THE JUDGER IN RUSSELL'S THEORIES OF JUDGMENT

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Russell's 1910–14 theory of belief and truth continues to capture attention for its historical priority and for its negative epistemological lessons.[1] I say negative lessons, for, as Russell informs us from 1918 on, the theory is false and he has a better one. I find more interesting the positive lesson about how Russell's evolving conception of the judger contributed to the formulation of his better theory. From James's neutral monism he thought he could derive intentionality. And, inspired by his friend Wittgenstein, he thought he could connect more insightfully the statements in a language to the subjective judgments they express and to their objective truth conditions. Both advances turned on Russell's reconceptualization of the judger's role in the analysis of judgment.

I. RUSSELL'S FOUR THEORIES OF JUDGMENT

Kirkham, in his recent study of theories of truth, chooses the earlier false theory as one of his two paradigms of a correspondence theory of truth. He calls it the original modern correspondence theory.[2] Historically it is

[1] He expressed the theory in four publications: "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood" (the last essay of his *Philosophical Essays*), Part III of Chapter II of the Introduction to the first edition of *Principia Mathematica* (1910), a chapter of *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and his 1914 article, "On the Nature of Acquaintance". The latter was taken from his aborted book, *Theory of Knowlege* (*Papers* 7).

[2] R. L. Kirkham, *Theories of Truth* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P., 1992), p. 133.

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significant, but perhaps priority in the post-Hegelian period must be shared or even granted to the American New Realists such as W. P. Montague or to the Austrian realists such as Meinong for presenting correspondence theories of truth before Russell did. That is not to say their theories are the same as Russell's of 1910–14; indeed Russell criticizes both Montague and Meinong in the 1914 article. More ironically for Kirkham's historical claim, this 1910–14 theory was not even the original Russellian correspondence theory.

I call Russell's 1910–14 theory the non-representational correspondence theory, for its chief characteristic and chief error is that it did without representations as primitive entities. It has a feature like his theory of descriptions in that it contextually defines away key terms, in this case "judgment", "belief", and "proposition" in terms of acts. Just as in the theory of descriptions the singular descriptions disappear upon analysis into constituents of the formalized version of the sentence in which they appear, so the mental truth-bearer of representational correspondence theories of truth disappears into Russell's analysis of the act of judging. It is a theory of truth in which there is no mental, or judgmental, truth-bearer. When one judged, one judged either truly or falsely, but in the strictest sense (that is, analysis would reveal that) there was no entity other than the act that had in a primitive way the property of being true or being false. (The truth-values of statements in a language derive from the judgings they express.) Thus the theory is typical of a style of thought that Russell acquired first in 1905, several years after he had become a realist. I should not imply that no one could have had this non-representational theory until after Russell's theory of descriptions, or even that Russell was the first to conceive of it. If Chisholm is right, Brentano gave the same non-representational account of judgment long before Russell did.

Because the theory's structure is misanalyzed or analyzed with insufficient specificity, some commentators on Russell do not distinguish it from theories of truth and judgment that Russell held before 1905 and after 1914. Russell went through at least four stages of thought about judgment. In the first he was a monist and idealist, and his theories of judgment and truth followed suit, finessing the distinction between subjective and objective.[3] Despite Russell's later disavowal of monistic

[3] Russell said that "Idealism oscillates between" urging "that the knowledge does not differ from what is known" and admitting "the distinction of content and object, but hold[ing] that the latter is merely immanent" ("Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III)"), *Mind*, 13 (1904): 512f.; *Papers* 4: 464.

idealism, his sense of the unity of judgment as an ever-present issue developed under Bradley's influence. Bradley had himself made an issue of the unity of judgment against associationist accounts of judgment. Bradley had also said that meaning is what a certain sort of fact had; such facts he called signs.[4]

Russell's second stage began in 1898 with his reading of Moore's dissertation for the Trinity Prize Fellowship, published as "The Nature of Judgment".[5] It converted him from Bradleian idealism to a realism about meanings.[6] In his plunge into realism Moore gave short shrift to the subjective side; meanings are the entities meant. Russell followed suit, holding that only objective abstract entities, propositions, are true or false. Judgments are correct or erroneous:

> And as regards judgments, there seems no difference in the relation to their objects when they are correct and when they are incorrect; the difference is rather in the objects, which are true propositions in the one case, and false propositions in the other.[7]

Moore, in his contribution to the article, "Truth and Falsity" in Baldwin's 1901 *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, claimed to refute correspondence theories of truth on the grounds that there was an identity between truth and reality, whereas any correspondence implies that the corresponding entities are distinct. Russell in 1904 did not question

[4] F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1883), Bk. I, Chap. I.

[5] *Mind*, 8 (1899): 176–93. Reprinted in Tom Regan, ed., *G. E. Moore: the Early Essays* (Philadelphia: Temple U. P., 1986).

[6] Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*. See the Preface, pp. xviiif., for the non-mental character of a proposition. On the nature of singular propositions see p. 47, together with p. 44 on proper names. See also his correspondence with Frege on pp. 159 and 163, which provide context for the main passage, written in 1904, on p. 169 of Gottfried Gabriel *et al.*, eds., *Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

[7] "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (II)", *Mind*, 13 (1904): 348; *Papers* 4: 455. Although this passage occurs in the course of his criticizing an idea of Meinong's, it does represent Russell's view, for it is a consequence of the last few pages of the third instalment of his article, in which he argues for equal transcendental status for false and true propositions. See also *The Principles of Mathematics*, §§38 and 52.

