Edith Russell had already written the lives of Carey Thomas and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt when she married Bertrand Russell in 1952. She ordered and preserved his files as no one before had, and took a great interest in his earlier years as she did, of course, in his current campaigns and family. When Clark’s Life appeared in 1975, she reacted strongly to it. She wrote three drafts of comments, each draft more extensive than the last, and including information only she would have. She numbered the comments within the chapters and referred to them in her final (and often difficult) manuscript by page and comment number. On the verso of the dustjacket, having turned it inside out, she wrote: “Clark’s fatuous book”; then she replaced the jacket in its new state. Not all of her original comments are present in the final version, which she headed “Comments on Clark’s Biography of BR; Rather Rough Notes”. She also made a summary of her overall attitude and complaints. Altogether Countess Russell laboured hard in her effort to correct for researchers—especially future biographers—what she saw as imbalance, errors in fact, and appreciation of her esteemed husband. Along with similar but shorter critical notes on Dora Russell’s autobiography and a draft book by Michael Burn, the document was listed in the finding-aid to her papers (see S. Turcon, “The Edith Russell Papers”, Russell 12 [1992]: 61–78). This unabridged, third excerpt covers Chapters 21–24, up to Russell’s death. My notes are in angle brackets.

At page 618/26 Lady Russell wishes Clark had mentioned the embargo to “protect” various individuals. Russell embargoed at McMaster any documents regarding them for five years after the death of the survivor of Russell and the person concerned.

—K.B.
Chapter 21 “The Genesis of Protest”

554/1 This repudiation of “banning the bomb” in the early ’50s and 1957 is important. It changed, as B’s opinions did, with changed circumstances.

554–5/2 The first of these was the evidence that the U.S. would not protect Europe, and more, by the Bikini test.

Why should this report (p. 554) be considered “mis-reported”? B. changed his mind gradually as he amassed evidence: that leaders are safer than the general population, that the chance of the hydrogen bomb being used in spite of bringing total devastation was far greater than he had thought. And so, to the deterrent not deterring.

555/3 B. continued to believe that inspection was necessary.

At this time, banning tests would remove a fear that held the Russians in check.

Then came the Bikini test and the full knowledge of the dangers of fall-out.

Clark’s mixed-up dating of all this makes it very difficult to follow the quite reasonable changes in B’s mind: p. 554 is 1957–8 then goes back p. 555 to 1954 and then on to 1957.

556–7/14 The old difficulty of Clark’s juggling with dates: Goes back from November 1957 and the spring of 1957 to September 1957 without any indication that the September Labour meeting and the defeat of Britain’s renunciation of nuclear weapons took place before the letters were written as was the article by Priestley.

559/5 So had many others—Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, for instance.

559/6 “The organization of which Russell now became president”. But Clark has already been discussing things that happened after he became president.

This see-saw is very difficult and, I think comes from Clark not having digested the facts.

560/7 The N-CF in time brought a new attitude towards conscientious objectors. There was hope that the CND might act similarly. Clark does not bring this out. Also, the elite Pugwash scientists were pretty well ham-strung unless they could persuade the politicians that the latter’s constituents would back them. Therefore, the general public had to be convinced. Clark misses this point.

560/8 Civil disobedience slipped into discussion of the parallels between N-CF and CND.

560/9 B’s “contradictions and wild phrases”—I do not know of any. I should have thought that Clark should have examined phrases so-called and shown—as can be shown—that they were neither “contradictions” nor “wild phrases”. I question Clark’s “objectivity” at this point. The N-CF were far enough in time for him to subdue his prejudices but the CND, etc., was not.
Clark is very stupid here. B. is talking about his feelings. But his argument progressed reasonably, perfectly logically. Would the anti-nuclear movement have blazed any visible public trail at all without him? Seems to me doubtful. But that is the point which should take first priority with Clark.

The point that B. was making, as he says, is that too much fuss is made of the mortality caused by the atom bomb. This restriction seems to be missed by Clark.

