

THE TEXTS OF *A CRITICAL EXPOSITION* OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ

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The extant manuscript is described in relation to Russell's Trinity College lecture course in 1899 and its subsequent preparation for the book of 1900. Alterations within the MS are reported. So are revisions that must have followed on a missing typescript, as derived from comparing G. E. Moore's copy of the page proofs with the MS. His suggested changes are compared with the text of the first edition along with emendations Russell must have made on his own copy of the proofs.

The Bertrand Russell Archives contain the following prepublication documents for *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, as well as Russell's corrected copy of the first edition:

- (1) A 511-leaf manuscript (the "extant MS") of the front matter and chapters (RA 210.006549-F1-17). The leaves have been archivally numbered 1–514 (allowing for three missing leaves) in the top right corner. The paper is of the same laid quality and size (221 × 288 mm.) as Russell habitually used at this time, although insertions tended to be on lighter-coloured, wove paper. The MS, with three leaves in Alys Russell's hand, is written only on the rectos; only four versos are not blank.¹

¹ Folios 172 and 175 (see below, section 1, notes 108: 24 and 110n.), and folios 344 (some mathematics) and 504 (an unrevised draft of the passage from G. II. 265 quoted in *PL*, p. 281). Folder 17 ends with a card depicting Leibniz's house at Hanover. This must be the *souvenir* acknowledged in Russell's letter of 18 September 1900 (A.-F. SCHMID, ed., B. Russell, *Correspondance sur la philosophie, la logique et la politique avec Louis Couturat* [Paris: Kimé, 2001], 1: 195).

- (2) A photocopy of a set of serially date-stamped page proofs, corrected by G. E. Moore (RA REC. ACQ. 276). The original set is in the library of the State University of New York, Purchase.² We do not have the proofs corrected by Russell, nor his correspondence with the publisher, Cambridge University Press, or his publishing contract.

The extant MS has the following components:

- (1a) A 298-leaf MS (the “main MS”) of the front matter and chapters.
 (1b) A 184-leaf MS of the appendix and index of leading passages, archivally number-stamped 299–482, except for folios 386–8 (missing, as noted at the time of filming, on the RA backup microfilm, reel 18).
 (1c) Russell’s 32-leaf general index, number-stamped 483–514 and date-stamped 20 August 1900 by the printer.
 (1d) A three-leaf MS of a discarded preface, included in (1a) as folios 18–20.³

This paper is concerned chiefly with (1), the main MS, and (2), the page proofs. The discarded preface, (1d), is published for the first time to scholarly standards in this issue. There is little to report on (1b), the MS of the appendix: for the most part, it is neatly written out, with occasional corrections, insertions and deletions. We know from Russell’s correspondence with Moore and from the acknowledgements in the published book that the two took considerable pains over the translation of these passages (and other translated passages in the book).⁴ The MS of the appendix was evidently selected and written out as a clean copy from what were probably heavily revised originals, perhaps on separate sheets or cards.⁵ On it Russell put a small pencil tick against each passage, presumably indicating that he had verified it with the original. He asked the printers to “be careful to put square and round brackets respectively as they occur in the MS” (fol. 304).

² See the table of page-proof date-stamps in WALTER H. O’BRIANT, “Russell on Leibniz”, *Studia Leibnitiana* 11 (1979): 159–222 (at 179–80).

³ Also “discarded” was an Aristotelian paper derived from the unpublished book in February 1900. The paper survives in galley proof. Titled “Leibniz’s Doctrine of Substance as Deduced from His Logic”, it is comprised of new opening and closing paragraphs and substantial parts of *PL*, Chapters II–v. See *Papers* 3: 20 for the text.

⁴ “I have made, however, as many corrections in consequence of your remarks as were possible without radical alteration ...” (to Moore, 9 May 1900; O’BRIANT, p. 182).

⁵ This might explain otherwise mysterious references in the extant MS. “(11e)” may be a passage compilation number at 43: 6 and at 45n.; see similar references, “(8a)” at 65n.2 and “(33b)” at 114: 8, all in sec. 1 below.

In analyzing the extant MS, some distinctions among the texts, or states of the text, are in order. We are confident that Russell wrote the original MS as a series of lectures. This state is designated, in what follows, “MS1”. MS1 was very heavily revised, with some leaves omitted and many new ones added, to form the final version of the MS, which we designate “MS2”. In serving as his lectures script,⁶ MS1, for the most part, can be matched with the progress of Moore’s notes on the lectures actually given.⁷ MS1 contains many instances of second-person locutions, in which Russell seems to speak directly to his class. For example, at 113: 12–13 in section I of the textual notes below, he wrote, “If any of you can suggest theory free from both these defects, I shall be glad to consider it”. Two lines below in MS1 he altered “lecture” to “chapter”. (The many instances of “lecture” were altered to “chapter” throughout MS2.⁸) Several other contexts combined a second-person locution with use of the word “lecture”, and both were revised in the process of turning MS1 into MS2.⁹ Finally, MS1 contains three notes to himself written at the head or foot of the leaf.¹⁰ They were usually reminders to himself of something to discuss, and he did so in the next few leaves.

The extant MS, as a physical unit, is not what served as printer’s copy. This was a combination of the MS of the front matter and first chapter with a now lost typescript of the remaining chapters. Chapter II is mostly new writing since the delivery of the lectures, and Chapters I and III are wholly new; but both II and III, unlike Chapter I, must have been part of the ensuing typescript. At some point MS2 may have included revised MS1 leaves of the first three chapters; now only four such leaves remain, all in Chapter II. Since Chapter I, in the only form we have it, was not part of the typescript, it is designated “MS3”. MS2 was the manuscript as it was sent to the typist and, with the exception of Chapter I, is wholly extant. Most of MS1 is extant, being recoverable through the alterations recorded in section I.

⁶ This was his third course of lectures. He gave *German Social Democracy* as lectures to the London School of Economics in early 1896, and he lectured on the Foundations of Geometry at Bryn Mawr and Johns Hopkins later that year (*Papers* I: 335).

⁷ Cf. ARTHUR AND GRIFFIN, “Moore’s Notes on Russell’s Leibniz Lectures”, above.

⁸ The many instances appear in section I (e.g. at 54: 1 and 70: 1; cf. also 191: 14–15).

⁹ Other such passages will be found at 48: 28–9, 75: 18 and 25, 101: 1, 113: 15, 149: 36 and 180: 12 and 21.

¹⁰ The notes are recorded in section I at 13: 26, 108: 3–5 and 112: 13.

It was Russell's habit as a writer to number his leaves in the top right corner (usually omitting the folio number on the first leaf of a chapter or other grouping) and to indicate to which chapter each leaf belonged by writing a chapter label (usually the chapter number but sometimes a brief acronym of the chapter title) in the top left corner. In revising a document, he would rarely heavily correct it, preferring to write out the whole leaf afresh, though he would incorporate whole leaves which required little correction from an earlier draft into a new one, renumbering and relabelling them to fit their new location. He followed both practices in the *Leibniz* MS. He created MS2 from MS1 by revising original leaves, adding new leaves, and deleting old ones, with the exceptions of Chapters I–III. A record of both the foliation and the chapter labels in the main MS will be found in the appendix to this paper. The foliation is recorded, in reverse order, in the first column: the first number is the archival folio number, the second the final number Russell gave the leaf, followed (in parentheses) by any previous numberings. Typically, these last reflect his shifting around of content, not only within but also between chapters. The second column gives the chapter label on the leaf in MS2, while the third gives the cancelled label (if any) from MS1.

Russell's reworking of MS1 is evident from the leaves which bear two different chapter labels, but the practice extends beyond those cases. In MS2 Russell used arabic numerals as chapter labels, whereas in MS1 he used roman numerals. In Chapter II, for example, Russell took folio 37 from MS1, changed the chapter label from "II" to "2", and renumbered the leaf from "3" to "3a" so that it would fit in the new sequence. Similar changes occurred in Chapter 4 with folios 91–3. But earlier in Chapter 4, folios 75, 77–81 and 83–7 have only the chapter label "IV", which suggests that they came from Lecture IV in MS1 and that Russell didn't bother to change the number to arabic. That their source was indeed MS1 is confirmed by folio 82, a leaf which Russell added to MS2 and numbered "6a" and to which he gave the arabic chapter label "4". Similarly marked insertions occur at folios 104 and 107 and several others. If the use of roman numerals as chapter labels indicates that a leaf originated in MS1, as it seems to, it is clear that most of the book originated there.

We learn from the chapter labels that there were originally seventeen lectures in MS1. Subsequently the sixteenth lecture ("The Place of God in Leibniz's Philosophy") was attached to the end of Chapter/

Lecture xv, and Lecture xvii's roman numeral became a blotted "xvi". There are other examples of material being moved from one heading to another without changing its place in the order of presentation. For example, the first three leaves of Lecture xi ("The Nature of Monads in General") become the last three leaves of Chapter x ("The Theory of Space and Time and Its Relation to Monadism"), and the first seven leaves of Lecture xiii ("Details of the Doctrine of Monads") become the last seven of Chapter xii ("Soul and Body"). The original presentation of the material as actual lectures obviously required it to be divided into sections of roughly uniform length. Even when presenting MS1 as a series of lectures, Russell did not adhere to the divisions that classroom presentation would have imposed: Lecture vi ("Why Did Leibniz Believe in an External World?") is too short, and Lecture vii ("The Philosophy of Matter (a)") too long. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that he delivered only seventeen lectures in 1899. But in changing the format from lectures to chapters, he seems to have felt free to go further in letting topic dictate length. It is clear that Russell did not conceive his Trinity lectures as treating a given number of topics in the philosophy of Leibniz, one lecture per topic, but as a single continuous argument, which might be divided in various ways for the listener's or reader's convenience.

Another example of his dividing his material for the convenience of the reader, this time at a very late stage in composition, is his division of the book first into sections numbered within each chapter (as indicated in the table of contents), and then into a single sequence for the whole book. Russell had so numbered the sections of *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* and would do it again in *The Principles of Mathematics*. The section numbers are not present in MS2. They must have been added to the typescript, for the single sequence is in the page proofs; moreover, the sections were not renumbered into a single sequence until after he had prepared the analytical table of contents in the front matter, where each section is described individually. In the MS of the appendix his section renumbering is evident throughout.

Internal evidence in Russell's hand in MS2 at 109n.3 (fol. 174; see sec. 1) makes it plain that a typescript was prepared from the heavily revised MS2—presumably the typescript from which the book was set. Even without this single mention of the typescript, a text intermediate between MS2 and the proofs would have to be inferred, for there are numerous otherwise unaccountable discrepancies between MS2 and

the page proofs. (These are recorded in section III of the present article.) Apart from the first chapter and the front matter, MS2 was not marked up for typesetting, nor does it show any signs of the sort of hard usage that printer's copy usually suffers. The same is not true of (1b), the appendix MS, which is so neatly written out that it must have been intended to go direct to the publisher. It bears the Press's sequential page numbering in pencil, a reference to another book's housestyling, compositors' names, the text for signature lines, and the name of the font in which to set the bold "G." references.

The first chapter (MS3) is different from the others: it, too, was marked up for composition. The printer dated the first leaf "April 2, '00" and indicated that the book was to be formatted in the same way as Russell's *Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* three years earlier. The chapter label for the first chapter is also different. Though the title is "Leibniz's Premises", Russell used the letter "L." as the chapter label, either because he had already used "LP" for the preface or simply to indicate that it belonged to the Leibniz book. The first chapter as published evidently replaced an earlier first chapter in MS2 that was to have the title "Introductory" and presumably also in the typescript. Significantly, the first chapter is the one part of the book which differs in major ways from the actual lectures as recorded in Moore's notes. Russell started the lectures with an account of Leibniz's life, and it's reasonable to suppose that his book originally began in the same way. Presumably the biographical material was suppressed because it was irrelevant to the book's philosophical purpose and was readily available elsewhere.

In section I below, the textual notes report the alterations within the main MS.¹¹ After the page and line number of any printing of the first edition, the final MS reading is followed by a square bracket and the previous reading or whether the final MS reading was "inserted". Complex alterations are described as "replaced". Section II has a table of brief exchanges, with quoted context, between Moore and Russell on the former's copy of the page proofs. In section III, the collation of the main MS, page proofs and first edition, the first reading—to the left of "PLJ"—is the reading cited in any printing of the first edition.

¹¹ O'BRIANT (p. 178) points to three MS deletions (86: 19, 87: 20, 117: 29–30), and (p. 185) to some changes after the proofs, but not the addition to the section (§105) on the *Characteristica Universalis*, for which Russell came to respect Leibniz more highly.

“PP” refers to document (2), Moore’s set of page proofs; “MS” to MS2; and “PL37+”¹² to the printings of 1937 and later.¹³

I. ALTERATIONS WITHIN THE MAIN MANUSCRIPT

Preface [first edition pp. in brackets]

xi[v]: 3–4 mainly historical, while the second is mainly philosophical MS] historical rather than philosophical, while the second is philosophical rather than historical (*fol. 11*)

xi[v]: 5 find MS] *after deleted* get

xi[v]: 12–13 it may be doubted MS] *inserted*

xi[v]: 24 previous MS] past (*fol. 12*)

xii[vi]: 2 possible MS] *inserted*

xii[vi]: 4–5 is still MS] *above deleted* remains

xii[vi]: 6 of MS] *above deleted* part of

xii[vi]: 11 by learning MS] *after deleted* a knowledge of the

xii[vi]: 19 what MS] *after deleted* what (*fol. 13*)

xiii[vii]: 1–2 notably Professor Stein MS] *inserted*

xiii[vii]: 4 Erdmann’s admirable account MS] *after deleted* The best (*fol. 14*)

xiii[vii]: 5 (1842) MS] *inserted*

xiii: 10 in the minds of commentators MS] *after deleted* in peop

xiii[vii]: 13 book MS] *above deleted* work

xiii[vii]: 18 the text MS] *replaced* his text
xiii[vii]: 20–1 In the Lent term MS] *after deleted* I was led to the study of his phi-

losophy by a course of lec

xiv[viii]: 1 Leibniz’s MS] *above deleted* his

xiv[viii]: 3 seemingly MS] *above deleted* apparently (*fol. 15*)

xiv[viii]: 11 theory MS] *above deleted* doctrine (*fol. 16*)

xiv[viii]: 20, wherever one could be

found, MS] *inserted*

xiv[viii]: 22 quotations MS] *after deleted* passages

xiv[viii]: 23–4 I have given the date of a passage whenever it is not later than 1686, or seems important for some other reason. MS] *inserted*

xiv[viii]: 27–8 but passages quoted in the text are in general not repeated in the Appendix. MS] *inserted*

xiv[viii]: 30 contained in it MS] *replaced* quoted in the appendix (*fol. 17*)

xiv[viii]: 31 by the reference MS] *inserted*

xiv[viii]: 32–3 nowhere assumed any knowledge of a foreign language. MS] *before deleted* or of other writings of Leibn

xv[ix]: 2 him MS] *above deleted* Mr. Latta

xv[ix]: 5 followed MS] *after deleted* as far as possible

xv[ix]: 8, Cambridge, MS] *inserted*

Table of Contents

xvii[xi]: 3 Chapter I Leibniz’s Premises MS] Chapter I. Introductory (*fol. 2*)

xviii[xi]: 18 with the identity MS] *replaced* the identity

Abbreviations

xxiii[xvii]: 16 Langley MS] *after deleted* Brown

Chapter I

1: 6 views MS] *above deleted* works (*fol. 21*)

1: 13 than MS] *after deleted* that

1: 19 rival MS] *inserted*

¹² Corrections in PL37+ are recorded in sec. III at 141: 11, 145: 15 and 178: 23.

¹³ We gratefully acknowledge Arlene Duncan’s drafting of textual notes from Moore’s “X” comments on his set of page proofs (he put “a little cross of ink” where he “saw reason to suggest an actual correction”) and Brandon Wooldridge’s collation of a photocopy of a later impression of the first edition with the main MS.

- 1: 26 readers MS] *inserted* (fol. 22)
 2: 7–8 modern students, such as MS] *inserted*
 2: 8 or Gerhardt. MS] *before deleted* or
 2: 11 cause MS] *above deleted* ground
 2n.: MS] *inserted*
 2: 22 laborious researches MS] *after deleted* the (fol. 23)
 2: 28–30 combined to prevent Leibniz from doing himself justice in a connected exposition of his system. MS] (*these lines at the top of fol. 24/3a (renumbered from 3) must have belonged to the previous draft:*) combined with the circumstances of his life in preventing Leibniz from publishing a connected exposition of his system. (fol. 24)
 3: 1–2 unavoidable MS] *above deleted* necessary
 3: 4–5 its necessity is my only excuse MS] only its necessity is my only (only *inserted*) excuse
 3: 10 influence MS] *replaced* influences which led to (fol. 25)
 3: 14 on MS] *written over* &
 3: 27 contains MS] does contain (s *inserted*)
 3: 36–7 And when we MS] *after deleted* But other inconsisten (fol. 26)
 4: 2 excellence, and MS] excellence, and (*before inserted*) perception that it so follows is (see 4: 2 in sec. III; fol. 27)
 4: 6 will be found MS] *above deleted* appear
 4: 8 one or more of MS] *inserted*
 4: 9 to give MS] *after deleted* then
 4: 10 erroneous MS] *above deleted* at fault
 4: 13 skill MS] *above deleted* care
 4: 16 were MS] *above deleted* are
 4: 26–7 asserting existence at particular times MS] *replaced* referring to particular parts of time (s *inserted*) (fol. 28)
 4: 35 fifth; and in this MS] *replaced* fifth. In this
 5: 10–12 Jewish Atheist MS] *replaced* Jew Atheist (fol. 29)
 5: 13 own MS] *inserted*
 5: 28 , without being at any time a mere disciple, MS] *inserted*

- 5n.: , Breslau, 1846 MS] *inserted* (fol. 30)
 5n.: , Leipzig, 1885 MS] *inserted*
 5n.: Phil. Monatshefte, Vol. XXIII; Trendelenburg, “Historische Beiträge”, Vol. II. MS] *replaced* Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. Vol.
 5: 35 Plato’s Dialogues. MS] *before deleted* , especially of the Phaedo. (fol. 31)
 6: 4 in MS] *inserted*
 6n.2: MS] *inserted* (*because written at foot of leaf instead of inline*)
 6: 11 greatly to influence MS] *replaced* to be the chief influence in
 6: 12 journey to MS] *replaced* stay in
 6: 13 two MS] *inserted*
 6: 16 with Malebranche MS] *after deleted* He became acquainted
 6n.3: MS] *inserted*
 6: 21–2 invented the Infinitesimal Calculus, and MS] *inserted* (fol. 32)
 6: 25 learnt to know the greatest MS] *replaced* became acquainted with the chief
 6: 26 He spent MS] *after deleted* With
 6: 28 laws of motion and the MS] *inserted*
 6n.4: MS] *inserted*
 6: 32 notes MS] *after deleted* careful
 7: 5 from MS] *inserted* (fol. 33)
 7: 9 sufficiently MS] *after deleted* become
 7: 13 not only the temporal, but the logical MS] *replaced* the logical as well as temporal
 7: 14 also is MS] *replaced* is also

Chapter II

- 8n.1: MS] *inserted* (fol. 34)
 8n.2: MS] *inserted*
 8: 21 is MS] *after deleted* which
 8: 27 drawn MS] *above deleted* taken
 9: 10 points MS] *above deleted* questions
 9: 11 alteration. MS] *before deleted* This
 9: 12 in question, MS] *inserted* (fol. 35)
 9: 13 three MS] *written over* two
 9: 23 logically MS] *above deleted* evidently
 9: 31 predicate MS] *after deleted* notion of the
 10: 4 many MS] *above deleted* several (fol. 36)
 10: 9 their MS] *inserted*
 10: 11 no one MS] *after deleted* they are

- not ea cannot be inferred one from another
- 10: 21–2 The need of such reasons is the principle of sufficient reason. MS] *inserted*
- 10: 22 Subjects whose MS] *replaced* Such subjects,
- 10: 23 are MS] *after deleted illegible word beginning I*
- 10: 28 substance MS] *above deleted* subject (*fol. 37*)
- 10: 35 necessary or contingent, MS] *inserted*
- 11: 10 he MS] *inserted*
- 11: 13 empirical premiss MS] *replaced* two empirical premisses
- 12: 13, moreover, MS] *inserted* (*fol. 38/4; fol. 39*)
- 12: 24–5 a predicate to each of the subjects. MS] *replaced* each of the subjects a predicate.
- 12: 31 part. MS] *before deleted*, etc.
- 12: 33 from Leibniz himself MS] *replaced* in Leibniz
- 12: 34; G. VII. 401 MS] *inserted*
- 13: 9 in MS] *above deleted* (*fol. 40*)
- 13: 18 thrusts MS] *above deleted* pushes
- 13: 26 evident. MS] *before deleted notes at foot of leaf, 2nd being deleted in pencil* Cf. G. II. 347. “Position, like priority or posteriority, is nothing but a mode of a thing.” 233. “If extended were conceived per se, wouldn’t be in a place.” 240. “Every extrinsic denomination has an intrinsic one for its foundation.”
- 13: 31 most MS] *after deleted* all
- 13: 33 As regards MS] *replaced* But as regards (*fol. 41*)
- 14: 5; G. V. 210 MS] *inserted*
- 14: 12 N. E. MS] *inserted*
- 14: 12; G. V. 132 MS] *inserted, and deleted at 14: 19*
- 14: 18 consists only MS] *after deleted* ultimately
- 14: 24 the Kantian theory MS] *replaced* deduce the Kantian doctrine (*fol. 42*)
- 14: 27 special MS] *after deleted* the various
- 14: 31 deduction MS] *in pencil above deleted* proof
- 14: 33 relational MS] *inserted*
- 15: 7–8, on the other hand, be truly a proposition, MS] *replaced* be true, on the other hand,
- 15: 8–9 propositions MS] *after deleted* true
- 15: 13–14 there is no reason to suppose the truth dependent upon MS] *replaced* the truth is distinct from his perception of it
- 15: 18–19 relation. MS] *before deleted*, express (*fol. 43*)
- 15: 33 in respect of belief in MS] *above deleted* as to
- 16: 2 more difficult MS] *after deleted* equally (*fol. 44*)
- 16: 4–5 and their relation to necessity MS] *inserted*
- 16: 8–9 an account of MS] *inserted*
- 16: 11 meaning and MS] *inserted*
- 16: 26–17: 16 ¶As regards the range of analytic judgments ... ¶The notion that all *à priori* truths are analytic is MS] *inserted as chapter fol. 10a, replacing* ¶As regards the meaning of analytic judgments, this meaning is (*fol. 45*)
- 16: 31–2, as I shall show in the next chapter, MS] *inserted*
- 16: 36–7 some of the instances which Leibniz suggests. MS] *replaced* some instances of what Leibniz considers to be immediately analytic evident, and suitable as premisses.] *replaced* some instances of what Leibniz considers to be immediately analytic.
- 17: 3 (N. E. p. 404; G. V. 343) MS] *inserted*
- 17: 20 one or more of which are MS] one of which is (*fol. 44*)
- 17: 21–3 Thus Leibniz, as we have just seen, gives as an instance the proposition: “The equilateral rectangle is a rectangle” (N. E. p. 405; G. V. 343). MS] *inserted, with* G. V. 403 *as an insertion within and with*, as we have just seen, *as typescript or proof insertion*
- 17: 27 of MS] *inserted*
- 17: 30 human MS] *above deleted* wise (*fol. 46*)
- 18: 5 If, however, MS] *replaced* Or rather, since
- 18: 5 be deemed MS] *above deleted* seems
-

