“AN ISOLATED OUTPOST OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION”: RUSSELL’S APPRAISAL OF MID-CENTURY AUSTRALIA

ANDREW G. BONE
Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.
Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4L6
BONE@MCMaster.CA

On his Australian lecture tour of 1950 Russell talked more about the global dimensions of the Cold War than about the politics, culture and society of the country he was visiting for the first and only time. As a keen but non-specialist observer, however, he readily offered his impressions and opinions of Australia and its place in the world. Like the majority of his hosts, Russell regarded this British Commonwealth state and American ally as an integral if distant part of the “West” and assumed that its comparatively small and overwhelmingly white population could continue to exist largely apart from the region within which it was situated. In so doing, he emphasized Australia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities and demographic challenges, sometimes also displaying a Cold War mindset that remained decidedly anti-Soviet at the mid-century mark. Russell’s reflections on these matters, and the linkages he drew between them, spoke to (rather than questioned) deep-seated Australian anxieties and prejudices about national security, race and immigration.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE VISITING DYASON LECTURER

From 22 June to 23 August 1950, Russell spent nine weeks touring Australia at the invitation of the E. C. Dyason Trust and the Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA). He travelled to every state bar Tasmania, and he spoke publicly to capacity crowds in Sydney, Brisbane, Canberra, Adelaide and Perth, as well as addressing state branches of the AIIA in smaller, semi-private...
gatherings.\(^1\) His mission as a Dyason Lecturer was to “foster in Australia a greater understanding of its situation in the world”.\(^2\) Russell endeavoured to fulfil this mandate, not as an expert analyst of a country with which he was only superficially acquainted, but more indirectly. In Sydney he delivered three lectures on world government, or, more accurately, on three formidable obstacles to its attainment: unchecked population growth, race hatreds and ideological polarization.\(^3\) In Melbourne he turned to the perplexities of “Living in the Atomic Age”—not only the strategic and diplomatic aspects, but also the psychological burdens of the nuclear peril and the attendant risks of frivolity, fanaticism and despair—“states of mind which must be avoided”. In both these state capitals and in the three others on his itinerary, plus Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory, Russell also dissected the social and political tumult of post-war Asia and (after completing the New South Wales leg of his tour) presented a standalone compendium of his Sydney world government triptych.\(^4\)

Broadly speaking, Russell’s material tended towards more general discussion of contemporary problems—superpower rivalries, nuclear

---

\(^1\) He also made an unscheduled repeat presentation of one lecture, “Obstacles to World Government”, in the small town of Cairns on the Great Barrier Reef during a short expedition to northern Queensland (14–16 July), as well as giving philosophy seminars (mainly on non-deductive inference) at the Universities of Sydney, Melbourne and Western Australia. (See RA Rec. Acq. 313 for notes from the Sydney sessions taken by eminent Australian realist John Anderson, holder of the Challis chair in philosophy in that department.)

\(^2\) Quoted in Griffin, “Russell in Australia” (1974), p. 3. Russell was the second overseas scholar invited to Australia by E. C. Dyason, a wealthy Australian mining engineer turned stockbroker who had been living in London since 1947 (and before that, Argentina). The American philosopher F. S. C. Northrop had become the inaugural Dyason Lecturer in 1949. Dyason was probably the unnamed “Australian” with whom Russell’s pocket diary noted an appointment for 5 February 1949. When Dyason died suddenly that October, arrangements for bringing Russell to Australia were still unsettled. Although an E. C. Dyason Trust had been established in 1942 for scholarly purposes (to investigate the “psychology of conflict”), the Dyason Lectures were not yet endowed, and funds had to be released from the businessman’s substantial estate before Russell’s tour could proceed (Russell was to be paid £600 sterling plus expenses.) The preparatory work had already been delegated to the AIA, an organization (part think-tank, part public educator) that Dyason helped establish in 1933 and of which he remained a generous patron (see Legge, Australian Outlook [1999], pp. 1–2).

\(^3\) Each appeared later, with revisions, in NHCW (Chs. v, xi, and xiii, respectively).

weapons, anti-colonial revolts—as opposed to the bearing of such issues on his host nation. Yet he was easily coaxed into passing comment on early Cold War Australia by its inquisitive press and public. He hesitated to do so at first, having “arrived too recently”, he said in opening the first of five radio talks for the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC)—before proceeding to discuss the country’s foreign policy, geography and culture at some length. He ended up saying a great deal more about Australia in a smattering of newspaper articles, plus numerous interviews and off-the-cuff comments to reporters, freely given as he moved from state to state, and a “farewell” talk for the national broadcaster.

Indeed, he seems to have landed in Australia with some sense of its relationship to both the wider world and the region of which it was geographically a part, the significance of population, race and immigration to the country’s political discourse, and the checks placed on economic development by its tropical and desert environments. This last question, answered by Russell with boosterish optimism in the potential of applied science to achieve mastery over a hostile nature, has been expertly probed by Jo-Anne Grant and will be touched on only lightly here. But the connections he made between Australia’s national security and its geopolitical and demographic situations warrant closer scrutiny of the textual records left by his tour (newly assembled in Collected Papers). This examination is necessary not least because Russell, in keeping with mainstream Australian opinion, but somewhat jarringly from a usually forthright critic of racial chauvinism and injustice, repeatedly positioned Australia as “a white man’s outpost on the borders of Asia”.

---

5 This broadcast aired nationally on 25 June 1950 (“Guest of Honour”; 1 in Papers 26, quotation at p. 5, and for the fullest newspaper report, “Russia Is Seen as Our Problem”, The Argus, Melbourne, 26 June 1950, p. 12).
6 “Russell the Rainmaker” (2016). See also the same author’s “‘Sane Ideas Which May Yet Save the World …’” (2018) for analysis of Russell’s tour as a vehicle for the promotion of his (restricted) vision of a peaceful and liberal international order. The lecture tour is covered briefly by Russell’s biographers, with Wood (Ch. 23), an Australian, providing the fullest treatment. For more detail on Russell’s itinerary and movements, along with the organizational role of the aiia, see Griffin.
7 “My Impressions of Australia”, broadcast on the evening of Russell’s departure (23 August 1950) and published next day as “I Leave Your Shores with More Hope for Man”; 15 in Papers 26, p. 120.
II. “THE FORTUNES OF AUSTRALIA ARE … INTIMATELY BOUND UP WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD”

Only two days after arriving in Australia, Russell’s attention was diverted from the strange yet oddly familiar society and culture to which he had been transported. The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June abruptly shifted his focus towards East Asia and back to Britain. “I hate being so far from home at such a time”, he wrote his friends the Crawshay-Williamses on 2 July (see SLBR 2: 448), albeit after gamely resolving to soldier on. Fearful in the event of a widening war for the safety of his older son’s family in London,9 Russell even tried (without success) to repurchase from his estranged wife the cottage in Llan Ffestiniog he had bought in 1946.10 He viewed Australia as an even safer haven than rural North Wales and never dispensed with the notion—more of a rhetorical ploy—that vestiges of humanity might survive nuclear war in parts of Australia and other remote regions, “in Tierra del Fuego … and in Alice Springs”, as he told the latter small town’s newspaper during a brief visit to the central Australian outback.11 Yet one of the stock points he later employed as an anti-nuclear campaigner12 was that the next world war would be catastrophic for belligerents and neutrals alike—and Australia, increasingly enmeshed in an American-led network of Cold War alliances, was far from neutral in any case.