Clark cites B’s remark, in March ’58, that H-bombs “would soon be possessed by all and sundry” as being “a rash over-statement”. Yet now, 17 years later, it is pretty generally accepted as a true prophecy. Clark cuts the word “soon” down too narrowly for the meaning of “soon” in terms of international affairs and their movement.

B. entered the (House of Lords) debate, I remember, with no hope of any success. Things turned out as he thought they would.

Presumably this was 11 Feb. 1959. Clark should have said so. He overworks the reader.

But this does not mean any change in B’s attitude and it might have done some good in making Kruschev’s and Russia’s position as understandable to the populace as was their own—I.e. they were all human beings. K’s book did not come out in time. B. was and remained sceptical of K’s reception of the suggestion, but it was worth a try (like the House of Lord’s debate, etc., etc.).

Why does Clark take this rather offensive quotation from Rupert? It, like most—or many—of the quotations from B. in Rupert’s book were casual gossip and said half in fun. But Clark never recognizes the flavour of casual talk and the difference between casual talk among friends and carefully thought-out stuff for publication.

Clark seems not to recognize what B. saw clearly: the old methods had lost their edge. As in all long campaigns, various and fresh methods have to be taken to hold the public interest and keep up the strength of determination. Clark does not appear to understand B’s perception of the growing urgency of getting something done or of the fact that all the various “methods” that B. at one time or another supported were part of the same campaign.

Chapter 22 “The Rise of Ralph Schoenman”

Again, this episode and R.S. himself were of much less importance in B’s long life than Clark implies by naming this chapter for R.S. (not to speak of inserting, as one Appendix, the only one, B’s “memorandum” on R.S.). The fact that he did so, I suppose, is the result of his wish to make the book sell by being topical and, where possible, a little scandalous.

It is true that he was always glad to return to Plas Penrhyn. On the other hand so was he always glad to get to Millbank on the River and to the
little Hasker St. house which, as he often said, he loved.

571/2 No suggestion that the correspondence was world-wide and with the general public (not just foreign Heads of States)—No, I expect I am carping. But the “postman” was a “postmistress” in those days and came on her own two feet. Her name was Miss Morris.

571/3 Clark might have pointed out—as Moseley himself took pains to do—that Moseley’s wife at the time was a cousin of B.

572/4 At the time of which Clark is presumably writing, we fetched our own thrillers from the various WH Smiths and Railway bookstalls in the neighbourhood. Not till B. fell ill, much later than this, did Rupert bring thrillers from the libraries (travelling and other).

573/5 Ralph was not in the least “stocky”—nor did he “charm” either of us. Nor did he win B’s confidence “quickly”. Neither of us knew what to make of him for some time after his first appearance.

574/6 Why no mention of Lord John in connection with the Reform Bill?

576/7 B’s influence continued to increase seriously in foreign parts throughout the ’60’s. But Clark does not ever seem to count anywhere but the U.S.A. and Great Britain—and, perhaps, when he has to, the more Western countries of Europe.

578/8 Precisely because the cat caused such havoc Clark should understand why the Committee of 100 had to be “secret” till the stage was prepared for the cat.

578/9 Clark should have quashed this suggestion. It is nonsense. The wrong John Connell was approached by mistake and with no ulterior motives whatsoever.

581–2/10 I wonder if Clark has listened to the tape recordings of these meetings (with Canon Collins).

582/11 This seems quite sufficient justification for starting the Committee of 100 in a long campaign of such urgency.

582(583)/12 Nonsense. This “flash of insight” as Clark calls it (à propos Gregory/Russell in Malleson’s The Coming Back, passing from person to person, never finding or giving any real happiness) is all very well as fiction but, taken as insight into B’s character and relations with other human beings, it is very wide of the mark. It quite overlooks the fact of B’s lifelong and very close friendships with both men and women: Crompton Llewelyn Davies, Charlie Sanger, G. Murray, G. Lowes Dickinson, Lucy Donnelly, etc. etc. etc. As for never giving any real happiness—this is nonsense too. Certainly he gave me, for one, intense and profound and very real happiness.