18: 6–7 we shall have to say that MS] *inserted*
 18: 9 proposition MS] *after deleted* inde
 18: 13 ; G. v. 428 MS] *inserted*
 18: 15 evidently MS] *after deleted* is
 18: 25 (predictability being here of the first type) MS] *inserted* (fol. 47)
 19: 4 Monadology, §§ MS] *replaced* Mon.
 19: 12 ; G. VI. 612 MS] *inserted*
 19: 16–17 that the “primary principles” are identical or analytic MS] *above deleted* of analytic judgments
 19: 22 G. IV. 425 MS] *inserted*
 19: 25 ; G. V. 347 MS] *inserted* (fol. 48)
 19: 34 (G. VII. 261) MS] *inserted in brackets*
 19n.1: (1676) MS] *inserted*
 20: 5 necessarily MS] *above deleted* ultimately
 20: 10 Hence MS] Thus
 20: 12–13 there is always involved, in definition MS] *after deleted* in definition
 20: 21 two MS] *inserted* (fol. 49)
 20: 26 ; G. V. 343 MS] *inserted*
 21: 9 , as defined by Leibniz, MS] *inserted*
 21: 12 Thus Leibniz’s criterion MS] *after deleted* two propositions, again, involve the propositions that there are such concepts as square and circle. (fol. 50)
 21: 19 other. MS] *before inserted and deleted* [Cf. G. VII. 261] [Proof of God for Spinoza.]
 21: 35 the opposite view MS] *after deleted* this
 22: 8 argument; MS] *before deleted* [Cf. Kant, ed. Hart. I. p. 21 ff] and Kant, while still a Leibnizian, rightly rejected the necessity of three dimensions. (see 22: 13 for use of reference to Kant)
 22: 33 ; G. V. 92 MS] *inserted* (fol. 51)
 23: 14 metaphysical necessity, which is here in question, MS] *replaced* necessity (fol. 52)
 23: 29–30 and by his strict determinism, MS] *inserted*
 23: 32 (For Leibniz, MS] *written over* (In Leibniz,
 23: 38 that MS] *above deleted* which (fol. 53)
 24: 12 with MS] *above deleted* between

24: 20 , however, MS] *inserted*
 24: 23 destroy MS] *after deleted* show

Chapter III

25: 1 MS] (*no chapter head or number; fol. 54*)
 25: 2–3 Contingent Propositions and the Law of Sufficient Reason PL] Analysis of Propositions (continued) | The Law of Sufficient Reason. MS
 25: 10 propositions MS] *after deleted* the divis
 25: 17 classification, MS] *above deleted* principle
 25: 22–3 the necessary existence of God, MS] *replaced* God’s existence, which is necessary,
 26: 15 , of course, MS] *inserted* (fol. 55)
 26: 17 propositions about MS] *inserted*
 27: 10 applications MS] *above deleted* cases (fol. 56)
 27: 12 the further MS] *replaced* this further
 27: 17 necessary or contingent, past, present, or future, MS] *replaced* past, present, or future, necessary or contingent, (fol. 57)
 27: 30 the contrary MS] *above deleted* existence to be a predicate
 27: 32 denial MS] *before deleted* of this assertion
 27n.: MS] *inserted*
 27n.: joined MS] *after deleted* connected with
 28: 16 a MS] *inserted* (fol. 58)
 28: 33 laws, MS] *replaced* general laws are of the nature of empirical generalizations (fol. 59; fol. 60)
 31: 13 statement PL] enunciation MS (fol. 61; fol. 62)
 31: 13 veritable MS] *after deleted* correct
 32: 25 Even MS] *inserted in pencil* (fol. 63; fol. 64)
 32: 27 and any true MS] *after deleted* not only of a
 32: 30 than in later years, MS] *inserted*
 33: 4–5 every truth has its *à priori* proof PL] everything truth has its *à priori* proof MS] *replaced* every truth has its *à priori* reason (every *replaced* everything)

- 33: 7 (G. II. 62). MS] *before deleted* These statements, as they stand, seem very different from the (*last word already deleted*) Leibniz's ordinary account of the principle. But it would seem
- 33: 13 help MS] *above deleted* means (*fol. 65*)
- 33: 25 itself MS] *inserted*
- 34: 2 Leibniz's MS] *above deleted* his
- 34: 5 also written in 1686, MS] *replaced* written seven months before the above (*fol. 66*)
- 34: 17 only MS] *inserted*
- 34: 26 will MS] *inserted*
- 35: 7 meaning MS] *after deleted* bearing (*fol. 67*)
- 35: 29–30 a letter to the Princess of Wales, accompanying MS] *inserted* (*fol. 68*)
- 35: 36 have been MS] *after deleted* also
- 36n.: the conception of a MS] *inserted before* a possible cause (*fol. 69*)
- 36: 28–9 This is the essence of activity, MS] *replaced* This is the essence of the doctrine of activity,
- 37: 27 exist MS] *inserted* (*fol. 70*)
- 38: 5 causal connections do not really connect MS] *after deleted* they do not (*fol. 71*)
- 38: 8 must MS] *above deleted* may
- 38: 24 effect MS] *after deleted* end
- 38: 26 what MS] *replaced* the (*fol. 72*)
- 38: 29 any possible MS] *replaced* the possible
- 39: 8 remedy MS] *above deleted* escape
- 39n.: MS] (*at head of leaf: Footnote. end of Chap. III*) (*fol. 73*)
- Chapter IV**
- 40: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture (*fol. 74*)
- 40: 18 in MS] *above deleted* to
- 40: 19–20 not so obscure as that philosopher thought it MS] *replaced* not obscure
- 40: 20 ; G. V. 132 MS] *inserted*
- 40: 24 ; G. IV. 469 MS] *inserted*
- 40: 26 of MS] *written over* to (*fol. 75*)
- 41: 7–8 or “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Substance, to him, MS] *inserted after* and (*no closing quotes*)
- 41: 8–10 a remedy which Leibniz regarded as condemning the original definition (G. VI. 582). MS] *inserted*
- 41: 14 not MS] *before deleted* really
- 41: 21–42: 6 ¶ There is ... (*Ib. 585–6*). MS] *inserted as fol. 76*
- 41: 38 may involve MS] *replaced* involves
- 42: 6 (*Ib. 582*) MS] *inserted*
- 42: 7 , however, MS] *inserted* (*fol. 77*)
- 42: 9 existence.* MS] (*inserted and then deleted note: See Dialogue between Philarète and Ariste, G. VI. 579–594, for criticism of Malebranche's definition of substance. (followed by: [See 3a.]*)
- 42: 13–15 the words support or substratum, which Locke is using as synonymous with substance, mean MS] *replaced* the word means
- 42: 15 ; G. V. 201–2 MS] *inserted*
- 42: 35 G. II. 43 MS] *inserted* (*fol. 78*)
- 42: 37 of MS] *written over* to
- 43: 5–6 G. IV. 432 MS] *inserted*
- 43: 6 made a subject. MS] *before inserted and deleted* [Cf. G. II. 457] (11c) (*slightly expanded G. reference reappears at 43: 9*)
- 43: 8–9 The ultimate subject is always a substance (G. II. 457–8). MS] *inserted*
- 43: 9 Thus the term I MS] *replaced in pencil at first* The term I, on the other hand
- 43: 10 attribution to any other term; MS] *replaced in pencil at first* such attribution
- 43: 13 states MS] *above deleted* predicates
- 43: 15 which he denies, MS] *inserted, initially as* which Leibniz denies,
- 43: 16 predicate'. MS] *before deleted* But in this case, Leibniz holds that what is real about space is not space as it appears, but predicates
- 43: 21–2 any attribute exists only at a certain time MS] *replaced* the attributes exist only at certain times (*fol. 79*)
- 43: 22–3 its being an attribute at that time MS] *replaced* their being attributes at those times
- 43: 24 subject MS] *inserted*
- 43: 33 G. II. 46, 47 MS] *replaced* G. II. 46

- 44: 4 without. * MS] *followed by instruction*: "Insert footnote, p. 5a"
- 44n.1: older (deleted in PL) philosophers who feel tempted to condemn their juniors MS] *replaced* philosophers who feel tempted to condemn what is new (fol. 80)
- 44n.1: everything MS] *after deleted* whatever
- 44: 11 ; G. IV. 508 MS] *inserted* (fol. 81)
- 44n.2: MS] *inserted* (note was revised between MS and page proofs to include Pollock's 2nd edn.)
- 44: 11 a being MS] *a inserted*
- 44: 12 ; L. 406; G. VI. 598 MS] *inserted*
- 44: 16 in reality MS] *after deleted* they
- 44: 22 ; G. IV. 507 MS] *inserted*
- 44: 28–45: 10 Again he ... substance." MS] *inserted following instruction, as fol. 82]*
- 45: 18 be MS] *inserted; deleted on next line before some element* (fol. 83)
- 45: 18 state MS] *after deleted* subst
- 45n.: MS] *inserted with* (11c) *deleted before* G. IV. 506–7
- 46: 3 Lotze PL] Lotze and Mr. Bradley MS] *with Mr. inserted*
- 46: 6 states. MS] *written over* series
- 46: 9 different. MS] *after deleted* distinct. (below, in corner: [Lecture IX])
- 46n.2: MS] *inserted* (fol. 84)
- 46: 21 or to each other. MS] *inserted*
- 46: 23 a specific or incomplete notion MS] *replaced* incomplete notions
- 46: 32 to decide MS] *after deleted* so
- 47: 21 Monads. MS] monads. ¶(note in pencil to BR himself:) How does a substance differ from a causal series? Lotze: things are laws. (in ink and deleted) ¶[The relation of time to Leibniz's notion of substance is a very difficult question. Is the reality of time unduly assumed by this notion? We have seen that a substance is essentially a subject persisting in time. But by the doctrine that all the states of the substance are eternally its predicates, Leibniz is evidently trying to render his substance superior to time. He holds time to be nothing real in itself, but a mere relation among phenomena. Thus the succession of states ought not to be assumed to begin with, but to be deduced as a result of their differing qualities. By means of activity, this is to some extent effected. Activity makes a difference of quality. MS (fol. 85; similar text reappears on fol. 91)
- 47: 23 given MS] *inserted* (fol. 86)
- 47: 25 Lotze's MS] *above deleted* the
- 47n.: MS] *inserted*
- 47: 30 remaining MS] *inserted*
- 48: 6 of the MS] *inserted*
- 48: 7 ; G. II. 136 MS] *inserted*
- 48: 15 preceding MS] *above deleted* previous (fol. 87/11)
- 48: 19 , respectively, MS] *inserted*
- 48: 22 For MS] *inserted*
- 48: 28–9 I wish to point out MS] *replaced* I wish you to observe
- 48: 30 stage, MS] *in pencil above deleted* point,
- 48: 33 follows. MS] follows. (with deleted instruction below:) [Return to p. 9.]
- 49: 2 series of perpetually new terms. MS] *replaced* series prolonged throughout all time. (fol. 88)
- 49: 2–3 still have been simple substances, in the sense of independent causal series, but there would MS] *inserted, at first in pencil*
- 49: 5 one of these simple substances MS] *inserted, at first in pencil, after deleted* a single substance
- 49: 9 independent MS] *inserted*
- 49: 13 predicates. MS] (instruction:) [Insert p. 12a] [Footnote]
- 49n.1: action, MS] *after deleted* substance (fol. 89)
- 49n.1: I hold that MS] *inserted*
- 49n.1: is also reciprocal MS] *after deleted* may be inverted
- 50: 3 ; G. V. 201–3; esp. § 2 MS] *inserted* (fol. 90)
- 50n.1: 43, MS] *inserted*
- 50: 24–6 while the judgment that a substance exists would not be one judgment, but as many judgments as the subject has temporal predicates. MS] *inserted, temporal being added after page proofs*

- 51: 11 pretended predicate, MS] *before deleted* f, (fol. 91)
- 51: 13 predicate. MS] predicate *before deleted instruction*: [Insert p. 12a (fol. 92)] *before deleted* Leibniz would have to maintain that to exist now and to exist then are not different: but this contention would stultify his use of activity and final causes. (replaced Leibniz must admit that to exist now and to exist then are different: this admission is involved in his use of activity and final causes.) When once this difference is admitted, then the pretended predicates presuppose, as their (their *above deleted* its) logical *prius*, the propositions “this state exists now”, “that state existed then”. Such propositions render time fundamental, and destroy the reduction of
- 52: 5 activity or MS] *inserted* (fol. 92; fol. 93)
- 52: 27 contains traces of MS] *replaced* contains traces] *replaced* involves references to (fol. 94)
- 53: 5–6 will appear, as regards space, MS] *replaced* as regards space, will appear
- 53: 6 the grounds MS] *replaced* Leibniz’s grounds
- Chapter V**
- 54: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture
- 54: 10 possible MS] *inserted* (fol. 95)
- 54: 21 ; G. VII. 393 MS] *inserted*
- 54: 21 that MS] *inserted*
- 54: 24 ; G. VII. 400, 401 MS] *inserted*
- 55: 5 Diversity MS] *after deleted* To di (fol. 96)
- 55: 37 ; G. VII. 394 MS] *inserted* (fol. 97)
- 56: 1 (poser) MS] *inserted*
- 56: 6 ; G. VII. 394–5 MS] *inserted*
- 56: 6–7 the preceding paper (D. 247; G. VII. 371–2) MS] *replaced* the same passage
- 56: 9 God could have no reason MS] *replaced* no reason could exist
- 56: 10 rather than to have for adopting MS] *replaced* and that consequently to have adopted
- 56: 15 negative MS] *inserted* (fol. 98)
- 56: 16 proposition MS] *above deleted* thing
- 56: 19 concludes MS] *above deleted* prefaces
- 56: 21 ; G. VII. 372 MS] *inserted*
- 56: 26–8 And it is difficult to be sure how great a reservation is implied by the words “in abstract terms.” MS] *inserted*
- 56: 31 seems to presuppose MS] *replaced* presupposes
- 57: 1–2 Where difference of place *appears* there must *be* MS] *replaced* Thus where there is difference of place there must also *be* (fol. 99)
- 57: 5 at the same time MS] *inserted*
- 57: 5–6 proposition logically subsequent to MS] *replaced* particular case of
- 57: 11 Leibniz MS] *above deleted* he
- 57: 11 ; G. V. 213 MS] *inserted*
- 57: 23 also MS] *inserted*
- 57: 27 ; G. VII. 407 MS] *inserted*
- 57: 29 result MS] *above deleted* consequence (fol. 101)
- 57: 35 concerned MS] *inserted*
- 58n.: MS] *inserted* (instruction: [See p. 6a] (i.e. fol. 100)
- 58: 17–18 ; G. V. 268 MS] *inserted* (fol. 102)
- 58: 25 its MS] *inserted*
- 58: 27 involved in MS] *above deleted* which
- 58: 34 at all. MS] *inserted*
- 59n.: MS] *inserted* (fol. 103)
- 59: 13 collection of qualities MS] *above deleted* concepts
- 59: 17–60: 22 ¶]But further ... Mr Bradley’s Reality. MS] *inserted* (fol. 104)
- 59: 24 its MS] *after deleted* the
- 59: 33 substance MS] *above deleted* subject
- 60: 3 Even MS] *inserted*
- 60: 12 a MS] *inserted*
- 60: 18–22 As against many substances, we may urge, with Mr. Bradley, that all diversity must (be) of the diversity of meanings; as against one substance, we may urge that the same is true of identity. And this holds equally against the supposed self-identity of Mr. Bradley’s Reality. MS] *inserted* (see sec. 111)

- 61: 1 analysis of numbers ends with unity. MS] *replaced* numbers with unity. (*fol. 105*)
- 61: 4 for us MS] *inserted*
- 61: 8 ; G. V. 268 MS] *inserted*
- 61: 8–10 Necessary and contingent truths differ as rational numbers and surds. The resolution of the latter proceeds to infinity (G. VII. 309). MS] *inserted after deleted* Again and above *deleted* This, he explains, is due to the influence (“understanding it healthfu
- 61: 11–20 ¶Again he says ... accomplish.” MS] *inserted* (*fol. 106*)
- 61: 26 the cause of Alexander’s death. MS] *replaced* how Alexander died.
- 61n.: MS] *inserted*
- 61: 27–8 the fact MS] *inserted* (*fol. 105*)
- 61: 30–62: 25 Such passages ... Leibniz does MS] *inserted* (*fol. 106*)
- 62: 23 ultimately MS] *after deleted* distinction
- 62: 24 necessary MS] *above deleted* other
- 62: 25 not only mean MS] *after deleted* That he does (*fol. 105*)
- 62: 26 explain. MS] *replaced* explain, is evident from the fact that he uses the notion of contingency to prove that God’s acts are free.
- 62: 5 suggested MS] *above deleted* explicitly urged (*fol. 107*)
- 62: 38 making MS] *after deleted* between
- 63: 4 ; G. V. 287–8 MS] *inserted*
- 63: 19–20 The infinite complexity of substances will help us in dealing with our next topic, MS] *inserted* (*fol. 108*)
- 63: 28 or of forms MS] *inserted, like other recent insertions, in pencil first and written over in ink*
- 64: 7 Jumps MS] *replaced* A jump (*fol. 109*)
- 64: 19 ; G. III. 51–55 MS] *inserted*
- 64: 24–5 ; G. III. 52 MS] *inserted*
- 64: 29 in constant use MS] *replaced* used with great effect (*fol. 110*)
- 65: 3–4 G. II. 168 MS] *before deleted* N. E. pp. 50–51
- 65: 4–5 N. E. p. 51; G. V. 49–50 MS] ; G. V. 49–50 *inserted*
- 65: 18–19 And this is why Leibniz

- remarks parenthetically (N. E. 51; G. V. 51) that he has a priori reasons for his view. MS] *inserted before instruction:* [Insert here the 2nd § of p. 14] (*fol. 111*)
- 65: 20–66: 4 ¶Why Leibniz ... Leibniz’s mind. MS] *inserted* (*fol. 112*)
- 65n.2: MS] *inserted, followed by deleted* (8a)
- 66: 5 ¶The continuity MS] *after deleted* It is diff (*fol. 111*)
- 66: 13–14 ; cf. also G. II. 41 MS] *inserted with cf. also above deleted* Quote
- 66: 23–4 no one order contains] their order is not the sum of MS (*fol. 112*)
- 66: 24 ; G. V. 286 MS] *inserted before instruction:* [Continue with p. 15]
- 67: 7 contingent MS] *inserted* (*fol. 113*)
- 67: 19 principal MS] *after deleted* principle (*fol. 114*)
- 68: 1 principal MS] *inserted* (*fol. 115*)
- 68: 1 all MS] *inserted*
- 68: 17 while space and motion MS] *replaced* space
- 68: 23 one MS] *inserted*
- 68: 29 number and MS] *inserted*
- 69: 25 with MS] *inserted* (*fol. 116*)
- 69n.: MS] *inserted*

Chapter VI

- 70: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture
- 70: 4 the nature of MS] *after deleted* what is (*fol. 117*)
- 70: 13 apparently were MS] *above deleted* seem to have been
- 70: 17 VII, 377; IV. 478 and L. 300; MS] *inserted*
- 70: 24–6 Leibniz, whose ontology begins with Dynamics, which it gradually transforms into psychology, was less philosophical than Bishop Berkeley. MS] *replaced* Berkeley was more philosophical than Leibniz, whose (whose *after deleted* nevertheless) ontology begins with Dynamics, which it gradually transforms into psychology.
- 71: 8–10 Though scattered remarks in his later writings seem in agreement with these two papers, MS] *inserted* (*fol. 118*)
- 71: 13 its existence MS] *above deleted* this
- 71: 14–32 & nn. This view ... discrete.