Russell’s thoughts on Australian security were probably more accurately reflected in his observation that “technical causes” made it impossible for Australia “to keep out of the complications and tragedies of the old world”. The Second World War had starkly illustrated Russell’s point about Australia being “intimately integrated with the great problems of the world”.13 But the nature of that integration was

8 “Hopes for Australia in a Hundred Years” (1951); 17 in Papers 26, p. 131.
9 Where they had been living with him at 41 Queen’s Road, Richmond since May 1950 (see Turconi, “Russell’s Homes: 41 Queen’s Road, Richmond” [2018]).
10 I.e. “Penralltgoch”, legal ownership of which had been transferred to Patricia Russell before she and Russell separated (in April 1949) in order to circumvent payment of death duties in the likely event of his predeceasing her (see Papers 26: xvii).
11 “Lord Russell Says Australians Optimistic” (1950); App. i. 21 in Papers 26, p. 594. See also similar comments made almost a decade later in one of Russell’s rare speeches to the House of Lords (“Nuclear Disarmament” [1959], p. 102).
12 Most famously in “Man’s Peril” (1954); 16 in Papers 28.
13 “Guest of Honour” (1 in Papers 26, p. 5).
changing. In a wartime essay about Britain’s diminished imperial standing, Russell correctly intuited that the simultaneous expansion of American power in the Pacific “will mean, inevitably, that Australia and New Zealand will be drawn more and more into the orbit of the United States.”\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, the central thrust of Australian foreign policy since 1945 had been towards striking a military alliance with the Americans. Although the United States harboured reservations about binding security commitments in the Pacific analogous to what NATO represented in Europe, these doubts were overcome by the Korean War, which signalled an extension of American containment policy globally. The despatch of Australian ground troops to the fighting made the United States more amenable to a mutual defence treaty, which was signed by these two powers and New Zealand in September 1951. The ANZUS pact became the central pillar of Australian security for the next two decades, and Australia’s participation in the Korean War was an early example of what would be enshrined as “forward defence”. This strategy of confronting perceived Cold War threats at a distance and in tandem with more senior alliance partners led also to Australian military intervention in Malaya (twice) and, most contentiously, in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus Australia’s relations with the region of which it was geographically a part were constrained by the anti-communist alliance to which it was bound, as they had been before by the imperatives of the British Empire—reflecting a continuing national security fixation on “the support of culturally similar but geographically distant powerful friends” (Fitpatrick, p. 116). But Australia did not seamlessly move from a dependent relationship with a declining Britain into another with an ascendant America. The older, imperial framework of security may have been disrupted by the Second World War, but Britain remained a primary reference point of Australian diplomacy and defence. Its troops were even stationed in the Middle East in support of British bomber bases as the Cold War turned hot in Korea, and the Liberal–Country coalition led for sixteen years by the unabashed

\textsuperscript{14} “Twilight of British Empire” (1944).
\textsuperscript{15} The strategic doctrine and sources of conflict were products of the Cold War, but Australia’s use of armed force continued to be guided, as in the British imperial era, less by cold calculation of national interests than by “the underlying settler colonial fear of abandonment in an alien environment” (Fitpatrick, “European Settler Colonialism and National Security Ideologies in Australian History” [1997], p. 105).
Anglophile Robert Menzies willingly and controversially assisted Britain’s nuclear testing programme. More generally, British influence on Australia persisted until the end of the Menzies era in the mid-1960s, when—with a post-imperial Britain looking towards Europe, and Australian trade and immigration pivoting towards Asia—the relationship “unravelled with astonishing speed.”

III. “THE FEAR OF ASIA HAS DOMINATED THE IMAGINATION OF AUSTRALIANS”

Centred in recent years on a militaristic Japan, Australia’s “dread of invasion from Asia” was shifting towards the new bugbear of Communist China—although for decades a sense of threat had also been evoked in the Australian imagination by a largely undifferentiated Asian “other”. Russell certainly sensed the depth of these enduring Australian insecurities, heightened across a half century of British decline as the peripheral reach of the waning metropolitan power was increasingly strained (see Fitzpatrick, pp. 93–102). Writing from Melbourne to Rupert Crawshay-Williams, Russell remarked that, in contrast to the British, Australians were “much more conscious of Asia; they were alarmed when the Japs got into Papua, and have remained so” (26 July 1950, RA Rec. Acq. 501c). This long-smouldering anxiety was fuelled by the eruption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and some of Russell’s ensuing prognostications were unlikely to have assuaged nervy Australian speculation about the conflict spreading uncontrollably outwards.

Many Australians (not least Prime Minister Menzies) were deeply troubled by the “ferment” diagnosed in Russell’s “Asia” lecture (5 in Papers 26) and emphasized the dangers emanating from a continent in upheaval. In light of rising Cold War tensions (and worse in Korea), Russell certainly did not discount Australia’s Asia-complex. But he was in closer alignment with those quieter Australian voices (many
from inside the AIIA] who were calling less persuasively than the fear-mongers for the cultivation of more constructive and less antagonistic relationships with the region. In critiquing for the benefit of his daughter a recent survey of Asian developments by Robert Payne, Russell offered a tidy summation of his own position—almost equally passionate in its anti-imperialism and Cold War partisanship:

My own view is this: the day of Western imperialism in Asia is past, but there is a new danger of Russian imperialism. If Asia is to be made aware of this danger, we of the West must make it obvious that we no longer threaten Asia’s independence. The British have done well in India, and in recognizing the communist government of China. If America and France could be induced to follow suit, and not to oppose land reform in Asia, S.E. Asia would become a large neutral block. Nehru has the right ideas. China would adopt Titoism if the West did not stand for everything corrupt and reactionary in China. We ought to give up Hong-kong. The French ought to abandon Indo-China. Malaya is difficult because it earns dollars, but I think an arrangement should be possible.