583–4/13 “I was able to deploy”. The “I” is wrong. B. continued to direct the deployment and there were Schoenman’s colleagues who, with R.S., did the leg work and activity.

584/14 I remember B. remarking that the nuclear expansion was analogous
to War Crimes and that there had been a War Crimes Tribunal held against the Nazis and could be in the case of nuclear expansion. But he did not favour such a procedure. In the case of war crimes in Vietnam there was much to be said in its favour. But he remained hesitant, arguing the matter with R.S. and every one else. At last there was a meeting at Hasker Street of young men from the New Left Review, London University, the School of Economics, and certain of R.S’s colleagues. There was much well-informed argument. Finally the arguments in favour of a War Crimes Tribunal won and B. agreed to support it.

(At a meeting not attended by B.) R.S. was made Director-General of the War Crimes Tribunal out of deference to B. who, it was thought, would wish it. But B. did not wish it. He was not consulted and was horrified when he learned of it, foreseeing in broad outline a good many of the disasters that the appointment brought about. There was, however, nothing that he could do about it once the appointment was made. B. had already become disillusioned by R.S’s ability to toss away money, and by his tactless self-importance and lack of good judgment.

584/15 The paths were always chosen by B. Whether possible paths were pointed out by someone else or found by B. himself, he examined them with care and chose only when he thought them possible. He refused to take many that R.S. wished him to take.

584/16 B. wanted to “disown” R.S. long before he did so, but he was begged not to do so by R.S’s colleagues in the Foundation. I thought these colleagues quite wrong. But I believe that they behaved honourably (though sometimes ignorantly) in opposing the ousting of R.S.

586/17 Clark might have noted that, at the Trafalgar Square demonstration when we were in prison, the police arrested many more people than they could manage.

587/18 The beginnings of a severe case of hepatitis (i.e. shingles) also blew it. (Re Auto. 3: 144.)

588/19 There was no air cushion—ingenious or otherwise—in his trousers, nor would he have permitted it.

589/20 Yet Clark rates B. for “Conspiracy” theory!

589/21 Unfortunately “a few good staff officers” were unavailable. B. had to make use of those who were willing and able.

589/22 B. and I laid the wreath on behalf of the Committee.

589–90/23 B. did not lead the march down Oxford St. He met it at Trafalgar Square.

590/24 True, it was not denial—nor was it mitigation. It was the reason, the explanation.

591/25 The New Statesman was quite right. But Clark hasn’t enough “objectivity”—enough perspective on events still so near—to judge them impartially.
Possibly this is true. On the other hand, it (BR’s prison leaflet, Auto. 3: 146) moved and won over many people.

In view of the remarks of prisoners and some officials at Holloway during this time there is a good deal in this [in the “youth’s” remark]—but Clark, who sees little of the general populace doesn’t know much about what they were feeling.

No. We stayed a few days at Hasket Street and left cases and boxes of letters to “helpers” to dispose of—foolish of us, as the letters would be both interesting and useful now. No one—not least of all the “helpers”—seems now to know how the masses of letters and telegrams were disposed of.

Clark makes far too much play with “exaggerations and overstatements”. They were exceedingly rare—if not wholly non-existent. Clark’s tendency to, himself, over-emphasize what is adverse to B. is particularly noticeable during his account of the last 20 or 25 years of B’s life. Touches his own prejudices.

B. made forcible criticisms in this vein to the Committee, but the Committee did not heed his warnings.

He did not mention the man’s name because he found “the man” not up to what he had at first thought. “The man” was Pat Pottle (1938–2000). Also, B. did not wish to expose him further and he had a strong suspicion that Pat Pottle would be in difficulty if his name continued to be associated with this incident.

After all, as Clark has told, B. had tried this with Lord Simon—all to no avail.

This remains true at the time of the publication of Clark’s book—Oct. 1975. But it is one of the things that Clark dubs “exaggeration”.

Clark might have noted that Russia felt much the same about U.S. bases in Turkey and near her Western borders.

