

RUSSELL'S NOTES FOR "MEINONG'S THEORY OF COMPLEXES AND ASSUMPTIONS"

BERNARD LINSKY
Philosophy / U. of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2E5
BERNARD.LINSKY@UALBERTA.CA

This paper presents fifteen pages of notes and marginal comments from Russell's study of Meinong's *Ueber Annahmen* and two other works in preparation for his 1904 article "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions". The notes include an early appearance of the argument for the existence of universals that Russell later used in Chapter 9 of *The Problems of Philosophy*. The main focus of the notes is on Meinong's notion of "objective" and the contrast with Russell's notion of proposition, with non-existents such as "the round square" barely mentioned.

Bertrand Russell published a long review article, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", in *Mind* in three parts in 1904.¹ To prepare for writing the article Russell made notes on several of Alexius Meinong's works, the articles "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung" [On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relation to Inner Perception], published in 1889, and "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen" [Abstracting and Comparing] from 1900, and the monograph *Ueber Annahmen* [On Assumptions] in 1902.² To prepare for his review in

¹ RUSSELL, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions"; Paper 17 in *Papers* 4: 431–74. Page references are to this edition. See also the annotations at 4: 651–2.

² MEINONG, "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung" (1889); "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen" (1900); *Ueber Annahmen* (1902; 2nd edn., 1910). The second edition of *Ueber Annahmen* was translated by James Heanue as *On Assumptions* (1983). All of Russell's notes on Meinong that survive are in file 230.030450 of the Bertrand Russell Archives. Russell also commented in the margins of his copy of MEINONG'S "Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes" for his 1899 review. His copy is bound with other pamphlets

Mind 1905 of the collection *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* [Investigations in the Theory of Objects and Psychology], Russell also made notes on that book. The notes for both writings by Russell are together in one file in the Bertrand Russell Archives. The notes on Meinong are identified and described in the headnotes to both papers in *Collected Papers* 4, but have not previously been published. This article presents the notes for “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”.

Russell describes writing “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” in the 8 April 1903 entry in his “Journal”:

The power of writing has for the present deserted me completely; I began on *Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. II, but made no progress; then an imperative need of achievement possessed me, so I am writing an article on Meinong. Some few shreds of self-respect come to me this way.

(*Papers* 12: 22)

The notes help us to see how writing the article restored some of Russell’s “self-respect”. In May of 1902 Russell had completed *The Principles of Mathematics* and then made a study of the works by Frege and others including Meinong in order to add notes and the Appendices to the *Principles* before it was published in 1903. Beginning in June of 1902 Russell conducted a correspondence with Frege while struggling with the paradoxes. “Meinong’s Theory” was written in April of 1903, and thus well before “On Denoting” which Russell considered to be a step toward the ultimate resolution of the paradoxes. The focus of the article is on Meinong’s theory of *assumptions*, which are his version of the theory of propositions that Russell and Moore had proposed. The main theses of “Meinong’s Theory” are drawn to our attention by observing the distribution and topics of the notes.³

The sheer bulk of the notes for “Meinong’s Theory”, and the fact that it does not contain much of the famous objections to “Meinongian objects”, shows that Russell’s interest in Meinong was not destroyed by his discovery of those objections, nor does it seem that his primary goal in studying Meinong was to refute his general approach

in volume no. 70 in Russell’s library.

³ See DOUGLAS LACKEY’s introduction to “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” in *EA*. The editor’s introduction is on pp. 17–20, and the article pp. 20–76.

of using "objects" to account for logical phenomena. This only seems to have emerged out of Russell's disagreement with Meinong about propositions. Meinong held that in presentations such as those of perception, the object presented does exist, but for an illusion or impossible object such as the round square, the object is only immanent. Russell, following Moore and Frege, held that a proposition is always a "transcendent" object to which we are related in thought:

Meinong holds—so it would seem—that the object of a presentation is sometimes immanent, but at other times not so; while the object of a judgment—which he calls an Objective, and I call a proposition—is always purely immanent (p. 257). Now for my part I do not see how an immanent object differs from no object at all. The immanent object does not exist, according to Meinong, and is therefore no part of the mental state whose object it is; for this mental state exists. Yet, although not part of any mental state, it is supposed to be in some sense psychical. But it cannot be in any way bound up with any particular mental state of which it is the object; for other states, at other times and in other people, may have precisely the same object, since an object or a proposition can be presented or believed more than once. I confess these facts seem to me to show, without more ado, that objects and propositions must always have being, and cannot be merely imaginary *relata* for what appears as a relation of presentation or judgment. (Papers 4: 461)

Russell's objection to Meinong's account of propositions as non-existent were coeval with his worries about non-existent objects such as the round square.

Russell had an attitude towards Meinong that resembles his assessment of Frege. Russell had much in common with both thinkers; however, he is most famous for producing devastating logical objections to their views. For Frege it was "Russell's Paradox" of the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves, and for Meinong it was objections to non-existent objects such as "the round square".

In a letter to Meinong dated 15 December 1904, Russell summarizes his attitude towards *Ueber Annahmen*:

I find myself in almost complete agreement with the general viewpoint and the problems dealt with seem to be very important. I myself have been accustomed to use the name "Logic" for that which you call "Theory of Objects", and the reasons you cite against this use on p. 20ff

appear to me to be hardly decisive....

I have always believed until now that every object must be in some sense, and I find it difficult to recognize nonexistent objects. In a case such as the golden mountain or the round square one must distinguish between sense and reference (in accordance with Frege's distinction).⁴

In the article Russell opposes Meinong's doctrine that distinguishes *assumption* as the relation to an "objective" (*Objectiv*), or proposition, from the relation of presentation of objects (*Vorstellung*) in perception or illusion. Russell counters that assumption is simply the presentation of a proposition. Understanding this helps to properly explain the assertion now known as "Russell's Principle" from "On Denoting":

Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (*i.e.* not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. (OD, *Papers* 4: 427)

Russell's Principle in fact asserts that the relation of *apprehending* or being able to *think about* a proposition, as in an *assumption*, is the very same relation of *acquaintance* or *presentation* which relates us to the objects which are constituents of that proposition. The expression "Russell's Principle" was coined in 1982 by Gareth Evans in *The Varieties of Reference*.⁵ Although Evans cites *The Problems of Philosophy* as the source for the principle, he states it without mentioning *acquaintance*, but instead in terms of "knowing which" thing one is talking about.⁶

Russell held the view that in order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgment about an object, one must *know which* object is in question—one must *know which* object it is that one is thinking about.

We learn from these notes for "Meinong's Theory" that for Russell acquaintance was an intentional relation to a "transcendent" object,

⁴ Translated in an appendix (pp. 347–8) to JANET FARRELL SMITH, "The Russell–Meinong Debate". See also *Papers* 4.

⁵ EVANS, *The Varieties of Reference*, p. 65.

⁶ Russell states the principle as: "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted", *PP*₂ (New York OUP edn.), p. 58.

rather than a relation to direct objects of experience as in the empiricist tradition. There is no intimate connection between acquaintance with an object and being able to "identify" or to "know which" thing it is to any extent, nor is "apprehending" a judgment more than the non-linguistic relation of "assumption", and so not "understanding" in the sense of some sort of knowledge.