(29 Sept. 1950; SLBR 2: 451–2)

Although far from blasé about the rise of communism in Asia, Russell was quick to point out that past and present Western mistakes were stoking its appeal and called for the complete eradication of “whatever remains of British, French or Dutch imperialism”. He was also desperate for the Cold War to be kept out of Asia, urging that “the West should preach everywhere the doctrine that the conflict between Russia and the Atlantic Powers is a conflict among Europeans, from which every prudent Asiatic would wish to stand aloof.” But even before he issued this appeal to the first of several Australian audiences, it had been superseded by events in Korea that brought the Cold War into Asia with a vengeance.

Chinese intervention in the Korean War would shortly magnify Australian suspicions of its new communist regime. Diplomatic recognition was initially favoured by members of the then Labor government but ruled out from well-founded concerns that the party would be labelled soft on communism by a Liberal opposition whose Cold War

22 The Revolt of Asia (London: Gollancz, 1948), a book which Russell found useful, despite his misgivings about Payne’s evident sympathy for Chinese communism.
23 “Ferment in Asia” (1950); 5 in Papers 26, pp. 37, 34.
rhetoric was, indeed, ratcheted up before their general election triumph in December 1949. The China policy of the incoming administration followed the lead of the United States rather than Britain, which (with Russell’s approval) quickly recognized Mao’s regime. Australia did not match its American ally’s unreserved backing for the rump Chinese state led by Chiang Kai-shek (one of Russell’s Cold War bêtes noires). But in other respects, the Menzies government looked at Asia through the same Cold War prism as the United States. The new administration was less comfortable than its Labor predecessor with the end of European empire and inclined to interpret the turbulence of which Russell wrote as the product of imported communist ideology rather than internal conditions—political subordination, social misery and economic exploitation.

In the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution, an exaggerated state of alarm about communism encroached on Australia’s domestic political scene as well. Indeed, Australia was “second only to the U.S. in the hostility directed towards local members of the party, and in the intensity of public anxieties.” A major constitutional crisis was triggered by the determination of the Menzies administration to outlaw the small Communist Party of Australia (CPA). Legislation compelling anyone “declared” to be communist to show otherwise had been introduced but was stalled in the federal parliament’s Labor-controlled Senate when Russell was in Australia. It passed into law in slightly amended form in September, only to be overturned by the High Court six months later. Undeterred, the Prime Minister then called a snap “double dissolution” election, which left his ruling coalition in command of both legislative chambers. Instead of bringing in another bill, however, Menzies moved for a prohibition by constitutional amendment, which was narrowly rejected in the September 1951 referendum. Russell waded briefly into the still-escalating controversy about a month before leaving for Australia, telling a reporter from the Adelaide Advertiser that he had no qualms about treating communists as “public enemies. But I cannot approve of the proposal to place the onus of proof upon the accused.”

27 Murphy, Imagining the Fifties (2000), pp. 97–8.
28 “A Philosopher’s Theme” (1950); App. 1.2 in Papers 26, p. 562.
IV. “EASTERN PEOPLES MUST BE GIVEN A COMFORTABLE STANDARD OF LIVING”

Strategic and diplomatic cooperation with an omnipotent United States was judged by many Australians as the best insurance against threats all too readily detected not only at home but also, first and foremost, throughout the Asia–Pacific region. But Australia’s Asian diplomacy also had a more generous and less apprehensive face—which Russell commended since it meshed with his conviction that peace would always be threatened without “the abolition of white imperialism, and the raising of the standard of life in impoverished countries.”

The outgoing Labor government paved the way for an alternative model of engagement with the region, notably by the dispatch in 1948 of a somewhat fraught mission to Asia led by W. Macmahon Ball, an occasional diplomat as well as an AIA academic, who brought not only the hand of Australian friendship but also promises of economic, technical and educational assistance.

Then, at the Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Colombo in January 1950, Australia’s newly appointed (Liberal–Country) Minister of External Affairs, Percy Spender (who would meet Russell in Sydney on 2 July), took the lead in presenting an ambitious aid plan for South and South-East Asia.

This British Commonwealth initiative was lauded by Russell as “one of the few really encouraging events of our time in the international sphere”. Donor nations need not be motivated by humanitarianism alone, he argued. With political stability likely to be reinforced by economic development, Western powers had an interest as well as a duty in ameliorating poverty in Asia. Commenting on the “Spender Plan” a few weeks before flying to Australia, he considered this “the only way to combat Communism”.

Spender’s successor at External Affairs, Richard Casey, said as much a few years later when he admitted that the principal goal of the Colombo Plan was to assist “the

---

29 Ibid.
30 “We and the u.s. Can Lead and Help Asian People” (1950); 8 in Papers 26, p. 67.
31 And an admirer of Russell: see Ball’s “Bertrand Russell”, in the AIA’s journal, Australian Outlook (4 [June 1950] 80–5).
34 “A Philosopher’s Theme” (App. 1.2 in Papers 26, p. 562).
countries concerned to maintain democracy and combat communism”. But anti-communist fears might easily result instead in the United States and the former colonial powers blindly opposing all requisite social and economic reforms. This mistake had already been made in China, Russell believed, and must not be repeated elsewhere. If Western powers incurred the enmity of emerging states by such grave miscalculation, communism was likely to be perceived as an even more plausible and attractive model of post-colonial development than it already was. A “new and more insidious form of white imperialism” was filling the void left by Europe’s retreat from empire. In the ideological contest, the West was seriously handicapped by its colonial past, while the Soviet Union was adept at using the “symbolic elements of freedom” to push its great power interests:

It is here that the Communists have such an advantage over us. They insist upon no symbols of domination, and yet in fact subject the territories in which they prevail to a control by Moscow far more intimate and far more absolute than London ever attempted to exercise over India. Theirs is undoubtedly the best technique for modern imperialism; ours, depending upon sovereigns and flags and oaths of allegiance, is mediaeval and effete in comparison with theirs.

Although the Colombo Plan was bolstered by the adhesion of the United States in 1951 and the extension of its coverage to non-Commonwealth states, the scheme did not evolve into an Asian version of the Marshall Plan. On his “arrival” broadcast on ABC radio, Russell praised the fourth point of President Truman’s 1949 inauguration address as a noble and principled template for the delivery of overseas aid (Papers 26: 6–7). But he also grasped that the fulfilment of “Point Four” or similar pledges was likely to be complicated by political considerations, later complaining about the parsimony of the United States Congress in this regard. A similar reticence about Australia’s far from onerous financial obligations under the Colombo Plan (which totalled US$72 million by 1956) was present inside its ruling

36 “Obstacles to World Government” (1950); 6 in Papers 26, p. 52.
37 “Ferment in Asia” (5 in Papers 26, p. 31).
38 “Competition and Co-operation in Politics and Economics” (1951); 29 in Papers 26, p. 212.
Liberal–Country coalition. However resonant were Russell’s warnings to Australians about their proximity to mass poverty in Asia, responsibility for alleviating these wretched conditions was not readily accepted. If an ancillary objective of the initiative was to curry regional diplomatic favour, then these returns on the Colombo Plan for Australia were also limited. Any goodwill produced by placements for Asian students or the participation of young Australian technicians in development projects overseas was more than offset by Asian outrage over Australia’s restrictive immigration policy.