No. The differences occur because the two cases are different: The U.S. had no right whatever to object to Russia having a base [which was further than Russia had gone] in Cuba if Cuba had invited Russia in; Russia had every right, if Cuba wished Russian help and even a Russian base in Cuba, to accept Cuba’s invitation. Again, Clark cannot get far enough away from these events to develop perspective and his own prejudices are too firm for him to judge impartially. [It would be interesting to know what his position is in regard to Russia’s and Cuba’s aid to the MPLA in Angola now—February 1976.]

Clark is right: they preferred to risk war and destruction. But, as Clark implies in discussing B’s refusal to Hailsham to speak in the House of Lords, everything that was likely to forward the campaign had to be tried. The

1 (Despite this, BRACERS shows hundreds of such letters on file in the Russell Archives.)
risk in this case was very great and very urgently immediate.

597/37 I see no evidence in what Clark quotes B. as writing that B. was surprised. He was not surprised. He wrote as he did to explain to the general public why what he was reported (during the Cuban Missile Crisis) as saying lacked the support that he had included and the press, “the media”, omitted.

598/38 But why should the penultimate paragraph be ignored? [Moreover—and what Clark does not say—was that the u.s. never put any limit to what it would risk. It would risk nuclear war. Clark should have noted this, but his own prejudices prevent.] He touches on this point in the next paragraph.

599/39 The incomparable folly of Kennedy’s telegram should be pointed out: however much the u.s. might dislike and be frightened by the proposed nearness of a Russian base to the u.s., both Cuba and Russia were quite within their rights in establishing it. The u.s. position was false.

599/40 The (Cuban Missile Crisis) cables were composed by B. I know. I listened to all the arguments and the discussion and the composing of the telegrams. The correspondence at that time was certainly not initiated and accomplished by R.S. R.S. took part in the discussion of it with B. and typed it and telephoned the telegrams.

600/41 Why does Clark make so much of R.S.? I suppose because Rupert has poured out his rage to him and Clark overestimates the soundness of Rupert’s judgment always. The scheme of the thank you party was initiated and organized not by R.S. but by others of B’s admirers—and many people “helped”. It was not organized by any of B’s old friends in North Wales or elsewhere.

600/42 A disgusting belittlement of what B. had done and was doing.

600/43 Unarmed Victory was not “tailored together by R. and his helpers”. It was written by BR. I was his only “helper” at the time. R.S. was away. When he returned from abroad to London he provided B. with two or three facts that B. had asked him for. B. tells the story in his autobiography, i.e. “Private Memorandum”, Clark, p. 644. [The story of the book that R.S. wrote in answer to B’s request for three or four facts.]

601/44 Only “damaging” in the eyes of those who differed in opinion from B. And this includes the “liberals” like Rupert and Clark.

601/45 This story is told entirely from Rupert, etc.’s, point of view and is far from accurate. There was no political question in this matter of the fund (the Bertrand Russell Peace Fund) whatever. The whole party was a surprise to B. He knew nothing of it till half hour before it happened. The difficulty came when Rupert, a good many days after the party, wrote that he had forgot to contribute to the fund and enclosed a half crown as his contribution. His letter was very grudging and abrupt. It said that he “supposed that he must contribute”. This made not only R.S. but the organizers of the party and fund furious and R.S. returned the 2/6 to Rupert saying as I remember it that there was no need for
him to contribute. Then the fat was in the fire. Rupert took his hurt feelings to Michael Williams and to Clough and they summoned R.S. and the chief organizer, Tom Kinsey, to a sort of Tribunal at the Crawshays—and R.S. behaved very ill, but he had some justification. B. knew nothing whatever about all this till he received an utterly nasty unwarranted and rude letter from Michael Williams complaining of R.S.

Rupert’s letter had been brusque and unpleasant. Michael Williams’s letter to B. was worse. The party, which had been a pleasant surprise to B. who knew nothing about its organization or its aftermath was ruined by Michael Williams’s letter. So much for friends and friendship.