Moore's assumption that all correspondence theories are representational, and he did not call his own theory a correspondence theory.

Yet, *pace* Russell of 1904, this second theory is a correspondence theory of correct judgment, albeit a non-representational one.[8] Correct judgments are complex unities consisting of relations of judgers to the true objective propositions they judge; the complex unities of judging are put into correspondence with true propositions by virtue of *an identity* of a part of the complex unity of judging with the whole of another complex unity, the true proposition. I am using the Russell of 1912 against the Russell of 1904 in explicating correspondence in terms of identity. In his popular 1912 exposition of philosophy,[9] he redefined correspondence so brazenly that in another context we might have taken it for playful witticism rather than serious analysis. But the redefinition has prevailed so totally that Kirkham and many others including me accept Russell's characterization of his 1912 theory as a correspondence theory. If his 1912 theory is one, his 1904 theory is one also. I will describe Russell's 1912 identity account of correspondence by way of an analogy: Think of a paperweight consisting of a glass sphere enclosing a snowman and some liquid. When you shake it, you stir up a snowstorm. There are two complex unities, to use Russell's language. One complex unity is just the inner scene, its snowing on the snowman. Since my analogy has nothing to do with representations and everything to do with identity, I say that in the scene it's flecking on the statuette. The other complex is the more comprehensive unity, the glass sphere revealing the scene of its flecking on the statuette. There is *an identity* of the whole of the scene-complex with a part of the sphere-complex. The identity entitles us to say the sphere-complex corresponds to the scene-complex. A true belief is like the glass sphere revealing the flecking on the statuette. The believed fact is the flecking on the statuette. That is how true beliefs correspond to facts without being representations of

[8] *Pace* Nicholas Griffin, "Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment", *Philosophical Studies*, 47 (1985): 213–47. Griffin does not allow for non-representational correspondence theories. Thus he takes Russell's rejection in 1904 of a correspondence of ideas to facts, that is, of a correspondence of representations to the facts represented, as a rejection of correspondence as such.

[9] *PP*, Chap. 12. See also the third from last paragraph in the 1910 *Philosophical Essays* (*Papers* 6: 123–4).

them.

One might say there is altogether too much correspondence in this 1904 theory, for erroneous judgments generate a parallel correspondence. Russell accepted such odd consequences as objectively existing falsehoods. If one acquiesces in falsehoods being citizens of the realm of being along with truths, just as red roses exist along with white roses, then one must justify discriminating against falsehoods as objects of one's belief or else admit to unaccountable prejudice.[10] Russell concluded that the erroneousness of a belief in a false proposition consisted in the ethical badness of such belief.

Russell began to express doubt about this view by 1907. From 1910 to 1914 Russell developed a third view of judgment that avoided both objective and mental propositions. As he wrote in 1910, "whether we judge truly or whether we judge falsely, there is no one thing that we are judging",[11] and in 1913, his was "a theory which shall regard true and false propositions as alike unreal, i.e., as incomplete symbols."[12] (Quine advocated something like it from 1956 to 1977 to analyze relational belief.[13]) Afterwards, when Russell wanted to say something about propositions neutral between the theory he had given up and his later one, he stated it perspicuously:

> A proposition may be defined as: *What we believe when we believe truly or falsely.* This definition is so framed as to avoid the assumption that, whenever we believe, our belief is true or false.[14]

Russell dubbed this third view his multiple-relation theory of belief, to

[10] "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III)", *Mind*, 13 (1904): 523f.; *Papers* 4: 474.

[11] *Philosophical Essays*, new ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 153; *Papers* 6: 120.

[12] *TK*, *Papers* 7: 109.

[13] "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", *Journal of Philosophy*, 53 (1956); reprinted in his *Ways of Paradox and Other Essays* (New York: Random House, 1966), Chap. 15. He repudiates the importance of the distinction in 1977 in "Intensions Revisited", P. French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota P., 1979), p. 273; reprinted in his *Theories and Things*.

[14] "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean" (1919), reprinted in *LK*, p. 285; *Papers* 8: 278.

contrast with the account of belief as a dual relation in his second theory.

Russell's final view, a part of his philosophy of logical atomism, revives subjective propositions and extensional facts. Geach defends it today with modifications. In this fourth stage Russell continues his avoidance of propositions that are supposed to exist without their depending on minds. As he said in 1918, "A proposition is just a symbol" and in 1919, "I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'."[15]

In other words, despite L. Susan Stebbing's vastly influential attribution to Russell in 1930 of a theory of singular objective propositions,[16] based on Russell's misstatement of his position in 1914, which he left uncorrected in 1928,[17] Russell had by then and for a long time really

[15] The first quote is from Lecture I of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", *LK*, p. 185; *Papers* 8: 166. The second quote is from "On Propositions", *LK*, p. 308; *Papers* 8: 297.

[16] *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (London: Methuen, 1930; rev. ed., 1933), Chap. IV, secs. 1 and 2.; also Chap. IX, sec. 3, where she cites Moore's explication of Russell as her source, p. 154 n. 2. The term "logically proper name" also seems to have gained currency from Stebbing's use of it to explain Russell, in her Chap. III, sec. 2 and Chap. IX, sec. 2. Unlike her account of propositions, her account of proper names explicates accurately the last part of the second lecture in *PLA*, where the phrase "logically proper name" almost but never quite crosses Russell's lips. He uses "true proper name in the logical sense" in 1914 (*LK*, p. 164; *Papers* 7: 37).