V. “THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVING AUSTRALIA AS A WHITE MAN’S COUNTRY”

“White Australia” was enshrined in the first legislative enactment of the new Commonwealth in 1901, although several pre-federation statutes, imposing head taxes on immigrant Chinese gold miners, had been similarly intended. As well as further restricting all non-white immigration to Australia, the policy served broader cultural and political purposes. It reinforced a narrow British-Australian national identity and served as “both a statement about Australia’s ideal racial destiny and … Australia’s place in the world; it stated that Australia wanted to quarantine itself from its immediate surroundings in the interest of a much desired internal homogeneity and white racial purity” (Ang, p. 58). The Australian labour movement was especially staunch in championing “White Australia” as a safeguard of wages and working conditions. Russell had been aware of Australian immigration practice (and of organized labour’s support for it) at least since the 1920s. He then tended to situate its racial exclusivism in the broader context of anti-Asian racism across “the English-speaking world” and
appraised the policy rather more critically than he would three decades later. In the earlier period he focused on the cosmopolitanism of international finance as well as the nativism of Australian and other white working classes:

Opposition to Asiatic immigration in America and the British Dominions comes most from the Trade Unions and Labour Parties; the capitalists would be only too glad to welcome cheap labour. As industry develops in Asia, there will be increasing competition between Asiatic and Euro-American manufactures. So long as Asiatic enterprises are largely financed by European capital, European capitalists will wish them to develop; they will be used as a stick to beat the Trade Unions with. But in proportion as labour has power in the West, in that proportion it will insist on the exclusion of Asiatic manufactured goods from all the markets which it controls.42

After the Second World War “White Australia” was rigidly upheld by Labor’s Minister of Immigration, Arthur Callwell, even as he directed “the largest planned immigration programme of any nation … with the exception of Israel”.43 Non-whites—including Japanese wives of Australian servicemen in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force—remained personae non gratae. In order to maintain an ambitious population-growth target of 1% per annum from immigration alone, however, Australia had to look beyond the British Isles—from where hitherto an overwhelming majority of its migrant intake originated. As a result, the country also offered “assisted passages” to thousands of war refugees and southern and southeastern Europeans who would have been unwelcome previously.44 For decades “White Australia” had been underpinned by pseudo-scientific theorizing about

42 “The Future Development of Asia” (1926). See also the following passage written by Russell two years previously for the Independent Labour Party weekly, The New Leader: “Throughout the English-speaking world, Labour has successfully opposed Asiatic immigration, for fear of its effect in lowering the standard of life. But Labour has not yet developed any method of preventing white capitalists from investing their capital in Asia, and so producing an even more severe competition. This policy of investment in Asia requires a Government in Asiatic countries able to establish internal order, but unable or unwilling to keep out the foreign capitalist” (“A Dawes Plan for China” [1924]).
44 Russell encouraged this influx of displaced persons as well as mass emigration to Australia (and other Commonwealth states) from an overcrowded, economically
the innate inferiority or superiority of some races to others. In the post-war era the language of anti-Asian bias shifted: “Personality rather than race, behaviour rather than blood, were now emphasized in discussions of national identity and immigration” that centred on the capacity of different racial or ethnic groups to assimilate into an Australian “way of life” (see Murphy, p. 154).

Russell had a long history of opposition to racial oppression, on which he continued to build for the rest of his life. Indeed, this political and humanitarian commitment deepened in his final decades. Hence his almost casual assumption that mid-century Australia “must be preserved by whites” is especially perplexing. The general tenor of his position at this time is well conveyed by a wartime lecture in which he had discussed at length the protections to be afforded by democratic polities to racial minorities. But Russell’s writings are occasionally at odds with his progressive record of advocacy and action. Especially before the Nazis’ rise to power he could be condescending or disparaging about non-whites whose subjugation or exploitation he might also be protesting. Practical support for national liberation movements coexisted with a historical conception of empire as an effective and useful instrument for diffusing civilization. He always retained elements of this view, which informed the liberal imperialism he had abandoned half a century earlier, but also his appraisal of early Cold War Australia. In 1950 Russell was appalled by the racist treatment and miserable plight of Aboriginal Australians,

weak and militarily exposed post-war Britain. See “Bertrand Russell Smokes, Laughs—and Talks” (1950; App. 1.14 in Papers 26, p. 586), and an “Australian” interview from two years before, “Dominions Migration is ‘Urgent’”, The Herald, Melbourne, 24 April 1948, p. 2.

45 “Philosopher Bertrand Russell Here Next Month” (1950); App. 1.1 in Papers 26, p. 559.

46 See “The Problem of Minorities” (BRA 2: 315–27), a lecture delivered in the fall of 1942 at the Rand School, New York, as part of the series “Problems of Democracy”.

47 This tendency is noted in the biographical literature (e.g. CLARK, The Life of Bertrand Russell (1975), p. 380, MONK 2: 104–5), and the most egregious illustrations of it—a few flippant anti-Semitic asides in early private correspondence, or the suggestion in Marriage and Morals that “[i]t seems on the whole fair to regard negroes as on the average inferior to white men” (p. 209)—have been more widely discussed. But specialist treatments of Russell on race are lacking—although see ROSS, “Bertrand Russell and the Colonialist Assumption” (1994).

48 E.g. in Roads to Freedom (1918); see ROSS, “Orwell, Russell and the Language of Imperialism” (1995), p. 64.
which he observed at first hand. He also exhibited some curiosity about their indigenous culture (see Papers 26: 555)—although without intimating that he held it in higher regard than twenty years previously, when he issued this blunt apologia for the effects of European settler colonialism: “North America, Australia and New Zealand certainly contribute more to the civilization of the world than they would do if they were still peopled by aborigines” (MM, p. 209).