I told Clark all about this affair but he accepts nothing that I say.

Moreover, the stress upon this party and the quarrel of B’s “friends” with R.S. is quite out of balance and much too long and detailed in comparison with the detail given about the Cuban affair itself and B’s part in it.

I think that this whole tempest in a teapot showed that R.S. said unforgivable things, but that Clough + Williams-Ellis showed considerably more worldly wisdom and understanding of young men and especially unlicked young men than did Michael Williams or Rupert or Clark.

601/45 It is a pity that Rupert and Michael Williams didn’t behave equally well. But all this sob stuff of Clark’s about Clough is quite unwarranted. It is just another stick to beat B. with because Clark does not approve of B’s position in the Cuban affair.

Chapter 23 “The Enigmatic Friendship”

There was nothing enigmatic about the relationship of B. and R.S. Moreover why is another whole chapter concerned, according to its title, with R.S.? Out of a life of 97 years, R.S. worked for and with B. for seven years. Yet out of a book of 24 Chapters and one Appendix R.S. gets two chapters and the Appendix. As Clark nowhere accounts for this imbalance it is to be supposed that he is concerned not with B’s life but with putting together enough “new” and “topical” (at the time of this publication) material to sell his book widely regardless of whether the material is of greater or less importance to B’s life than other possible material.

602/1 This second paragraph seems to me to be pretty much nonsense (that BR’s reputation was so high that he could afford to fail in his international interventions).

602/2 Clark should point out that the activities to which B. turned were those needed to combat events and attitudes that threatened the peace of the world. In order to avoid nuclear destruction not only must people understand the risk run in nuclear arming but peace must be established to prevent the risk being run. [Moreover, the chief urgency was owing not to B’s age but to the fact...
that he saw the impossibility of staving off nuclear destruction if it were not done within the next few years. And it looks now as if B. had been right. Certainly, as time passes, it becomes more and more difficult to accomplish.

603
I don’t think that he had many fears for Pugwash which was already showing the institutional signs of becoming “respectable” and losing its bite.

605
Why does Clark mention Vanessa Redgrave and not simply include her with “others equally on the side of the angels”? She is hardly a famous name in the sense that the other named individuals are. Is he, again, trying to belittle? Or is it his insularity to the fore? Or what?

605
This is an extremely important point and accounts entirely, as it was the entire reason, for the continued relationship of B. to R.S. B. not only “admitted” this point but he put it to the complainers and neither they nor anyone else could suggest anyone who could take R.S’s place. B. would have welcomed someone else.

606
What was this Israeli prize that R.S. accepted for B.? (The Jerusalem Prize, 1963.) But surely this episode of R.S. and Pat Pottle’s journey to the East happened before Pat Pottle et al. came to complain at Plas Pencyn of which Clark tells on the previous page. Clark’s dates are very muddling.

606
The various Heads of State themselves do not seem to have considered B’s activities as either presumptuous or ridiculous. If so, their letters and their talks with him in London were considerably more disingenuous than I think they were.

607
Clark’s own judgment that B. seems to have had some effect in settling the Sino-Indian dispute seems to negate this feather on stone business. But I suppose that to Clark—who is very insular—the Sino-Indian dispute doesn’t count for much.

607
This question (whether his opposition to communism was wavering) used to be put to B. with continued frequency from 1920’s on.

607
Clark overlooks the point that in 1954 u.s. nuclear armaments were far and away ahead of Russian nuclear armaments. I do not understand Clark’s difficulty here.

608
Who other than B. made any success at all—let alone successes. Also, if B. was so unimportant and ineffective why was there so much effort made to shut him up and, by u.s. and British establishments, to belittle him?

608
Is this true? I do not remember Shastri coming to Plas Pencyn. But I remember his visits to Hasker St. and also Indira Gandhi’s.

608
The British reaction is equally understandable. Britain was in the process of letting itself be gobbled up economically by the u.s. and (as is still pretty much the case) was well under the thumb of the u.s. It had to be—as it still does—careful not to offend the u.s., especially after the Suez lesson.