- MS] *inserted* (fol. 119)
 71: 15 L. 300; G. IV. 478. Cf. also L. 351–2.] MS] cf. also L. 351–2. *inserted*
 71: 17 view MS] *above deleted* theory
 71: 24 mathematical MS] *after deleted* the
 71: 26 *units*, MS] *after deleted* unities,
 71: 34 with which MS] *inserted* (fol. 118)
 72: 8 , he says, MS] *inserted*
 72: 13 ; G. VII. 320 MS] *inserted* (fol. 120)
 72: 16–17 that there is no “exact demonstration” that the objects of sense are outside us, and that MS] *inserted*
 72n. G. V. 275, 355–6; VII. 320–321; MS] *inserted with* 719 *switched from 1st to 3rd position at start*
 73: 4–6 “The argument by which Des Cartes seeks to demonstrate the existence of material things is weak. It would have been better therefore not to try” (D. 58; G. IV. 366). MS] *inserted* (fol. 121)
 73: 6 would have been MS] were
 73: 9 G. IV. 367; MS] *inserted*
 73: 9 V. 275; MS] *inserted*
 73: 10–23 ¶There is ... great extent. MS] *inserted* (fol. 122)
 73: 12 truth MS] *above deleted* veracity
 73: 21 consistent MS] *after deleted* relia
 73: 24 other MS] *inserted* (fol. 121)
 73: 25 commonly MS] *inserted*
 73: 32–74: 20 ¶The ground ... their place. MS] *inserted* (fol. 123)
 73: 33 is MS] *after deleted* seems to have been
 73: 35 D. 102, 103; L. 340, 341; G. VII. 303, 304 PL] D. 102, 103; G. VII. 303, 304 MS] ; G. VII. 303, 304 *inserted*
 73n.: MS] *inserted*
 74: 35 Chapters MS] *above deleted* lectures
 74n.: MS] *inserted on fol. 123*
 74n.: G. IV. 495 MS] *inserted*
- Chapter VII**
 75: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture (fol. 124)
 75: 7 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
 75: 16 succeeding MS] *in pencil above pencil deletion* following
 75: 16 chapters MS] *above deleted* lectures
 75: 18 the chief criticism MS] *after deleted* I wish you to remember that
 75: 23 or MS] *above deleted* and
 75: 25 readers MS] *above deleted* you (fol. 125)
 75: 25 he uses MS] *inserted*
 75: 25–6 *matter and body* MS] *before deleted* are used by Leibniz
 75: 28 employed MS] *above deleted* used
 76: 14 and Leibniz’s correctness MS] *replaced* and it is a test of Leibniz’s correctness
 76: 20 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture (fol. 126)
 76: 26 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
 76: 35 N. E. p. 722 and VII, 501 MS] N. E. p. 722 and *inserted*
 76: 37 pair of MS] *inserted*
 76: 38 second pair MS] *replaced* second two
 76: 38 constitutes MS] *above deleted* is
 76: 39 chapters. PL] lectures. MS
 77: 1 *mass* or MS] *inserted*
 77: 1–2 , with the dominant monad, MS] *inserted*
 77: 7 Dynamics MS] *after deleted* matter (fol. 127)
 77: 10 *force* is proportional to quantity of motion. MS] *replaced* there is no need of an ultimate conception of *force* in addition to motion.
 77: 26 formed MS] *after deleted* called for
 77n.1: MS] *inserted in place of* , a work which called forth an epigram from Lessing.
 77: 28 To Leibniz and his contemporaries, MS] *inserted*
 77: 29 something MS] *inserted*
 77n.2: MS] *inserted*
 78: 19 G. VII. 328 MS] *inserted* (fol. 128; fol. 129)
 78: 21 a MS] *inserted*
 78: 22 cannot MS] *above deleted* can’t (fol. 131)
 78: 23–4 does not MS] *replaced* doesn’t
 78: 25–6 are uniform MS] *above deleted* equal
 79: 3–18 Thus Leibniz ... G. M. VI. 236). MS] *inserted* (fol. 130/6a; *insertion to have been made first at 79: 26*)

- 79: 5 matter MS] *above deleted* power
 79: 8 motion." MS] *before deleted* And by
 which it comes about that
 79: 27 part of MS] *inserted* (fol. 131)
 80n.2: is no less MS] *replaced* would be as
 (see sec. III; fol. 132)
 80n.2: subject" MS] *before deleted* ... (sic)
 I have already said something about it
 above.
 81: 4 inferring MS] *inserted* (fol. 133)
 81: 12 perfectly elastic MS] *inserted*
 81: 25 occasionalism MS] *after deleted* this
 81: 28 every collection of MS] *inserted*
 81: 30 all MS] *inserted*
 81: 32 the form of a polemic MS] *replaced*
 a polemical form (fol. 134)
 81: 35–82: 3 The two measures ... (N. E.
 675; G. M. VI. 239). MS] *inserted* (fol.
 135)
 82: 9 in any independent system; MS] *in-*
serted (fol. 134)
 82n.1: The same maxim was employed by
 Leibniz in arguing with Spinoza in
 1676 against Des Cartes' laws of mo-
 tion. See L. p. 10. MS] *inserted* (with in
 1676 *inserted*) (see this note in sec. III)
 82: 22 on MS] *above deleted* of
 82: 23 (*Archiv*, loc. cit.) MS] *inserted*
 82n.2: MS] *inserted*
 83: 2–3 a later chapter MS] ("chapter"
suggests this leaf not written for lectures)
 83: 4 of force MS] *inserted* (fol. 136)
 83: 8 so-called MS] *inserted*
 83: 35 was a main purpose of MS] *inserted*
 (fol. 137)
 84: 26 space MS] *after deleted* place (fol.
 138/12)
 84: 33 and MS] *inserted after deleted* and
 85: 5 is MS] *before deleted* extremely
 85: 13 He and Huygens agree MS] He *be-*
fore deleted agr (fol. 139)
 85: 18–20 The Copernican hypothesis,
 Leibniz says, anticipating Mach, is
 simpler, not truer, than the other [N.
 E. 685]. MS] *inserted*
 85: 29 of MS] *inserted*
 85: 36–86: 4 Again he says ... [D. 269].
 MS] *inserted* (fol. 140)
 86: 6 reconciled MS] *after deleted* held
 (fol. 141)
 86: 19–87: 20 ¶As this point ... his mon-
 adism. MS] *inserted* (fol. 142–143)
 86: 19 As this point MS] *after deleted* the
 need of force in Dynamics seems thor-
 oughly out of place. In short, the whole
 attempt to connect force with the activ-
 ity of substance seems fundamentally
 erroneous; the two are totally inconsis-
 tent, and can only be connected by a
 person who is content with vague anal-
 ogies. (fol. 142)
 86: 19–21 ¶As this point is important, it
 may be well briefly to repeat the argu-
 ments which show the relativity of mo-
 tion to be inconsistent with the
 absoluteness of force. MS] *replaced*
 This point may be substantiated by ex-
 amining the connection of force with
 the relativity of motion.
 87: 3 mathematical MS] *inserted* (fol. 143)
 87: 5 strenuously MS] *inserted*
 87: 7 Let us MS] *above deleted* We are to
 87: 20 his Monadism. MS] *before deleted*
 ¶Thus the attempt, on the basis of Dy-
 namics, to establish a plurality of
 independent causal series, must be
 considered a complete failure. Not only
 was the attempt faulty in detail, but it
 was mistaken in principle, since the re-
 sult aimed at was the reduction of the
 whole series of dynamical phenomena
 to subjective series of perceptions,
 complete in each monad and self-con-
 tained. In the next lecture, we shall
 have to consider a better argument, an
 argument from the difficulties of the
 continuum to the unreality of space,
 and to the consequent non-spatial
 nature of substances.
 87: 25 metaphysical MS] *à priori* (fol. 141)
 88: 4 continuation or MS] (fol. 144)
 88: 31 doubly a relation MS] *replaced*
 doubly relative (fol. 145)
 88: 37–8 not only are the difficulties of
 the temporal continuum supposed to
 be overcome, [L. 351] but also MS]
inserted
 89: 5 its MS] *above deleted* their
 89: 14 the MS] *after deleted* this

- 89: 28–9 all-pervading fluid. PL] all-pervading fluid—or rather, of all pervading fluids, for three were needed in his theory (Wundt op. cit. p. 30; Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis, G. M. VI.). MS] *deleted in PP; see this note in sec. III; fol. 146*
- 90: 10–22 Again he says ... (G. III. 57). MS] *fol. 148*
- 90: 39–91: 1, from his love of a middle position, MS] *inserted fol. 147; fol. 149*
- 91: 4 by Huygens. MS] *before deleted* His relational theory of space, and his whole doctrine ofmonds
- 91n.1: MS] *inserted*
- 91: 21 in later life MS] *before deleted* at any rate *fol. 150*
- 91: 26 personal MS] *inserted in pencil*
- 92: 10 is impossible, MS] *inserted fol. 151*
- 92: 12 Again MS] *after deleted* Moreover
- 92: 26 D. 240, 253 MS] 240, *inserted*
- 93n.: MS] *inserted fol. 153*
- 93: 5 be MS] *inserted in pencil fol. 152*
- 93: 24–5 on Leibniz’s system MS] *inserted (see sec. III)*
- 94: 13 brings MS] *after deleted* is the *fol. 154*
- 94: 6 Chapter MS] *“chapter” and footnote on leaf suggest leaf was rewritten, despite roman numeral in upper left corner*
- 94n.2: MS] *inserted*
- 94: 17 D. 122 MS] *inserted in square brackets*
- 95: 23 Every body, MS] ¶ *inserted before* Every *fol. 155*
- 94: 23, we are told, MS] *inserted*
- 94: 32 particle of matter, MS] *after deleted* state of a body,
- 95: 4 N. E. 673 MS] *after deleted* Archi
- 95: 6 spontaneously MS] *above deleted* perpetually
- 95: 18 absolute MS] *inserted*
- 95: 19–96: 20 at length ...G. IV. 396). MS] *in handwriting of Alys Russell except for last sentence on fol. 158: In this argument, it must be evident that, so far from basing metaphysics upon Dynamics, Leibniz has inferred, on purely metaphysical grounds, a primitive force*
- of which no dynamical use is made. *(fos. 156–158)*
- 96: 8 (N. E. 672; G. M. VI. 236). PL] (N. E. 672). MS *fol. 156*
- 96: 11 Vis Viva, MS] *inserted fol. 157*
- 96: 13 (G. III. 457) MS] *before deleted* and 396
- 96: 24 What was useful PL] *instruction: [Same ¶] What was useful MS fol. 158; fol. 159*
- 96: 30 as MS] *after deleted* the
- 97: 27 this standpoint, which is MS] *replaced* this diametrically opposite standpoint
- 97: 34 which renders MS] from which
- 97: 34 which MS] *after deleted* from with
- 98: 21 every MS] *above deleted* no *fol. 160; fol. 161*
- 98: 33 causation MS] *inserted*
- 99: 6–7 find to be the case with MS] *above deleted* see that *fol. 162*
- 99: 10 chapters MS] *(yet roman numeral for chapter no. in upper left corner)*

Chapter VIII

- 100: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture *fol. 163*
- 100: 4 central MS] *after deleted* very central
- 100: 7 To MS] *after deleted* The
- 100: 8 one MS] *above deleted* the
- 100: 11 Mr. MS] *inserted*
- 100: 14 one of the two chief MS] *above deleted* the
- 100: 20 mastered MS] *above deleted* understood
- 100: 21 understood. MS] *after deleted* dealt with
- 100: 22 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
- 101: 1 in MS] *above deleted* concerning
- 101: 1 to point out MS] you to observe
- 101: 2 the following MS] *inserted fol. 164*
- 101: 7 presuppositions, MS] *inserted*
- 101: 9 inquire MS] *above deleted* observe
- 101: 23 rather MS] *above deleted* more or less
- 101: 24 fully MS] *inserted*
- 101: 26 His MS] *written over* The
- 101: 28 notion MS] *above deleted* idea
- 102: 3 among which are MS] *inserted*

102: 8 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
(*fol. 165*)
 102: 12 a dialogue MS] *replaced* an
argument
 102: 13–14 continues, MS] *in pencil above*
deleted says,
 102: 35 created MS] *inserted in pencil*
 103: 13 consider merely MS] *replaced* take
account only of
 103: 15 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
(*fol. 166*)
 103: 30 special MS] *inserted*
 103: 39–104: 4 At the same time, it is re-
markable that, in his early statements
of the doctrine of monads, he hesitates
to allow real unities to *all* bodies, and
inclines to think that there may be in-
animate bodies without any unities,
and therefore without reality (G. II. 77
and 127). MS] *deleted and dashed under-*
neath with stet in left margin
 104n.: MS] *inserted*
 104: 8 But MS] *above deleted* Now
 104: 9 , since its constituents exist simul-
taneously, MS] *inserted*
 104: 22 What is MS] *replaced* We may
now return to (*fol. 167*)
 104: 24 Chapter X MS] *replaced* my next
lecture
 104: 25 required to explain extension.
MS] *above deleted* a result of the doc-
trine concerning continuity.
 104: 25–30 We shall have in the next
chapter to investigate the abstract doc-
trine as to the continuous and the dis-
crete, as to space and extension, which
underlies this present argument; but it
will be well to begin with the more con-
crete form of Leibniz's difficult
doctrine of the continuum. MS] *re-*
placed We shall thus have an oppor-
tunity to repeat this doctrine in a more
concrete form, namely in direct con-
nection with matter and the entelechies
which form the unities.
 105: 8 employed MS] *above deleted* used
 105: 17 Infinitesimal Calculus MS] *after*
deleted Int Cal (*fol. 168*)
 105: 22–3 A simple substance cannot be
extended, since all extension is

composite (G. III. 363). MS] *inserted*
 105: 28 are not MS] *after deleted* they
 106: 9 , he says, MS] *inserted* (*fol. 169*)
 106: 37 argument MS] *after deleted* last
(*fol. 170*)
 106: 39 Chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
 107: 4 the appearance of something MS]
after deleted someth
 107: 10 slightly MS] *inserted*
 107: 21 arbitrary and MS] *inserted*

Chapter IX

108: 1 Chapter MS] *above deleted* Lecture
(*fol. 171*)
 108: 3–5 ¶In the last chapter, we saw that
matter is a phenomenon, resulting
from aggregates of real unities or mon-
ads. Extension is repetition, and the ex-
tended is therefore plural. MS] *inserted,*
with lecture number and title, at head of
what was continuation of Chapter VIII;
note at head on Cohen used in 109n.1
 108: 3 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
 108: 6 But MS] *preceded by* [Same ¶]
 108: 7 extended MS] *after deleted* dis
 108: 11–12 Leibniz, in admitting it, is
MS] *replaced* in admitting it, Leibniz
 108: 14 his MS] *above deleted* Leibniz's
 108: 21 somewhere MS] *inserted*
 108: 23 that things are to be conceived
MS] *above deleted* to consider the mat-
ter
 108: 24–109: 3 Again ... labyrinth."¹ MS]
inserted (*fol. 172 (with calculations on*
verso))
 109n.1: *Infinitesimalmethode*, MS] p. 64;
G. M. VII. 323? (*title inserted*)
 109: 5 nearly MS] *above deleted* about (*fol.*
171)
 109: 14 author MS] *after deleted* divine
 109: 25 , strictly speaking, MS] *inserted*
(*fol. 173*)
 109: 28 is anterior to all composition, and
is not formed by the addition of parts
MS] *replaced* has no parts
 109nn.1–3: MS] *where 2 notes were indi-*
cated, 3 were made; there are instructions
to [Quote D. 97] and [Insert p. 2a];
both took place in n.3 with references ex-
panded

- 109n.3: MS] *instruction*: [Directions: on p. 2, “N. E. p. 162; cf. G. II. 305” is to be typed as the beginning of a footnote, to continue as follows:] (*fol. 174*)
- 110n.: MS] *note inserted as fol. 175 (recto) replacing fol. 176 (verso of same leaf)*: [Footnote, end of p. 2] ¶The argument may be put thus: Matter is extended. Thesis: Owing to infinite divisibility, the parts of what is extended are always extended. Antithesis: Since extension means repetition, the parts of what is extended must be ultimately unextended. Synthesis: Reality is not composed of extended matter, but consists of infinite unextended simple substances. Here thesis and antithesis are false, since there is nothing really extended; and for the same reason they are inconsistent with the synthesis. Nevertheless, the infinite plurality of the synthesis only results from supposing some element of truth to be contained in both thesis and antithesis. These are the characteristics of a dialectical argument. (*fol. 176*)
- 110: 9 defended MS] *advocated (fol. 173)*
- 110: 17–19 he often seems to imply, as we have already seen in connection with extension, MS] as we have already seen in connection with extension, he (*above deleted Leibniz*) often seems to imply
- 110: 20 the present question MS] *above deleted* this point
- 110: 22 bear a close analogy to MS] *above deleted* be best described as
- 110: 24 inferred MS] *above deleted* deduced
- 110: 25 inconsistent with each other MS] *before deleted* and with the result. *followed by*: [Insert footnote, p. 2b (110n., *fol. 177*).]
- 110n.: MS] *inserted (fol. 177)*
- 110n.: Now MS] But
- 111: 10 he MS] Leibniz (*fol. 177*)
- 111n.1: MS] *inserted*
- 111n.2: MS] *inserted*
- 111: 32 fractions MS] the fractions (*fol. 178*)
- 111: 34–112: 1 Similarly one half, abstractly taken, is a mere ratio, not the sum of two quarters; the latter is only true of numbered things (G. IV. 491). MS] *inserted*
- 112: 5 (G. IV. 491) MS] *inserted*
- 112: 10–12 It is the confusion of the ideal and the actual, Leibniz says again, which has embroiled everything, and produced the labyrinth of the continuum. MS] *inserted*
- 112: 13–114: 8 60. At this point ... which is extended¹. MS] *inserted as fos. 179–180 (at top of fol. 179, in pencil and deleted in ink*: D. pp. 265–267, § 47 (5th letter to Clarke). *D. reference is used at 120: 35 and in Appendix*)
- 112: 16 something MS] *above deleted* much (*fol. 179*)
- 112: 21 , and even the other integers, are MS] *above deleted* is
- 112: 22 a similar MS] *above deleted* the same
- 112: 30 possible MS] *inserted*
- 112: 30–1 an extension which extends MS] *replaced* the extension of a body whose extension extends
- 112: 8 in MS] *above deleted* of
- 113: 11–12 and, in the end, just as self-contradictory as Newton’s. MS] *inserted (fol. 180)*
- 113: 12–13 A theory free from both these defects is much to be desired, MS] *replaced* If any of you can suggest a theory free from both these defects, I shall be glad to consider it,
- 113: 15 my next chapter. MS] *above deleted* a later lecture.
- 113: 15 to point out MS] *replaced* you to observe
- 113: 17 by Lotze and others MS] *replaced* though I think less clearly, by Lotze and all others
- 113: 19–20 occupied by MS] *inserted*
- 113: 24 He says, what suffices for me, that in space and time there are no divisions but such as are made by the mind [G. II. 278–9]. MS] *inserted*
- 113: 30 part of MS] *inserted*
- 113: 37 parts MS] *after deleted illegible word*
- 114: 8 extended¹. MS] *before deleted*

- extended. [cf. D. 270] (33b)] 114n. was inserted instead
- 114: 9 The MS] *written over* This
- 114: 10 thus MS] *inserted* (fol. 178)
- 114: 11 means MS] *before deleted*, for example,
- 114: 13 76 MS] *inserted*
- 114: 15 Mathematical MS] *inserted*
- 114: 16 possible MS] *inserted*
- 114: 16 for MS] *after deleted* of
- 114: 27 whole MS] *inserted*
- 114n.: MS] *inserted as fol. 181/6a*
- 114: 30–115:1 account of Leibniz MS] lectures (fol. 182, following 178)
- 114n.: follows MS] *after deleted* goes after
- 115: 2 a result MS] *replaced* an outcome
- 115: 4 is MS] *after deleted* may be
- 115: 4–5 The reality of what appears as matter is MS] *above deleted* This
- 115: 15 part MS] *after deleted* whole is pr
- 115: 17 indivisible MS] *after deleted* the
- 115: 26 completely MS] *inserted*
- 115: 31–2 what Leibniz calls semi-mental (G. III. 304) MS] *above deleted* something purely mental (fol. 183)
- 115: 36 “real beings” MS] *above deleted* “purely ideal things”
- 115: 39 161; PL] 161 and MS
- 116: 3 only verbally a whole (G. II. 305) MS] *replaced* not a whole
- 116: 4 *per se* MS] *inserted*
- 116: 5 semi-mental. MS] *before inserted* and *deleted* rather [Insert p. 8a]
- 116: 5–21 In most passages ... (N. E. 149; G. V. 133). MS] *inserted as* (fol. 184/8a)
- 116: 11 separate MS] *after deleted* *dispara*
- 116: 17 single MS] *inserted*
- 116: 27 many MS] *after deleted* other (fol. 183)
- 116: 30 separate MS] *inserted*
- 116: 30 the perception of it MS] *replaced* perception
- 116: 34 every monad MS] *replaced* all the monads
- 116: 35 such MS] *after deleted* their
- 116: 36–7 a multitude in a unity MS] *replaced* multitude in unity
- 117: 5 then MS] *inserted* (fol. 185)
- 117: 10 is MS] *inserted*
- 117: 25 three MS] *written over* two
- 117: 26 my first chapter MS] *replaced* my first lecture (see sec. 111)
- 117: 26 three MS] *written over* two
- 117: 27 that all MS] *after deleted* the doctrine
- 117: 28–9 perception gives knowledge of a world not myself or my predicates, MS] *replaced* perception is in general trustworthy.
- 117: 29–30 logical subject. MS] *before deleted* That previous philosophers had not arrived at the same dilemma, was not due to their greater merit, but to their smaller consistency. Leibniz’s error was one involved in all previous philosophies, and concealed in them only by subsequent errors and by failure to work out necessary results in detail.
- 117: 29–30 (3) that the Ego is an ultimate logical subject. MS] *inserted*

Chapter X

- 118: 4–5 the preceding chapter, the nature of Leibniz’s theory of space and time MS] my last lecture, what Leibniz’s theory of space and time was (fol. 186)
- 118: 5 wish to examine, in this chapter, MS] *replaced* have to examine, today,
- 118n.: in his M. MS] *replaced* in M, being incapable of Leibniz’s thorough-going consistency.
- 118: 20 space MS] *before deleted* and time
- 118: 21 substances MS] *after deleted* spaces and times
- 118: 21 and the spaces MS] *before deleted* and times
- 118: 25 space MS] *before deleted* or time (fol. 187)
- 119: 2 room. MS] *after deleted* place.
- 119: 6 which MS] *after deleted* in
- 119: 15 his MS] *above deleted* Leibniz’s
- 119: 17 D. 252; G. VII. 376–7 PL] D. 252 MS
- 119: 22–3 theory is designed MS] *above deleted* sought
- 119n.: MS] *inserted*
- 119: 23 be MS] is
- 119: 23 Leibniz MS] he