Such blanket assertions of Western superiority are not uncharacteristic of Russell, although he was neither an uncritical nor a chauvinistic champion of the West. (After a year in China he concluded that its civilization was “superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness.”) In addressing Australian audiences on race, his world government lecture on the subject concluded with a more typical clarion call for tolerance and understanding, after highlighting the “hardships and injustices and cruelties” occasioned by white ascendency and explaining race hatred as the product, above all, of “fear of subjection to alien power”. Russell’s preferred solution to race problems was “complete equality, including free intermarriage”. He nevertheless regarded “avoiding geographical propinquity” to other races as an “entirely cogent” approach for Australia to employ—so long as this separation was reinforced by “superior military strength”. Australia had mustered this during the Second World War only with the backing of the United States and was likely, unless its modest population were significantly augmented, to remain “something of a military liability to America”. This demographic deficit was not to be offset by the desperately poor of Asian countries, “densely over-populated and urgently desirous of opportunities of emigration”. Although Russell insisted in “Ferment in Asia” that it was “both just and expedient that economic aid should be given to South East Asia” (Papers 26: 33), in utilitarian fashion he also opposed unimpeded movement out of the region:

49 See “My Impressions of Australia” (15 in Papers 26: 120) and Auto. 3: 27. As Russell lamented, Aboriginal Australians faced hostility, contempt and indifference from the majority culture. On account of dwindling Aboriginal numbers, however (3% of the population in 1900, down to 1% by 1950), they did not engender the racial fear with which the spectre of Asia’s innumerable poor assailed much of white Australia, driving the race-population debate into which Russell was drawn.

50 The Problem of China (1922), p. 167.
51 “Obstacles to World Government” (6 in Papers 26, pp. 52, 54, 55).
52 “Happy Australia” (16 in Papers 26, p. 126).
53 “Guest of Honour” (1 in Papers 26, p. 6).
Illustration. The first leaf of Russell’s manuscript for the lecture he delivered in Sydney on 3 July 1950. Footnote references to “Obstacles to World Government” in this article are to a typed version of all three lectures in the series (others were “I. Food and Population” and “III. Creeds and Ideologies”). Each Sydney lecture was condensed into a section of this three-in-one treatment (6 in Papers 26), which Russell presented six times during his tour.
I do not consider that countries of Western civilization should open their doors to Asiatic immigration. If this were done without a lowering of the Asian birth-rate the only effect would be to destroy the superior standards of life at present enjoyed in the West. The best would be pulled down to the level of the worst, not the worst raised up to the level of the best. But to prevent population pressure bursting its dams may at some point be only possible if the West has military preponderance. This consideration is especially relevant in Australia, which is a white man’s outpost close to the great centres of overflowing poverty. It is for this reason chiefly that we cannot hope to be safe from world wars until the East has achieved approximate equality with the West in its standard of life.

(Ibid., p. 37)

When this portentous assessment of mounting population pressure resurfaced shortly afterwards in *New Hopes for a Changing World*, Russell did not allow his unease to divert the book’s intentionally affirmative thrust. The demographic foreboding (customized for Cold War conditions) was balanced by hope that the Malthusian upward spiral could be reversed by Western largesse and sound birth-control policies. Russell’s race-inflected analysis drew no particular scrutiny from British or American reviewers (a measure of the wider culture perhaps). His earlier presentation of the same arguments to Australian audiences, however, made a noticeable and generally favourable impression on a country where racial discrimination in immigration was aggressively pursued and broadly accepted. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s account of Russell’s second lecture in that city—on racial conflict as an ultimately surmountable obstacle to world government (see Illustration)—was headlined “Bertrand Russell Puts Case for White Australia” (4 July 1950, p. 2). Brisbane’s *Courier-Mail* reported the same speech as “Support for Race Policy” (4 July 1950, p. 5). A Perth Daily News leader (“Our Need for Population”, 5 July 1950, p. 10), meanwhile, on boosting Australia’s numbers with “some variety in white blood”—so long as these non-British European migrants “become real Australians in thought and habit”—opened by suggesting that Russell had “proved the wisdom of the White Australia policy.” Many newspaper reports of his first appearance on ABC radio, or of

---

54 E.g., pp. 12–13, 38–9, 50–2.

55 As Russell recalled, he had “deliberately, wherever there were two possibilities, ... emphasized that it might be the happier one which would be realized” (*Auto.* 3: 31).
the “Asia” lecture given at nearly all stops on the tour, were similarly selective in their coverage, placing undue weight on Russell’s present acceptance of strict immigration controls. At least his Sydney lecture on race was reported elsewhere as “How the Races Could Live Side by Side” (Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 July 1950, p. 8) and “Russell Hits at Racial Hatreds” (Sun, Melbourne, 4 July 1950, p. 2).

Russell did not seem overly concerned with ensuring that his condemnation of racial prejudice obtained as wide a hearing as his disapproval of non-white immigration. Nor was he perplexed by what is certainly striking retrospectively—namely the disjunction between his declarations of contempt for “white man’s insolence” and unequivocal insistence on “preserving Australia as a white man’s country”. At no point on Russell’s tour did he question whether what he categorized as a “problem” needed to be resolved. In fact, a racially distinct Australia might become more than a mere “outpost” of the West, conserving and invigorating a “transplanted” European civilization that Russell saw endangered by internal decay and external conflict. He appeared unaware of the bitter resentment of “White Australia” in newly independent Asian states. A few Australian politicians and officials already considered the policy an embarrassing diplomatic millstone. But when Russell was touring the country it remained “part of the fabric of Australian political culture, supported across the political spectrum by most sections of the community” (Waters, p. 358).

VI. “ONLY A LARGE POPULATION CAN MAKE AUSTRALIA SAFE”

Australia’s rate of population growth was “pathetically, dangerously slow”, Russell contended, and its people should be reminded forcefully of the “urgent necessity” of increasing their numbers—“the most important safeguard of Australian security in the long run”. This was a “matter of self-preservation”, he told one reporter, employing

56 “Obstacles to World Government”; “Guest of Honour” (6 and 1 in Papers 26, pp. 52 and 5, respectively).
57 “Land with a Future for Ambitious Youth” (1950); 14 in Papers 26, p. 114. See also Grant, “Russell the Rainmaker”, p. 76.
58 “Happy Australia” (16 in Papers 26, p. 126).
59 “Philosopher Bertrand Russell Here Next Month” (1950, App. 1.1 in Papers 26, p. 559); “We and the u.s. Can Lead and Help Asian People” (1950, 8 in Papers 26, p. 67); “Future Work Depends on Stalin, Says Lord Russell” (1950, App. 1.12 in Papers 26, p. 581).
“populate or perish” alarmism previously stoked by Japanese invasion scares and by which the acceleration of non-English speaking (but still white) immigration was marketed to a wary Australian public in the early post-war years (see Langfield, p. 32). Russell’s analysis of the broader population question (in “Obstacles to World Government”) is striking because it seemingly validated the “White Australia” policy. In tying Australia’s geopolitical vulnerability to its comparatively small population (approximately eight million in 1950), Russell was not making any dramatic revelations to Australian audiences. The demographic dilemma of increasing population without sacrificing racial homogeneity had been central to nation-building since before federation even. Australians could easily be persuaded that the vast and essentially “empty” space they inhabited was coveted by less prosperous, more numerous and racially distinct northern neighbours.60 One ambitious if not quixotic salve for this national disquiet was a more concerted approach to rural development, which Russell certainly embraced (see also pp. 123–4 below), urging government expenditure on a massive scale to “get people into the empty lands.”61