[17] *OKEW*$_3$ (1st ed., 1914). On p. 45 of the 1929 edition he says, "If I say a number of things about Socrates—that he was an Athenian, that he married Xanthippe, that he drank the hemlock—there is a common constituent, namely Socrates [*sic*!], in all the propositions I enunciate, but they have diverse forms." Clearly Socrates is only a constituent of the facts, for on p. 55 he also says, "A form of words which must be either true or false I shall call a *proposition*." The correction to "fact" as what Socrates is a constituent of is made in the third paragraph of the 1919 article, "On Propositions": "To say that facts are complex is the same thing as to say that they have *constituents*. That Socrates was Greek, that he married Xanthippe, that he died of drinking the hemlock, are facts that all have something in common, namely, that they are 'about' Socrates, who is accordingly said to be a constituent of each of them." An example of a benign reference to objective propositions during this period is in his 1911 article, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description": "*Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted*" (*Papers* 6: 154). Clearly nothing in this statement prevents contextual elimination of the proposition in a statement of the judging relation.

recognized only mental propositions, sentences, and logical constructions from them. Objective propositions could be analyzed away contextually, and so he could speak of them without any ontological commitment to them.

The picture is one that some commentators seem to miss. Ignoring the use of the term "proposition" to mean a declarative sentence in some language—it occurs in the *Principia*—we have either subjective ones or objective ones:[18]

RUSSELL'S STAGES	ARE THERE OBJECTIVE PROPS.?	ARE THERE SUBJECTIVE PROPS.?
To 1898	The distinction ... is finessed.	
To about 1907	Yes	No
To about 1917	No	No
From 1918 on	No	Yes

In 1912 Russell did freely use the nominative "beliefs" and said they were true or false. Thus the mistake I find in Kirkham, who attributes a representational correspondence theory to the Russell of 1910–14, is easily made. Nor is Kirkham the only one to make the mistake of running Russell's 1910–14 theory of judgment together with those that came after. One commentator who clearly does perceive the non-representational character of the 1910–14 theory is Nicholas Griffin.[19]

[18] Seven years ago I wrote a sketchier version of this section and the next two as part of a paper on "Singular Knowledge" for a festschrift which I am told will be published. The table here is the same, but almost everything else has been revised. The festschrift will be *Realism: Responses and Reactions (Essays in Honour of Pranab Kumar Sen)*, ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya, S. Basu, M. N. Mitra, and R. Mukhopadhyaya.

[19] See "Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment", *Russell*, n.s. 5 (1985): 134, 137n. My account of Wittgenstein's effect on Russell complements Griffin's account, in that my emphasis on the problem of the simplicity of the self helps us better understand why Russell's fourth theory of true belief took the representational form that it did.

II. THE THIRD THEORY CLOSE UP

Let us review Russell's third period in the formative years from 1910 to 1913. I have indicated two features of Russell's theory: no mental truth-bearers, and truth is adverbial. To understand these we must backtrack to the fundamental feature, namely the semantic simplicity of the self. He made it easy during this stage to conjure up a paradox about meant entities by continuing to fail to attribute any logically relevant complexity to the subject who judges:

> The first point upon which it is important to be clear is the relation of truth and falsehood to the mind. If we were right in saying that the things that are true or false are always judgments, then it is plain that there can be no truth or falsehood unless there are minds to judge. Nevertheless it is plain, also, that the truth or falsehood of a given judgment *depends in no way* upon the person judging, but solely upon the facts about which he judges.[20]

For the purpose of analyzing the semantical properties of judgment, judgers are interchangeable and atomic. Leave their complexities to physiology and psychology. For the theory of knowledge the self is no more than a relatum of such relations as judging, perceiving, and being acquainted with. If, further, all judgments, the false ones as well as the true, are the same dual (i.e., dyadic) relation of selves to their judgments' objective contents, the distinction between true and false must be located on the objective side as a distinction between true and false objects. There's paradox: false objects. For the Russell of the third stage this outcome is a *reductio ad absurdum* of treating judgment as a dyadic relation. For the objective side can consist only of what exists, the match to truth, and nothing has being except within the totality of actuality. False objects (like possible worlds other than the actual one) do not exist within that totality.

He then evaded the paradox by a theory of judgment as a multiple (i.e., polyadic) relation.[21] Judgments are multiple relations of the judger

[20] "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", *Philosophical Essays*, p. 149; *Papers* 6: 117. My italics.

[21] Appearing tentatively in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1906–07, and then made more positive in *Philosophical Essays* (1910), the article "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood" is the first appearance of the multiple-relation theory of judgment. In 1910 he also presented "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" to the Aristotelian Society, elaborating the theory in complementary ways. It was reprinted with added notes dated 1917, in his collection, *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). Further elaboration occurred in *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. 1, Parts II and III of Chapter II of the 1910 Introduction. However, as footnotes 2 and 5 to the *ML* reprint of "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" indicate, Russell knew he had a problem of analyzing one term in particular, the self judging, and difficulties with type levels of the various objects. The theory was later defended by Ramsey and Woozley.