In addition to this important lesson from studying Russell's notes we also find the first occurrence of Russell's famous "infinite regress argument" for the existence of universals. In the notes on "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen" we find:

- p. 67 Comparison-theory supposes similarity of a and b discovered by that of (a, b) and (c, d) . Hence endless regress.
- p. 68 This regress, unlike many, is objectionable, since its beginning, not its end, goes to infinity.

This is clearly an anticipation of the argument for universals that Russell later used in Chapter IX of *The Problems of Philosophy*.⁷ While Russell had an enduring interest in regress arguments, beginning with the problem of "the unity of the proposition" in *Principles of Mathematics* §54, this appears to be the first appearance of a regress argument related to the similarity of objects and their sharing of properties.

ABOUT THE NOTES

The 29 sheets of notes for Russell's article and review are combined in one file: RA 230.030450. The fifteen sheets of notes for the first, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", cover the two works that are discussed in the article, "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung" and *Ueber Annahmen*, as well as Russell's notes on "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen", which is merely mentioned in the article. The notes have been numbered here as (i) through (xv) as they appear in the Archives file. Explaining Russell's own numbering (or "foliation") and the

⁷ *PP*₂ (New York OUP edn.), p. 96. I am grateful to Katerina Perovic of the University of Iowa for pointing out the history of Russell's "regress argument" and its occurrence in "Meinong's Theory" at p. 437, where it is a regress for the relation relating a relation R to the objects a and b it relates when aRb . This is the regress familiar from the "problem of the unity of the proposition" from *PoM*, §54.

order in which the notes were taken is complicated. Leaf (*i*) is on the left-hand side of a folded sheet and contains notes on *Ueber Annahmen* from pages 257–79.⁸ It matches leaf (*xiv verso*), which is on the left- and right-hand side of the sheet and covers *Ueber Annahmen*, pages 178–208. It appears that these three half-sheets of notes were written at a different time from others, as they are written in pencil, as opposed to the ink of all the other notes, and they duplicate material in the foliated series (*xiv recto* covers pages 150–75 of *Ueber Annahmen*, and *xv* covers 150–83). That leaf (*i*) and page (*xiv verso lhs*) are both foliated “1” further complicates the issue.

The hypothesis which is proposed here is that Russell wrote the notes in four different groups. The four leaves of notes on “Ueber Gegenstände”—(*ii*) to (*v*), which are foliated by Russell as 1 to 4—may have been made much earlier, as this work was published in 1899. The two leaves of notes on “Abstrahieren und Vergleichen”—(*vi*) and (*vii*), foliated 1 and 2—may also have been earlier, at some time after the article’s publication in 1900. Russell started the notes on *Ueber Annahmen* with the seven leaves (*viii*) to (*xiii*) and (*xv*), and numbered them 1–7. What remains to be explained are sheets (*i*), numbered 1, and in pencil on the left-hand side of a sheet with 2 on the blank right side; (*xiv recto*), in ink and unnumbered; and (*xiv verso*), in pencil, on left- and right-hand sides, numbered 2 and 1 respectively.

There is some duplication of material in the notes on *Ueber Annahmen*, as both leaves (*xiv recto* and *verso*) and (*xv*) contain notes from the start of Chapter 7, with notes on each of pages 150, 151–2, 153, 154, 156, 159, 163, 166, 174, 175, 179, 182 and 183. One explanation of this series of notes is that Russell returned to his notes on *Ueber Annahmen*, perhaps when composing part III of “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”, which deals primarily with Chapter 7, “The Objective”, and later. He may have started at his desk, with ink, taking notes on leaf (*xiv recto*), which is not numbered, taking notes on the same pages as he did on (*xv*), and adding notes on pages 155, 157, 164, 168 and 169; so, five more notes. Then, moving to a different place, away from ink, but with a pencil, he turned (*xiv*) over and folded it in half, numbering the right-hand side 1 and the left-

⁸ A note by then Assistant Russell Archivist Carl Spadoni identifies the sheet as “BR’s notes of Meinong’s *Ueber Annahmen* found in his copy of the book in his library”. Russell dated the copy June 1902.

hand side 2, and filled it with notes on pages 178–208 of *Ueber Annahmen*. Finally, he took a second sheet of blank paper (*i*), folded it and numbered the left-hand side 1 and the right-hand side 2, and finished his notes on *Ueber Annahmen* on the left-hand side with notes on pages 257–79 (skipping Chapter 8 “On the Psychology of Desire and Value” on pages 212–54). The book ends eight pages later on 287 with general remarks. The occasional passages in pencil on (*viii*) to (*xiii*) and (*xv*) were clearly added after the originals in ink.

When in the original a passage continues from one page to the next, Russell indicated it in the notes by including the new page number where this occurs, sometimes in the middle of a sentence. For example on (*ii*) a note on page 185 continues mid-sentence to page 186. Russell began most notes on a new line with a page number on the left. In the following transcription, for ease of reference, the sentence is continued on a new line with the new page reference. Notes that are used in the published paper are indicated with a bold reference to the page on which the citation occurs. They are listed by the part of “Meinong’s Theory” in which they occur, i.e. I, II or III, followed by the page in the *Collected Papers* edition on which each occurs. Thus the first note, on leaf (*i*), which cites page 257 of *Ueber Annahmen*, is used in part II of “Meinong’s Theory” on page 461 in *Papers* 4. The annotation of that note is thus **II, 461**.

There are a handful of page references in the published papers that do not appear in the notes. These include a reference to “Ueber Gegenstände” at *Papers* 4: 441: “Indeed, as Meinong himself says (p. 210), materialism is the natural view of the plain man.” Second, at *Papers* 4: 449 there is a reference to page 50 of *Ueber Annahmen* after: “And this is why liars tend to believe their own lies—a mere presentation would not be so liable to turn into a judgment.” There are more such references to *Ueber Annahmen* in “Meinong’s Theory” which do not appear in the notes, viz. at pages 55, 61, 121, 134 and 261–5 (a whole passage for which there are no notes but several marginal comments in Russell’s copy of *Ueber Annahmen*). This all indicates that Russell worked mostly from his notes, but that he also looked through the texts again when composing the papers and did not rely solely on his notes. The text is marked, profusely in this case, with vertical lines in pencil down the margins, as Russell often did. Every note reports on a passage with this marginal lining. It appears that Russell first read through the text, marking likely passages with a pencil for a later

notetaking with ink.

In addition to the lines by passages in the text, there are several marginal comments by Russell. Most are connected with notes on particular passages, and are mentioned below in footnotes to those passages. The marginal comments that are not included in the notes are passages where Russell either changed his mind and agreed with Meinong, or gave an example to further Meinong's point. A list of these completes the marginalia in Russell's copy of *Ueber Annahmen*.⁹

Russell sometimes underlined German words in his notetaking. They are consistently italicized here, as are publication titles, other underlined words, and variables. His many abbreviations are spelled out. Remarks in square brackets are Russell's. Angle brackets indicate editorial insertions.