608
I do not think that Clark examines sufficiently B’s importance in
the various dissident movements in the U.S. and elsewhere, yet these were very important in the '60s.

609/15 I think that B. counted upon R.S.'s information much more than upon his judgment, though he tried to balance it with all the information that he could get elsewhere. He was quite aware of R.S.'s proclivities—unfortunately he could find no one else of R.S.'s stamina and activity and quick understanding and courage to help him.

609/16 Yet Clark cannot deny the accuracy of these charges concerning the Profumo affair. He can only gobble. His British sensibilities are offended—so were B's.

611/17 I cannot remember who these young men were, though it may well be that Wayland Young was one of them. I remember the latter's visits to Hasker St. and B's hope at first and then discouragement when after two or more discussions he found that W.Y. would be of no use to him.

612/18 "The Statement" was B's however "Un-Russellian" it may have sounded to some of those who "knew R. well". When R.S. returned to England, B. remonstrated with him strongly about his behaviour and his second speech, made on his own. R.S. pointed out that he had stated that this second speech was his and made on his own behalf since he had been invited to the Congress as an accredited delegate apart from as a delegate speaking for B. (which was true). He also pointed out that had he not behaved as he did the Chinese would have got no hearing since the Congress had been rigged to be pro-Russian (which was almost certainly true).

612/19 This criticism by the Economist [which at best was inimical to B. at this time] does not mention the true difficulty at this speech ("The Labour Party's Foreign Policy", Feb. 1965, Auto. 3: 205–15). The difficulty was that the TV lighting was trained upon the platform at just the height to catch B's eyes. He could not see anything—neither audience nor his own notes. No complaints had any effect, though it was admitted later that this lighting, so adjusted, was quite unnecessary. The result was, unhappily, fumbling and disjointedness. It was a sorry occasion, but the blame for it lay not upon B. or R.S. or upon B's speech, but upon the organizers of the occasion.

614/20 I believe that Chris. Farley went to Vietnam before R.S. did. Did he not? In any case he might more justly have been called R.S.'s colleague or R.S.'s colleague and one of his successors.

614–15/21 Recent Revelations made in the last few years about the war in Vietnam and the U.S. in Chile etc. and now the doings in Timor seem to bear out B's view of Vietnam and his recognition of certain revolutions being necessary and to be supported.

616/22 This story about B's treatment of Wilson is not accurate. What happened was that B. was waiting to begin his TV talks with Woodrow Wyatt. His mind was on them. Suddenly a little man appeared and said "good morning
Lord R. B. never even saw Wilson’s outstretched hand. He jumped, and said “good-morning”. I am afraid that R.S. embellished the story. He was delighted by it. But B. would never have been intentionally so rude to Wilson. He once brought himself to refuse to shake Canon Collins’ hand but that was after a personal disagreement and was a great effort.

Canon Collins was not on the platform when B. tore up his labour card. Peggy Duff and I were both on the platform and we each deny Canon C’s presence there. Of course the affair was “stage-managed”, but not by B. The organizers of the meeting knew of B’s intention to probably destroy his card from the beginning of their plans for the meeting.

The evidence vs. Sobell has been conceded “framed” and the Warren report is fairly generally suspect. In both cases B. has been proved—right, and, in the first case, certainly—right.

The suggestion here seems to be that B. decided to support Mark Lane before examining the evidence. This is untrue. Also, it is untrue that he pronounced upon the Warren report before examining it. He did not.

Clark does not mention the fact that upon the creation of the Who Killed Kennedy? Committee some of its members were warned by the u.s. Embassy to take no part in it and the woman—Caroline Benn (1926–2000)—who had accepted the Chairmanship resigned. With considerable evidence to support the view, it was believed that the u.s. Embassy had warned her that if she persisted in supporting the Committee, the u.s. Embassy would see to it that her husband’s career should be ruined. She was frightened.