to at least one universal and perhaps some particulars. A condition of judgment is that the judger be acquainted with all the other terms in the judgment relation that are judged about. The judger is acquainted with the particulars by perceiving them and with the universals by conceiving or thinking what they are. For example, we know that beforeness is a transitive relation. Some judgments relate the judger to universals only, for example, judgments that the tallest man is over eight feet tall, and that some animal is swifter than any antelope. Russell had hinted how these judgments could be analyzed without particulars entering the analysis. His student Dorothy Wrinch showed how to extend the account to compound propositions, which include propositions with no particulars.[22] Other judgments forming singular knowledge, for example the judgment that this apple is red, he analyzed to show the judger related to a particular. If we extrapolate from universals that are polyadic and monadic to medadic (0-adic) universals, Russell's theory of the cognitive content of a perception is that perception is the dyadic relation between a perceiver and a cognitive content, which is a medadic universal, an instantiation of a universal with all its terms filled in thus: knife-to-left-of-book.[23] But the objection to these complexes (objective singular affirmative true propositions, in effect) as terms in the relation of judgment does not apply to them as terms in the relation of perception; he did not recognize falsehoods in perception in these years. The

[22] "On the Nature of Judgment", *Mind*, 28 (1919): 319–29. By this year Russell had already abandoned the theory, but it is unlikely that she would have published her theory if Russell had not seen it and found merit in it. See Gregory Landini, "A New Interpretation of Russell's Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment", *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 12 (1990): 37–69, for an assessment of the extent to which Russell solved the problem of generalizing his theory to cover truth functionally compound judgments and general judgments.

[23] "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", *Philosophical Essays*, p. 156f.; *Papers* 6: 123.

perceptual relation presupposes, but is more than, the other dyadic relation which Russell postulated, that of acquaintance; perception entails conviction. There is a continuity between judgment and perception in the matter of being convinced of something by virtue of being related to objective entities. This continuity entails that any change in Russell's theory of the one will change his theory of the other. When he changed his account of judgment after 1917, that entailed a concomitant change in his account of sensation as a relation to sense-data. In 1919 he did convert to a more indirect realist account of perception.

We casually talk of judgments and beliefs as entities, which have truth or falsity as their adjectival properties. Strictly, however, an instantiation of the judging relation is an *act* (*PP*, pp. 126ff.). We can continue to talk of judgments provided that we understand they are analyzable in terms of acts.[24] Truth and falsity are adverbial properties of the acts; one believes truly or falsely. Adverbs of acts usually depend on the agents acting, but Russell's remark that "the truth or falsehood ... depends in no way on the person judging" was intended to warn the reader that "truly" and "falsely" are atypical adverbs. Consider the difference between the wind blowing steadily and the wind blowing soothingly, where the soothingness depends more on the object of the act of blowing than on the agent, so to speak, whereas the steadiness depends more on the blowing; "truly" and "falsely" are more like the "soothingly". A singular affirmative judgment is true if the particulars in the judgment relation instantiate the universal in the relation, false if they don't. A singular negative judgment is true if the particulars don't instantiate the universal, false if they do. General judgments are true or false according to whether the universals in them are or are not connected to each other by the mode of connection in the judgment, if we accept Dorothy

[24] The analysis must be contextual. Defining belief as Kirkham does as a sequence of entities (*Theories of Truth*, p. 122) is inadequate intrinsically and as an exposition of Russell. Kirkham's sequences do not distinguish, for instance, between Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio and his consternation over Desdemona's loving Cassio, which presumably must be the same sequence. In general, one cannot expect to name an instance of a relation by extracting one sequence from the set of sequences in the relation's extension. For that sequence can be in the extension of other relations. Taken as a name, such a sequence must be ambiguous. Kirkham also fails to notice that Russell's definition of belief eliminates it by paraphrasing all sentences in which it occurs in terms of acts of judging. Thus his account fails as an exposition of Russell.

Wrinch's amendment of the theory.

There are no false objects to be dealt with. A false judgment does not correspond to a false instantiation of a universal, but to its not being instantiated where the judgment alleges it to be. Objective and subjective propositions are not in this analysis of judgment.[25] Curiously, the analysis manages to account for the non-extensionality of the judgment anyway, by making the universal terms in the judgment separate terms in a judgment relation from the particulars, if there are any. For the universals are not individuated extensionally. (This feature appealed to Ramsey, who revived the theory in 1927 to support his trivializing the theory of truth and falsity.[26] For Russell's account of judgment does not require commitment to the existence of facts as primitive entities.)

III. THE NEGATIVE LESSONS FROM THE THIRD THEORY

By 1913, however, the student Wittgenstein was hammering home to Russell his failure to recognize the logically relevant complexity *within the judging subject.* Only that failure made it *seem* necessary, if judging were to be a dual relation, to find something on the objective side to bear the property of falsehood. In fact, thought Wittgenstein, falsity applies to a directed complex *within* the subject, which I identify with a subjectively formed proposition. It is false when it gets the direction wrong, though its names (undirected complexes) do correspond, part for part, to an actual complex on the objective side.[27] For subjectively held propositions are bidirectional, except for the degenerate cases of tautology and contradiction. Propositions point as the truth points, or

[25] His article, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (1911), reprinted in *ML* (1918), does refer to propositions as if they could be derived from judgment relations by extracting the terms in the relation to which the judger is related dually, i.e., dyadically, by acquaintance. Of course, that is just a set or a list, not a proposition.

[26] "Facts and Propositions" (1927), reprinted in his *The Foundations of Mathematics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), especially pp. 141f. He did not accept Russell's treatment of "the mental factor" as having no logically relevant composition, a position that Wittgenstein had criticized.