Russell usually dwelt on the issue of Australian under-population (including its racial dimension) in counterpoint to unchecked population growth in Asian countries mired in poverty. But he was concerned less with the strategic weakness of a demographically static Australia than with a more elemental Cold War danger—albeit one of great relevance to Australians—namely, the Soviet Union’s possible emergence as the dominant regional power. To pre-empt what Russell would have regarded as a political disaster, he urged the West (as noted already) to help Asia and “prove itself more truly than Russia the friend of all that Eastern nations desire for themselves.”62 His dissection of communist imperialism “disguised as championship of the oppressed” also examined birth control because, without it, “the plunge towards misery and the attendant revolutionary fury”63 was likely to

61 “A Philosopher’s Theme” (App. 1.2 in Papers 26, p. 562). Russell was echoing a standard trope of Australian discourse, embedded also in the dubious legal doctrine of *terra nullius* under which Aboriginal claims of title to these “empty” (more literally, “nobody’s”) lands were not fully recognized until the 1990s.
62 “Ferment in Asia” (5 in Papers 26, p. 38).
63 “Guest of Honour”; Obstacles to World Government” (1 and 6 in Papers 26, pp. 6 and 52, respectively).
accelerate in countries already susceptible to Soviet propaganda. Since Russell’s concern about the world’s rapidly rising population was centred on dulling the ideological appeal of communism among the non-white poor, he was exasperated by Western moralists who objected to the teaching and practice of birth control on religious grounds. Months after returning from Australia, Russell sent Gilbert Murray a copy of his world government lecture on population, remarking subsequently (18 May 1951) that his friend was “unduly pessimistic about birth control in Asia and Africa. Most people in those continents would practise birth control if they knew how, but medical missions are supported by Catholics and Baptists, and refuse to give the information” (RA Rec. Acq. 17).

On this slightly later occasion Russell singled out “the people of Connecticut or Massachusetts” for their obscurantism (ibid.). But it was entirely foreseeable that his public advocacy of birth control in Australia should have aroused clerical ire there. One of his antagonists was the well-known Catholic broadcaster, the Rev. Dr. Leslie Rumble. Responding to the Sydney speech on population, this Australian priest and theologian disputed Russell’s Malthusian tendencies and lambasted his “atheistic materialism”. Russell remained silent until vigorously denouncing the Catholic Church at a dinner hosted by the Rationalist Society of Australia in Melbourne on 26 July. Rumble neglected to mention in his letter to the Sydney Morning Herald (28 June 1950, p. 2) that Russell wanted Australia to increase, not limit, its population. This oversight was brought to the attention of the newspaper’s readers in a follow-up letter to the editor from L. F. Giblin (30 June 1950, p. 2), the Tasmanian economist and retired civil servant who had acted as liaison between the AIA and Russell during the planning stages of the latter’s tour. Giblin even cheekily suggested that Rumble, “by his insistence on the urgency of populating Australia against invasion, shows that he is essentially in agreement with Bertrand Russell’s position, however much he may dislike the manner of its expression.”

64 “The Roman Catholic Church has always done everything in its power to oppose science. I consider it is, in Western countries, the most pernicious thing we have. I think there is a great similarity between Catholicism and Communism. In the Age of Faith, Catholicism occupied very much the same position as Communism now occupies in Russia” (“And He Ran True to Form” [1950]; App. 1.16 in Papers 26, p. 588).
For Russell, then, the small size of Australia’s population, the country’s national security, and its restrictive immigration policy were all related. In emphasizing these associations, he spoke to abiding fears of a nation whose collective memory of the Pacific War was still raw and where Chinese communism was supplanting Japanese imperialism as the principal focus of deeply rooted and highly race-conscious official and popular anxieties. Yet Russell also addressed the issue of under-population in a less foreboding vein, more attuned to Cold War Australia’s hopes than its newly conjoined ideological and racial fears:

“If Australians are to hold their own as a white man’s outpost on the borders of Asia”—an objective of which the Russell of 1950 unquestionably approved—“they can hardly hope to be successful while their population is no larger than that of London.”

But Russell was confident that Australia could support a much bigger (white) population and was significantly more bullish in his projections of future growth than the Commonwealth government. The “energetic encouragement of immigration on a large scale” (but only from Europe) was a necessary first step towards this goal. But “a parallel development of technical progress” was also required, he added, touching on the question of rural growth that he ranked “the most important problem with which Australia has to deal”.

Throughout his nine-week stay Russell drew attention to the forbidding ecology and climate of the country’s arid interior and tropical north. But he was convinced that these regions could sustain agriculture and settlement on a large scale. Commonwealth governments had long encouraged movement out of the big cities in the temperate south-east. They were guided by “[b]eliefs about the superiority of rural living and concerns that ‘empty spaces’ posed a threat to national security.”

City-dwelling, by contrast, was frowned upon as enervating and polluting (to the white Australian male especially) and

65 “My Impressions of Australia” (15 in Papers 26, p. 120).
66 In “Science Can Help Australia Support More People” (1950), Russell suggested that “the population of Australia might rise to 50,000,000 at the end of thirty years, and perhaps to 100,000,000 by the end of the present century” (9 in Papers 26, p. 70)—forecasts far exceeding the roughly accurate official target of 20 million people by the year 2000, by which time Australia’s population had climbed to 19.6 million (see Grant, “Russell the Rainmaker”, p. 80).
67 “My Impressions of Australia”; “Happy Australia” (15 and 16 in Papers 26, pp. 120 and 126, respectively).
therefore sapping the nation’s capacity to combat foreign (i.e. Asian) threats (see Walker, p. 35). Yet neither land grants to returning soldiers nor other measures had reversed Australia’s almost uniquely “top-heavy” urban density, which had concentrated (as Russell noted) “[n]early half the population … in Sydney or Melbourne”.69

Unchastened by past policy failures, Russell moulded his upbeat assessments of the country’s rural development prospects into a full-fledged vision of a “safe, prosperous and fertile Australia”.70 Along with his demographic warnings to Australia, his Utopian imagining of its bountiful social and economic future is vaguely discernible in New Hopes for a Changing World. The influence of Russell’s Australian impressions on this book is oblique because it contains only a handful of references to the country he had recently toured. But it can be detected in the work’s general expressions of confidence in the capacity of “modern technique to bring a far higher level of happiness than was formerly possible” (NHCW, p. 165)—so long as attitudes were adapted to technical changes and harmful, obsolete ideas banished.