- 119: 26 What, MS] *after deleted* It is su
 119: 34–5 Against regarding space as an
attribute, the real argument is, MS] The
 real (real *inserted*) argument against re-
 garding space as an *attribute* is] *after de-
 leted* This argument (*fol. 188*)
- 119: 36–8 Against regarding space as a
substance, or independent existent,
 Leibniz's favourite argument is MS]
 Leibniz's favourite argument against
 regarding space as a *substance*, or inde-
 pendent existent, is
- 120: 2 Space MS] *after deleted* For
 120: 3 uniform, MS] *inserted*
 120: 15 chapter MS] *above deleted* lecture
 120: 15–16, if they are real, MS] *inserted*
 120: 20–2 And as ... exist MS] *possibly in-
 serted*
- 120: 21 it, MS] it (D. 268),
 120: 24 From that MS] *after deleted* For
 them (*fol. 189*)
- 120: 34 Time, again, is a being of reason
 exactly as much as space, but co- pre-
 and post-existence are something real
 (G. II. 183). MS] *inserted*
- 120: 35–6 265–7 MS] *{written over 266–8}*
 120: 1 precisely MS] *inserted*
 121: 2 to that MS] *inserted*
 121: 4 there is nothing MS] *replaced* noth-
 ing is
- 121: 15 same MS] *inserted* (*fol. 190*)
 121: 16 the MS] *inserted*
 121: 17 this MS] *after deleted illegible inser-
 tion*
- 121: 17–18, on his theory, is neither nec-
 essary nor possible. MS] *replaced* he has
 absolutely no right to.
- 121: 34 more MS] further
 121: 37–8 are unable, owing to obvious
 facts MS] *replaced*, owing to obvious
 facts, are unable
- 122: 23 different points of view MS]
above deleted an objective counterpart
 (*fol. 191*)
- 122: 30 occupying MS] *inserted* (*fol. 192*)
 123: 5 appears MS] *above deleted* seems
 123: 10 had proved the MS] *above deleted*
 saw the
- 123: 12 matter. MS] *before deleted* I can
 123: 13 before his journey to Paris, MS]
above deleted at this time,
- 123: 19 his proofs MS] mind consists
 properly in a point of space, whereas a
 body occupies a place his proofs (*fol.
 193/8*)
- 123: 22 difficulties MS] *above deleted*
 questions
- 123: 22 solve MS] *above deleted* answer
 123: 25 mind MS] *after deleted* body
 123: 33 which reminds one MS] almost as
 gross as that
- 123: 34–6 The mind, he says, must be in
 the place of a concourse of all motions
 which are impressed by objects of sense
 (G. I. 53). MS] *inserted*
- 124: 9 expression MS] *before deleted*
 mathema (*fol. 194*)
- 124: 13–14 seen in perspective MS] *above
 deleted* photographed
- 124: 15–16 to what it is analogous MS] *re-
 placed* what it is analogous to
- 124: 30 After MS] *above deleted* With (*fol.
 195*)
- 124n.2: without disapproval MS] *replaced*
 with evident approval
- 125: 17 assigned to MS] *above deleted*
 derived from
- 125: 38–126: 7 This preposterous ... the
 multitude^e. MS] *inserted as fol. 197*
- 126n.1: hence MS] *above deleted* thus
- 126: 6 *unité* MS] *replaced* *unités*
- 126: 8 of immediate presence in a volume
 MS] *inserted* (*fol. 196*)
- 126: 19 are not MS] *above deleted* is one
 space (*fol. 198*)
- 126: 21 is not only MS] (*after deleted
 illegible word*) is not only
- 127: 4 Time, MS] Concerning time, or
 (*fol. 199*)
- 127: 6 Chapter IV MS] (*yet roman nu-
 meral for chapter no. in upper left corner*)
- 127: 9 lengths MS] *before deleted* are
- 127: 15 events MS] *after deleted* other
- 127: 16 But when MS] *after deleted* The
 (*illegible word*)
- 127: 21 Nor can we say MS] But we can-
 not say either
- 127: 22 since MS] *after deleted* for
- 127: 26–7 D. 281 MS] *inserted*
- 127: 28–9 which actually occur MS]

- inserted* (fol. 200)
- 128: 1 presence in one position in space is MS] *replaced* successive positions in space are
- 128: 2–3 from presence at the position next occupied. MS] *inserted*
- 128: 5, in the usual acceptation of the words MS] *inserted*
- 128: 13 spatial MS] *after deleted* chan
- 128: 14–15 occupied. Exactly the same argument will apply to change in general, and a state of motion or change MS] *replaced* occupied; and a state of motion
- 128: 16 absolutely MS] *after deleted* never
- 128n.: MS] *inserted with* Cf. G. IV. 513. *inserted within insertion*
- 128: 21–2, and that there was probably a first event, i.e. the creation MS] *inserted* (fol. 201)
- 128: 33–4 confusedly by common sense as regards things, MS] *replaced* by common sense
- 129: 5 74. It would thus appear MS] *replaced* Lecture XI. | The Nature of Monads in General. | ¶I endeavoured to prove, in my last lecture, (fol. 202/16)
- 129: 8 giving to the relations among perceptions that counterpart, in the objects of perception, MS] *replaced* giving that counterpart, in the objects of perception, to the relations among perceptions themselves
- 129: 14 and time MS] *inserted*
- 129: 15 they MS] *after deleted* it
- 129n.: MS] *inserted* (fol. 203)
- 129: 24–5 which, according to Leibniz, is on a level with geometrical proofs (G. II. 295), MS] *inserted* (fol. 202)
- 129: 30 argument MS] *replaced* favourite argument
- 130: 7 it MS] *above deleted* they (fol. 204)
- 130: 14 he MS] *after deleted* Leibniz
- 130: 18 between MS] *above deleted* being
- 130: 23 fact MS] *above deleted* case
- Chapter XI**
- 131: 1 Chapter MS] (*Despite the roman chapter no., Lecture does not appear in title but does on 1st line.*)
- 131: 3 I come now to the description MS] *replaced* I come now to the proper subject of this lecture, the description MS] (fol. 205)
- 131: 19 “Since the world MS] *after deleted*, which, moreover, contains a hint as to the objective counterpart of space.
- 132: 3 perceptions. MS] *after deleted* sub (fol. 206)
- 132: 37 fact that ideas of things are in us MS] *replaced* ideas of things existing in us (fol. 207)
- 133: 1–2 what perfectly corresponds to what follows from the things. MS] *replaced* those things which perfectly correspond to those which follow from things.
- 133: 6 might seem to be MS] *replaced* is
- 133: 7 and to amount MS] *replaced* it amounts
- 133: 10 at the end of Chapter X, MS] *above deleted* before *after deleted* above
- 133: 12 synthesis or MS] *inserted*
- 133: 15 We must also suppose that clear perceptions differ from those that are confused by greater resemblance to their objects. MS] *inserted* (*see sec. III for its deletion*)
- 133: 17 was MS] *above deleted* I
- 133: 38 an individual MS] *inserted* (fol. 208)
- 134: 26 that MS] *replaced* of that the (fol. 209)
- 134: 28–135: 2 One of these ... objects of sense. MS] *inserted* (fol. 210)
- 134: 34 when this is admitted MS] *above deleted* therefore
- 135: 12 that MS] *inserted*
- 135: 14 employing MS] *above deleted* using
- 135: 28 in question MS] *after deleted* questionable (fol. 211)
- 135: 29 logical MS] *inserted*
- 135: 30 set forth in Chapters II.–IV. above, MS] *above deleted*, with which I began these lectures,
- 135: 32 each must MS] *replaced* they must each
- 136: 17 present external things MS] *after deleted* truth (fol. 212)
- 136: 19–20 conception MS] *after deleted* pre-

- 136: 20–1 loved to call himself MS] *replaced* called himself
- 136: 22 is MS] *above deleted* was
- 136: 26 clocks, MS] *before deleted* and others
- 136: 27–8 and even in Des Cartes¹. MS] *inserted as fol. 213*
- 136n.: to require MS] *above deleted* worth
- 136: 28 Spinoza MS] *after deleted* Geulinx and (fol. 212)
- 136: 34 not MS] *inserted*
- 137: 1 there MS] *inserted*
- 137: 5 all MS] *inserted*
- 137: 15 long as MS] *after deleted* the (fol. 214)
- 137: 21–31 It is interesting ... pre-established harmony. MS] *inserted as fol. 215*
- 137: 21 It is interesting to MS] *inserted below deleted instruction: [Footnote]*
- 137: 30 may MS] *after deleted* might
- 137: 32 this more allied hypothesis. MS] *replaced* these more allied hypotheses. (fol. 214)
- 138: 5 represents MS] *above deleted* perceives
- 138: 9–10 others (Met. § 66). MS] *replaced* others, like a clock that gains or loses (Met. § 66). (fol. 216)
- 138: 19 number of events MS] *above deleted* quantity of change
- 138: 30 the next chapter. MS] *replaced* my next lecture.
- 138n.: MS] *inserted*
- Chapter XII**
- 139: top left corner: *word-count calculation of 34 × 220 for a result of 7480 with separate figure of 68,000* (fol. 217)
- 139: 1 Chapter MS] *written over* Lecture
- 139: 26 81. The problem MS] *below deleted* Lecture XII. | Soul and Body. (fol. 218)
- 140: 4 Occasionalism MS] *after deleted* the 140n.: MS] *inserted*
- 140: 26 another MS] *replaced* the other (fol. 219)
- 140: 26 set it forth MS] *after deleted* explain
- 140: 35 the body MS] *above deleted* it
- 141: 7–8 distinguished from the first class by memory, feeling, and attention MS] *replaced* not clearly distinguished from the first class, unless by *memory*, and a greater distinctness of perceptions
- 141: 9 Animals have souls, MS] *before deleted* and possibly even plants
- 141: 11 from him MS] *inserted*
- 141: 12–13 self-consciousness or apprehension, by MS] *inserted*
- 141: 14 what is called reason. MS] what is called the possession of reason.
- 141: 17–18 [D. 231. Contrast G. VI 169] MS] *inserted* (see sec. III)
- 141: 18–21 *Spirits* ... knowing it. MS] *inserted*
- 141n.1: MS] *inserted* (fol. 220)
- 141n.2: MS] *inserted*
- 142: 6 the other MS] *replaced* another
- 142: 12 while MS] *inserted*
- 142: 14–27 ¶[The activity ... step to pain.” MS] *inserted as fol. 221*
- 142: 16–17 ; G. V. 195 MS] *inserted*
- 142: 18 whatever MS] *above deleted* only what is active
- 142: 28 Spinoza¹ MS] *after deleted* Des Cartes and (fol. 220)
- 142n.: MS] *inserted*
- 142: 33 He MS] *after deleted* Leibniz (fol. 222)
- 142: 33 , moreover, MS] *inserted*
- 142: 34 cases of MS] *inserted*
- 143: 10 But MS] *inserted*
- 143: 18 the phrase “containing MS] *replaced* to “contain (fol. 223)
- 143: 19–20 in relation both to MS] *replaced* both in relation to
- 143: 21 the changes MS] *after deleted* only those which have
- 143: 22 spirits. MS] *replaced* superior monads.
- 144: 1 passive MS] *after deleted* subject
- 144: 1 final MS] *inserted in pencil*
- 144: 2–3 , but in some correlated change elsewhere. MS] *inserted*
- 144: 14–15 , before we can understand the connection of soul and body, MS] *inserted*
- 144: 18 is that whose MS] *after deleted* *Materia prima*, here, (fol. 224; also at 146: 13–14, 32 (fol. 226))

- 144: 23 monads MS] *after deleted* be
 144: 29 Arnauld, MS] *above deleted* a physicist (De Volder),
 145: 2 that belongs to substance MS] *replaced* corresponds in the substance
 145: 9 monad, and it adheres MS] *replaced* monad. It a
 145n.1: cf. also D. 120. MS] *inserted*
 145: 11 confusedly; MS] *after deleted* distinctly;
 145: 30 the finite MS] *after deleted* thus the finite
 146: 7–8 other substances if these all MS] *replaced* (all *in pencil*) substances if these (*fol.* 225)
 146: 23 in their relation to God MS] *after deleted* to him
 146: 24 must be MS] *above deleted* is
 146: 34 number MS] *above deleted* series
 146: 36 quality MS] *inserted in pencil*
 146: 38 **88.** ¶The MS] ¶ *sign inserted*
 147: 2 required MS] *after deleted* need for necessar
 147: 27–38 There are here ... begin with, MS] *inserted as fol.* 228
 147: 33 his MS] *after deleted* Leibniz's
 147: 33 proceed MS] *after deleted* set
 147: 38 We must, to begin with, MS] *replaced* In the first theory we must, to begin with
 148: 20, 22, 23 volume MS] *in pencil above deleted* area (*fol.* 227; *fol.* 229)
 148: 21 all that MS] *above deleted* what
 148: 31 (i.e. secondary matter), MS] *inserted*
 149: 3, at any given time, MS] *inserted in pencil*
 149: 4 that MS] *in pencil above deleted* those
 149: 6 Body and soul MS] *after deleted* And the
 149: 8 interact. MS] *before deleted* The organized mass, within which is the point of view of the soul, is ready to act of itself at the moment when the soul wills it. This, says, Leibniz, produces the so-called union of soul and body (D. 78). Soul and body follow each its own laws, the one acting freely, the other without choice (G. II. 58). (*its after deleted* the)
 149: 13, Leibniz says, MS] *inserted* (*fol.* 230)
 149: 22 first MS] *inserted*
 149: 28 either MS] *inserted*
 149: 31, apparently, MS] *inserted*
 149: 34–5 To these we must now turn our attention. MS] *replaced* These I must leave to another lecture.
 149: 36 **91.** Though everything MS] *replaced* Lecture XIII. | Details of the Doctrine of Monads | ¶I gave you, in my last lecture, what seems to be Leibniz's theory of soul and body. But I must now confess that, though everything (*fol.* 231)
 149: 36 the above MS] *after deleted* that
 150: 2 necessary MS] *after deleted* essential
 150n.: MS] *inserted*
 150: 22 "principles of life belong only to organic body (D. 163)" MS] *inserted* (*see sec.* III)
 150: 28 Leibniz says, MS] *inserted* (*fol.* 232)
 151: 3 theory MS] *above deleted* doctrine
 151: 12–13 an admission he had already made to Tournemine MS] *inserted*
 151n.: (Erdmann p. 453. Hist. pp. XL, 98) (G. VI. 595), MS] *inserted* (*a different note is at PL, p. 151; MS note was typeset in page proofs with serious (and erroneous) alterations and does not appear in book; see sec. III, 151: 13.*)
 151: 18 something MS] *after deleted* anything
 151: 35–152: 9 The *vinculum substantiale* ... soul (G. II. 481). MS] *inserted as fol.* 234 (*first it was to be inserted at 152: 12 before He was*)
 152: 6–7 afterwards led PL] afterwards compelled, MS] *replaced* compelled, later,
 152: 18 first theory of body MS] theory of body which I gave in my last lecture (*fol.* 233)
 152: 30 And when Arnauld MS] *after deleted* Again (*fol.* 235)
 153: 3 without such MS] *after deleted* the
 153: 15–16 in so far as it is real, is many. MS] is many in so far as it is real. (*fol.*

- 236)
 153: 20 we found inevitable, namely MS] *inserted*
 153: 23 other MS] *inserted*
 153: 32 To these two MS] Two
 154: 3 The latter MS] *above deleted* This last
 154: 33 lose MS] *after deleted* get (fol. 237)
 154: 37 we must deny ourselves this pleasure. MS] *replaced* this pleasure must be denied us

Chapter XIII

- 155: 1 MS] (no "Lecture" to be deleted, yet roman chapter no. in left corner)
 155n.: MS] *inserted* (fol. 238)
 155: 6 underlying MS] *after deleted* at the
 155: 16 ¶The point of view MS] ¶ *sign inserted*
 155: 21 he MS] *above deleted* Leibniz
 155: 23 This is also MS] *above deleted* The same is
 156: 6 us MS] *written over me* (fol. 239)
 156: 16 in it we are PL] *in it we are MS] replaced* it is
 156: 22 the things MS] *the inserted*
 156: 30 , he says, MS] *inserted*
 157: 3 the perceptible MS] *above deleted* that which is perceivable (fol. 240)
 157: 5 finite MS] *inserted*
 157: 7 apparently MS] *inserted*
 157: 8–9 perception MS] *replaced* perceptions (4 times)
 157: 15 a perception MS] *replaced* the perception
 157: 18 may be MS] *above deleted* is
 157: 20 very like MS] *after deleted* which is
 157: 21 denied by Locke and asserted MS] *after deleted* ass
 157: 22 is worth MS] *in pencil above deleted* seems
 157: 25 such that MS] *after deleted* one
 157: 26–7 is confused, MS] *inserted*
 157: 27 the marks MS] *all the marks (all inserted and deleted in pencil)*
 157: 30 conscious MS] *after deleted* able to (fol. 241)
 157: 31 (e.g. N. E. p. 120) MS] *inserted*
 158: 1 minute perceptions PL] minute perception MS] *replaced* a minute

- perception
 158: 3 sufficiently MS] *inserted*
 158: 6 every MS] *above deleted* the
 158: 10 , in reply, MS] *inserted*
 158: 18 confesses, MS] *above deleted* says,
 158: 15–18 The senses, he says, give the material for reflection; we should not think of thought, if we did not think of something else, i.e. of the particular things which the senses furnish (p. 220). MS] *inserted*
 158: 24–7 Leibniz explains that when he says (he says *inserted*) truths are innate, he does not mean simply that the mind has the faculty of knowing them, but that it has the faculty of finding them in itself (N. E. 74–5). It cannot be denied, however, that both in the remainder of this passage, and elsewhere, he falls back into the explanation of truths as psychical dispositions. (e.g. N. E. 84, 105). MS] *inserted* (fol. 242)
 158: 27 the MS] *inserted*
 158: 33 Leibniz. MS] Leibniz. *before deleted* ¶In my next Lecture I shall examine further Leibniz's theory of knowledge, which depends throughout upon confused and unconscious perception.
 159: 2 a MS] *inserted* (fol. 243)
 159: 16 minute and unconscious MS] *after deleted* confused and u
 159: 17 create a difficulty in the MS] *above deleted* have no
 159: 23 true MS] *inserted*
 159: 27 Chapter MS] (no lecture to be replaced)

Chapter XIV

- 160: 1 Chapter PL] Lecture MS (fol. 244)
 160: 6–7 of Chapters II.–IV. PL] with which I began my lectures MS
 160: 7 in MS] *after deleted* of
 160: 11 or, MS] *inserted*
 160: 12 problem MS] *above deleted* question
 160: 13 origin MS] *above deleted* natural history
 160: 15–16, and, as Leibniz truly says, is not preliminary in philosophy (D. 95).