[27] "Notes on Logic, September 1913" in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), App. 1, see pp. 94f. "Names are points, propositions arrows—they have *sense*", p. 97. See the last paragraph on p. 98. For the language of correspondence see the top of p. 100.

oppositely. So, we deny one of the quoted sentences of Russell's: "the truth or falsehood of a given judgment depends in" *some* "way upon the person judging" after all, namely on the directed complex within the person judging. And judgment can be a dual relation after all. To fill the role of objects of knowledge and false belief, we do not need objectively existing propositions as possible states of affairs, only honest-to-goodness facts (actual complexes) which the subjectively held propositions that count as knowledge assert and those that count as false belief deny. In non-assertive mental acts, like considering or wondering about something, a subjective proposition's representing or misrepresenting a fact is what we need to analyze non-assertive acts. (Judgment has been our example, but we may extend our concern to all mental acts having propositional content, not just acts of assertion.)

Not only were Russell's reasons for creating the third theory of judgment illusory, but the theory itself was incoherent, Wittgenstein argued. To understand the criticism, we remind ourselves of the two ways universals occur to us, first as predicates bearing a mark of their incompleteness, like "__ is just" and "__ loves __", and secondly as genuine subjects of predication, like "justice" and "love".[28] In their second guise, universals are individuals just as you and I are. The difference is that they are abstract individuals whereas particulars like us are concrete individuals. We are acquainted with universals as being stand-alone individuals. Consider now Othello's belief that Desdemona loved Cassio. Russell analyzed this belief as a relation between the judger and three other individuals; one of the individuals was an abstract individual, a universal, the relation of loving. It enters the relation of judging no differently from the way it enters the relation of acquaintance, namely, as an entity related to others, not itself relating. It seems that Russell had not weighted enough those words he published in 1903:

> A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguishable from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account of the precise nature of the distinction. (*PoM*, §54)

[28] See the sixth paragraph of his "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description". This doctrine is his essential Platonism.

Russell's analysis of a few years later than this passage could not provide the analyst with the resources to generate Othello's belief of Desdemona loving Cassio, as distinct from Desdemona not loving Cassio. For the universal Love enters the judgment in a way that is neutral to its relating the two, which would make an affirmative judgment true or a negative one false, and its not relating the two, which would make an affirmative judgment false or a negative one true. (A relation as named must be distinguished from a relation as expressed by a verb in a false sentence. Yet each may be referred to as a relation not relating. Thus I avoid the equivocation, and I refer to the relation as named as one neutral to relating and not relating. As named, the relation does not even purport to relate.) It would not solve the problem for Russell to distinguish an affirmative propositional attitude of believing from a negative one of denying, for we may deny a non-relating as well as a relating.

Nor does Russell's analysis distinguish Othello's judgment from his acquaintance with a list of items: Desdemona Love Cassio, or Cassio Love Desdemona, or even Love Desdemona Cassio, or Cassio Desdemona Love! Since the words for *all* these entities are singular terms, names, they do not put a representation into Othello's mind, a relation as purporting to relate, but only a list with a relation as one item on the list. Recall that Russell's judger is logically simple; the judging relation must bear the burden in this analysis. Since the judging relation relates things as in a list, Russell's endowing the judging relation with a sense in 1912 does not succeed in distinguishing the judgment that Desdemona loves Cassio from the judgment that Cassio loves Desdemona.[29] The judging relation's sense only distinguishes lists. One list: Desdemona Love Cassio, is distinguished from the other list: Cassio Love Desdemona. Russell might reply that a judgment differs from an acquaintance with items on a list in that the judgment is assertoric. Lists are not asserted. But, Wittgenstein might continue, the names of the concrete and abstract individuals in the judging relation don't point the analyst to the relevant fact for assessing the belief's truth or falsity. For example, if I am not acquainted with the letters' positions in *AB*, but must learn the fact from what you tell me, nothing in Russell's theory shows how I could

[29] In 1910 (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 158; *Papers* 6: 123–4) Russell had let the love relation carry the sense, but G. F. Stout had shown that did not solve the problem, as Nicholas Griffin points out ("Wittgeinstein's Criticism", p. 135).

learn it, whether you tell me "*A* is before *B*" or "*B* is after *A*", both being reports of the same fact, although beforeness and afterness are different converse universals. Geach, alluding to Aristotle's dictum (*Metaph.* 9.5) that one and the same science is of opposite effects, concludes, as I think Wittgenstein did, that

> not only is the concept of a pair of converse relations a single and indivisible mental capacity ...; the exercise of that concept in judgment also brings in the two relations equally and simultaneously, for to judge that *a* bears the one relation to *b* is the very same act as judging that *b* bears the converse relation to *a*. Thus both relations of a pair of converses ... must enter into the act of judgment equally and simultaneously; his solution [of the judging imposing a sense on the relation] then collapses....[30]

The analysis of judgment fails to show how it is assertoric of one thing; the analysis represents judging as only gathering items into the unity of a list. A theory of judging unable to say what structures are in the judger's mind as he judges, and unable to say what fact is relevant to assessing the judgment's truth, is surely bankrupt. In Wittgenstein's words, "This shows that a proposition itself [a subjective proposition] must occur [= reference to it must not be analyzed away] in the statement [to the effect] that it is judged."[31]

