personal copies of *Human Knowledge*, given to him by his British and American publishers. In a Simon and Schuster first edition we discovered their business reply card, tucked between pages 400 and 401. It read:

INFORMATION PLEASE The publishers would like to know whether this book has lived up to your expectations. If so, why? And if not, why not?  
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: Its Scope and Limits

I wonder if Russell was as amused as we were. [Ned S. Garvin]

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<sup>11</sup> See Kenneth Blackwell's paper, "Perhaps You Will Think Me Fussy ...": Three Myths in Editing Russell's *Collected Papers*, given at the eighteenth annual Conference on Editorial Problems at the U. of Toronto, November 5-6, 1982. In H.J. Jackson, ed., *Editing Polymaths: Erasmus to Russell* (Toronto: Conference on Editorial Problems, 1983), pp. 99-142 (esp. 113).

<sup>12</sup> I would like to thank the Faculty Development Committee at Albion College for the small grant that allowed me to bring my Russell Seminar to the Archives. Special thanks are due to Dr. Blackwell and Sheila Turcon for their generous assistance, patience, and encouragement. [Ned S. Garvin]

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