- MS] *inserted* (see sec. III)
- 160: 18 have supposed MS] *replaced* supposed
- 160: 21 might seem MS] *above deleted* also appears
- 160: 23–161: 6 At the same time ... of belief. MS] *inserted as fol. 245*
- 160: 24 Locke is in one sense justified. The MS] *replaced* the
- 161: 1 or MS] *above deleted* of
- 161: 20 explains MS] *above deleted* hints (fol. 244; fol. 246)
- 161: 21 70 MS] *inserted*
- 161: 33 a MS] *above deleted* their
- 161: 35 quite definite, MS] *inserted*
- 161: 35–162: 9 The nearest approach ... [G. V. 99 (N. E. 109)]. MS] *inserted as fol. 247*
- 162: 6 explained MS] *after deleted* which I
- 162: 9 G. V. 99 (N. E. 109) PL] N. E. p. 109; G. V. p. 99 MS
- 162: 9 He MS] *replaced* but he (fol. 246)
- 162: 16 they are MS] *inserted*
- 162: 16 the external MS] *after deleted* externality
- 162: 23 (cf. G. II. 265) MS] *inserted*
- 162: 27 indeed MS] *in pencil above deleted* in fact (fol. 248)
- 162: 32 intellect MS] *above deleted* mind
- 162: 34–163: 1 “It is very true ... [G. V. 23 (N. E. 24) PL] “It is very true ... [N. E. 24] MS] *inserted as fol. 249*
- 163: 1–2 is innate to itself, and therefore contains certain ideas essentially (G. III. 479 N. E. p. 100). MS] *inserted with* N. E. p. 100 *inserted within*
- 163: 12 cannot MS] *above deleted* could not
- 163: 12 a causal MS] *inserted*
- 163: 12 is MS] *above deleted* was
- 163: 18–166: 10 **100**. The doctrine ... aptitudes” (N. E. 105; G. V. 97). MS] *inserted as fos. 250–252*
- 163: 20 while MS] *inserted* (fol. 250)
- 163: 22 theory MS] *above deleted* doctrine
- 163: 22 which are known MS] *inserted*
- 163: 24 theory MS] *above deleted* doctrine
- 163: 35 , it is held, MS] *inserted*
- 164: 9 innate knowledge is only virtual (p. 76), while all MS] *inserted after deleted*
- the
- 164: 10 knowledge MS] *before deleted* of such truths
- 164: 29 this is equally present MS] *replaced* we know (fol. 251)
- 165: 8 particular MS] *inserted*
- 165: 12 ideas MS] *after deleted* these
- 165n.: MS] *inserted on fol. 252*
- 165: 27 exist MS] *before deleted* out (?)
- 165: 28 merely MS] *inserted*
- 166: 6 merely something MS] *inserted*
- 166: 11 in Leibniz, MS] *inserted above deleted* then (fol. 248)
- 166: 20 distinctly MS] *after deleted* already (fol. 253)
- 166: 20 he MS] *above deleted* Leibniz
- 166: 20 He MS] *in pencil above deleted* Leibniz
- 166: 29 ultimate MS] *inserted*
- 166: 31–4 Nothing, he says, should be taken as primitive principles, except experiences and the law of identity, without which last there would be no difference between truth and falsehood (D. p. 94). MS] *inserted* (see sec. III)
- 166: 36 this is only the case, MS] *inserted*
- 167: 10 existence, MS] *inserted* (fol. 254)
- 167: 18 the existence of MS] *inserted*
- 167: 18 is as MS] *replaced* are
- 167: 27 G. IV. 422–6 MS] *inserted*
- 167: 28 422–6). (1684). PL] 422–6). MS
- 167: 30 and MS] *above deleted* of
- 167: 34 is also either *symbolical* or *intuitive* MS] *replaced* adequate knowledge is *symbolical* or *intuitive* or both
- 167: 35 adequate MS] *symbolical*
- 167: 37 me MS] *in pencil* us (fol. 255)
- 168: 25 our MS] *in pencil above deleted* or
- 168: 29 **104**. This MS] *after inserted* ¶ (fol. 256)
- 168: 30 A *real* definition, as opposed to one which is merely nominal, shows MS] *replaced* For a real definition shows (For a *edited in pencil*)
- 168: 38 important MS] *above deleted* good
- 168: 38–169: 6 A definition ... predicated [N. E. p. 325] MS] *inserted* (see sec. III)
- 169: 9 when we say MS] *inserted*
- 169: 16 human MS] *replaced in pencil* a man (*twice*)

- 169: 17 in doubt MS] *after deleted* unable
 169: 21 more MS] *inserted*
 169: 22 bald MS] *before deleted* (p. 328)
 169: 22 thinks MS] seems to think
 170: 7 *à priori* MS] *inserted* (fol. 258 (fol. 257 being out of order—see 186: 26 below))
 170: 14 The MS] *after deleted* Theo
 170: 18 akin to MS] *in pencil above deleted* very much
 170: 23 conception MS] *above deleted* idea
 170: 30 The belief MS] *above deleted* To suppose (fol. 259)
 171: 8 a MS] *in pencil after deleted* that
- Chapter XV**
- 172: 1 Chapter MS] *in pencil above deleted* Lecture (fol. 260)
 172: 3, 4 part MS] *written over* point
 172: 17, Goodness and Wisdom. MS] *replaced in pencil* and Goodness and wisdom.
 172: 20 the four. MS] *replaced* four.
 173n.2: MS] *inserted*
 173: 15 Being MS] *written over* being (fol. 261/2)
 173: 35 The contents MS] *after deleted in pencil* This paper has been supposed (e.g. by Stein) to show that Leibniz was, at that time, specially influenced by Spinoza. For my part, I can see absolutely no grounds for such an inference. (fol. 262)
 173: 35–6, in spite of its early date, MS] *inserted in pencil*
 174: 14–15 A and B are not incompatible, MS] *inserted*
 174: 18 not self-contradictory; MS] *after deleted* poss
 174: 28 in the subject MS] *below inserted and deleted* not (fol. 263)
 174: 30 would have MS] *inserted*
 175: 32 synthetic MS] *after deleted* idea of
 174: 34 actual MS] possible
 175n.: MS] *inserted*
 175: 11 superior MS] *inserted* (fol. 264)
 175: 32 such grounds, however, PL] but such grounds, MS] *replaced* and such grounds,
 175: 34–5 and this Leibniz virtually admits by calling this proof an argument *à posteriori* (D. 224) MS] *inserted* (see sec. III)
 176: 22 an existent MS] *above deleted* the existing (fol. 265)
 176: 27 contingent MS] *underlined in pencil*
 176: 31 the world MS] *after deleted* his (fol. 266)
 176: 32 from it necessarily. MS] *transposed in pencil from* necessarily from it.
 176: 39 274 MS] *inserted*
 177: 4 good MS] *after deleted* right
 177: 3 (G. IV. 438) MS] *inserted*
 177: 19–178: 8 MS] *leaf has no alterations* (fol. 267; at this point fol. 268 is out of order in file—see 187: 25–36)
 178: 13–31 Thus confused ideas ... but also God. MS] *inserted on fol. 269 from fol. 270*
 178: 15–16 God's understanding is MS] *replaced* God is (fol. 270)
 178: 15 region MS] *above deleted* locus
 178: 21 God] God alone, MS] *replaced* God
 178n.: PL] *Monadology in pencil above deleted* Mon. MS] *inserted*
 178: 26, after all, MS] *inserted in pencil*
 179: 13 eternal MS] *inserted*
 179: 20 possible MS] *inserted* (fol. 271)
 179: 28 what he knows MS] *after deleted* this is
 179: 33 Goodness MS] *after deleted* Wisdo
 179n.: MS] *parenthetical reference in text converted to footnote by pencil asterisks*
 180: 4 to MS] *inserted* (fol. 272)
 180: 6 Again, MS] *above deleted* Finally,
 180: 6 identity or MS] *inserted*
 180: 12 consider MS] *after deleted in pencil* I invite you
 180: 18 (D. 225), MS] *inserted*
 180: 21 we MS] *in pencil above deleted* you
 180: 28 studying MS] *inserted* (fol. 273)
 180n.: MS] *inserted from fol. 274*
 181: 1 a MS] *inserted* (fol. 273)
 181: 15 as to MS] *inserted* (fol. 274)
 181: 23 **113.** We have now seen MS] *inserted in pencil below deleted in pencil* Lecture XVI. | The Place of God in Leibniz's Philosophy. *and after deleted* I ended my last lecture by pointing out (fol. 275)

- 181: 24–5 reinforce the above arguments MS] *in pencil above deleted* begin this lecture
- 181: 32 exalted MS] *above deleted* raised
- 181: 34 , on this view, MS] *inserted*
- 182: 13 collapses MS] *after deleted* falls (fol. 276)
- 182: 20 rests on MS] *above deleted* springs from
- 182: 26 nothing, or even meaningless. MS] *replaced* nothing, and even meaningless.
- 182: 27 , on this theory, MS] *inserted in pencil*
- 182: 28 (perhaps) MS] *inserted*
- 183: 9 , or some one else, MS] *inserted* (fol. 277)
- 183: 30 [e.g. G. IV. 486 (D. 79; L. 316)] PL] [e.g. L. 316; G. IV. 486] MS] *inserted with e.g. inserted in insertion*
- 183n.: MS] *inserted* (fol. 278)
- 183: 36 Leibniz merged the first of these functions MS] *replaced* The first of these functions was merged by Leibniz
- 184n.: MS] *inserted and footnoted* (fol. 279)
- 184: 25 necessary MS] *above deleted* eternal
- 184: 26 God's volitions could not MS] *replaced* God not
- 184: 28 though MS] *inserted*
- 185: 15 necessary MS] *after deleted* owed (?) (fol. 280)
- 185: 24 contain MS] *above deleted* have
- 185: 32 it MS] *after deleted* the argument
- 185: 34 it MS] *above deleted* the argument
- 186: 6 attribute MS] *above deleted* predicate (fol. 281)
- 186: 12 passage of the *Discours de Métaphysique* might almost have been written by Spinoza. PL] passages might almost have been written by Spinoza. "All realities and perfections emanate from God by a kind of continual creation." MS] *passage made plural and last sentence inserted*
- 186: 26 pantheism. MS] *before inserted but not retained* And this appears also in the assertion that everything is a product of God and nothing (Erd. Gesch. 64. To Schulenburg).
- 186: 26–187: 8 Leibniz once approaches ... (My italics). MS] *inserted on fol. 281 from fol. 257 (out of order in file); at top: [V. Guhrauer, Leibnizens Deutsche Schriften, I, 411]*
- 187: 25 slips. MS] *before deleted* , the more so as the *custo* (fol. 282)
- 187: 25–36 The usual expressions ... the fact that MS] *inserted on fol. 282 from fol. 268 (out of order in file)*
- 187: 25 usual MS] *after deleted* pl
- 187: 32 the primitive one MS] *replaced* primitive
- 187: 35 if only because MS] *after deleted* from the fact that
- 188: 1 have MS] *inserted* (fol. 282)
- 188: 2 subsequent MS] future
- 188: 4 supposition. MS] *after deleted* remark.
- 188: 24 the truth of MS] *inserted*
- 188: 26–7 quite arbitrary what propositions God is to believe. PL] strictly meaningless to assert that God has any knowledge of the truth MS] of the truth *inserted in pencil* (fol. 283)
- 188: 34 and must MS] *after deleted* but
- 189: 5 its MS] *inserted*
- 189: 25 or MS] *after deleted* and (fol. 284)
- 189n.: MS] *inserted with* , where moral perfection appears as a species of metaphysical perfection *in pencil*
- 190: 7 Ethics MS] *after deleted* do
- 190: 7–8 this work MS] *in pencil above deleted* these lectures

Chapter XVI

- 191: 1 Chapter XVI. MS] Lecture XVII.] II *appears written over to become I in XVI* (fol. 285)
- 191: 5 indeed MS] *inserted*
- 191: 12 his MS] *inserted*
- 191: 14–15 Though I shall treat the subject briefly, MS] *replaced* I shall have to treat the subject briefly, as only one lecture remains for it. But
- 191: 26 term. MS] *before deleted* There are three [three *written over* two] principle (*sic*) meanings which Leibniz attaches to the word. One is self-determination or spontaneity, the second (second

- above deleted other) is freedom from the slavery to passion, the third is the fact that the will is always contingent, not necessary [N. E. p. 179].
- 192: 2 , opposed to necessity, MS] *inserted* (fol. 286)
- 192: 16 distinct MS] *after deleted* free
- 192n.1: MS] *originally in text*
- 192n.2: MS] *inserted*
- 192n.3: MS] *originally in text*
- 192: 36 follow MS] *inserted* (fol. 287)
- 193n.1: MS] *originally in text*
- 193: 4–9 He held also that the indifference of equilibrium would destroy moral good and evil. For it would imply a choice without reason, and therefore without a good or a bad reason. But it is in the goodness of badness of the reason that moral good and evil consist (G. VI. 411). MS] *inserted*
- 193: 16 no MS] *written over in pencil* no
- 193: 17 have spontaneity MS] *after deleted* are spontane
- 193: 23 , accordingly, MS] *inserted*
- 193n.2: MS] *inserted* (fos. 288–289)
- 193: 30 contingency MS] *after deleted* liberty
- 193: 38–9 (Cf. Pollock’s ... distinctions.) MS] *inserted*
- 193: 39–41 [Cf. Pollock’s Spinoza, p. 208. Spinoza has only the opposition *free* or *constrained*, not Leibniz’s further distinctions] MS] *inserted*
- 194: 6 the determined is opposed to it.) PL] what is opposed to this is determined.] MS
- 194: 8 if MS] *above deleted* in case
- 194: 30 that MS] *inserted*
- 194: 44 harmful MS] *after deleted* liberty
- 195n.1: MS] *inserted*
- 195n.1: “By *pleasure* I shall, therefore, hereafter, understand an affection whereby the mind passes to a greater perfection; and by *pain* an affection whereby it passes to a less perfection.” MS] *replaced* “By *joy*, therefore, in what follows, I shall understand the passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection; by *sorrow*, on the other hand, the passion by which it passes to a less perfection”. (*inserted from fol. 291*)
- 195n.1: *ib.* Prop. LIX. Schol. MS] *inserted* before deleted and Hobbes
- 195: 11 innate instincts MS] *after deleted* no innate practical principles, but there are (fol. 290)
- 195n.3: MS] *inserted*
- 195n.3: “We have not endeavour, will, appetite or desire for anything because we deem it good, but contrariwise deem a thing good because we have an endeavour, will, appetite, or desire for it.” MS] *replaced* “We neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything, because we think it to be good, but on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.” (fol. 291)
- 195n.3: Part III MS] *replaced* Bk. III
- 195: 14 pursue MS] *after deleted* follow
- 195: 20 seek MS] *after deleted* seek (fol. 290)
- 195: 28–9 reason only useful in showing MS] *replaced* that reason only shows
- 196: 2 must be MS] *above deleted* is
- 196: 5 necessarily MS] *inserted* (fol. 292)
- 196: 6 the good MS] *after deleted* desire
- 196: 10 supposing that the good means the desired. MS] *replaced* psychological hedonism, i.e. does not suppose that the good means the desired.
- 196: 14 God’s will MS] *replaced* the god’s will
- 196: 26–9 And similarly vice is not the force of action, but an impediment to it, such as ignorance (G. II. 317). In fact, original sin and *materia prima* are almost indistinguishable. MS] *inserted* with PL *replacing* like with such as
- 196: 32 what he does say is that MS] *replaced* he says
- 196: 34 that MS] *inserted in pencil*
- 197: 1 (G. IV. 454) MS] *inserted*
- 197: 3 indicates MS] *after deleted* presents
- 197: 19 , and harmonizes MS] *replaced* ; it (fol. 293)
- 197: 25 fundamental MS] *after deleted* ethically
- 198: 19–20 And hence Leibniz rejects Des Cartes’ principle, that errors depend more on the will than on the intellect

- MS] *inserted with* (D. 52) (*see sec. III; fol. 294*)
- 198: 27 limitation MS] *after deleted*
finitude
- 198: 30 usually MS] *inserted*
- 198n.2: G. VII. 303. *See also the preceding sentence. PL] cf. also the preceding sentence.) MS] inserted*
- 199: 4–6 And in the preceding sentence he has used imperfection and moral absurdity as synonyms. MS] *inserted*
- 199: 12 and should admit the latter while denying the former MS] *replaced* or that the former is denying while the latter is granted
- 199: 19 That is MS] *after deleted* Observe that “physical perfection” is used here in a sense which does not correspond to “physical evil” in the above passage from the Theodicy (*originally footnote that began with reference at 199: 18, since raised to text*) (*fol. 295*)
- 199: 19 right action MS] *replaced* to act rightly
- 199n.: MS] *inserted as fol. 296*
- 200: 4 merely MS] *inserted*
- 200: 5 just MS] *inserted*
- 200: 6 a MS] *above deleted* the
- 200: 6 extension MS] *above deleted*
reality
- 200n.1: MS] *inserted*
- 200n.2: MS] *inserted (fol. 297)*
- 200: 33 he MS] *above deleted* Leibniz
- 201: 1 Ethics PL] Ethic MS] *replaced* Ethics
- 201n.1: MS] *inserted*
- 201: 6 [G. VI. (D. 194)] PL] (e.g. D. 194) MS] *inserted*
- 201: 9 evil MS] *above deleted* bad
- 201: 14 are MS] *above deleted* were
- 202: 18–19 to remain MS] *replaced* remain (*fol. 298*)

II. EXCHANGES IN MOORE’S PAGE PROOFS OF “THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ”

Moore commented to Russell about the page proofs: “As to the proofs, many of the pencil marks were made for my own benefit alone; accordingly I have put a little cross of ink [“X” in sec. III] where I saw reason to suggest an actual correction. I have been through all the Latin passages” (c. May 1900; O’BRIANT, p. 182). Moore and Russell exchanged comments at four places in the page proofs. The underlinings are Moore’s.

Page	PL Proofs	Moore’s Comment	Russell’s Response
149: 2–5	Thus the body consists merely of those inferior monads whose points of view, at any given time, are <u>so near</u> that of the dominant monad <u>that</u> they perceive <i>everything</i> less clearly than it does.	It is not because they are near that they perceive less clearly.	[Yes: nearness is essential, otherwise things in their neighbourhood but remote from the dominant monad would be perceived more clearly by them.]
163: 39–164: 2	It (an argument for the innateness of knowledge) seems to depend upon the radically vicious disjunction that knowledge must be either caused by what is known or <u>wholly uncaused</u> .	Does this represent the doctrine of innateness?	(Yes: since the knowledge is <i>always</i> in the mind, and not only at certain times.)

- 187: In the two passages where Surely G. VII. 502 [G. VII. 502 is the page
27-34 God is called a monad, quoted p. 150 is an- of one of the passages
this does not occur very other case; 'created quoted: the quotation
directly.... The other is monad' being opposite on p. 150 is hardly a
more direct. "The monad to God in its generic new passage]
or simple substance con- definition.
tains in its generic
definition (PP: the genus
perception) and
appetition, and is either
the primitive one or God,
in which is the ultimate
reason of things, or is de-
rivative, *i.e.* a created
monad" (G. VII. 502).
- 287: (PP:) Or, if it is not nec- Surely this makes non- [I agree with you; the
essary that *A* and *B* sense. I think the 'non' passage had puzzled me
should be in the same before possunt should much.]
subject, they cannot be transposed to be-
therefore be in the same fore sint; giving trans-
25-7 subjects.... (PL: In other lation as above.
words, since it is not necessary that *A* and *B*
should not be in the same subject, they can there-
fore be in the same sub-
ject;...)

III. SUBSTANTIVE REVISIONS BETWEEN MANUSCRIPT, PAGE PROOFS
AND FIRST EDITION OF "THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ"

Preface

[first edition pages are in brackets]
xi[v]: 8 growth PL] replaced on PP] devel-
opment MS, PP
xiii[vii]: 4 excellent PL] admirable MS,
PP
xiv[viii]: 2 laid PP, PL] layed MS
xv[ix]: 14 September 1900 PL] August
1900 MS, PP

Chapter I

1n.: (G. VI. 483) PL] *not present* MS, PP
2: 6 discovered PL] found MS, PP
3: 38-9 proof that his system PL] fact that
it MS, PP
4: 2 the permanent PL] perception that it
so follows is the permanent MS, PP
6: 1 then PL] still *with* then inserted in

Moore's hand on PP] then still MS
6: 19 correspondence PP, PL] corre-
spondences MS
6: 21 during PL] thus during MS, PP
6n.1: PL] *not present* MS, PP
6n.4: , Chapter IV PL] *not present* MS,
PP
7: 4 only slight traces remain PL] very lit-
tle trace remains MS, PP
7: 6 write much. PL] write. MS, PP
7n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP

Chapter II

8: 6 seems to be PP, PL] *not present* MS
12n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
13: 4 is the subject PL] *not present* MS, PP
13: 5 or *ratio* PL] *not present* MS, PP
14n.1: PL] *not present* MS, PP

- 14n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 15: 30 belief (2nd occurrence) PL] agnosticism—his limitation of categories to experience, and his belief MS, PP (with Agnosticism)
 15: 31 was largely PL] largely inserted in Moore's hand on PP] —was MS
 17: 21 as we have just seen, PP, PL] *not present* MS
 18: 11 all PL] replaced on PP] one and all MS
 18: 14 to the first type PP, PL] *not present* MS
 18: 17–18 N. E. p. 516; G. V. 429 PL] replaced on PP] Ib. MS
 18n.: Foucher de Careil ... 1854, PL] *not present* MS, PP
 18n.: (D. 175); G. V. 268 (N. E. 309); G. II. 49. PP, PL] N. E. p. 309, D. 175; G. V. 268; II. 49. MS
 19: 12 223 PL] inserted on PP] 222–3 MS
 19: 22 424 PL] inserted on PP] 425 MS
 19: 26 ideas in general PL] replaced on PP] all ideas MS
 19n.: We shall find, when we PL] replaced on PP] I shall show, when I MS
 20: 6 or collections of predicates, PP, PL] *not present* MS
 20n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 20n.: quoted by PL] inserted on PP] *not present* MS
 21: 15–16 relations—relations which can only be expressed in synthetic propositions PP, PL] relations, which always involve synthetic relations MS
 22: 4 that, PP, PL] *not present* MS
 22: 37 analysis PP, PL] the analysis MS
 24: 24 the analytic PL] replaced in Moore's hand on PP] the synthetic MS
- Chapter III**
- 25: 18 held to be PL] replaced on PP] invoked as MS
 26: 5 in fact PL] replaced on PP] in effect MS
 26: 7 who distinguish PL] replaced on PP] distinguishing MS
 26: 18 are PP, PL] is MS
 26: 24 , or PP, PL] and MS
 27: 27 has PL] replaced on PP] had MS
 27: 38 has PP, PL] marked with “?X” in Moore's hand on PP] MS
 28: 8 do so necessarily PL] replaced on PP] necessarily do so MS
 28: 10 journey PP, PL] voyage MS
 28: 25–6 And hence Leibniz often speaks of them as contingent predicates. PP, PL] *not present* MS
 28: 29 little PP, PL] no MS
 28n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 29: 32 essential to PP, PL] the essence of MS
 29: 33 by means PP, PL] , as we shall see, MS
 30: 11 or PL] replaced of on PP] or MS
 30: 13–14 follow necessarily from any other existential proposition, nor yet PP, PL] follow MS
 30: 30–1 causality, asserting all possible causes to be desires or appetites PL] causality, MS, PP (with Moore's “X”)
 30: 32–3 determined by desire for the good PL] final MS, PP (Moore's “X”)
 30n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 31: 6 earlier PP, PL] earliest MS
 31: 7 especially PP, PL] *not present* MS
 31: 13 statement PP, PL] enunciation MS
 31: 13 veritable, PL] replaced on PP] true; MS
 31: 15 kinds PP, PL] sorts MS
 31: 16 Truths PP, PL] The truths MS
 31: 17 ; truths PP, PL] , and those MS
 31: 20 there must also be a sufficient reason for PP, PL] the sufficient reason must also be found in MS
 31: 21 fact PP, PL] facts MS
 31: 21 for PP, PL] in MS
 31: 21–2 which are dispersed PP, PL] spread MS
 31: 22 created beings, in which PP, PL] creatures, where MS
 31: 23 might go on PP, PL] can go MS
 31: 23 endless PP, PL] an unlimited MS
 31: 24 (D. 222–3; L. 235–7; G. VI. 612) PP, PL] (D. 222–3) MS
 31: 27 “Thus far PP, PL] “Up to this time MS
 31: 27 only as mere PP, PL] as simple MS
 31: 28 rise PP, PL] advance MS