Of the two criticisms, falsely presupposing the judger's irrelevance and incoherently analyzing the judging, the first is the more obviously serious. Cosmetic surgery will repair the incoherence of Russell's theory. We can interpret more charitably his endowing the judgment relation with a sense. The applying of universals and the direction of application can be built into a more complicated judging relation, which still depends on the acquaintance relation to give it its terms: Othello deems the universal Love to apply to Desdemona as lover and Cassio as beloved. Wittgenstein attacked this amendment, which Russell had worked out in his projected book on the theory of knowledge. Griffin and Landini have analyzed this episode, and I will not repeat or challenge them. *Pace* Wittgenstein, I do not think that the amendment is incoherent, although it might only capture the phenomenon of judgment's directedness in an unilluminating way. For the higher order relation, deeming __ to apply to __, is still an "unduly simple"[32] label for a complex situation of a relation (the deeming) allowing one of its relata (the love) to purport to do some relating of the first's (the deeming's) own other relata, which that relatum (the love) doesn't do outside this context. For one might be deeming true something that happens to be false, though false contingently—it is possibly true. Here incoherence is gone, replaced by mystery. Russell can only say that the judger unites the objects judged by "bringing them into relation with the general form" of a complex (*Papers* 7: 116). Quine's 1956–77 theory, whose similarity to Russell's I noted earlier, puts a predicative thought in place of Russell's acquaintances with a stand-alone universal and a general form of a complex. Thus Quine conceded that even singular beliefs require us to recognize the relevance of complexity in the believer, namely acts of predication, and he thereby removed much of the mystery.

[30] Peter Geach, *Mental Acts*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1971), p. 52.
[31] "Notes on Logic", *Notebooks, 1914–16*, p. 94.

IV. POSITIVE LESSONS ABOUT THE JUDGER

As for the first criticism, why did Russell so underrate the significance of complexity within the judger? In a word, it was due to his anti-idealism which included anti-representationalism. In 1910 Russell had said:

> ... I think the theory [that judgments consist of ideas] is fundamentally mistaken. The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the "idea" of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging. But in this view ideas become a veil between us and outside things—we never really, in knowledge, attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.[33]

An attraction of the multiple-relation theory of judgment is that, according to the theory, not only don't mental entities veil the thing we know in singular knowledge, they do not even present it, for such a presen-

[32] *PLA*, Lecture 4, *LK*, p. 226; *Papers* 8: 199. The label is applied to his published views, and here I apply it to his unpublished view.
[33] "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", *ML*, pp. 221–2; *Papers* 8: 155. Geach criticizes this passage in *Mental Acts*, Chap. 14, second to last paragraph.

tation would be of the thing in costume, so to speak. While ideas, in this case descriptive singular terms, would present things already dressed up, in singular knowledge the things known present themselves bare, ready for our dressing them any which way. For a while he thought the self-judging was also presented directly, although he soon backed off from that claim, deciding that it was enough for the judger to know himself by description as the one judging.

By 1919, however, Russell had come to think that ideas could *not* veil reality from the self, for Hume was right about the self. In Russellian terms, not only wasn't the self an object term of the acquaintance relation, but the relation itself, of which the self was at least subject term, is not an object term of acquaintance or any other knowledge (as a 1904 essay by James had finally convinced him after more than a decade of resistance), and so the self could not even be known by description in the way he had supposed. So the self just *was* a congeries of ideas.

Russell saw a payoff in a reductive theory of what we today call intentionality. For the ideas to be about things just is for the things to be there for the self. Russell tried to spell this out in his neutral monism: When an idea is in a mind-constituting group and also in an object-constituting group in the least problematic way in perception,[34] then it is *that* mind's perceptual idea *of that* thing. Neat (if it works). Conceptual ideas of that thing include those ideas which bring about a chain of ideas that terminate satisfactorily in the perceptual idea of that thing. Once the aboutness of ideas is explained by reference to their context among other ideas, there is no longer a need for the acquaintance relation to generate aboutness. Russell conceded its non-existence. This admission of logically relevant complexity into the self removed one of the props for the multiple-relation theory, namely the logically simple entity that is acquainted with all the relata in a judgment. (Wittgenstein did not push this analysis of self on Russell. His own theory of the judger, worked out after he left Cambridge, was that, when the judger is taken metaphysically rather than psychologically, it was neither simple nor complex, escaping both characterizations by being a limit.[35])

[34] Ideas of a thing may be of it while the ideas are in times and places where the thing is not, and some ideas are of things that do not exist. Neutral monism is no more illuminating about these forms of intentionality than any other theory.

[35] My attempt at reconciling *Notebooks*, Appendix 2, the last entry dictated to Moore in April 1914; *Tractatus*, 5.5421 and 5.641.

Other payoffs followed the elimination of acquaintance. The multiple-relation theory of judgment had possessed independent strength in its fidelity to singular judgments expressing knowledge by acquaintance with particulars, to which a non-representational correspondence theory of truth seemed particularly appropriate. Thus giving up the theory made singular knowledge problematic. To capture the directness of singular knowledge in a theory of subjectively formed propositions, non-descriptive, i.e., non-ideative, names or demonstratives will be the symbolic proxies of the indicated individuals in singular subjective propositions. Thus the complexity of the judger must be variegated enough to capture this difference in types of names, ideative and non-ideative, that are resident in the judger. Recall the four kinds of non-ideative names we recognize today: free variables, demonstratives such as "this", referential singular descriptions that have rigidified reference, distinct from attributive descriptions, and proper names whose reference has not been plasticified by their becoming abbreviations for descriptions, as the name "Pegasus" has become. Proper names must be further distinguished as either vivid for their users or not vivid, depending on whether the user has taken perceptual notice of the thing named. Although the term "vivid name" is due to Kaplan, Russell developed the idea in 1940 with his theory of noticing: One's noticing of a thing makes one's name for it vivid enough to yield a singular proposition for one to believe.[36] Thus the false direct realist semantics of acquaintance is replaced by a representational realist semantics of vivid proper names, achieved by replacing acquaintance with the act of noticing. For the purposes of this essay, however, the problem of capturing singular knowledge in a theory of subjective propositions may be put aside.