Clark seems to have forgot that O. asked B. not to publish her letters to him. He made no attempt to do so. This should be noted. Also, there should be a mention of the embargo that he put upon O’s, Colette’s and his various families’ letters in order to protect these various individuals. There seems to be no mention anywhere in Clark’s book of these embargoes. [When he finds things omitted from the Autobiography the suggestion often is that B. omitted them to protect himself. This is quite untrue.]

The Autobiography (already extant up to an earlier date—1950) was worked on during the mid 50’s—some additions made and some passages (especially letters) omitted. It was also again worked on immediately before its publication—especially the years 1944 to 1944 and the ten years following 1944. And most of the final volume, 1944–1967 was written then. Clark mistakes this.

Stanley Unwin often came to see B.—almost every time we were in London—and B. often went to Museum St. to see him. Often I went with B. And I was always there when Unwin came to see us. We were both fond of him and respected him and liked to see him.

Somewhere in this paragraph it should be noted that much correspondence was kept—but very much was not.

R.S. would have done better, and been more accurate, to say that
“we discussed the possibility of selling B’s papers in order to get the money needed for pursuing B’s work.” And “Russell decided to do so.”

Clark says that B. wrote to Adrian, à propos of his papers, that “he should be proud to be in the neighbourhood of Lycidas”. But, Clark says, “this was denied him.” This gives the wrong impression. The papers were offered to Trinity but Trinity could not afford to pay for them and B. had to have the money in order to carry out his work. [I think that Clark has muddled this story with the story of the ms of “Man’s Peril” being given to the Trinity Library.]

623/31 “ill-fated War Crimes Tribunal”. Clark does not tell the full story of the w.c. Tribunal and what he does tell he “slants” against it. This is his prejudice interfering. He does not, and I think cannot, give evidence for his condemnation. [He nowhere mentions Isaac Deutscher for whose judgment B. had a high regard and upon whose “common sense” he depended much. I. Deutscher’s death soon after the founding of the Tribunal was a blow—and a disaster to the Tribunal.]

623/32 It would be interesting to know what these not proven individual allegations were and upon what they were based.

624/33 This and the following few paragraphs are interesting as showing B’s insistence upon the Tribunal not being there to judge only one side. In this he largely failed—but through no fault of his own. Moreover the leaders of both sides in the Vietnam war were invited to attend and give their own point of view and evidence. Again, that the u.s. establishment refused to do so was hardly B’s fault. But the evidence given to the Tribunal seems to have been very thoroughly tested. Moreover, it is now admitted in the u.s. (since the Mai Lai disclosures, etc.) that the Tribunal was right in its judgment. Cf. the N.Y. Book Review.

624/33 It was the evidence not R.S. who changed B’s mind.

Clark should mention the volume Prevent the Crime of Silence. I suppose that he was afraid to touch the difficulties of financing.

625/34 How can Clark be so smugly pompous!

625/35 This can be answered and the answer is not so obvious as Clark appears to think. The answer is based upon the difference between napalm as a means of destruction and ordinary means.

626/36 Clark should be ashamed of this.

626/37 There had been a meeting in the morning at which the Tribunal had been set up. R.S. had been (before the afternoon) appointed Secretary General. All that B. was asked to do at the Press Conference was to announce publicly the establishment of the Tribunal. The details of organization and action were, by the afternoon, out of his hands. This was, I believe, made clear—but Clark chooses to ignore it. This whole tale as told by Clark is a sad witness to the difficulty of “objectivity” upon which he prides himself.

626/38 Neither Horowitz knew nor Clark knows of B’s fall.

626/39 “To carry on work” would be more accurate, in view of the French
financial defection, than “to start work”.

627/40 Until the last minute de Gaulle had been unexpectedly welcoming to having it held in Paris.

627/41 And this suspicion and doubt sprang in considerable measure from B’s pronouncements, the Tribunal’s findings.

627/42 This confusion (over releasing the Tribunal’s verdict) was by no means entirely the fault of R.S. and certainly was not the fault of B.