- 31: 29 affirms PP, PL] teaches MS
 31: 31 one PP, PL] him MS
 31: 31–2 know things sufficiently PP, PL] sufficiently understand things MS
 31: 33 things are PP, PL] it is MS
 31: 33 being PP, PL] *not present* MS
 31: 34 we are entitled to put will PP, PL] which should rightly be asked would MS
 31: 35 is there PL] *replaced* there is on PP] is there MS
 31: 35 *nothing* PP, PL] nothing MS
 31: 36 *something* PP, PL] something MS
 31n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 32: 2 thus PL] so MS
 32: 2–3 (D. 212–3; L. 414–5; G. VI. 602) PL] 212–3 *replaced* 213 PP] D 213–3 *replaced* 213 in MS
 32: 15 (L. 338; D. 100; G. VII. 302) PP, PL] (L. 339; D. 100) MS
 33: 8 ¶There PP, PL] There MS (*fol. 65/12 did not originally follow fol. 64/11*)
 33: 20 kind of PL] certain MS, PP (*Moore queried* certain)
 33: 28 ideas themselves and its own decrees PL] its own ideas and decrees MS, PP (*Moore’s “X”; he suggests* the ideas themselves and its own decrees)
 33: 31 that PP, PL] that that MS
 33n.: PL] *Spinoza note very different in* PP] *not present* MS
 33n.: The principle of sufficient reason ... Schuller’s account of Spinoza: PL] The principle seems to have developed gradually in Leibniz’s mind. The earliest statement I know of is in a friendly comment on Spinoza [1676]: PP
 33n.: [G. I. 138.] PL] He proceeds, as later (e.g. in the *Monadology*), to the cosmological Argument. As he was already *wont* to speak so, the principle cannot have been new even in 1676. But the connection with *final* causes, which later became more and more important, does not appear in this passage. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 11, 2nd dem. PP] *not present* MS
 34: 3 in contingent matter MS, PP, PL] (*Moore’s “X”; he suggests* and possibly contingent) PP
 34: 12–13 applied to actual existents MS, PP, PL] (*Moore’s “X”*: It would seem also, as applied to possibles)
 34: 14–15 causes, in the sense that actual desires are always directed towards what appears to be best. PL] causes. MS, PP
 34: 33 a degree PL] the degree MS, PP (*Moore’s “X”; he suggests* a degree)
 34: 33–4 (by which the greatest number of things are compossible), PL] *not present* MS, PP
 34n.1: MS, PP, PL] (*Moore’s “X”; he writes*: “See above, p. 23”)
 35: 1 (D. 103; L. 342–3; G.VII. 304) PP, PL] (D. 103) MS
 35: 3 determined by desire for what appears best, PL] final, MS, PP
 35: 8 as well PP, PL] also MS
 35: 11 will PP, PL] , on the other hand, will MS
 35: 13 enquire PL] inquire MS, PP
 35: 24 foundation PL] (*Moore’s “X”; he writes*: “foundation? p. 38”) fundament MS, PP (*also at 116: 16*)
 35n.: amount PL] magnitude MS, PP
 35n.: (*Monadology*, § 41, D. 224) PL] (D. 224) MS, PP
 35n.: In the sentence ... perfection. See Chap. XVI. PL] *not present* MS
 35n.: he speaks of “imperfection or PL] *replaced* Leibniz speaks of “imperfection as *with Moore’s “X” being on* PP
 36: 3 (G. II. 51; § 13) PL] (G. II. 51) MS, PP
 36: 7 continues PL] says MS, PP
 36: 10 ends of God PL] ends MS, PP
 36: 21 preceding PL] last MS, PP
 36: 23–4 , though his design might not have been the best possible PL] *not present* MS, PP
 36: 28–9 This form of causality PP, PL] This MS
 36n.: II PL] *replaced* XI on PP] II MS
 36n.: “I retort,” PL] I retort, MS, PP
 36n.: Leibniz replies, “to PL] *replaced with* ” Leibniz says, “ PP] to MS
 36n.: conception PP, PL] concept MS
 36n.: a possible cause, to conceive ... cause.” PP, PL] an actual cause.” MS

- 37: 4 for its creation PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 37: 8–10 So Leibniz says ... (G. IV. 438)¹. PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 37: 16 his MS, PL] His PP
- 37n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 37n.1: [G. VII.] PL] *inserted on* PP
- 37n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 37: 28–38: 1 produce their effects necessarily. PL] *replaced on* PP] necessarily produce their effects. MS
- 38: 11 anything except God PL] *replaced on* PP] anything MS
- 38: 29 any other PP, PL] any MS
- 39: 3 and 39n.: necessary¹. PL] necessary. *(textual location of note on fol. 73 not specified; note omitted in PP)* MS
- 39: 7 into Spinozism. MS, PP, PL] *queried in Moore's hand on* PP
- 39n.: MS, PL] *not present* PP
- 39n.: necessary, but this conclusion PL] necessary. But in this MS
- 39n.: referring solely PL] referring MS
- 39n.: world. PL] world of creatures MS
- 39n.: make this supposition PL] suppose this MS
- 39n.: further, since we should then PL] further back and MS
- 39n.: necessary, God's goodness would also be necessary PL] itself necessary, it would seem to make God necessarily good MS
- 39n.: itself require a sufficient PL] require a new MS
- Chapter IV**
- 40: 3 chapter PP, PL] lecture MS *(also at 78: 8, 104: 26, 161: 7, 162: 6, 191: 3; see also 199: 26)*
- 40: 9 is PP, PL] is MS
- 40: 20 133). The PL] 132), and that the MS, PP
- 40: 21 it, he says, PL] it MS, PP
- 40: 22 : from PL] . For *replaced as* . From *in Moore's hand on* PP] . From MS
- 40: 22 substance PL] substance, he says, MS, PP
- 41: 10 VI PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] VI MS
- 41: 36 (1) that PL] that (1) MS, PP
- 41n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 42: 2 But he avoids, PL] He avoids, however, MS, PP
- 42: 9 (cf. G. II. 221) PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 42: 14 *support* or *substratum* PP, PL] *support* or *substratum* MS
- 42: 34 are PP, PL] *Moore queried and suggested* must be *on* PP] MS
- 43: 4 individual PL] *Moore's "X" marked misprint*: individual PP] individual MS
- 43: 17 Substance PL] A substance *replaced on* PP] Substance MS
- 43: 34 my PP, PL] the MS
- 44: 28 (L. 300, n.; PP, PL] (L. 300, MS
- 44n.1: philosophers PL] older philosophers MS, PP
- 44n.2: 1st ed. pp. 217, 221; 2nd ed. pp. 201, 205. PP, PL] 217, 221 MS
- 45: 2 capacity PP, PL] power MS *(also at 45: 5)*
- 45: 6 entelechy PL] *Moore's "X" marked misprint* antelechy PP] entelechy MS
- 46: 3 Lotze PP, PL] Lotze and Mr. Bradley MS
- 46n.1: PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 46n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 46: 20 related *necessarily* PL] *necessarily* related MS, PP
- 46: 31–2 either as true or as false PP, PL] as either true or false MS
- 47: 17 connection PL] *Moore's "X" marked apparent misprint in this word on* PP] connection MS
- 47: 37–8 or of continuous simple transition, PL] *Moore's "X" with Latin for this insertion on* PP] *not present* MS
- 48: 1–2 That there should be a persistent law, involving the future states of that which we conceive as the same, PL] *Moore wrote the final reading on* PP *above deleted* That a certain law, involving its future states, persists in a substance, MS, PP
- 48: 5 phrase PP, PL] ordinary phrase MS
- 48: 6 its nature PL] itself MS, PP
- 48n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 49: 11 substances PL] substance MS, PP
- 49n.1: single PL] single *replaced* particular

at both occurrences, 2nd being suggested in Moore's hand on PP] particular MS
 49n.2: PL] *not present* MS, PP
 50: 12 wholly destitute of meaning MS, PP, PL] Moore commented: "It has a meaning but we don't know which?" on PP
 50: 26 temporal predicates PL] predicates MS, PP
 51: 9 eternally MS, PL] Moore's "X" with comment: "It can unless 'eternal' means 'throughout time'." on PP
 51: 28 for Leibniz PL] *not present* MS, PP
 51: 30 existed PP, PL] exists MS
 52: 11 there are substances. PP, PL] substances. MS
 52: 28 all past states, and is big with all future states. It is further a reflection PP, PL] all past and future states, and is a reflection MS

Chapter V (*unlike other chapters, which have one running head, Chapter V employs three different ones*)

54: 12 and that PL] that inserted in Moore's hand after his "X" on PP] that MS
 54: 20 not in nature two PL] in nature not two PP] two MS
 55: 12 also used PP, PL] used also MS
 55: 24 once at least PL] sometimes MS, PP
 55: 26 at other times PL] sometimes MS, PP
 56: 10 rather than PP, PL] rather than to have MS
 57: 1, on Leibniz's theory, place PL] place, on Leibniz's theory, MS, PP
 60: 18 many PP, PL] many MS
 60: 20 must be diversity PP, PL] must (be) of the diversity MS
 60: 20 one PP, PL] one MS
 61: 19 so PL] Moore's "X"; his so replaced as on PP] so MS
 61: 20 accomplish." MS, PL] Moore's "X"; he added closing quotes on PP] accomplish PP
 61: 21 Leibniz PP, PL] he MS
 61n.: PL] in text MS, PP
 62: 8 truths about possible MS, PP, PL]

Moore noted "?X" by the line on PP
 64n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
 65: 4 L. 377; N. E. p. 51; G. V. 49–50 PP, PL] N. E. p. 51; G. V. 49–50 MS
 65: 10 we shall find PL] replaced evidently queried by Moore on PP] evidently MS
 65: 18–19 (L. 380; N. E. 52; G. V. 51) PP, PL] (N. E. 52; G. V. 51) MS
 65n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 65n.1: exist PL] are PP
 65n.1: God, who knows distinctly their essential gradations, PL] God PP
 65n.1: [Guhrauer, *Leibnitz: Eine Biographie*, Anmerkungen zum zweiten Buche, p. 32.] PL] *not present* MS, PP
 66: 30–1 i.e. ... i.e. PL] "itals" in Moore's hand on PP] i.e. ... i.e. MS
 66: 37 (cf. G. III. 573) PL] inserted on PP] *not present* MS
 67: 11 (cf. *supra*, pp. 19, 20) PL] inserted on PP, Moore having commented on the sentence, "The inference is not sufficiently obvious"] *not present* MS
 67: 19 ends of God PL] inserted on PP] ends MS
 67: 22 motion MS, PL] notion PP
 67: 23 motions MS, PL] notions PP
 67n.: § 67.) PP, PL] § 67.) The above passage seems to have escaped Lotze's attention. MS
 68: 23–4 any one PL] precisely similar to deleted with query in Moore's hand on PP] precisely similar to any one MS
 68: 32–3 (though not Causality itself) PL] replaced except Causality itself (with but not Causality itself inserted in Moore's hand at sentence end) PP] except causality itself MS
 68n.: PL] inserted on PP] *not present* MS
 69: 15 good The PL] good. The MS, PP (period lacking in 1st edition and reprints)

Chapter VI

70: 16 Gassendi and Hobbes PP, PL] Gassendi MS
 70: 17–18 L. 300 and D. 72 PP, PL] L. 300 MS
 71: 15 in the *Système Nouveau*: PL] in the inserted in Moore's hand on PP] ("*Système Nouveau*" taken from MS footnote)

- 71: 20–1 *the principles of a real unity* PL] the principles of a real unity MS, PP
- 71: 26–7 *the continuum* PL] the continuum MS, PP
- 71n.1: L. 300; D. 72; G. IV. 478; cf. also *Archiv. für Gesch. der Phil.* I. 577 [L. 351–2]. PP, PL] L. 300; G. IV. 478. Cf. also L. 351–2. MS
- 72: 10 the whole of PL] *inserted on* PP] this entire MS
- 72: 24 might happen PP, PL] are possible MS
- 72: 25 *ca.* PL] *inserted on* PP] *not present* MS
- 72: 34 suitable PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] sufficient MS
- 73: 5–6 would have been PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] were MS
- 73: 13 ...regards all the aspects of the world PL] *replaced on* PP] perceives the universe MS
- 73: 14 in all possible ways PL] *replaced on* PP] from each point of view MS
- 73: 15 seen from PL] seen *inserted on* PP] from MS
- 73: 16 sees fit to make PL] *replaced on* PP] makes MS
- 73: 17 produce PL] *replaced on* PP] produces MS
- 73: 18 but it PL] but *inserted on* PP] it MS
- 73: 27 only PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] so much MS
- 73: 27–8 but also PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] [i.e. metaphysical necessity] as MS
- 73: 35 D. 102, 103; L. 340, 341 PL] *replaced* D. 101, 103; L. 340, 343 *on* PP] D. 101, 103; MS
- 73n.: PL] *inserted on* PP] *not present* MS
- 74n.: D. 86; PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 74n.: neither PL] *replaced never on* PP] neither MS
- Chapter VII**
- 75: 10 (cf. G. IV. 106) PL] *inserted on* PP] *not present* MS
- 76: 34 dominates PL] *replaced nominates in Moore's hand on* PP] dominates MS
- 77: 25 the Marquise du Chatelet, PP, PL] his “divine Emily”, the Marquise du Chatelet, MS
- 77n.2: This results *e.g.* PL] *replaced on* PP] at (*sic*) least this would seem to result MS
- 77n.2: (G. I. 58). PL] *moved from* G. I. 321 and G. I. 58 *on* PP] G. I. 321 MS
- 77n.2: appears also PL] *replaced as* also appears *on* PP] appears MS
- 77n.2: Again in PL] *inserted on* PP] In MS
- 77n.2: *Entwicklungsgang* PP, PL] (*misprint*) *Entwicklungsgang* MS (fol. 129/5)
- 78: 27 G. IV. 395; G. M. VI. 100 PP, PL] G. IV. 395 MS
- 78n.: Cf. G. IV. 106 (1669): “The definition of a body is that it exists in space.” Also *Ib.* 171 (1670). PL] *inserted on* PP] *not present* MS
- 78n.: Leibniz appears ... Eucharist ... p. 77. PL] He *replaced* Leibniz *on* PP] *not present* MS
- 79: 3 (*ib.*) PL] [N. E. 701; G. M. VI. 100] MS, PP
- 79: 5 force PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] power MS
- 79: 5–6 the active constitutes PP, PL] active MS
- 79: 6 Passive force is that very PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] Passive power is the MS
- 79: 11 *materia prima* PP, PL] *primary matter* MS (also at 79: 30, 103: 3, 103: 11, 103: 15, 103: 16–17, 144: 14, 145: 25)
- 79: 26 asserts PL] continues MS, PP
- 79n.: See L. 352–3; N. E. 678; PL] N. E. 678 *inserted on* PP] See L. 352–3; MS
- 79n.: G. M. VI. 240. PL] G. Math. VI. 240 MS, PP
- 80: 16 N. E. 678; G. M. VI. 241 PL] 241 *replaced on* PP] G. M. VI. 240 MS
- 80: 25 ; G. IV. 369 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 80n.2: scarcely less PL] *replaced on* PP] no less MS
- 80n.2: , when repelled from PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] repelled by MS
- 80n.3: [G. III. 69] PL] *added after Moore's call for reference on* PP] *not present* MS
- 81: 3 235 PL] *replaced on* PP] 234 MS
- 81: 21 ; G. VI. 540 PP, PL] *not present* MS

- 81: 36 Statics PL] *capitalized with Moore's query on PP*] statics MS (also at 82: 2)
- 82: 3 (N. E. 675; G. M. VI. 239) PL] (G. M. VI. 238) MS, PP
- 82: 13 always PL] *inserted on PP*] *not present* MS
- 82: 16 equality PL] principle of the equality MS, PP
- 82: 16 analytical Calculus PL] analytic calculus MS] analytic Calculus PP
- 82: 18–19 mechanical Algebra by the use of this axiom PL] Mechanical Algebra *in Moore's hand on PP*] algebraic Mechanics MS
- 82n.1: p. 10, and Foucher de Careil, *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza*, p. lxiv. PP, PL] p. 10 MS
- 82n.3: 211–5 PL] 212–5 MS, PP
- 83: 3 were PL] are MS, PP
- 83: 15 has an endeavour PP, PL] makes an effort MS
- 83: 17 ; G. IV. 511 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 84: 4–5 argument in favour of force PL] argument MS, PP
- 84: 14 ; G. IV. 369 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 84: 24 (*Ib.*) PP, PL] [D. 60, 61] MS
- 84n: See Newton, *Principia*, Scholium to the eighth definition. Contrast, in Clerk Maxwell's *Matter and Motion*, Arts. XVIII, CV. PL] *comma after Contrast inserted in Moore's hand on PP*] *not present* MS
- 85: 3–4 *that the total ... cause* PL] *italics and closing quotes inserted in Moore's hand PP*] *no italics* MS
- 85: 4 353 PL] 354 MS, PP
- 85: 11 251–2 PL] 252 PP] 232 MS
- 85: 15 than do PP, PL] than MS
- 85: 20 G. M. VI. 248 PL] G. M. VI. 247 PP] *not present* MS
- 86: 4 ; G. VII. 404 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 86: 17 not, PL] *comma added in Moore's hand PP*] not MS
- 86: 25 its effect PL] effect MS, PP
- 86: 25 ; G. II. 137 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 86: 36 shall PL] *inserted in Moore's hand on PP*] *not present* MS
- 86: 38 ; G. IV. 369 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 86: 39 ; G. VII. 404 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 87: 6 ; G. VII. 401–2 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 87: 30 235 PP, PL] 234 MS
- 87: 38 even if we are not PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] unless we are MS
- 88: 1–2 it be produced in the bodies PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] this force in bodies be produced from MS
- 88: 3 the PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] a MS
- 88: 6 constitute the very essence of PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] produce MS
- 88: 6 relevant that PP, PL] necessary because MS
- 88: 9 it never exists as a whole, since PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] a whole never exists, when it MS
- 88: 11 at all is real in it, except that momentary property PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] is so real in itself, as that momentary increment MS
- 88: 26–7 ; G. M. VI. 247 PL] *replaced the 246 on PP*] *not present* MS
- 88: 29 ; G. M. VI. 252 PL] *replaced the 251 on PP*] *not present* MS
- 88: 38 ; *Archiv.* I. 577 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 88n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 89: 29 fluid. PL] *deletion of remainder of MS reading on PP*] fluid—or rather, of all pervading fluids, for three were needed in his theory (Wundt op. cit. p. 30; Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis, G. M. VI.). MS
- 89: 35–6 ; G. M. VI. 230–231 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 90: 8 ; G. M. VI. 228 PL] *replaced the 229 on PP*] *not present* MS
- 90: 11 suggests PP, PL] bases MS
- 91: 13–15 all matter consists of material points, and all action is action at a distance. These material points PP, PL] material points attract at ordinary distances, and repel at very small distances. They MS
- 91: 17–18 attraction or repulsion PP, PL]

- attraction MS
- 91n.1: p. 224 ff. PP, PL] p. MS
- 91n.3: Boscovich differs from Newtonian Dynamics chiefly in assuming that, at very small distances, the force between two particles is repulsive. He differs from the Newtonian *philosophy* by regarding action at a distance as ultimate. PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 92: 6 155–7 PL] 156, 157 MS, PP
- 92: 21–2 ; G. V. 140 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 92: 26 ; G. VII. 356, 378 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 92: 28 less theological PL] more mathematical MS, PP (*where Moore queried mathematical*)
- 92: 32 ; VII. 378 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 92: 35 ; G. VII. 372 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 93: 14–15 A man will have an equal right to say that anything is PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] It can be said that anything is, by an equal title, MS
- 93: 15–16 or time PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] and time MS
- 93: 16–17 ; G. IV. 507 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 93: 24 in Leibniz's PL] *replaced in Moore's hand with a query* PP] on Leibniz's MS
- 93n.: ; L. 385; G. V. 52 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 93n.: It should indeed be PP, PL] It is indeed MS
- 94: 17 ; G. IV. 512–3 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 94n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 95: 4 ; G. M. VI. 237 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 95: 4–6 PL] *Moore deleted quote marks around this on PP*] *only closing quotes on* MS
- 95: 14–15 occasion of something external PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] external occasion MS
- 95: 19 belongs PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] corresponds MS
- 95: 27 by the one an occasion is furnished to the action of the other, which is PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] by the action of one an occasion is furnished to the other for MS
- 95: 28 ; G. M. VI. 251 PL] *replaced the 250 on PP*] *not present* MS
- 95: 31 , which is a modification of the former, is PL] is a modification of the former, MS, PP
- 96: 3–4 *soul or substantial form* PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] substantial soul or form MS
- 96: 4 for this very PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] indeed this MS
- 96: 8 ; G. M. VI. 236 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 96: 8 conserved" PL] *Moore supplied quotes on PP*] conserved" MS
- 96: 19 N. E. 702; PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 96n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 97: 4 however MS, PL] *not present* PP
- 97: 17 motion PL] *Moore replaced notion on PP*] motion MS
- 97: 25 ; D. 227; G. VI. 617 PL] *Moore's "X" marked a punctuation misprint on PP*] *not present* MS
- 97: 34 Berkelian PL] *corrected in Moore's hand on PP*] Berkleian MS
- 97n.: 112. PL] *replaced on PP*] 112; IV. 115. MS
- 98: 13 since PL] as MS, PP
- 98: 23 (unless the descriptive school is in the right) PL] (*pace* the descriptive school) MS, PP
- 98: 35 in the words: PL] , when he says MS, PP

Chapter VIII

- 100: 11 (L. 21) PL] (p. 20) MS, PP
- 100: 28 aggregate PL] aggregation MS, PP
- 100: 28–101: 1 ; G. VI. 607 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 101: 10 enquire PL] inquire MS, PP
- 101: 14 (cf. G. II. 261) PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 101: 17–18 "A body can change space, but cannot leave its extension" (D. 263; G. VII. 398) PL] A body can change its space, but not its extension (D. 263; G. VII. 398) PP] A thing can change its space, but not its extension