TEXT OF RUSSELL'S NOTES

(ii)

I

Meinong, *Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung u. deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung. Z.s. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. S-organe*, XXI, 1899.

p. 184 Geg. h. O. embrace relations and what I call *complexions*. **I, 435**¹⁰

p. 185 That everything psychological must have an object will be admitted at least for presentations and judgments. But many think object much the same as content. But object may not exist: may be

p. 186 self-contradictory, not a fact, a relation such as equality, or something which did or will exist. But *content* of presentation exists when presentation exists. Existence of an object in presentation is no existence: might be called pseudo-existence. **I, 435**

p. 187 Also physical as well as psychological can be presented: but content always psychological. **I, 435**

p. 188 What all presentations have in common is the act of presentation itself.—Presentations of different objects differ, and differ in respect of content. Content tends to be ignored in favour of object. **I, 435**

p. 189 There are no natural designations for contents: they must be named by objects.—Some objects have an intrinsic lack of independence: e.g. diversity. Can't think

⁹ In addition Russell marked two typographical errors: at p. 88 n.1 he corrected "implicirte"; and on p. 280, 8 lines up, he deleted "zu". He also wrote query marks "?" in the margins of pp. 88, 101, 154, 170 and 238.

¹⁰ Russell cites the range of pp. 184–92 in one reference.

- p. 190 of such an object except in relation to differing objects. Such objects are based on others as indispensable presuppositions: call them G.h.O. Call the presupposed objects *inferiors*. An object which *can* have an inferior *must* have one: not vice versa. **I, 435**
- p. 191 Not all G.h.O. are relations: e.g. 4 nuts. **I, 435**
- p. 192 Similarly melody or red square; in short, *complexions* generally. **I, 435**
- p. 193 A complexion is more than the collection of its constituents: there must be a combining relation. But the complexion is not composed of terms and relation. A complexion implies a relation and vice versa.—The relation is part of the complexion. **I, 437¹¹**
- p. 194 The complexion is thus relation together with its terms, but not R *and* its terms. The terms are related to R, whence an endless regress, but one that does not matter. The other relations besides R are unimportant. **I, 437**
- p. 196 A complexion may have more than two terms: e.g. 6 objects. R may have more than 2 terms. **I, 437**
- p. 197 Opposition of ideal and real (i.e. of what can't and what can exist) (in pencil above deleted "corresponding to":) is connected with mine: ideal objects are G.h.O. Similarity e.g. does not exist, but subsists (*besteht*). **I, 438**
- p. 199 So when there are 4 nuts, 4-ness does not exist in them. But there are also real complexions and therefore real R's: e.g. occupation of a time-place, and relations of desire, and relations of parts in the unity of consciousness. **I, 438**

(iii)

2¹²

Meinong, G.h.O.

- p. 200 I shall use *Verhältniss* for real R's, *Beziehung* for ideal.—Ideal objects are not perceptible. **I, 438**
- p. 202 Real R's are not necessary: ideal R's are. I call them *fundirt*, and the objects of this kind *fundirte Gegenstände*. [Don't admit the distinction.] **I, 438**
- p. 205 Schumann objects that the internal perception reveals no G.h.O.
- p. 206 Common-sense is inclined to agree: when we see red and blue, do we see difference too?
- p. 207 Consider presentation e.g. of a steeple. Internal perception only assures us of the "presented steeple", not the real one. But this has only pseudo-existence. Not true that internal perception gives only the

¹¹ In pencil in margin: "(cf. p. 236)".

¹² In margin, at an angle: "Mem".

- content: it gives also the (immanent) object. This involves a fundamental problem in theory of knowledge. **I, 438; III, 465**
- p. 208 Seeing is less perceptible to internal perception than what is seen. **I, 438**
- p. 209 Internal perception reveals feelings as well as objects: but seems to reveal nothing else. The objection comes to this: that internal perception reveals only physical objects and feelings; or, since latter easily confused with sensations, perhaps only physical objects. **I, 438**
- p. 211 But we must be more careful in questioning empirically.
- p. 212 A thing is only perceived when its existence is immediately known (i.e. without other premisses), and exists at (at least practically) the same time as the knowledge. This is not quite exact: e.g. fixed stars: but the inexactnesses apply specially to *external* perception. A perception is characterized as internal (1) by its object being psychical (2) by its preeminent certainty and evidence (?). That there is such knowledge, internal perception itself can alone show; one of its peculiarities is that perception can be perceived. **I, 439**¹³
- p. 214 It is as a rule not by inference that I discover that so-and-so is my opinion; therefore it is by perception.
- p. 215 Perception of judgment is internal perception.
- p. 216 All perception, including internal perception, is not only presentation, but judgment, i.e. of existence; therefore to perceive perception is to perceive judgment.—Object of judgment also perceived, [and this is a G.h.O.] **I, 442**
- p. 217 Hume has proved definitely that causation can't be perceived.—We know by perception that we desire and what we desire and the relation of desire to its object.
- p. 218 Ditto of feelings.
- p. 218 Presentations can be perceived: for we know of such as have non-existent objects, and only what exists can be perceived. [There is a fallacy here: we have perception of Being.] **I, 439; I, 442**
- p. 226 To be a unity is a property of pluralities: a unity is nothing but a whole or complexion. In fact a plurality as such must be a unity. And so 2 enumerations may give different results.

(iv)

3

Meinong, G.h.O.

- p. 226 Schumann contends against me that continuum is a unity: this is only relevant if he means it is simple.
- p. 229 Continua have by nature only indeterminate parts: the definite parts

¹³ Russell cites pp. 212–18 in one reference.

- are therefore fictions. But the inferiora of a *fundirter Gegenstand* may be indeterminate parts.
- p. 230 Time and space distinguished by fact that point only limit, which not obviously so for colours and tones.
- p. 235 If I have no presentation of relations and complexions, how can I know or even suppose that collectively apprehended objects are grasped according to *their* similarity?
- p. 236 It is true that a melody of 4 notes is not a fifth note, and that generally a complexion is not formed by adding an object to the constituents; nevertheless, in turning a collection into a complexion, *something* is added. What is added is the R, rightly related to the constituents: red, green, and difference together don't make "red differs from green".
I, 437
- p. 238 Why do G.h.O. seem not perceivable?
- p. 239 When we will, there is difficulty in keeping *act* of will before the
- p. 240 Mind: so when we compare or abstract, etc. Generally, psychical acts have what I call *Wahrnehmungsfüchtigkeit*.
- p. 241 This property belongs also to objects sometimes, e.g. when imagined.
- p. 241 People who can imagine a colour often can't do so long.
- p. 242 G.h.O. often have this property, [But I is harder than I thing] especially when analyzed.
- p. 243 There are cases where the superius is centre of attention, and inferiora are substrata.
- p. 244 E.g. a melody is composed of notes, but can't be perceived till all the notes have been played: hence all must be present in final perception of melody; but very hard to find them there. **I, 439**¹⁴
- p. 246 Distinguish in a presentation: (1) Act-time; (2) Content-time, same as (1); (3) Object-time; (4), in rare cases, pseudo-object-time, i.e. time in which object of presentation pseudo-exists. (1) and (2) together, *if* identical, may be called presentation-time. (4) is same as (1) and (2). Are there limits to differences of (2) and (3)? **I, 439**
- p. 248 Call *distributed* object one requiring time, like a melody; *undistributed*, one possible in a moment. Question is: Can or must presentation of a distributed object be a distributed fact? Or, more precisely, in presenting a distributed object, must a sequence in the object have a corresponding sequence in the content? Or, inexactly, does it take time to think of the temporally extended? **I, 439**

¹⁴ Russell cites the page range 244–55.