Wittgenstein saw a payoff in greater insight into the relation of a subjective proposition to the linguistic statement that expressed it and to its objective truth conditions. Both of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's third theory were rooted in one vexing problem which he formulated on 20 September 1914: "to say how propositions hang together internally. How the *propositional bond* comes into existence."[37] Since the judging relation cannot bind elements into the proposition judged,

[36] *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940), Chaps. 3 and 24.

[37] *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, p. 5e. Compare *Tractatus*, 4.221.

the proposition must have unity independently of the judging through the proposition's verb. If we extrude the verb of propositional attitude from the binding problem, and yet admit that a proposition would not exist without some attitude or mood directed toward either it or a proposition it is part of, we can see our one problem bifurcating. There is the accounting for the propositional bond independently of the attitude, and there is the accounting for the role of the attitude as internally related to the proposition. There are two aspects of the problem: content-unity and mood-essentiality. So Russell stated the one vexing problem as Wittgenstein's discovery of a non-natural kind of unitary fact, one with two verbs, a verb of propositional attitude such as "judges", "believes", "wishes", or the like, and a verb of the proposition that is believed or wished for.[38]

Russell made public these debates over his non-representational theory of belief a decade later in his Introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.[39] A year afterwards, in 1923, W. D. Ross published his *Aristotle*[40] and, with a pertinence to this debate that I cannot dismiss as coincidence, reported that Aristotle had seen both sides of the issue. Aristotle had defined truth as correspondence in two ways. One way implied a representational theory of judgment. The other way avoided subjective propositions altogether:

> The terms "being" and "non-being" are employed ... thirdly in the sense of true and false. This depends, on the side of the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error.[41]

[38] *PLA*, in *LK*, p. 226; *Papers* 8: 200.

[39] "Introduction" to Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; 1st ed., 1922), pp. xix–xxii; *Papers* 9: 109–11. With the publication in 1967 of his *Autobiography*, we learned more about these debates from his letters. See also Elizabeth R. Eames, *Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries* (Carbondale, Ill.: U of Southern Illinois P., 1989). I think that the criticisms that Peter Geach levels against Russell's 1910 theory of judgment (in *Mental Acts*) are just the sort Wittgenstein was making in 1913.

[40] London: Methuen, 1923. Later editions had the subtitle, *A Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought*.

[41] *Metaphysica* 9.10 1051a 34ff. Ross's translation.

Ross glosses this, "To say this is to state in some sense a correspondence view of truth, but one which is free from the notion that there is a thought-structure which actually copies the structure of reality."[42] Instead, one judges truly or falsely without representations (subjective propositions) or any objectively existing propositions. We are confined to an adverbial form of "true" as the full characterization of a mind's judging in correspondence with a reality: It thinks truly. It is a consequence of Russell's third way of describing judgment,[43] although only a pragmatist or idealist could complete the account of a non-representational form of correspondence. Aristotle, being neither, also expressed the alternative:

> But what these [spoken sounds] are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul [i.e., thoughts]—are the same for all [human beings]; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same.[44]

Ross glosses this, "In accordance with this view, judgment is described not as the apprehension of connections in reality, but as the establishing of connections (or, in the case of negative judgment, of divisions) between these affections of the soul, which are also called 'concepts'."[45] So we get compound likenesses from atomic ones. Some compounds are only names, but others are directed compounds, subjective propositions.

Wittgenstein went with subjective propositions; he did not posit false objectively existing propositions, however, or even non-extensional true ones, but only facts. Russell then followed suit. When Russell conceded the existence of facts and their role as the standards in evaluating mental complexes made up of symbols, in his 1918 lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",[46] he was giving up his multiple-relation theory

[42] *Aristotle*, p. 26.

[43] And even propositions, when he wants to begin in a preliminary, theory-neutral way. Thus the 1919 article "On Propositions" begins, "A proposition may be defined as: *What we believe when we believe truly or falsely*. This definition is so framed as to avoid the assumption that, whenever we believe, our belief is true or false." The article, being from Russell's fourth stage, does end up with a commitment to a representational account of correspondence.

[44] *De Interpretatione* 1.1 16a 7. Ackrill's translation.

[45] *Aristotle*, pp. 25–6.

[46] See especially Lectures I and IV, section 2. His disavowal of the multiple-relation theory is explicit in his 1919 article, "On Propositions", *LK*, pp. 306f.; *Papers* 8: 294–5.

of judgment. In doing so, he gave up a non-representational correspondence theory of truth for a representational one.