VII. “AT THE APOGEE OF MY RESPECTABILITY”

At a farewell luncheon for Russell in Sydney on 23 August, the AIIA’s general secretary, George Caiger, paid handsome tribute to the guest of honour’s recent contributions to Australian public life: “You have roused us, generating light as well as a little heat…. Your comments have been an astringent change from the guarded statements and the half-truths which so often in recent years have debased the currency of ideas.” Russell had consistently “hewed to the line … of Truth”, Caiger continued, and as a result “the chips of criticism fell sometimes on the Right and sometimes on the Left” (typescript, RA Rec. Acq. 291e). Certainly, Russell had come under fire from both sides of the Australian political spectrum—from the Right, for example, for an alleged overindulgence of Communist China. The Canberra Times (“Recognition of Red China”, 20 July 1950, p. 4) could applaud Russell’s call for Western states to back non-communist movements in South-East Asia, but it disdained both his confidence in Beijing’s

69 “Land with a Future for Ambitious Youth” (14 in Papers 26, p. 114).

70 Grant, “Russell the Rainmaker”, p. 73.
ability to remain outside Moscow’s orbit and his enthusiasm for extending diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic. The newspaper’s editorial echoed the governing Liberal–Country coalition’s rejection of this approach, which commanded widespread popular backing even before the onset of Chinese military intervention in the Korean War in November 1950.

From the far Left Russell was condemned for accepting that another world war was inevitable or perhaps even desirable. Shortly after his lecture tour was announced, the latter, more extreme, position was imputed to him by the editor of the Communist Party of Australia’s official newspaper. On 1 August the embattled CPA even staged a protest outside Russell’s second “Atomic Age” lecture at the University of Melbourne, distributing flyers decrying the speaker as a “Man of War”. This makeshift polemic referred not to anything said by Russell in his first lecture a week previously, but rather to a recently published conversation with George H. Johnston in the Sydney Sun (see n. 21 above), in which he foresaw the Soviet Union provoking a third world war. By contrast with such unwarranted fatalism, the CPA’s message was that peaceful coexistence was perfectly feasible. Their flyer called for the principle of self-determination to be respected throughout Asia—unlike Russell, who urged the Western powers (in a part of the interview quoted back at him) to “detach as much as we possibly can of Asia from the Russian orbit” (Papers 26: 571).

If communist caricatures of Russell the warmonger seem implausible, it is worth noting that the lecturer who visited Australia at the mid-century mark was moving only slowly from the orthodox and sometimes pugnacious defence of the West he mounted in the early post-war years, towards the dissenting advocacy of nuclear disarmament and détente upon which he embarked in earnest from the mid-

71 On Russell’s prediction of future Chinese “Titoism”, see “Ferment in Asia” (5 in Papers 26, p. 32).
72 L. Harry Gould, “Bertrand Russell, Philosopher of the Atom Bomb”, Tribune, Sydney, 18 Feb. 1950, p. 8. This savage attack on Russell’s politics and philosophy directed a battery of Stalinist insults at its target—“a hireling of the warmongers”—as well as misquoting from his lecture on nuclear strategy at Westminster School in November 1948. In that address Russell had certainly called for greater war-readiness on the part of the West, but not an immediate, or pre-emptive, strike on the Soviet Union. The distortion of Russell’s views gave him cause for complaint both at the time and subsequently (see Russell, YF, pp. 191–2).
73 Copy in RA Rec. Acq. 291d. See also Griffin, p. 11.
1950s. In fact, Russell was, as he recalled, at “the apogee of my respectability” (*Auto*. 3: 26)—and not only because of the prestigious formal honours bestowed on him in 1949 (Order of Merit) and 1950 (Nobel Prize for Literature). As a still staunch upholder of the West in its Cold War struggle with communism, Russell’s political views were perhaps “safer” than ever before. The arc of his transformation into the role of anti-nuclear prophet and sage, by which he is much better remembered by posterity, was neither steep nor smooth. Some of his writings from the period immediately prior (including his Australian lectures, broadcasts and newspaper articles) echo harsh past criticism of Soviet expansionism and dictatorship, although others register growing qualms about the conduct of American foreign policy and the baneful effects of anti-communist hysteria inside the United States.

Whether continuing to push for Western rearmament, however, or highlighting in more placatory vein the folly of the Cold War’s divisions and rival fanaticisms, Russell insisted that his paramount goal was avoiding the major war that threatened global catastrophe. In April 1951, for example, Russell drew on his Australian lectures to issue a detailed refutation of Kingsley Martin’s public insinuation that he had once advocated war against the Soviet Union.  

He had already felt compelled to counter when similar charges were brought by the Cambridge University Labour Club in light of hawkish comments made by Russell to the press in New York only a few weeks after leaving Australia. These were neither the first nor last occasions when Russell stood thus accused, and he could never put his “preventive war” controversy to rest (see, e.g., *Papers* 26: 367–71).

In his first Melbourne lecture Russell grimly evoked the devastating effects of a thermonuclear war. He sided firmly with the pessimistic scientists who had participated in a recent University of Chicago Round Table discussion of the subject (Hans Bethe, Harrison Brown, Frederick Seitz and Leo Szilard), rather than with Vannevar Bush, an American scientific administrator and author of a more comforting treatise on modern military strategy. But the overall impression left

---

74 “Lord Russell and the Atom Bomb” (1951); 53 in *Papers* 26. Russell’s letter to *The New Statesman and Nation* was accompanied by a formal retraction from Martin, the left-wing weekly’s editor.
76 See “The Facts about the Hydrogen Bomb”, *The University of Chicago Round Table*,
by Russell was less ominous than it would be after March 1954, when the H-bomb era dramatically opened with the experimental explosion of a fifteen-megaton American thermonuclear device over Bikini atoll (see Papers 28: xvi–xvii). From that moment the threat of civilization’s complete destruction became the overriding factor in Russell’s assessment of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. When he toured Australia four years previously, however, he gave some credence to strategists who considered that nuclear weapons would not be decisive if world war broke out in the very near future (see Papers 26: lxi–lxiv), and that the final outcome of such a conflict would likely be settled only after “long years of bitter land warfare”. In Melbourne he was also prepared to state that, however appalling the prospect of war, “it would be even more dreadful and more disastrous if the Soviet system, with all its cruelty and all its obscurantism, were to extend over the whole world.”77 Although Russell was careful to balance such defiance with emphasis on the importance of war prevention, his anti-Soviet rhetoric was much more pronounced than it would be even a few years hence. And this rational yet robust “defencism”78 was highly palatable to an Australia long fixated on threats to its north and therefore understandably alarmed by the outbreak of war in Korea.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In Australia Russell experienced the odd political rebuke and (more predictably) infuriated the Catholic Church.79 His Pollyannaish blueprints of Australian rural development were sometimes disdained, too