Meinong, G.h.O.

- p. 249 Direct observation seems to say yes; à priori considerations prove no, provided
- p. 251 we are dealing, not with a mere collection, but with a simple object with successive parts: for their successive presentation only gives parts, not the whole. Hence distributed G.h.O. can only be presented by undistributed contents: the temporally
- p. 252 distinct inferiora must be given to presentation simultaneously, though not as simultaneous. **I, 439**
- p. 253 Impossible the Superius alone should come at the end; for a G.h.O. cannot be presented unless its inferiora, or some of them, are also presented.—Quite absurd to distinguish act-time from content-time as a way out. **I, 439**
- p. 254 Hence sequence in object needn't have corresponding sequence in content. **I, 439**
- p. 255 But when, after hearing the notes of a melody, I perceive the melody, the notes are not presented as still existing: their mutual time-relations and their relations to the moment of presentation are somehow involved, and the melody seems more or less past. **I, 439**
- p. 259 If we can only perceive what is, not what was or will be, it seems we cannot perceive anything extended in time. But only what is real can be perceived, and a time-point is not real, but only a limit. It would follow therefore that there is no perception. **I, 440**
- p. 260 I don't deny the existence of the point absolutely, but only of the point in isolation, without a stretch. The point does not exist, but subsist; but where the point is, something may exist, only not confined to the point.—Must admit reality of past and future: opposite is unduly subjective, for determination as past or future merely expresses a relation between judgment-time and object-time, which is as irrelevant to the real as whether and when someone knows it. **I, 440**¹⁵
- p. 261 Is there any reason to limit perception to the present? Memory also is immediate, and more and more certain as we approach the present. Might call it perception when time very short. **I, 440**
- p. 263 Either there is no perception, or it need not be simultaneous with its object. Common sense supposes simultaneity, because it supposes a causal or conditional connexion. But if causal, simultaneity impossible; if conditional, unnecessary. **I, 440**

¹⁵ Russell cites pp. 260–6.

- p. 264 We can perceive what is past, though not without limit: the perceptible part we call "psychic present". Thus we can perceive change and motion. **I, 440**
- p. 265 Distinction of perception and memory loses its sharpness by above theory.
- p. 266 Only past is perceptible. **I, 440**
- p. 269 The main error is to regard as imperceptible what is only *wahrnehmungsflüchtig*.

(vi)

I

- Meinong, Abstrahiren u. Vergleichen, *Z. f. Ps. u. Ph. d. S.-o*, Vol. 24. 1900.
- p. 37 There is a region of facts to be accounted for either by abstraction or by comparison.
- p. 38 Immediate inspection shows that in many, indeed most cases of abstracting we do not compare.
- p. 39 All cases of predication at first sight prove comparison-theory: but not on further reflection.
- p. 40 Thus empirical instances do not prove comparison-theory. But new experiences, e.g.
- p. 41 melodies or shapes, can be abstractly conceived: and this goes against comparison-theory. Empirical refutation seems alone sufficient: but there are others too.
- p. 43 If A is similar to M and N, how distinguish similarity in different respects from ditto in same respect? For different respects, require M and N not similar.
- p. 44 Difficulty for comparison-theory in notion of two objects similar in one respect, not in another. Require two further mutually totally dissimilar objects to compare them with.
- p. 45 This is sometimes impossible: 2 artists are alike artists and men, but we can't find any artists who are not human.—Similarities themselves may differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively.
- p. 46 Necessary to assume that different respects in which similarity is possible not due to comparison with different objects, but to different kinds of similarity.
- p. 47 Similarities are certainly different in degree, but are they in kind? The maximum equality [*Gleichheit*], is only of one kind. [? Is this maximum of similarity?]
- p. 48 To consider difference of e.g. pitch and loudness of notes, not in a particular note, but in general, necessary to abstract from similar objects, and consequently to contrast a similarity with the similar.
- p. 49 Comparison-view can't explain different similarities of simple things. Let *a*, *b*, *c* be simple, and *a* and *b* be similar in a different respect from
-
-

- a* and *c*. Consider extreme case of *Gleichheit*. Then
- p. 50 $a = b$, $a = c$, but not $b = c$. This is intolerable. Also *a* and *b* may be alike in one respect, dissimilar in another. But simples cannot be at once equal and unequal. [Invalid?]
- p. 52 Simples may form parts of a whole, and then have similarity in being parts of said whole; the whole maybe itself defined by their similarity in some other respect.
- p. 53 Can't substitute series of similars for abstraction, since they require abstraction in their formation.—Power of analysis has its limits: sometimes we can see that there is complexity, without being able to analyze.

(vii)

2

Meinong, A u V.

- p. 55 Indeterminateness may be objective: e.g. colour between green and yellow.
- p. 57 A thing would be objectively absolutely indeterminate if even infinite power of knowledge couldn't know it.
- p. 58 But only limitation in power of knowledge can prevent a thing(?)s being knowable: hence no thing objectively indeterminate.
- p. 60 But there is a relative indeterminateness: e.g. the nature of the triangle does not determine whether it is acute-angled, nor does the nature of 2 determine anything about the octave.
- p. 63 An object denoted by the indefinite article, as "a horse", is relatively indeterminate. But here what is really indeterminate is what object is meant. [No! "a horse" conveys a meaning which is definite, though in an objective sense ambiguous.] But in such cases, it seems an object is meant, but an indeterminate one: here we seem to have something absolutely indeterminate. But this object does not exist, it only pseudo-exists; all that exists is the presentation, which
- p. 64 has a fully determinate content.
- p. 65 Comparison-theory thinks that the indeterminate becomes determinate in the act of knowing it: yet if indeterminate, knowledge is impossible. Thus their supposition, that marks are given to an indeterminate by comparison, is impossible.
- p. 66 At bottom my objection is that similarity and difference relatively to the compared are always G.h.O., and well-founded ones. This requires that the compared should be determinate and not determined by comparison.
- p. 67 Comparison-theory supposes similarity of *a* and *b* discovered by that
-

- of (a, b) and (c, d) . Hence endless regress.¹⁶
- p. 68 This regress, unlike many, is objectionable, since its beginning, not its end, goes to infinity.
- p. 70, 71 (Summary of objections to comparison-theory.)
- p. 72 Is abstraction possible with what is simple? Abstracting from shades to get *blue* seems to imply yes.
- p. 73 Failure to analyze doesn't prove simplicity: yet colours may be taken as simple. Thus simples can be collected under a general presentation just as concretes under an abstract. Similarity theory here plausible, but won't do.
- p. 75 The extension of a *Vorstellung* is a peculiar kind of complex of objects held together by the content to which they are all related. These objects may be similar, and need not be exactly alike.
- p. 76 And different contents (though with differing exactness) can apply to same object.
- p. 77 There are *Umfangs* collective of similars as well of exactly likes. So we speak of "the horse", having in mind some particular horse and what-ever resembles him sufficiently.
- p. 78 The *Umfangs* collective of the similar present generalities in which abstraction has no part, at least immediately.
- p. 81 But there are processes which may be described as "abstraction in simples". In such cases,
- p. 82 generality is not got by extracting a constituent, but by intentionally inexact presentation of what, exactly taken, is a special *typical* case: where abstraction proper does not apply, type replaces it.