In his fourth theory Russell reduced the problem of accounting for the propositional bond to the proposition's representing or misrepresenting something already well consolidated, namely a fact. Since facts are to be represented only by facts, some facticity of a subjective proposition does the representing and unifies the representing entity as well. Here I think Russell never quite saw what Wittgenstein was driving at. For Russell, as for Bradley, this signifying facticity is just the tokening or occurring of the whole propositional complex. He says in 1919:

> Propositions are facts in exactly the same sense in which their objectives are facts. The relation of a proposition to its objective is ... a relation between two equally solid and equally actual facts. ("On Propositions", *LK*, p. 315; *Papers* 8: 302)

For Wittgenstein, however, the proposition's component names occurring in a special relation to each other unassisted by any verb constitutes the signifying facticity, and this was the special facticity that unified the subjective proposition. That is what he said in his 1913 notes and repeated in *Tractatus* 3.1432. Russell even parrots this entry in his Introduction to the *Tractatus* (correcting the typo "the person's name" to "the persons named" on page 10):

> If we say "Plato loves Socrates", the word "loves" which occurs between the word "Plato" and the word "Socrates" establishes [*wrong; he should have said "is established by"*] a certain relation between these two words [*actually a pre-English-language relation between their mental counterparts in the subjective proposition*], and it is owing to this fact that our sentence is able to assert a relation between the persons named by the words "Plato" and "Socrates". (*Papers* 9: 102–3)

He missed seeing how the verbal sentence derives from the preverbal proposition. Whenever Russell says in his own voice something to the effect that, *that* the symbols in a proposition occur as they do signifies *that* such and such is the case, he means only to reaffirm that facts signify facts. He sees the correspondence of fact to fact as replacing the relation of self to objects, which underwrote his third theory of judgment.[47] He does not solve the problem of the propositional bond.

Russell comes closest to Wittgenstein's solution in his contrast between word-propositions and propositions whose singular terms are images (image-propositions), and in his making word-propositions depend on pre-linguistic image-propositions for their meaning.[48] For image-propositions relate their singular term images by a relation that corresponds, in the case of true propositions, to a relation that relates what the images refer to. In true word-propositions the words are related to each other in a way that corresponds to the objective relation only indirectly by way of the image-proposition.

But several problems bedevil Russell's analysis of the meaning and truth of image-propositions. First, the reliance on introspective psychology to supply the pre-linguistic proposition's terms is unnecessary; we can theorize about brain events in place of images and about relations between the events that are less slavish resemblances of the relations they correspond to. Would images be more primitive than words as symbols? No. Since a word's sounds are totally irrelevant to its denoting, whereas not all of an image's looks are irrelevant, using images as names requires a willful regarding of them discriminatively, and that seems less primitive. If we free ourselves from the introspectively occurrent images, we can also free ourselves from Russell's solution to the mood–essentiality problem that depends on introspectively occurrent feelings of conviction or desire. We can depsychologize both mood and content. Secondly, the relation that he often supposes relates the images in true propositions is "the very same relation" as relates their referents (*AMi*, p. 274). Thus his examples almost always concern correspondences of spatial relations between images in a visual field to spatial relations between objects in physical space. But the correspondence, even for the most basic pre-linguistic propositions, need not be so literal that the true proposition may be constructed from the fact by "mere substitution of images for their prototypes" (*ibid.*). Thirdly, his examples of image-propositions never consider monadic predications. He gives us reason to think he imagines monadic predications to consist of two images, one as a singular term and one as a predicate, since he did allow "In Propositions" for

[47] Introduction to the *Tractatus*, p. xx; *Papers* 9: 110.
[48] "On Propositions", *LK*, p. 308; *Papers* 8: 296.

images of universals (*LK*, p. 303; *Papers* 8: 292) and he dismisses single image beliefs as peripheral (*LK*, p. 307) and non-propositional (*LK*, p. 308). If so, he failed to grasp Wittgenstein's idea of correspondence in its full generality as excluding all verbs, including intransitive ones, from subjective propositions.

Russell's theory of subjective propositions never developed satisfactorily. By 1925 the representing entity is a subjective proposition much too like a sentence to illuminate the structure of sentences, and the relation of predication is labelled but not derived.[49] Unfortunately, Russell thought the only way predicates could be in the mind was the way they are in sentences, namely as symbolized, and the only way they could be related to singular terms was by a primitive relation of predication. Without saying anything false, he manages to say nothing illuminating about mental propositions, because of these hidden assumptions. He cannot say what is directed about the concatenation that yields sentences rather than names, nor can he say why sentences must contain verbs, not just names. He cannot satisfy our expectation that subjective propositions be less complex than sentences since they are more primitive and must exist before sentences can express them.

In 1954, however, Stenius provided the needed clarification of Wittgenstein's account of the verb in the construction of sentences that express verbless propositions,[50] and in 1957 Geach provided the correlative correction to Russell's fourth account of judgment.[51]

[49] *PM* 1: App. C. He says, "when a man believes 'Socrates is Greek' he has simultaneously two thoughts, one of which 'means' Socrates while the other 'means' Greek, and these two thoughts are related in the way we call 'predication'." I believe this characterization gives up on the problem of understanding predication. See also Russell, *Philosophy* (New York: Norton, 1927), pp. 264f. Russell thinks that the names must occur in a serial order, forcing the binding relations to be individuated by verbs on pain of "intolerable ambiguity". But in the mind names are not restricted to serial ordering.

[50] Erik Stenius, "Linguistic Structure and the Structure of Experience", *Theoria*, 20 (1954): 153–72. See p. 170 for verbs as characteristics. See also his *Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U. P., 1960), Chap. 7.

[51] *Mental Acts*, Chap. 14 and the preface to the 1971 edition.