77 "1. Institutions" (tra in Papers 26, pp. 87–9, 90, 91).
78 The term is used by Martin Ceadel, who positions this dominant mode of thinking about war and peace in the middle of a political spectrum with absolute pacifism at one end and crusading militarism at the other (“Pacifism and Pacificism” [2003], p. 473). Defencists reject aggression but assert the legitimacy of self-defence, as well as valuing military preparedness as the surest prophylactic against war. But defencism is also grounded in a deeply pessimistic assumption—not shared by Russell—that warfare cannot truly be eradicated. Russell never lost sight of the achievable institutional reforms and psychological adjustments through which he thought that permanent peace could be secured. In this respect, he was closer (even in 1950) to the “pacificist” orientation dissected by Ceadel in the same essay, which looks ahead to the elimination of war but without eschewing all recourse to force in the short term.
79 See p. 122 above and, for Russell’s dispute with the Catholic Archbishop of
(see Papers 26: xl–xli), although the cheerleaders of these bold plans outnumbered the naysayers. Likewise, when Russell addressed issues of national security, population and race, he garnered more applause than censure. More striking than Russell’s occasional antagonism of different Australian constituencies in 1950 is the extent to which he reinforced rather than challenged the assumptions of his audiences. While condemning racial hatred unreservedly as “an illiberal and irrational heritage from our animal past”, 80 Russell managed to do so without calling out the discriminatory basis of Australian immigration. Although “White Australia” still commanded majority popular and political support, there were some detractors—inside peace, church and student groups, for example, as well as a diplomatic corps frustrated by damaging perceptions of the policy in the emerging states of the Asia–Pacific region. 81 Russell’s views were definitely not in harmony with those of these dissenting minorities. Indeed, underlying his internationalism and cosmopolitanism was “a strong awareness, and anxiety, of cultural and racial difference”. 82 An ardent anti-colonialism may have undergirded Russell’s call for the rapid removal of all vestiges of European influence over Asia (see p. 110 above). But his analysis of the continent in Cold War terms was far from inimical to an Australian mindset of “threat” ingrained by the country’s “development as a European settler society on the southeastern fringe of Asia” (Fitzpatrick, p. 118). Similarly, while gratified that the age of imperialism in Asia was drawing to a close, Russell did not push Australia towards any geopolitical repositioning within a region undergoing dramatic transformation and likely, he wrote, to become “much more important and much more dominant than it has been during the last 400 years”. Australia was an “isolated outpost of Western civilization” and need not imagine itself otherwise. 83

Melbourne, 12 in Papers 26. This short-lived spat ended when Dr. Daniel Mannix hastily retracted his public statement that Russell had once been denied entry to the United States—a false claim reported in the Adelaide News (“Reply to Dr. Mannix”, 9 Aug. 1950, p. 2) and made as the archbishop lamented that such a “dubious” visitor had been “treated differently in Australia”.

80 “Obstacles to World Government” (6 in Papers 26, p. 56).
82 Grant, “‘Sane Ideas Which May Yet Save the World ...’”, p. 127.
83 Ibid., p. 28, and “‘South-East Asia Must Be Wooed as Neutral!’” (1950); App. 1.18 in Papers 26, p. 589.
If Russell had travelled to Australia only a few years later, both his optimism and the nation’s plaudits would probably have been more muted. Although certainly affected by atomic angst when he did visit, by the mid-1950s his sombre messages of foreboding about the existential threat to humanity carried far greater urgency. After he dedicated himself to anti-nuclear protest, Russell consumed his early Cold War respectability. It is difficult to imagine him, even at this slightly later time, undertaking another such quasi-official trip to Australia or “Governors, Chancellors, High Commissioners and such” consorting so freely with him. Especially improbable is the thought of him dining with the foreign minister of a Commonwealth government complicit in the testing of British nuclear weapons on Australian soil. In 1950 no contact seems to have been established between Russell and the struggling, non-communist Australian peace movement, even though his advocacy of world government provided some common ground. Galvanized by “Man’s Peril” among other keynote anti-nuclear texts, as well as their country’s proximity to British (and American) nuclear test sites, Australian resistance to the bomb started to gather momentum around the same time as Russell’s. If he had returned to Australia in the mid-1950s or later, it is likely that religious, political and scientific organizations committed to peace would have reached out to him and that Russell would have reciprocated.

85 See Wittner, One World or None (1993), p. 104.

Author’s note: The author is grateful to the journal’s referees, for comments by Richard Rempel and members of the Bertrand Russell Society on an early draft presented at its annual meeting in June 2020, and for the research assistance of Lukas Spencer in the National Library of Australia’s digital newspaper collection (“Trove”).

WORKS CITED

ANG, IEN. “From White Australia to Fortress Australia: the Anxious Nation in the New Century”. In JAYASURIYA et al., eds.
BRIDGE, CARL. “Australia, Britain and the British Commonwealth”. In BASHFORD AND MACINTYRE, eds.


GRiffin, NICHOLAS. “Russell in Australia”. Russell, o.s. no. 16 (winter 1974): 3–12.

GURRY, MEG. “Australia’s Relations with India”. In McGILLIVRAY and SMITH, eds.


LANGFIELD, MICHELE. “Bridging the Cultural Divide: Movements of People between Australia and Asia”. In McGILLIVRAY and SMITH, eds.


RUSSELL, BERTRAND. PC.


—. “The Future Development of Asia”. The Hindu Annual, Madras, 1926, no p. nos. [third item in vol.].

—. MM.

—. “Twilight of British Empire”. Forward, Glasgow, 2 Dec. 1944, p. 4.


AUSTRALIAN WRITINGS, 1950–51


—. “Ferment in Asia”. Typescript (RA1 220.018910); 5 in Papers 26.

AUSTRALIAN INTERVIEWS, 1950

— “And He Ran True to Form”. The Argus, Melbourne, 27 July 1950, p. 5; App. 1.16 in Papers 26.
— “South-East Asia Must Be wooed as Neutrals’”. The Sun, Melbourne, 2 Aug. 1950, p. 9; App. 1.18 in Papers 26.

— NHG
— Auto. 3.
— SLBR 2. YF.
— Papers 9, 26, 28.


— “An Isolated Outpost of Western Civilization” 131