(viii)

I

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen. [Leipzig 1902]

Chapter I. Erste Aufstellungen.

- p. 2 Two things distinguish judgment from presentation: (1) conviction (2) affirmation or negation. (2) is separable from (1). **II, 445**
- p. 3 Chief purpose of this book to prove $\exists(2) - (1)$.¹⁷ This occurs in hypotheses and assumptions. **II, 445**
- p. 5 A hypothesis [*Annahme*] is not a mere presentation, though it might seem to be.
- p. 6 This is *proved* by the fact that negative assumptions are possible, and negative never presentation. But how about not-red, etc.? **II, 445**

¹⁶ This will remind the reader of the argument for the existence of universals in Chapter 9 of *The Problems of Philosophy*.

¹⁷ Russell used his logical notation " $\exists(2) - (1)$ " for "that there is something in (2) which is not in (1)".

- p. 7 Is the negative element here in Act, content, or object? Not in the act (next two words in pencil:) or content: it is impossible to have two kinds of presentation of one object. **II, 445**
- p. 8 Can't think not-red without red, any more than one can think like-red. Thus if there are negative objects, they are objects of higher order. **II, 445**
- p. 9 If there are negative objects, they are not objects of experience: To conceive not-A, we require not only A, but also an M, of which it is judged that M is not A. [(in pencil:) Observe M variable] **II, 446**
- p. 10 We might conclude: the negation is a product of judgment, but itself an object of presentation, which can be grasped without judgment. It is like "different from A". But we cannot identify negation and diversity. There are 2 sorts of diversity, one has degrees,
- p. 11 the other, opposed to identity, has not. [I call them *difference* and *diversity*.]¹⁸ Latter only could possibly be identified with negation: but this too is false: e.g. can't put $\sim\exists a. = : x \varepsilon a. \supset_{x,y}. x o' y$, for this hopelessly artificial. Again: what I am now thinking of is an *a*, or it is not an *a*, are judgments of which no analysis will show that the second contains diversity over and above contents of first. **II, 446**
- p. 12 Thus negation is a genuine element in a negative judgment. *Fundirte Gegenstände* are connected *necessarily* with their fundamentals, but negations (e.g. stones do not rise) are often not necessary. Thus not-A as such has no necessity, and is therefore not a founded object. But it is also not an object which is not founded;
- p. 13 Hence not-A is not an object at all: Q.E.D.
[I disagree with this conclusion: the argument as to necessity appears to me to be faulty.] **II, 446**

(ix)

2

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

- p. 13 It is true, "something of which the judgment holds that it is not red" is a negative object, which we may call not-red; but it involves, beyond *Gestalten*, also negative judgment and notion of that of which it *holds*. This introduction of psychological and epistemological (?) elements is remarkable. But when we examine negative presentations, we find (except perhaps in rare cases) no trace of any such roundabout process. Hence this interpretation must be ignored in future.¹⁹
II, 446

¹⁸ This is Russell's comment. In *Ueber Annahmen Meinong* only suggests that it might be best to use two different words for the two senses. *o'* expresses difference.

¹⁹ Marginal comment on p. 13: "I see no such things in $x \equiv x \sim \varepsilon a$ ".

- p. 14 The right to do (next word in pencil above deleted "say":) so may be enforced by observing the difference of $\phi(x, y)$ and $(x; y) \varepsilon (\xi; \eta) \exists \phi(\xi, \eta)$. Thus opposition of yes and no makes no difference to *act* of presentation, and can only be applied by an artificial and roundabout process to the object and therefore to the content of presentation. **II, 446**
- p. 15 The opposition never arises with mere presentation.

Chapter II. Zur Frage nach den charakteristischen Leistungen des Satzes.

- p. 16 On *Signs*: If given A, B is given, A is sign of B, and B (or B's being or existence) meaning of A.
- p. 18 When A is sign of B, and B is a psychical entity which is a sign of C, A is indirectly sign of C. This is the case of words.
- p. 19 Language expresses thoughts, but means objects.
- p. 20 Whatever has meaning is an expression,
- p. 21 but not vice versa. E.g., yes and no
- p. 21 express judgments, but don't tell what is judged about. Similarly interjections. Thus there are words without *Bedeutung* in the narrow sense.
- p. 23 Sentence (*Satz*) differs essentially from other complexes of words.
- p. 24 This doesn't depend on plurality of words: *credo* and *credere* have the opposition in question. The characteristic of a sentence must be sought on the psychical side; in meaning or in expression. But not in meaning: for "the man is ill" and "the ill man" have same
- p. 25 meaning (*Bedeutung*), but do not express same state of mind.²⁰ **II, 446**
- p. 26 Not all sentences express propositions: e.g. questions, optatives and imperatives. [p]²¹ **II, 446**
- p. 28 Dependent clauses also are unasserted: e.g. There is no case in which $x \varepsilon a$, I expect it will rain today.
- p. 29 Such clauses can be attached to a word: "The opinion that *p*"; here there is no judgment at all.
- p. 30 $p \supset q$ and $p \vee q$ do not assert *p* nor assert *q*.
- p. 32 In hearing a sentence, we don't usually infer the man's state of mind, even when (if he expresses a proposition) we don't assent; e.g. reading, especially fiction.
- p. 34 The fact is that the hypothesis [*Annahme*] must replace the judgment in these questions.

²⁰ In the margin of p. 24: "This is on what I call assertion."

²¹ In the margin of p. 26: "I doubt this [and I might have expressed my doubt by a question]".

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

Chapter III. Die nächstliegenden Annahmefälle.

- p. 38 (in pencil:) Let a right-angled triangle be given—is an *Annahme*(.)
- p. 39 Mathematical and scientific hypotheses are obvious instances.
- p. 40 Fancy and children's pretences.
- p. 45 (in pencil:) Lies and philosophical theories.
- p. 49 *Annahmen* required in understanding opinions of another, e.g. a philosopher; (in pencil:) except when we make judgment itself object of a presentation and thence a new judgment. **II, 449**
- p. 54 In asking a question to which the answer is yes or no, what is expressed is the wish to have an *Annahme* turned into a judgment or its opposite judgment. **II, 449**
- p. 56 In hearing a tale, we have *Annahmen* communicated to us.
- p. 59 Words are unnecessary for an *Annahme*, e.g. marionnette (*sic*) shows.

Chapter IV. Die Annahmeschlüsse.

- p. 64 (in pencil:) Relation of ground and consequent not causal:
- p. 65 Relation perceptible.
- p. 67 A conclusion (*Schluss*) is not a hypothetical proposition. A certain kind of evidence seems
- p. 68 to belong to whatever follows from a premiss, even if premiss not evident
- p. 69 (in pencil:) But this not always the case—e.g. with bad inferences.
- p. 69 Any evidence got by inference must be evidence (next 3 words in pencil:) of the conclusion: how then account
- p. 70 for the fact that correct conclusions are often so lacking in evidence?
- p. 72 Evidence in these cases exists once, and is then derived from memory.
- p. 79 $p \supset q$ is not a relation between presentations of p and q asserted, nor between the objects
- p. 80 occurring in the judgments p and q : e.g. $a \subset -b$ (a 's are not b) is really an implication,
- p. 81 because we agreed that there is no object $-b$.
- p. 85 *Annahmen* are involved in $p \supset q$: for we needn't assert p and q , but either may be a negation, which presupposes that we are not concerned with mere presentation.
- p. 86 Conclusions from unasserted premisses are not hypothetical judgments in the ordinary sense, but genuine conclusions; only they result in and start from *Annahmen*, not judgments.²²

²² Marginal comment on p. 86: "Might identify the *Annahmeschluss* with Assumption, i.e. $p \cdot p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot q$ ".