(D. 262) MS
 101: 20 ; G. VII. 399 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 101: 24 after PL] *after* MS, PP
 101: 24 doctrine of extension PL] doctrine on monads MS, PP
 102: 8 (p. 78) PL] *not present* MS, PP
 102: 17–18 to which it belongs to be PL] which is MS, PP
 102: 22 substance itself, PL] substance MS, PP
 102: 23–4 ; G. IV. 467 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 102: 32 ; G. IV. 394 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 103: 1 ; F. de C. 28–30 PL] *not present* MS, PP (*where space left for reference*)
 103: 3 in virtue PP, PL] only in virtue MS
 103: 12–13 monad and the general property of activity PP, PL] monad MS
 103: 14 these qualities. PP, PL] this quality. MS
 103: 19 namely PP, PL] they must have MS
 103: 24–5 presupposes beings endowed with a true unity, since it only derives its reality from that of PL] derives its reality from those MS, PP
 103: 26 will have PL] has MS, PP
 103: 27 a being by aggregation. PL] an aggregate. MS, PP
 103: 28 ... (*sic*) or PL] or MS, PP (*also at 103: 29*)
 103: 32 atoms PL] *replaced in Moore's hand, commenting*: “Not according to Epicurus, whose atoms differ in shape and size” *after underlining* indiscernible PP] the atoms of Epicurus MS
 103: 39–104: 3 At the same time ... without reality PP, PL] *deleted and statted* MS
 104: 24 XI PL] X MS, PP
 105: 2 together form PL] form MS, PP
 105: 4 exact PL] so in reality MS, PP
 105: 7 would PP, PL] could MS
 105: 8 ; L. 310–1; G. IV. 482 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 105: 35 or PL] of *queried in Moore's hand on PP*] or MS
 106: 2 ; L. 301; G. IV. 479 PL] ; L. 302; G. IV. 479 PP] *not present* MS

107: 4–5 he regarded as PL] is MS, PP
 107: 6 That PL] For *queried in Moore's hand suggesting* “That” PP] For MS

Chapter IX

108: 8 *i.e.* PL] but MS, PP
 108: 9 , but composed PL] composed MS, PP
 108: 22 *Théodicée* PL] Theodicy MS, PP
 108: 28 he PP, PL] Leibniz MS
 108: 26 nothing but PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] unless MS
 109: 1 and no PL] and *inserted in Moore's hand on* PP] no MS
 109: 3 that labyrinth PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on* PP] these MS
 109: 10 ; G. I. 416 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 109: 13 nature PL] it MS, PP
 109n.1: G. M. VII. 326 PL] G. M. VII. 328? MS, PP
 109n.2: ; V. 144 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 109n.3: G. V. 144 PL] G. V. 144. Cf. G. II. 305. PP] cf. G II 305 MS
 109n.3: the following passage PP, PL] also MS
 109n.3: greater PL] larger MS, PP
 109n.3: (D. 97; N. E. 16–17; G. V. 17; Erdmann's edition, p. 138. G.'s text appears to be defective). PL] (D. 97; N. E. 16–17; G. V. 17). PP] *not present* MS
 110: 1 ; G. V. 143–5 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 110: 8 consistent with PL] correspond to any MS, PP (*Moore queried this*)
 110n.: (The argument is stated almost exactly in this form in G. VII. 552.) PP, PL] *not present* MS
 111: 6 ; G. IV. 394 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 111: 35 compounding PL] composition of MS, PP
 111n.2: Cf. G. M. IV. 89 ff. PL] Cohen, p. 62. *deleted on* PP] Cf. G. Math. IV. 89 ff. Cohen, p. 62. MS
 112: 36 result from emphasizing PL] *replaced on* PP] proceed from the neglect of MS
 113: 26 9)]. PL] 278–9). *with Moore adding a queried parenthesis on* PP] 278–9). MS

- 114: 13–14 (D. 64, 76; L. 311; G. I. 416; II. 279; IV. 482) PP, PL] (D. 64, 76; G. II. 279) MS
- 114: 24 bare PP, PL] mere MS
- 114n.: (D. 270; G. VII. 404). Leibniz's views on intensive quantity were, however, by no means clear. PP, PL] (D. 270). MS
- 115: 38 or line or other PL] either of line or of any other MS, PP
- 117: 8 aggregates PL] *Moore drew a line to 117n. where infinite aggregates appears* PP] number MS, PP
- 117: 26 Chapter I. (p. 4) PL] my first chapter MS, PP
- 117n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
- Chapter X**
- 118: 14 ; G. VII. 363 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 118: 18 assumes, PP, PL] proceeds MS
- 118: 19 that PP, PL] on the assumption that MS
- 119: 7 (D. 263; G. VII. 398) PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 119: 17 ; G. VII. 376–7 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 119: 20–1 (ed. Hartenstein, 1867, Vol. III. p. 59) PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 119: 25 substancesⁿ PL] substances themselvesⁿ MS, PP
- 119: 25 ; G. VII. 373 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 119: 33–4 ; G. VII. 399, 372 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 7 ; G. VII. 364 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 10 ; G. VII. 373 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 13 ; G. VII. 372 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 22 ; G. VII. 402 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 30 ; G. VII. 415 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 120: 35–6 ; G. VII. 400–402 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 121: 8 illusion PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] allusion MS
- 121: 12 ; G. VII. 404 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 121: 34 ; G. VII. 400 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 122: 24 that PP, PL] than MS
- 122: 35 not yet PL] not MS, PP
- 122n.1: PL] *combining 2 overlapping footnotes at 122: 12, 13* MS, PP
- 122n.2: Cf. G. II. 253, 324, 339, 438; IV. 439, 482–3 (D. 76; L. 311), 484–5 (D. 78; L. 314); VII. 303–4 (D. 102; L. 340–2). PL] D. 76, 78, 122, 102; L. 311, 314, 340–2; G. IV. 482–3, 484–5, 513; VII. 303–4, II. 339, 253, 324, 438; IV. 439. PP] Cf. D. 76, 78, 102, 122; G. II, 339, 253, 324, 438; IV, 439 MS
- 123n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 124: 6 ; L. 311; G. IV. 382–3 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 124: 7 ¶But PP, PL] But MS
- 124: 13 *as it were* PP, PL] as it were MS
- 124: 14 G. II. 438; III. 357 PL] G. III. 357; II. 438) MS, PP
- 124: 18 thinks PP, PL] says MS
- 124: 21 (N. E. 230–1; G. V. 205–6) PP, PL] (N. E. 231) MS
- 124: 28 some body PL] the body MS, PP
- 124: 28 divisible PL] divided MS, PP
- 124: 30 ; G. VII. 365–6 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 125: 1 (N. E. 230; G. V. 205) PP, PL] (N. E. 231) MS
- 125: 17 unity or plurality PL] unity or *inserted in Moore's hand on PP*] unity or plurality MS
- 126: 32 became necessary PL] remained MS, PP
- 126n.1: Leibniz, however, rejected with ridicule the view, which seems to follow from this theory, that souls are extended. See D. 267; G. VII. 402. PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 126n.2: Cf. D. 102; L. 340–2; G. VII. 303–4; II. 379. PP, PL] Cf. D. 102; G. II. 379. MS
- 127: 5 VII. 364; PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 127: 10 *before* and *after* PP, PL] *before* and *after* MS
- 127: 26–7 ; G. VII. 415 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 127: 30 ; G. V. 142 PP, PL] *not present* MS

- MS
 128: 1 elapses: PL] elapses, though MS, PP
 128: 2 temporal distance, but not by a temporal length (*v. p. 112*). PL] temporal distance MS, PP
 128: 22–3 (D. 274; G. VII. 408) PP, PL] (D. 268) MS
 129: 21; G. II. 135 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 129: 22 with Kant PL] in Kant MS, PP
 129: 23 for PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP]* for MS
 129: 23 difference PP, PL] differences MS
 129: 27–8; L. 221; G. VI. 608 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 130: 4–5; L. 341; G. VII. 304 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 130: 6; G. VII. 377 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 130: 15; G. VI. 598 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 130: 17 actions PL] activities MS, PP
 130: 17 which PP, PL] and which MS
- Chapter XI**
 131: 6; G. VI. 598 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 131: 8 cannot PL] could not MS, PP
 131: 10–11 representations PL] the representation MS, PP
 131: 18–19; G. VI. 599 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 131: 20 every PL] each MS, PP
 131: 21–2 is affected by the other through reaction. PL] each, through reaction, is affected by every other. MS, PP
 131: 26–7, according to such a system as his, PL] *not present* MS, PP
 132: 7 “Souls PL] “The soul MS, PP
 132: 8 them PL] it MS, PP
 132: 9 things without” PP, PL] them MS
 132: 9; G. VII. 375 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 132: 10 Cf. D. 275–6 PP, PL] Cf. *ib.* 275–6 MS
 132: 10; G. VII. 410 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 132: 10–12 “What is miraculous, or rather marvellous is that each substance represents the universe from its point of view” (G. III. 464). PP, PL] *not present* MS
 132: 21; G. VII. 410 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 132: 23 plurality PL] *replaced in Moore's hand with a query on PP]* a multitude MS
 132: 23 *l'expression de la multitude dans l'unité* PP, PL] (*no italics*) MS
 132: 27 It is thus that PL] Thus MS, PP
 132: 39 a faculty PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP]* this power MS
 133: 1 such PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP]* so MS
 133: 5 have confirmed PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP]* confirm MS
 133: 5 G. VII. 264 PL] G. VII. 263–4 MS, PP
 133: 15 emphasized. PL] *sentence deleted in Moore's hand, citing p. 157n., on PP]* emphasized. We must also suppose that clear perceptions differ from those that are confused by greater resemblance to their objects. MS, PP
 133: 22; L. 301; G. IV. 479 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 133: 24 (D. 210; L. 409; G. VI. 599) PL] (D. 209; L. 407; G. VI. 598) PP] (D. 209) MS
 133: 32–3 causes (or grounds) PP, PL] causes MS
 133n.: E.g. *Reine Vernunft*, ed. Hartenstein, 1867, p. 349. PP, PL] e.g. 2nd ed. p. 522 MS
 134: 1–6 “I do not ... future” PL] *no quote marks* MS, PP
 134: 15 whole PL] all the MS, PP
 134: 18–21 “If I could ... me” PL] *no quote marks* MS, PP
 135: 7 aperture PL] passage MS, PP
 135: 9; G. VII. 410 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 135: 13–14 D. 276; G. VII. 410 PP, PL] D. 275 MS
 137: 10 *à priori*: only PL] *à priori*, since only MS, PP
 137: 22 Part PL] Bk. PP] Book MS
 137: 26–7 constituting PL] *replaced in*

Moore's hand on PP] contributing MS
 137: 39 at the PL] from the MS, PP
 138: 4–5; G. VII. 412 PP, PL] *not present*
 MS
 138: 10 (Met. § 66). PP, PL] (Met. § 66),
 like a clock that gains or loses. MS
 138n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS

Chapter XII

141: 8–9 (D. 190–1; G. VII. 529; D. 220;
 L. 230; G. VI. 610) PP, PL] (D. 191
 and 220) MS
 141: 11 man MS, PL₃₇₊] men PP, PL
(revision in BR's hand in his library copy
of PL)
 141: 17–18 [G. VI. 621–2 (D. 231; L.
 267–8); contrast G. VI. 169] PL] (G.
 VI. 622 (D. 231; L. 267–8); contrast G.
 VI. 169) PP] [D. 231. Contrast G. VI.
 169] MS
 141: 19 memory of self PL] of self *inserted*
on PP] memory MS
 141: 25–6; L. 317; G. IV. 486 PP, PL] *not*
present MS
 141: 26–8 “the domination ...
 perfections” PP, PL] *no quote marks*
 MS
 141: 28–31 “Modifications ... other” PP,
 PL] *no quote marks* MS
 141: 34 and PP, PL] i.e. MS
 142: 8 the superior monad PL] *Moore*
queried it on PP] it MS
 142: 9 others [G. VI. 615 (D. 225; L.
 245)] PL] (G. VI. 615 (D. 225; L.
 245)) PP] other monads (D. 225) MS
 142: 18 nature PL] depths MS, PP
 142: 30 plain PP, PL] evident MS
 142: 34 But PP, PL] Both MS
 143: 23 mainly PL] *replaced on PP]* only
 MS
 143n.1: G. IV. 454; V. 171 (N. E. 190–1);
 F. de C. 62 (D. 182). PL] N.E. 191; D.
 182; G. IV. 454; V. 171. PP] N. E. 191;
 D. 182; G. IV. 454 MS
 143n.2: Cf. § 15, *supra*. PL] *not present*
 MS, PP
 143n.3: was often PL] is often MS, PP
 143n.4: PL] *inserted on PP]* *not present* MS
 144n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 144n.2: G. II. 520, 248; VI. 546 (D. 169).

PP, PL] (D. 169; G. II. 520, 248) MS
 145: 3–4 introduces into the theory of
 monads PP, PL] uses MS
 145: 12–13; G. VII. 322 PP, PL] *not pre-*
sent MS
 145: 15 or passibilities PL₃₇₊] and possi-
 bilities MS, PP, PL] (*revisions in BR's*
hand in his library copy of PL)
 145n.1: G. IV. 511 PL] *not present* MS, PP
 145n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 146: 5 perceived PP, PL] perceives MS
 146: 23–4 God (G. IV. 439; II. 438), and
 the same must be true of the parts of
 time. PL] God, and the same must be
 true of the parts of time (G. IV. 439; II.
 438). MS, PP
 147: 1–4 “If ... laws” PP, PL] *no quote*
marks MS
 147: 3 This order PP, PL] This MS
 147: 7; G. VI. 546 PP, PL] *not present*
 MS
 147: 20–1; G. V. 105–7 PP, PL] *not pre-*
sent MS
 147: 31–2 first set forth PL] set forth first
 MS, PP
 147: 38 We PP, PL] In the first theory,
 we MS
 148: 1–3 unity. It is as regards the nature
 and degree of this unity that the two
 theories differ. PP, PL] unity. MS
 148: 9–10 [G. VI. 599 (D. 209; L. 408);
 G. II. 100; IV. 492] PP (with outer ()),
 PL] (D. 209. G. II. 100; IV. 492) MS
 148: 10–11 In the first theory, the
 dominant PL] The dominant MS, PP
 148: 14–15 [G. VI. 598 (D. 209; L. 407)]
 PL] (G. VI. 598 (D. 209; L. 406)) PP]
 (D. 208) MS
 148: 18–19 [G. II. 74; G. VI. 599 (D. 210;
 L. 409)] PL] (G. II. 58, 74; G. VI. 599
 (D. 210; L. 409)) PP] (G. II. 58, 74; D.
 210) MS
 148: 22 do any PL] any MS, PP
 148: 29 [G. VI. 619 (D. 229; L. 258)] PP,
 PL] (D. 229) MS (*Where PP differs only*
by the final substitution of square brackets
for parentheses, such variants are no
longer separately recorded.)
 148: 33 [G. VI. 543 (D. 167)] PP, PL]
 (D. 167) MS

- 148: 34 [G. V. 214 (N. E. 240)] PP, PL] (N. E. 240) MS
- 148n.1: G. VI. 539 (D. 163); G. V. 309 (N. E. 362); G. II. 75, 100. PP, PL] (N. E. p. 362; D. 163; G. II. 75, 100) MS
- 149: 5–6, since every monad perceives most clearly what is in its own neighbourhood. PL] *inserted in light of Moore's comment*: "It is not because they are near that they perceive less clearly." on PP] *not present* MS, PP
- 149: 8 (what is impossible) PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 149: 8–10 "Bodies ... other" PP, PL] *no quote marks* MS
- 149: 9–10 souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if the one influenced the other" [G. VI. 621 (D. 230; L. 264)] PL] ... G. VI. 612 PP] bodies, and each as if they influenced each other (D. 230) MS
- 149: 14 [G. IV. 484 (D. 78; L. 314)] PP, PL] (D. 78) MS
- 149: 20–1 [G. VII. 412 (D. 278)] PP, PL] (D. 278) MS
- 150: 9; F. de C. pp. 32, 34 PL] *Moore's "X"; he suggested referring to G.* PP] *not present* MS, PP
- 150: 20; N. E. 701 PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 150: 21 some PL] an MS, PP
- 150: 22 bodies PL] body MS, PP
- 150: 23 G. VI. 539 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 150: 33–151: 2 "The number ... phenomena" PP, PL] *no quote marks* MS
- 150: 34 beside PP, PL] besides MS
- 150: 35–6 of the sheep, for example, PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 151: 2 results PL] result MS, PP
- 151: 8 Leibniz's PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] the MS
- 151: 12 organic body PL] body MS, PP
- 151: 13 (G. VI. 595) PL] *footnote removed on this proof page (and replaced at 151n.)*: Erdmann, *Geschichte*, pp. 453, x. 1, 98; G. VI. 595. PP] (Erdmann p. 453. *Hist. pp.* X151L, 98) (G. VI. 595) MS (*see "Bibliographical Index" below for this reference*)
- 151: 21 some real thing which PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] something which really MS
- 151: 26 can thus PL] can MS, PP
- 151: 30 us to PL] to *inserted in Moore's hand on PP*] us MS
- 151n.: Cf. the schedule of all entities, G. II. 506. PL] *replaced n. at 151: 13 PP*] *not present* MS
- 152: 4–6 the mass. There is one *vinculum substantiale* for each organic body, *i.e.* one corresponding to each dominant monad (G. II. 481, 486, 496). PP, PL] the mass. MS
- 152: 6 (G. II. 481, 486, 496). PP, PL] (G. II. p.) MS
- 152: 7 led PL] compelled, MS, PP
- 152: 7 bond PL] *replaced on PP*] form MS
- 152: 9 (G. II. 481) PL] 481 *inserted on PP*] (G. II. p.) MS
- 152: 9 In later PL] ¶In later MS, PP
- 152: 16 (cf. G. II. 499) PL] *not present* MS, PP
- 152: 25–6 "The body ... aggregation" PP, PL] *no quote marks* MS
- 153: 2 that I say about true PL] I say about veritable MS, PP
- 153: 20 space (§ 71) PL] space MS, PP
- 153n.1: PL] as I should prefer to say *marked in Moore's hand to be transposed on PP*] *not present* MS
- 153n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 154: 7 ¶[There PP, PL] There MS
- 154: 11 Preformation PP, PL] *Preformation* MS

Chapter XIII

- 155: 23 [G. VII. 531; (D. 193)] PP, PL] (D. 193) MS
- 155: 28; G. V. 148 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 156: 2 G. V. 101; PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 156: 13–14 [G. V. 46 (N. E. 47; L. 370); G. VI. 600 (D. 211; L. 411)] PL] L. 369 in PP] [N. E. p. 47][D. 211] MS
- 156: 22–3 (N. E. 48; L. 373; G. V. 48) PP, PL] (N. E. 49) MS
- 156: 26–7 (G. V. 49; N. E. 51; L. 377) PL] (G. V. 50; (N. E. 51; L. 377)) PP]

- (p. 51) MS
 156: 33 (G. V. 80; N. E. 84) PL] (G. V. 79; N. E. 74)) PP] (p. 84) MS
 156: 34 reflect PP, PL] think MS
 156: 37 perceiving PL] my consciousness of MS, PP
 156: 38 have to think that I think of it PL] think that I think MS, PP
 156: 39 thinking of it, and so on PL] my thought, and thus MS, PP
 157: 1 (G. V. 108; N. E. 118–9) PP, PL] (p. 118–9) MS
 157: 3–4 [G. V. 24, 105, 107 (N. E. 25, 116, 118)] PP, PL] (p. 24, 116, 118) MS
 157: 29 G. IV. 422; PP, PL] *not present* MS
 157: 31 G. V. 109; PP, PL] *not present* MS
 157: 35 objects. The parts which I do not distinguish are minute¹. PP, PL] objects. MS
 158: 4 unconscious. PP, PL] unconscious. But it certainly does not *seem* to follow that confused perceptions (*sic*), or even those elements in them to which the confusion is due, are necessarily minute, nor do I know of any passage where Leibniz definitely identifies the two, though he treats them as equivalent. MS
 158: 8 name *per se* PP, PL] name MS
 158: 18 (G. V. 197; N. E. 220) PP, PL] (p. 220) MS
 158: 21 (G. V. 75; N. E. 80) PL] (G. V. 76; N. E. 80)) PP] (p. 80) MS
 158: 27 itself (G. V. 70; N. E. 74–5)¹. PP, PL] itself (N. E. 74–5). It cannot be denied, however, that both in the remainder of this passage, and elsewhere, he falls back into the explanation of truths as psychical dispositions [*e.g.* G. V. 79, 97 (N. E. 84, 105)]. MS (*in* PP and PL *complete sentence became footnote*)
- Chapter XIV**
 160: 5 not exactly PP, PL] not MS
 160: 5–6 subject which belongs in the main to Psychology. PP, PL] definite Branch of Psychology. MS
 160: 6–7 of Chapters II.–V. PP, PL] with which I began my lectures MS
 160: 14 mainly PP, PL] properly MS
 160: 15 Leibniz says PP, PL] Leibniz truly says MS
 160: 16 [G. V. 15 (N. E. 15; D. 95)] PP, PL] (D. 95) MS
 160: 23 avoid it. PP, PL] confine myself to Psychology MS
 160n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
 161: 21 [G. V. 66 (N. E. 70)] PL] (G. V. 66, 79 (N. E. 70, 84)) PP] (pp. 70, 84) MS
 161: 25 [G. V. 79 (N. E. 84)] PP, PL] (p. 84) MS
 161: 32 [G. V. 77, 109 (N. E. 82, 120)] PL] (G. V. 78, 109 (N. E. 82, 120)) PP] (p. 82, 120) MS
 161: 34–5 On this point, Leibniz, so far as I know, says nothing quite definite. PP, PL] On this point Leibniz says nothing quite definite, so far as I know. MS
 162: 2–3, by the ministrations of the senses, PL] *not present* MS, PP
 162: 9 [G. V. 99 (N. E. 109)] PP, PL] (p. 109; G. V. p. 99) MS
 162: 17 [G. V. 116 (N. E. 129)] PP, PL] (p. 129; G. V. 116) MS
 162: 31 [G. V. 117 (N. E. 130)] PP, PL] (p. 130) MS
 162: 33 *except the intellect itself* PP, PL] *no italics* MS
 162: 33 (G. V. 100; N. E. 111) PL] *not present* MS, PP
 162: 38–9 perceiving the mind PL] the consciousness of self MS, PP
 162: 39 G. V. 23 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 163: 2; G. V. 93 (N. E. 100) PP, PL] *not present* MS
 163: 5 G. V. 100 PL] G. V. 101 PP] *not present* MS
 163: 9 [G. V. 77 (N. E. 81)] PP, PL] (p. 81) MS
 163: 29 argument for subjectivity PP, PL] argument MS
 164: 9 [G. V. 71 (N. E. 76)] PP, PL] (p. 76) MS
 164: 17 Sensations of colours PL] Colours MS, PP
 164: 20 *any* PL] any MS, PP