Chapter 24 “Once More His Own Man”

629/1 These descriptions are pretty well fictitious. “The Observer series” [Clark might better have included Swift’s letters and Tristram Shandy and Chekov’s stories which were B’s and were there because he liked to read them.] was mine, not B’s; Leibniz and Frege never hung in our bedroom. B. never carried a stick during these years and he did not use a wheel chair till much later [off and on for about one and a half years before his death] than the time of which Clark is apparently writing. I never tried to persuade him that he was “taking a holiday”. B’s statement that he “had little experience of illness” is a flourish and not strictly true. Actually he had a good deal of experience of illness but he made little of it. His up-bringing and his feeling that his illnesses were to be dismissed without fuss or notice if possible as uninteresting, to him, and irrelevant made him ignore as far as possible his own bodily ills—unless, like the China one, they made a good story.

630/2 This all reads like fiction to me. “Cosy family parties”! Ugh!

630/3 He toyed with this (a joke-book about the Bible) long before he was 90 as well.

630–1/4 Clark’s summing up in these two pages may be fair but it does not, to me, recall B’s position. Einstein and Wittgenstein seem dragged in quite unnecessarily.

631/5 O. and Colette—the two women for whom B. had 1) the greatest love for 2) the greatest time. The latter must be granted, but I question the first.

631/6 The admirer who sent him the red rose was Chang Hsin-hai, the Chinese novelist.

631/7 There were a good many years when no red roses arrived.

631/8 The birthday parties seem to be mixed up.

631/9 Does Clark anywhere note B’s support for the Institute of Workers’ Control? He should—and he should, also, mention K. Coates in the years following 1963. And I don’t remember Clark’s noting B’s important work for var-
ious political prisoners.

632/10  It was Rupert, not B., who delighted in this story of Zena Dare and himself.

632/11  The 97th birthday was in 1969 and there were not two parties. The only times that there were two parties were on his 90th birthday and on his 95th birthday. This is all muddled.

633/12  Why “curiously elegant”? And all this without mentioning the letter and its writer John Stuart Mill! I added more than the Queen of Sheba.

633/13  B. was not “driven” to breaking with R.S. in his 98th year. He had wished for a number of years to break from him but had been deterred by the pleas of C. Farley and K. Coates not to do so. They feared on B’s behalf (and I suspect on their own) the fearful and unscrupulous fuss and retaliation that would be made by R.S. I thought then—and still think—that B. would have weathered R.S’s attack (both public and private) and could have rebutted it as no one else could. B. had weathered many storms and knew how to ride them.

634/14  There was no “incapacity” on B’s part. There was little money left when R.S. finished. The foundation by no means concentrated upon British Questions. Nor did I think that they should. But I did think, and had thought for some time (as B. had) that B. should break with R.S. and sack him.

634/15  I have no Quaker background and Clark is wrong in believing that I upheld R.S. and gave him the bene

636/17  No. B. never sent the memorandum to Michael Scott. Christopher Farley sent it to Michael after B’s death and after discussion with me. I knew that B. did not trust Scott’s judgment or cool sense but I agreed with Chris that if it were sent with a note saying that it was strictly con


As to how much that was issued under B’s name was written by B.: I think
that almost all perhaps quite all was either written or dictated by B. or—as with
the R.S. Memorandum—the requisites were set by B. and the result was read by
B. and passed by B.—as B. himself says.

637/19 This well might be. But the letter, when written, was what B.
wished to have said and agreed to.
637/20 This description of the memo *is* a tribute!
637/21 No. He said “It is hard to leave this beautiful world”.
637/22 Was B’s message to the Cairo conference “unexpected”? Or was the
message? The message took pains to lambast both Israelis and Arabs and to urge
peaceful negotiation and common sense.
638/23 No. While we were having tea together at 4.30.

There is far too much about R.S. in this and the preceding chapters and the
Appendix. To B. he counted for comparatively little in the context of 97 years.
But the squabbles and scandals about R.S. are alive to Clark and he has not yet
gained perspective on them. And, since they are still live issues (they) may help
to sell his book.