- p. 87 Hypothetical judgments don't assert a relation of p and q : e.g. "If a perpendicular is drawn from the vertex of an isosceles triangle onto the base, the base is bisected." This is not a mere presentation; but it seems to be not a judgment. It can't be
- p. 88 negation: "If p , q need not be true" deals with *must*, and denies something different. Here, a relation *is* denied of p and q .²³ **II, 450**
- p. 89 Hypothetical judgment is a genuine inference [*Schluss*], but one dealing with *Annahmen*, not with judgments. But of course there is also a proposition asserting connection of p and q . **II, 450**
- p. 90 If ... then ... usually expresses, but does not mean [cf. p. 19]
- p. 91 aRb may be asserted with R 's being itself conceived.

(*xi recto*)

4

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

Chapter V. Zur Gegenständlichkeit des Psychischen.

- p. 93 No psychical occurrence is without a *Gegenstand*. Important to realize relation of object and content of a presentation. **II, 452**
- p. 95 Not only in existential judgments, but in all judgments, if they are right, have correspondence with a *Bestand*. **II, 452**
- p. 96 False judgments have no object, unless we call object what would be object if they were true. **II, 452**
- p. 97 Similarly negative judgment as object that in which it would be transcendent if it were a true affirmation. [Observe the following points: (1) In the judgment that A exists, it is not A that is the object, but A 's existence; for if it were A , we should say that the judgment has an actual object when it is true, whereas " A does not exist" would only have an actual object when it is false. (2) All judgments have an object equally, and in the same sense, apart from truth or falsehood. (3) The object of a judgment is not an asserted, but an unasserted proposition, not " A exists" but "the existence of A ". Assertion occurs psychologically when any true or false proposition is affirmed; logically, only when a proposition is true. But assertion, logically, is not merely a relation to truth, for " p 's truth" is still unasserted.]
2 questions: (1) In what sense has negative judgment objectivity, if this means a property which the judgment would have under circumstances which its own truth requires to be unfulfilled? (2) In what sense can we say a judgment *has* an object if this object (as in true negative judgments) does not exist? **II, 452**
- p. 98 The object which a negative or false proposition *would* have if affirmative and true it doesn't have. What objects there really is (*sic*) belongs

²³ In the margin of p. 87: "Is this the case with hypothetical judgment?"

- only to the presentation involved: i.e. the presentation always has an object. **II, 452**
- p. 99 But the object of the presentation may not exist: the presentation has *Gegenständlichkeit* only in the sense of having a certain *capacity* for an object. [How about the idea of 2?] **II, 452**
- p. 100 There is however a difficulty: capacities are facts, but not perceivable ones. Yet the objectivity of presentations does seem perceivable. *Annahmen* to the rescue! **II, 452**
- p. 101 Difficulty only in regard to objects of presentations and negative judgments: affirmative judgments obviously objective when true, and falsehood can't make any difference. [Assume affirmative judgments existential?]²⁴ Presentation is accompanied
- p. 102 by affirmative *Annahme*, when it has objectivity which is not merely potential. A round square has
- p. 103 objectivity, and this is because it can be subject of an affirmative *Annahme*. Thus objectivity is better based on the *Annahme* than on the judgment. *Gegenständlichkeit* is capacity of a presentation to be *Grundlage* of an affirmative *Annahme*; a presentation is *auf einem Gegenstand gerichtet*²⁵ when its content is made the content of an affirmative *Annahme*. This weakens the notion of object, but makes it applicable to all presentations.²⁶ **II, 452**

(*xi verso*)²⁷

hoarsely repeating in the black night the lesson of irrevocable loss.

These, then, are the Gods. Do these deserve our worship?

²⁴ Russell took this from his marginal comment on p. 101: "Seems to assume positive judgments all existential."

²⁵ *auf einem Gegenstand gerichtet* = is directed towards an object.

²⁶ On the next page, 103: 10–11, Meinong asserts that "*Die Annahme ist ja durch den Satz des Widerspruches in keine Weise gebunden*" [Assumptions are in no way bound by the law of non-contradiction], yet Russell did not remark on it.

²⁷ Russell recycled this sheet of paper with only two lines on it. The sentence is reminiscent of "A Free Man's Worship" (*Papers* 12: 4), an essay originally published in *The Independent Review* in 1903, but the sentence does not belong to it. In the *Autobiography* (I: 150) he says of this difficult time: "I tried to take refuge in pure contemplation; I began to write *The Free Man's Worship*. The construction of prose rhythms was the only thing in which I found any real consolation." This was the same time that completing "Meinong's Theory" added "Some few shreds of self-respect" (*Papers* 12: 22).

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

Chapter V (continued).

- p. 105 Negative judgments, as experience shows, have objects just as much as others. These objects depend on affirmative *Annahmen*. Negations are only made when the contrary *Annahme* has suggested itself. **II, 451**
- p. 107 It is thus that negations get objectivity. **II, 451**
- p. 108 Negative *Annahmen* too require positive ones first, and thus get objectivity. **II, 451**

Chapter VI. Das Erfassen von Gegenständen höherer Ordnung.

- p. 109 *Annahmen* have an additional special function in the relation to objects of higher order.
- p. 112 A given object can be object of sensuous (*anschaulich*) or unsensuous presentation (*last word over deleted* perception); hence opposition of sensuous and unsensuous not in object.
- p. 113 The difference lies in the relations of the constituents of our presentations. In the one case,
- p. 116 the relations seem given and natural, in the other made by us.²⁸ **II, 454**
- p. 117 Use *red cross* for sensuous presentation, *cross which is red* for unsensuous. Also distinguish *compounds* and *composites* [*Zusammen-Setzungen u. Stellungen*]. **II, 454**
- p. 118 *Red* and *cross* can form composite *cross which is red*, or *which isn't*, but only compound
- p. 119 *red cross*. Both composites require *Annahmen*. Otherwise we don't get a complex object. Thus all unsensuous presentations require *Annahmen*. [I suppose simple concepts are *anschaulich*.]²⁹ **II, 455**
- p. 120 [Discussion of sensuous presentation: leaves the part of *Annahmen* doubtful. For my part, I should say it always contains judgments.] **II, 455**
- p. 122 The simple never unanschaulich, and not anschaulich except by convention. Can I have a presentation of aRb ? It is not enough to have presentations of a and R and b ; it is
- p. 123 necessary that R should stand in relation with a and b ; whence an endless regress. Such a regress objectionable, since it goes to presuppositions. **II, 454; II, 455**

²⁸ This is clearly a sentence that continues from 113 to 114, not 116 as Russell has it.

²⁹ A curved arrow drawn in pencil directs us from this note to the beginning of the note on p. 122.