- 164: 25–6 an existent PP, PL] a thing MS
 165: 14 [G. V. 99 (N. E. 109)] PP, PL
 (p. 109) MS
 165: 19–20 actual thoughts which correspond to it PL] thought to which it corresponds MS, PP
 165: 20 be before PL] exist previous to MS, PP
 165n.: Cf. also G. III. 659 (D. 236); IV. 451. PP, PL] Cf. also D. 236. MS
 166: 3 are not essentially constituents of PP, PL] do not, as such, exist in MS
 166: 8–10 knowledge, ideas and truths “are only natural habits, *i.e.* active and passive dispositions and aptitudes” (N. E. 105; G. V. 97). PP, PL] “truths are not thoughts, but habits and aptitudes, natural or acquired” (N. E. p. 84). MS
 166: 16 though PL] only MS, PP
 166: 18–19 [G. V. 275 (N. E. 320)] PL] (G. V. 276 (N. E. 319)) PP] (N. E. p. 319) MS
 166: 24 whilst PP, PL] while MS
 166: 25 I think PL] *I think* MS] , *I think*, PP
 166: 28 G. IV. 357 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 166: 32–3 or contradiction PL] *following Moore’s query, inserted on PP] not present* MS
 166: 34 [G. V. 14 (D. 94; N. E. 13)] PL] [G. V. 14 (D. 94; N. E. 14)] PP] (D. p. 94) MS
 167: 6 G. V. 391 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 167: 8 truths (N. E. 499; G. V. 415) PL] truths (p. 499) PP] truth (p. 499) MS
 167: 11 (*ib.*) PL] (G. V. 415 (N. E. 439)) PP] (N. E. p. 439) MS
 167: 13–14 [G. V. 117 (N. E. 130)] PP, PL] (p. 130) MS
 167: 27 Truth PL] *replaced* Truths on PP] Truth MS
 167: 28 (1684) PL] *not present* MS, PP
 167: 30–1 [G. IV. 425 (D. 31)] PL] (p. 30) MS, PP
 167: 31 D. 31 PL] *replaced as 30 in Moore’s hand on PP] 30* MS
 168: 16 *distinctly* PP, PL] distinctly MS
 168: 37 [G. IV. 424–5 (D. 30)] PP, PL] (D. p. 30) MS
 168: 39 G. V. 92 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 169: 6 [G. V. 279 (N. E. 325)] PP, PL] [N. E. p. 325] MS
 169: 10 G. V. 275 PL] G. V. 276 PP] *not present* MS
 169: 18 G. V. 290 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 169: 23 [G. V. 281 (N. E. 328)] PL] (G. V. 282 (N. E. 328) PP] (p. 328) MS
 169: 27 G. V. 92 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 169: 34–170: 6 “Telescopes and microscopes,” he says, “have not been so useful to the eye as this instrument would be in adding to the capacity of thought” (G. VII. 14). “If we had it, we should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in geometry and analysis” (G. VII. 21). “If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to sit down to their slates, and to say to each other (with a friend as witness, if they liked): Let us calculate” (G. VII. 200). PL] to their slates *replaced in Moore’s hand at the table on PP] not present* MS
 169n.: PL] *not present* MS, PP
 170: 14 Universal Characteristic PL] “Caps?” in *Moore’s hand on PP] universal characteristic* MS (*also at 171: 6*)
 170: 14 G. V. 92 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 170: 17 G. V. 460 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 170: 31 rather than PP, PL] as opposed to MS
 170n.: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 171n.: For an account of Leibniz’s views on this matter see Guhrauer, *op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 320 ff. For a full treatment, see Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz*, Paris, 1900 (in the press). PL] For an account of Leibniz’s views on this matter see Guhrauer, *op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 320 ff. PP] *not present* MS

Chapter XV

- 173: 6 his PL] His MS, PP
 173: 22 *e.g.* G. V. 419 (N. E. 504); G. VI. 614 (D. 224; L. 242) PL] 243 in PP]

- [N. E. 504 D. 224] MS
 173: 29 G. IV. 406 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 173: 32 [G. VI. 614 (D. 224; L. 242)] PP, PL] [D. 224] MS
 173n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
 173n.1: Vol. I PL] *not present* PP
 173n.2: (N. E. 714) PL] MS (*perhaps not intended as footnote; references in text but not yet one to Stein*)
 174: 3 Ontological Argument PP, PL] ontological argument MS (*also at 174: 4*)
 174: 23–4 G. V. 339 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 174: 24 he PP, PL] Leibniz MS
 175: 32 such grounds, however, PL] but such grounds MS, PP
 175: 35 [G. VI. 614 (D. 224; L. 242)] PL] 243 *in* PP] (D. 224) MS
 175n.: *Reine Vernunft*, ed. Hart. p. 409 PL] p. 438 *in* PP] R. V. 2nd ed. p. 626 MS
 176: 20 [G. VII. 302 (D. 100; L. 337)] PP, PL] (D. 100–101) MS
 176: 24 if there were PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] where there is MS
 176: 26 (*Ib.*) PP, PL] (D. 100) MS
 176: 39 [G. VI. 386 (D. 203); G. VII. 409 (D. 274)] PL] 408 *in* PP] (D. 203, 274) MS
 177: 1 must be supposed PL] is MS, PP
 177: 1 (cf. p. 39 *supra*) PL] (G. VI. 614 (D. 224; L. 243)) PP] (D. 224) MS
 177: 3–4 that God does not necessarily do good PL] that though God is necessarily good, he does not necessarily do good MS, PP
 177: 9 led him PL] “inclined him” *suggested in Moore's hand on PP*] made him MS, PP
 177: 31 Book I., PL] *not present* MS, PP
 177: 32 and Cosmological PP, PL] and the Cosmological MS
 178: 9–10 a contingent existent PL] *replaced with a reference to p. 176 in Moore's hand on PP*] what exists MS
 178: 12 [G. VII. 305 (D. 103; L. 343)] PP, PL] [D. 103] MS
 178: 14 distinct PL] *replaced in Moore's hand on PP*] clear MS
 178: 17; G. VII. 311 PL] 310 *in* PP] *not present* MS
 178: 18 [G. VII. 305 (D. 103; L. 343)] PL] 344 *in* PP] [D. 103] MS
 178: 19 from PP, PL] of MS
 178: 20 G. V. 210; PL] *not present* MS, PP
 178: 21 God PL] God alone MS, PP
 178: 23 monads, MS, PL] 37+] monad PP, PL] (*revision in BR's hand in his copy of PL, with printed comma patch glued on*)
 178: 23 relations¹. PP, PL] relations [G. II. 438.] MS
 178: 26–7 [G. VI. 614 (D. 225; L. 243)] PL] 615 and 245 *in* PP] [D. 225] MS
 178: 38–179: 1; F. de C. 24 PL] *Moore suggested referring to G. on PP*] *not present* MS
 178n.: G. II. 438. PL] *not present but moved from 178: 23* MS, PP
 179: 4; F. de C. 34 PL] *Moore suggested referring to G. on PP*] *not present* MS
 179: 11–12 since it is proved, has a ground PP, PL] has a ground, since it is proved MS
 179n.: G. VII. 365 (D. 244), 379; IV. 344. PL] 244–5 *in* PP] D 244–5; G VII. 379; IV 344. MS
 180: 4 Hence we cannot, PP, PL] We cannot, therefore, MS
 180: 7 [G. V. 14 (D. 94; N. E. 14)] PP, PL] (D. 94) MS
 180: 14–15 (G. VI. 230; VII. 305 (D. 103; L. 343)] PL] 344 *in* PP] (D. 103; G. VI. 230) MS
 180: 18–19 [G. VI. 614 (D. 225; L. 243)] PL] 615 and 245 *in* PP] (D. 225) MS
 180: 29–30 If, to mend matters, we were to say that truths actually constitute God's understanding PP, PL] Moreover, if the truth itself exists in God's mind MS
 180: 31 them PP, PL] it MS
 181: 29 226 PL] 230 MS, PP
 182: 33 G. VII. 302–5 (D. 100–103; L. 337–343) PL] G. VII. 302–5 (D. 100–103) PP] (D. 100–103) MS
 183: 30 D. 79 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 184: 3 G. V. 99 PP, PL] *not present* MS
 184: 4–5 G. VI. 578 PP, PL] *not present* MS

- 184: 15 led PL] made MS, PP
 184n.: G. VI. 615 (D. 225; L. 244–5) PL] 245 in PP] not present MS
 184n.: G. IV. 515 PL] 516 in PP] not present MS
 185: 20 G. V. 339 PP, PL] not present MS
 185: 36 (§ 106) PL] not present MS, PP
 186: 5–6 (D. 178; F. de C. 38). Now place, in his system, is a mere attribute of what is placed PL] no F. de C. 38 reference, Moore suggesting referring to G. on PP] not present MS
 186: 8–10 “is the original simple substance, of which all created or derivative monads are products, born, so to speak, PL] “is the original simple substance, of which all the monads are products, born MS, PP
 186: 11 [G. VI. 614 (D. 225; L. 243)] PL] 614 in PP] (D. 225) MS
 186: 12 of the *Discours de Métaphysique* PP, PL] not present MS
 186: 13–22 “Created substances depend on God, who conserves them, and even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, as we produce our thoughts. For God.....views all aspects of the world in all possible ways; the result of each view of the universe, as if seen from a certain place, is a substance expressing the universe conformably to this point of view, if God sees fit to make his thought effective and produce this substance. PL] “God conserves created substances, and even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, as we produce our thoughts. God perceives the universe from each point of view; the result of each view, as if from a certain place, is a substance expressing the universe from this point of view, if God makes his thought effective and produces this substance. MS, PP
 186: 26 pantheism². PL] pantheism². And this appears also in the assertion that everything is a product of God and nothing (Erdmann, *Gesch.* p. 64, To Schulenberg v. Guhrauer, *Leibnitzens deutsche Schriften*, I. 411). MS, PP
 186: 28 that PL] replaced on PP] whither MS
 186: 28 to Spinozism. PL] following Moore’s query “Where ought it to lead him?” inserted on PP] not present MS
 186n.1: PL] not present MS, PP
 187: 4 merely PL] not present MS, PP
 187: 10–11 its generic definition PL] inserted in Moore’s hand on PP] general MS
 187: 31 its generic definition PL] inserted in Moore’s hand on PP] the genus MS (*fol.* 268/8a)
 188: 26–7 quite arbitrary what propositions God is to believe PL] replaced on PP] strictly meaningless to assert that God has any knowledge of the truth MS
 188n.: PP, PL] not present MS
 188n.: Stein, *Leibniz und Spinoza* PL] Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza PP
 189: 13 and absolute PL] or absolute MS, PP
 189: 16 40, 41 MS, PL] 41, 42 PP
 189: 16–17; G. VI. 613 (D. 223; L. 239) PP, PL] (D 223–4) MS
 189: 32 G. VI. 378 PP, PL] not present MS
 189n.: G. VII. 303 (D. 101; L. 340) PP, PL] (D. 101) MS
 189n.: G. VII. 305 (D. 103; L. 342) PL] 344 in PP] p. 103 MS
 189n.: on the next page PP, PL] p. 104 MS
- Chapter XVI**
 192: 4 in proportion as PL] to the extent that MS, PP
 192: 5 properly concerns PL] concerns properly MS, PP
 192: 6 bare PL] naked MS, PP
 192: 27 resolved PP, PL] determined MS
 192n.3: V. 163–4 PL] V. 168 in PP] not present MS
 193: 14–15 (G. VII. 408–9; D. 273–4) PP, PL] (D. 203, 274) MS
 193n.1: G. II. 420; III. 401 (D. 171); V. 164 (N. E. 183); VII. 379. PP, PL] N. E. p 184; D. p. 171; G. II. 420; G. VII. 379 MS

- 193n.2: 2nd ed. p. 193 PP, PL] p. 208 MS
- 194n.: And the determined is opposed to it. PP, PL] And what is opposed to this is determined. MS
- 194n.: destroy neither contingency nor liberty. PP, PL] do not destroy contingency or MS
- 194n.: determined or regular PP, PL] determined or regulated MS
- 195: 1 [G. V. 175 (N. E. 194); VII. 73 (D. 130)] PP, PL] (D. 130; N. E. p. 194) MS
- 195: 5 G. V. 149 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 195: 18 [G. V. 81 (N. E. 86)] PP, PL] [(N. E. p. 86; G. V. 81) MS
- 195: 23 the future and the enduring. PP, PL] future and enduring welfare. MS
- 195: 26 [G. V. 82 (N. E. 87)] PP, PL] [(N. E. p. 87) G. V. p. 82] MS
- 195n.1: , *Human Nature*, Chap. VII. (ed. Molesworth, Vol. IV.) PP, PL] Cp. Hobbes. MS
- 196: 26 G. V. 171 (N. E. 191) PP, PL] (N. E. p. 191) MS
- 196: 27 such as PP, PL] like MS
- 196: 34 [G. V. 173 (N. E. 193)] PP, PL] (N. E. p. 191) MS
- 197n.1: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 197n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 198: 14 His PP, PL] his MS
- 198: 20 G. IV. 361 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 198: 35 combinations PP, PL] series MS
- 198n.1: G. VII. 377 (D. 253) PP, PL] D. 240, 253 MS
- 198n.2: G. VII. 303 (D. 101; L. 340). See PP, PL] D. 101; cf. MS
- 199: 3–4 (by which as many things as possible are compossible) PP, PL] (through which the greatest possible number is possible at the same time) MS
- 199: 6 [G. VII. 304 (D. 103; L. 342)] PP, PL] (D. 103) MS
- 199: 15–16 has been PP, PL] is MS
- 199: 18 G. VII. 306 (D. 104); L. 345 PP, PL] D. 104; G. VII. 306. MS
- 199: 26 preceding chapter PP, PL] last lecture MS
- 199: 35 [G. VII. 303 (D. 101; L. 340)] PP, PL] (D. 101) MS
- 199n.: happen PP, PL] belong MS
- 199n.: so to speak PP, PL] in so far as they are MS
- 200: 1 [G. VI. 613 (D. 224; L. 240)] PP, PL] (D. 224) MS
- 200: 7 G. I. 144 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 200: 11 G. VI. 378 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 200: 30 actuality PP, PL] the act MS
- 200: 32–3 [G. VII. 304 (D. 102; L. 341)] PP, PL] (D. 102) MS
- 200n.1: G. V. 15 (D. 95; PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 201: 5 Ethics PP, PL] Ethic MS
- 201: 6 G. VI. 376 PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 201: 24 [G. IV. 480 (D. 73; L. 304)] PP, PL] (D. 73) MS
- 201: 33–4 [G. VI. 605 (D. 215; L. 421)] PP, PL] (D. 215) MS
- 201n.2: PP, PL] *not present* MS
- 299n. (citation to Peano article with Leibniz passages; see “Bibliographical Index” below) PL] *not present* MS, PP

APPENDIX

MS FOLIATION, AND CHAPTER LABELS IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER

Russell originally used roman numerals as lecture labels, then arabic numbers in rewriting lectures into chapters. After the RA foliation is his own numbering within chapters and any previous numbering, which sometimes obscures the original number. “[1]” is used for the first chapter leaf when he numbered the remainder of a chapter. Where a chapter’s first leaf became part of another chapter, that leaf also shows an inferred “[1]”. Deletions in chapter titles, and former chapter titles, are indicated by strike-out text.

RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label	RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label
[Title and Table of Contents]			fol. 41/7	2	
fol. 1/1			fol. 42/8	2	
fol. 2/1a			fol. 43/9	2	
fol. 3/2			fol. 44/10	2	
fol. 4/3			fol. 45/10a		
fol. 5/4			fol. 46/11	2	
fol. 6/5			fol. 47/12	2	
fol. 7/6			fol. 48/13	2	
fol. 8/7			fol. 49/14	2	
fol. 9/8			fol. 50/15(10)	2	II
Abbreviations			fol. 51/16	2	
fol. 10			fol. 52/17	2	
Preface			fol. 53/18	2	
fol. 11/[1]			[Chapter III.] Analysis of Propositions (continued) The Law of Sufficient Reason [PL: "Contingent Propositions and the Law of Sufficient Reason"]		
fol. 12/2	LP		fol. 54/[1]		
fol. 13/3	LP		fol. 55/2		
fol. 14/4	LP		fol. 56/3		
fol. 15/5	LP		fol. 57/4		
fol. 16/6	LP		fol. 58/5		
fol. 17/7	LP		fol. 59/6		
[Discarded] Preface			fol. 60/7		
fol. 18/[1]			fol. 61/8		
fol. 19/2			fol. 62/9		
fol. 20/3			fol. 63/10		
Chapter I. Leibniz's Premises [initially, "Introductory"]			fol. 64/11		
fol. 21/1			fol. 65/12		
fol. 22/(over?)			fol. 66/13(12?)		
fol. 23/3			fol. 67/14		
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fol. 25/4	L.		fol. 69/16		
fol. 26/5	L.		fol. 70/17		
fol. 27/6	L.		fol. 71/18		
fol. 28/7	L.		fol. 72/19		
fol. 29/8	L.		fol. 73		
fol. 30/9	L.		Chapter Lecture IV. The Conception of Substance		
fol. 31/10	L.		fol. 74/1		
fol. 32/11	L.		fol. 75/2	IV	
fol. 33/12	L.		fol. 76/2a(?)		
Chapter II. Necessary Propositions and the Law of Contradiction			fol. 77/3	IV	
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fol. 36/3	2		fol. 80/5a	IV	
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fol. 39/5	2	II			
fol. 40/6(2)	2	II			

RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label	RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label
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fol. 83/7	IV		Chapter Lecture VII.		
fol. 84/8	IV		The Philosophy of Matter		
fol. 85/9	IV		(a) As the Outcome of		
fol. 86/10	IV		the Principles of Dynamics		
fol. 87/11	IV		fol. 124/[1]		
fol. 88/12	4		fol. 125/2	VII	
fol. 89/12a			fol. 126/3	VII	
fol. 90/13	4		fol. 127/4	VII	
fol. 91/14(12)	4	IV	fol. 128/5a		
fol. 92/15(12a)	4	IV	fol. 129/5	VII	
fol. 93/16	4	IV	fol. 130/6a		
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fol. 95/[1]			fol. 133/8	VII	
fol. 96/2	V		fol. 134/9	VII	
fol. 97/3	V		fol. 135/9a		
fol. 98/4	V		fol. 136/10	VII	
fol. 99/5	V		fol. 137/11	VII	
fol. 100/6a			fol. 138/12	VII	
fol. 101/6	V		fol. 139/13	VII	
fol. 102/7	V		fol. 140/13a		
fol. 103/8	V		fol. 141/14	VII	
fol. 104/8a(9)	5		fol.		
fol. 105/9	V		142/14a(12)	VII	
fol. 106/9a			fol.		
fol. 107/10(9a)	5		143/14b(13)	VII	
fol. 108/10a(10)	V		fol. 144/15	VII	
fol. 109/11	V		fol. 145/16	VII	
fol. 110/12	V		fol. 146/17	VII	
fol. 111/13	V		fol. 147/18	VII	
fol. 112/14	V		fol. 148/18a	VII	
fol. 113/15	V		fol. 149/19	VII	
fol. 114/16	V		fol. 150/20	VII	
fol. 115/17	5		fol. 151/21	VII	
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Chapter Lecture VI.			fol. 153/22a		
Why Did Leibniz Believe in an External World?			fol. 154/23	VII	
fol. 117/[1]			fol. 155/24(10a)	VII	
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fol. 119/2a	6		[in Alys's hand]		
fol. 120/3	VI		fol. 157/26	VII	
fol. 121/4	VI		[in Alys's hand]		
fol. 122/4a	6		fol. 158/27	VII	
			[in Alys's hand and BR's]		

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fol. 160/29	VII		fol. 197/11a	X	
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Chapter Lecture VIII. The Philosophy of Matter (continued), (b) As Explaining Continuity and Extension			fol. 200/14	X	
			fol. 201/15	X	
			fol. 202/16([1])	X	[XI]
			Lecture XI. The Nature of Monads in General		
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fol. 164/2	VIII		203/16a(1a)		
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fol. 166/4	VIII		Chapter XI. The Nature of Monads in General		
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fol. 169/7(14)	VIII		fol. 207/3	XI	
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Chapter Lecture IX. The Labyrinth of the Continuum			fol. 209/5(7)	XI	
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fol. 189/4	X		fol. 226/8	XII	
fol. 190/5	X				
fol. 191/6	X				
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fol. 193/8	X				
fol. 194/9	X				

RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label	RA foliation/ Russell's	Chapter label	Previous label
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fol. 230/11	XII		fol. 266/7	XV	
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fol. 235/15/4	XII	XIII	fol. 271/10	XV	
fol. 236/16/5	XII	XIII	fol. 272/11	XV	
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Chapter XIII. Confused and Unconscious Perception			fol. 274/13	XV	
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