- p. 124 Must discuss a fresh relation of object and content of presentations. Presentation of a square
- p. 125 table is not square. Thus if truth requires correspondence of ideas and facts, it is correspondence of immanent *objects* of ideas, not of contents, with facts. **II, 455; II, 466**
- p. 126 Relation of content and object is ideal, not real. **II, 455**

(xiii)

6

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

Chapter VI (continued).

- p. 128 Call relation of content and object relation of adequacy: in affirmative knowledge, presentation is adequate to object; in all other cases of a merely immanent object, say object adequate to presentation, for here presentation is the prior. Given a colour and a place, relation of the colour to colours, of the place to places, are unaffected by putting the colour in the place; generally, ideal relations not modified by real ones. **II, 455**
- p. 129 Hence no real relations can turn presentations of a, b, R into presentation of aRb .
- p. 130 In aRb , R primary object, a and b secondary. **II, 455**
- p. 131 Only *Annahmen* can direct presentations to secondary objects. Secondary objectivity only occurs in relation to objects of higher order.
- p. 135 There is no *presentation* of aRb , but an *Annahme* of it.
- p. 142 In “cross which is red”, cross and red are plain, but it is hard to see any relation. Is there any relation in such cases? **II, 456**
- p. 143 Every judgment is a judgment of Being (not of existence): at least
- p. 144 this view is practically harmless. **II, 456**
- p. 145 Categorical judgment synthetic, judgment of Being merely thetic. **II, 456**
- p. 146 Transcendence different for the 2 sorts of judgment: call one relative, other absolute.
- p. 147 If “the cross is red” can be judged without relation of cross to red, we must abandon coincidence of complexion and relation. If there is a relation established by the judgment, it can at most affect the *contents* of presentation; and we have shown (§30) that these have nothing to do with the relations of the objects. **II, 456**
- p. 148 (Distinguishes, I think, between aRb , which *is* present in “the cross is red”, and “ R holds between a and b ”, which is not present.)

Meinong, Ueber Annahmen.

Chapter VII. Das Objectiv.

- p. 150 In a negative judgment, "something" is known. **II, 457**
- p. 151 This something is a whole sentence, "that so-and-so". This is positive, though not a piece
- p. 152 of reality suitable for an existential judgment: it is an object, a fact. This object I shall call the *objective* of the judgment. **II, 457**
- p. 153 Put objectivity = *Gegenständlichkeit*, objectivity = possession of an objective. Affirmative and
- p. 154 false propositions equally have their objective. But with false judgments, the objective is only immanent. Judgment *has* its object and its objective, even if these do not have Being. **II, 457**
- p. 156 Some judgments only acquire significance through the objective: e.g. "it is certain that *p*". Also *p* is equivalent to "*p* is"; and here the objective of the judgment is the subject.
- p. 159 A judgment may have as its object the objective of another judgment, without requiring that this objective should be presented: thus we can think of things which are not presented. **II, 457**
- p. 163 Distinguish objects which are by nature objectives as *objects of thought*; others as *objects of presentation*.
- p. 166 Objective not in time. Object given before judgment, objective at most with judgment, which has a kind of priority.
- p. 174 True and false properly belong to objectives, not to judgments. So with probable, necessary, etc. **II, 457**
- p. 175 $p \supset q$ holds between objectives.
- p. 179 "Relation R between *a* and *b*" is not object of presentation: it is object of thought and requires judgment or *Annahme*. "Blackness of the table" is also object of thought. **II, 459**
- p. 182 All feelings of value have to do with objectives, i.e. existence or non-existence of objects. **II, 459**
- p. 183 Same holds of desires. [I believe in both cases propositions essential, but they need not be existential.] **II, 459**

(xiv recto)

Chapter VII. The Objective.

- p. 150 In addition to object of judgment in above sense, there is another moment, which is at least like an object. In e.g. a negative judgment, *something* is known, something positive. **II, 457**
- p. 151 This is not the object denied, but requires a whole sentence, "that so-and-so". **II, 457**
- p. 152 Can say "that there was no disturbance, is a fact", or merely "is".

- This is object of judgment in new sense: call it *objective* of judgment.³⁰
II, 457
- p. 153 Henceforth call *Gegenständlichkeit* objectivity,³¹ the other objectivity. A judgment has object and objective, objectivity and objectivity. **II, 457**
- p. 154 When judgment is false, objective merely immanent; just as object is sometimes. The judgment always *has* its object and objective, but these do not necessarily have Being. **II, 457**
- p. 155 Judgment always *directed* to objective, even when mistaken. **II, 457**
- p. 156 “It is certain that the evidence is not yet concluded” has the objective explicitly: for it is this, not the judgment, that is certain.
- p. 157 If A does not exist, can say: “That A does not exist, is”.³²
- p. 159 Where is the content for which objective is object? What presentation has this object? It seems a judgment can have as its object an objective apprehended by another judgment, without requiring to be mediated by presentation of said objective—i.e. we can think of something of which we have not a presentation. [I don’t understand presentation.]
II, 457
- p. 163 To express this peculiarity, call objectives objects of thought, as opposed to objects of presentation.—In last chapter, *aRb* was found not to involve R: but it involves objective, which will do. **II, 459**
- p. 164 The relation in such cases is object of thought, not of presentation.
- p. 166 Judgment is in some sense prior to its objective.
- p. 168 Every judgment *means* to apprehend its objective, but only succeeds when it is right.
- p. 169 “I believe that *p*” is concerned with the objective *p*.
- p. 174 True and false belong to objectives, not to judgments. So do evident, probable, necessary.
- p. 175 $p \supset q$ is concerned with objectives.

(*xiv verso, lhs*) (in pencil)

I³³

- p. 178 Line between object and objective not so sharp as seemed.³⁴ **II, 459**
- p. 179 “Relation R between *a* and *b*” involves judgment or Assumption, and is therefore not an object of presentation, but at most one of thought;

³⁰ Marginal comment on p. 152: “Propositions are objects”.

³¹ The German is “*Objectivität*” and “*Objectivität*”.

³² Russell put a question mark “?” next to this remark in the margin of p. 157.

³³ These two pages (1 and 2) are side by side on the verso of sheet (*xiv*), which is folded in half. This is to the right of the fold. These notes are also on *Ueber Annahmen*.

³⁴ In the margin of p. 178 next to Meinong’s comparison of the German expressions “*Das Frostwetter bevorsteht*” and “*das Bevorstehen des Frostwetters*”, Russell commented: “This does not apply in English”.

- ditto of "blackness of board"—*Black* is object of presentation, but "the black" is object of thought. **II, 459**
- p. 180 Relations, attributes, and all complexes require objectives. Objectives occur everywhere except where we are concerned with the simple, or (approximately) where we have complete intuitiveness with mere presentation; in this case, the complex involved is properly not apprehended, but is none the less an objective. **II, 459**
- p. 182 Value always attaches to objectives, i.e. existential propositions. **II, 459**
- p. 183 Ditto of desires—[May wish a mathematical proposition different, which not existential.] **II, 459**
- p. 185 Aversion not desire of non-existence, but qualitatively opposed to desire, as negation to affirmation.
- p. 187 What qualities have objectives? (1) all G.h.O. (2) They never have existence, but subsistence when true, not when false. **II, 459**
- p. 188 Difference of green and yellow necessary; not so that sun is now shining—(note) unless causally, which seems to make psychical process leading to belief relevant to necessity, and so introduces a problem. **I, 436; I, 437**
- p. 189 Objectives timeless. Objective which subsists, especially if empirical, is called a *fact*.
- p. 191 Objectives of 3 kinds: A exists, is, is B or is so; and their negations; *Dasein, Sein, So-sein*.
- p. 192 Neglect of objectives is reason why no one knew what things are to be called true and false. **II, 460**
- p. 195 The facts dealt with by epistemology or logic belong entirely in sphere of objectives. **II, 460**
- p. 196 Without objective, only knowing could be object of epistemology, which would thus become psychological. **II, 460**
- (*xiv verso, rhs*) (in pencil) 2
- p. 196 Epistemology is in the first place theory of knowledge; not of knowing; but it and logic are *also* theory of knowing, and hence must be built on a psychological basis: Psychology is thus the most fundamental part of philosophy. **II, 460**
- p. 197 Only since I have known objective, can I say *why* epistemology is not psychology. **II, 460**
- p. 199 Presentation without judgment possible: can think of A without thinking of its being or not-being.
- p. 200 In judgment, don't have object and also objective, but objective and *in it* object.
- p. 203 When objectives occur as objects, assumption of them occurs, as a

- rule, not judgment; **I, 460**
- p. 207 consider e.g. “I am not sure that p ”. **II, 460**
- p. 208 $p \supset q$ contains assumptions: consider e.g. “ p and q cannot both be true”.

(i lhs) (in pencil)

I³⁵

(Chapter IX. Ergebnisse. Bausteine zu einer Psychologie der Annahmen.)

- p. 257 No transcendence or quasi-transcendence of assumptions; object and objective purely immanent.—Hesitation is judgment without conviction. **III, 461**
- p. 260 Probability has to do with assumptive inferences.
- p. 261 Assumptions interconnected: having made one, can’t make another inconsistent with first unless first abandoned.³⁶
- p. 262 Yet can assume round square. **I, 440**
- p. 263 And even $p \cap \sim p(\cdot)$ [Law of Contradiction requires this] **I, 440**³⁷
- p. 265 Assumptions have relative not absolute evidence; but relative evidence is not really evidence at all.³⁸ **I, 440**
- p. 272 A sentence expresses a judgment or an assumption. To understand it, must assume(\cdot)
- p. 276 The way assumptions first presented themselves to us shows beyond doubt that they are more than presentations and less than judgments.
- p. 277 Assumption nearer judgment than presentation: are judgments without conviction, not presentations determined with respect to yes and no.
[I should say (1) objective yes and no have to do with nature of Proposition, p or $\sim p$: these occur in *Annahmen*. But subjective yes and no have to do with belief and disbelief: these may be affixed either to p or $\sim p$, and these occur in judgment, not in assumption.] [Also there is truth and falsehood, different from objective yes and no, but also objective: this doesn’t occur in *Annahmen*.] **II, 458**
- p. 279 Assumptions and judgments belong to *thought*, presentation, not.³⁹

³⁵ This half sheet of notes is on *Ueber Annahmen*, and is physically similar to the section, numbered 1 and 2 which covers pp. 178–208.

³⁶ A marginal comment in Russell’s copy of *Ueber Annahmen* at p. 261 reads: “Contrast p. 106 on round square. Also p. 262–3 inf.”

³⁷ A marginal comment in *Ueber Annahmen* at p. 263 reads: “If not free to assume $p \cap \sim p$, your account of negative judgment must be wrong: for Law of Contradiction is $\vdash (p) \cdot \sim(p \cap \sim p)$, which presupposes $p \cap \sim p$ (pp. 106–7).”

³⁸ At the beginning of this passage, on p. 264, Russell commented: “This rests on a confusion”.

³⁹ This sentence ends incompletely. This notetaking session may have come to an abrupt end here.

ADDITIONAL MARGINALIA IN RUSSELL'S COPY OF
"UEBER ANNAHMEN"

- §2, p. 10 Next to the sentence, "The attempt to regard differentness and negation as being essentially the same may very well have suggested itself to the more than one reduction-minded theorist already, but this has been merely with the intention of reducing differentness to negation, not with the intention of reducing negation to differentness. And an undertaking of the latter sort would do such unmistakable violence to the facts that ...",⁴⁰ by a line along this sentence and a short line by the last part of it, Russell added a question mark: "?"
- §4, p. 20 After saying that "... the word "pain" expresses in the first instance ... the representation of pain", Meinong asserts that "But on this occasion, it can also be gathered from the word that the speaker really is in pain."⁴¹ Russell wrote in the margin: "No!"
- §17, p. 70n. Meinong writes: "I cannot deny that in choosing this example, I have implicitly taken a position in the matter of Euclid's eleventh axiom. Yet the position is not essential in the present connection; if it is found objectionable, one can easily replace the above example with another."⁴²
Russell changed his pencil comment of "No" to "Yes", presumably after reconsideration since the pencil lead is duller.
- p. 84 To a discussion, deleted from the second edition, about the asymmetry of positive and negative hypothetical judgments in Hume, for example, Russell writes: "A better instance would have been $p \supset q \equiv . \sim q \supset \sim p$ ".
- p. 92 To an example of a conditional "When a train leaves the station, certain bell signals are sent to the next station", where the issue is identity of time and place in the antecedent and consequent of conditionals, Russell remarks: "These are just like other formal implications."
- p. 95 To a paragraph about the object of a judgment and the newly introduced notion of "quasi-transcendence", Russell says "Mistake".⁴³
- p. 154 Next to a remark that a false objective is immanent, Russell says "Mistake".

⁴⁰ From the HEANUE translation, p. 17.

⁴¹ HEANUE, p. 25.

⁴² HEANUE, p. 299.

⁴³ HEANUE, p. 161; p. 220 in *Gesamtausgabe*.

WORKS CITED

- EVANS, GARETH. *The Varieties of Reference*. —. *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*. Leipzig: Barth, 1904.
Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1982.
- HEANUE, JAMES, trans. Alexius Meinong, —. *Gesamtausgabe*. Ed. Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinger. 7 vols. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck, 1968.
On Assumptions. (2nd edn. of *Ueber Annahmen*.) Berkeley: U. of California P., 1983.
- LACKEY, DOUGLAS, ed. *EA*.
- MEINONG, ALEXIUS. *Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes; Beiträge zur Psychologie des Vergleichens und Messens*. Hamburg and Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1896. Pp. 164.
- . "Abstrahieren und Vergleichen". *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 24 (1900): 34–82.
- . "Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren Wahrnehmung". *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, 21 (1899): 182–272.
- . *Ueber Annahmen*. Leipzig: Johann Barth, 1902. 2nd edn., 1910; repr. *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 4.
- . "Notes on Meinong". [1902?–05]. *RAI* 230 .030450.
- . "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions". *Mind* 13 (April, July, Oct. 1904): 204–19, 336–54, 509–24; *EA; Papers* 4: 17.
- . "Review of *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*". *Mind* 14 (1905): 530–8; *EA; Papers* 4: 34.
- . *PP*.
- . *Auto*.
- SMITH, JANET FARRELL. "The Russell–Meinong Debate". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45 (1985): 305–50.